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This thesis opens up theoretical pathways for decolonial epistemologies for energy 
planning in Brazil. The critical analysis is verticalized from the 2015–2024 Brazilian 
Decennial Energy Expansion Plan (DEEP) to better highlight the epistemological 
problems in energy planning. Epistemological challenges demand a critical 
understanding of the ethical system we live in – the ethics of exhaustion – to enable a 
comprehensive radical transformation of the consideration of energy futures, since 
epistemology is part of the formalization of ethics. This thesis argues that energy planning 
in Brazil is based on the ethics of exhaustion to epistemically impose the colonial agenda 
of power. Energy futures are planned as necessary harm to achieve the fetishized good, 
normalized as the ethical intersubjective and human–environment relationships. 
Critically analysing the ethical system enables understanding the epistemologies for 
energy planning in Brazil as the formal moment of the ethics of exhaustion, which can 
only be challenged in an intersectional manner by framing the multilateral and collateral 
aspects of the violence consistent in planning energy futures regardless and to the 
detriment of the existence of life. Epistemic diversity is the first step towards decolonizing 
energy planning. It comprises: the inclusion of indigenous and communal perspectives 
when elaborating the energy plans; having persons directly affected by energy enterprises 
as the majority of the personnel involved in the activity of planning; setting the priority 
of energy planning as the production and reproduction of all lives in a non-hierarchized 
manner; recognizing the necessary balance in the human–environment relationship; 
privileging local needs in relation to transnational markets; and intentionally de-
hierarchizing the benefits of energy exploitation by delinking energy studies, production, 
and distribution from financial capital. This work challenges colonial epistemologies, 
based on the ethics of exhaustion, from the standpoint of the colonial difference, 
proposing epistemic diversity as the impulse for decolonial energy planning in Brazil. It 
is an urgent academic task to perceive epistemic decolonization to transform the present 
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 Energy related subjects have always been part of my life. It is important to begin 
this work by explaining what brings me in the year 2019 to the writing of my thesis about 
decolonial epistemologies for energy planning in Brazil.  
Beyond a bureaucratic apparatus in a government office, energy planning is also 
about lives, families, women, territories, communities, work, educating children, and 
living life with dignity. To establish these links, I need to briefly explain how my story is 
related to energy planning. In this preface, I describe how energy enterprises were part of 
my childhood, how I became a construction lawyer in Brazil, and why I decided to do 
LLM in Dispute Resolution in the United Kingdom, and move on to a PhD in Decolonial 
Epistemologies. I also explain why when I began my PhD, I wanted to work on 
hydropower dams concession contracts, but changed the scope to epistemology and ethics 
of energy planning at the end of the second year of the PhD programme.  
Understanding the reasoning for this trajectory demands a brief introduction of 
how my family, specially my mother, had to overcome challenges of a capitalist 
patriarchal world, which required her to work in socio-environmentally harmful 
enterprises for a living. Millions of families in the Global South go through similar 
experiences. This story exposes the human element in what seems an exclusively 
technical phenomenon and denies the pretence that the activity of energy planning is 
detached from livelihoods. By linking energy planning and life, I show how ethics is the 
primordial issue to be discussed when dealing with the current predatorial activity of 
energy planning in Brazil.  
 
A Barrageira’s Daughter  
I was born in the city of Tucuruí, in 1985.  
My mother moved to Tucuruí in 1980 to work in the construction of, at that time, 
the third largest hydropower dam in the world, the Tucuruí Dam. The dam is located in 
the state of Pará, in the northern region of Brazil in the north-eastern corner of the 
Amazonian region beside the river Tocantins. The Tucuruí dam was one of the 
megalomaniacal infrastructure projects of the dictatorial Brazilian military government 
begun for the so-called ‘development’ of the Amazonian region. 
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My mother is a technician in civil construction instrumentation and works on the 
trecho as a barrageira. The trecho is a popular expression in Brazil that refers to the 
‘nomad-like’ lifestyle of working on the road in jobs in heavy-industrial enterprises. The 
trecheiros (people who live and work on the trecho) who work on hydropower dam 
enterprises are called barrageiros: ‘barragem’ means ‘dam’ in Portuguese. Mother has 
been a barrageira for 47 years and still works on the trecho to this day at the age of 67. 
My sisters and I have always been familiar with dams; we grew up listening to how 
electricity is generated from water, why the course of a river is changed, the technicalities 
of concrete structures, the descriptions of different types of soil, and what transmission 
lines are; we saw engineering drawings and learnt about equipment for the protection of 
an individual’s health and safety, and other such things typically related to the building 
of dams. 
Due to the nature of my mother’s work, she had to work far from home. Her home 
has always been in her hometown, Belo Horizonte, the capital of the state of Minas 
Gerais, where my sisters and I grew up. Mother wanted us to have a solid education – 
what she thought would not be possible with a barrageira’s nomadic life, moving home 
every 2 to 3 years to another small village somewhere in the middle of nowhere. We lived 
on the outskirts of Belo Horizonte, near our relatives, and studied at public (state) schools. 
During school vacations, we would get into a bus and travel thousands of kilometers 
across the vastness of Brazil to visit her.  
On those visits, she used to take us to the site to visit the reservoir area, the power 
force house, the spillways, the tunnels used to change the course of the river, the turbines, 
the provisional head offices, and the refectory. I remember being impressed with the 
industrial food served to the workers in trays, not in plates. I noticed that my mother was 
the only woman wearing uniform, boots, and helmet, and shouting on the radio things 
that I could not understand. I was impressed by the sheer size of everything around me: 
the river, the pieces of concrete, the tunnels, and the height of the dam. I remember that I 
complained once about the toilet on the site. Mother said that I should be really happy 
with the toilet because ‘back in the days’ there was no toilet at all on site. She described 




Figure 1 - Mother at Furnas Hydropower Dam. Performing “water loss test with drilling rig”. Credit: 
Personal archive. July 2019. 
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hand, would have to ‘hold it’ for long hours. For her, I should celebrate how the facilities 
had improved from the early 1970s to the mid-2000s. 
I never wanted to be a barrageira. In my mind, it was a Mad Max chaotic scenario. 
Being a barrageira for my mother was a matter of great pride, breaking through all the 
barriers of distance, loneliness, sexism, unemployment, and education (since she had not 
gone to university). My mother made her name in one of the most difficult jobs, places, 
and times for a woman.  
 
A Construction Lawyer  
I was 18 when I went to law school at the Federal University of Ouro Preto. I 
chose law to be as far as possible from being a barrageira. I was then interested in the 
history of law and in criminal law; I was trying to understand the state’s power of 
punishment and the functioning of the institutions that control the lives of peripheral 
peoples. I was deeply concerned with understanding the police and the prison system; I 
wrote the final course dissertation on ‘Institutional Historical Origins of the Military 
Police in Minas Gerais’. Ironically though, after I qualified as a [criminal] lawyer, I was 
working in a small civil law firm, doing some clerical work for a paltry remuneration that 
made me feel worthless. After a few months, I heard of a job opportunity through one of 
my mother’s friends. It was to work at a newly started hydropower enterprise. I went to 
the interview on the site, a two-hour drive from the nearest urban centre, five hours’ drive 
from my house. The salary was good, and it was an opportunity to live a middle-class 
life. I passed the interview and started working for a firm involved in the construction of 
the Batalha Hydropower dam in June 2009. 
 ‘Batalha’ means battle in Portuguese. Suddenly, it was my turn to have meals in 
trays in the refectory and to be one of the few women working on the site. My initial job 
was to deal with ‘everything legal’ that was the project manager’s responsibility. I was 
working for a consultancy firm in a contractual scheme called ‘the owner’s engineering,’ 
in which the consultancy firm dealt with all the client issues on site. On my part, this 
involved dealing with procurement, compliance, local issues such as dialogue with the 
community affected by the dam, and handling the contractor. 
This last bit, handling the contractor, became a horror school of reality. The 
contract sum was about a hundred million dollars between the client, Furnas – a public 
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company, part of the holding Eletrobras – and the contractor, an old school established 
construction company called Camargo Correa, part of a national leading group in the 
infrastructure sector. Initially, some of my duties involved analysis of the contractor’s 
claims to guarantee that the client’s price and budget were complying with the directives 
of the Federal Accounts Tribunal. I was successful in this kind of task, so the financial 
balance of the contract – claims and counterclaims – became the central part of my work. 
This way I eventually became a construction lawyer, working in-house with the 
evaluation of the contractual situation. It was an unfair battle – I was a lawyer just out of 
law school and the contractors were old wolves. The series of happenings on the site gave 
me cause for concern about my professional future. In two years, I no longer wanted to 
be involved in any public contract. The sums of money involved in the contract, the 
politics, and the concern that I may be working with manufactured information made me 
quit.  
I believed at that time that if I were working for a private company, I wouldn’t 
face the ethical dilemmas that were haunting me. ‘How could a bunch of rich white men 
decide on the future of energy systems in Brazil? How is it possible that those half-dozen 
lobbyists could decide on the employment and future of entire families? How is it that 
small landowners have their lands taken for pennies, while rich landowners negotiate 
lifetime paid easements?’ Naturally, my initial problem was the public company. But this 
perception was superficial. 
Hence, I went to work on a private–private contract, this time for the contractor. 
The client was Gerdau, a leading national company in the iron ore mining and metallurgy 
businesses. The site had a dusty terracotta colour, a depressing scenario, and was located 
in Ouro Branco, at the iron ore mines region in Minas Gerais. Again, there were very few 
women on the site, a rare one in a leadership position (working for the client). I became 
friends with my co-workers, and the few women there gave me courage to go there every 
day. As I knew, the trecho is a lifestyle. I had decided to live it. I would have after-work 
leisure time with the same colleagues I had worked with throughout the day. They had 
similar stories as my mother’s: they came from another city, another region, another 
massive construction site, they had worked on huge projects, and their families had to 
adapt to that lifestyle. Of course, living on the trecho is better than being unemployed. 
Some of them loved the nomadic nature of the work, but the vast majority preferred to 
live in one place if only they could get a well-paid stable job.  
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 So something was not right in the private company as well. The corporate 
environment was sexist, the type of the business was predatorial, and the private 
businessman was greedy and aggressive. I left the company in July 2013 and decided to 
apply for a scholarship to study LLM in International and Commercial Dispute 
Resolution Law in the UK. It seemed related to whatever I was working with for the last 
four years and far from that Mad Max chaos.  
 
Something Wrong with Contractual Disputes 
In January 2014, I moved to London. I applied for scholarship to the University 
of Westminster for two reasons: my English was reasonable, and I needed an institution 
that would cover all the costs of the masters’ programme. I was awarded the University 
of Westminster Full International Scholarship, which covered the flights, the fee, and the 
accommodation. I was very grateful to the institution that was enabling me to have an 
international education.  
 The classes at Law School were challenging. First, I could not understand what 
was being taught. It was not only the language and cultural barriers but it was the scope 
of the course that made me question why the law would take the liberal agenda for 
granted. In the cradle of liberalism, contractual relationships were sanctified, private 
property was the absolute human right, and the rights of the foreign investor guaranteed 
against expropriation via the ‘principle of most favourable laws for the protection of 
aliens’. I knew who the aliens were under such protection: they were not the Syrian 
immigrants forced to leave their homelands that were being bombed with UK’s chemical 
weapons. The protected aliens were, instead, foreign entrepreneurs.  
 With my colonial memory and discomfort with the idea that the only thing legally 
protected in the world is wealth, I started falling into a depression in the second half of 
the master’s programme. In my mind, foreign entrepreneurs were colonizers. Foreign 
direct investment was a trendy name given to the old well-known colonial apparatus. The 
investor–state disputes that would eventually arise were the nouveau post-independence 
version of the settler–metropolis dispute over the monopoly of trade in the colonies. I 
realised that I should not advocate for the investor. In the former colonial nations, it would 
be complicated to advocate for the state as well, since the formal bureaucratic apparatus, 
to which was given the idea of ‘public’, was nothing but the formalization of a central 
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power imposed through the language of the law. I did not know back then that this was 
an epistemological problem; I realized this a few years later, in the second year of my 
PhD programme. 
Investors search for profit. The state, on the other hand, although forged by the 
imposed colonial rule, bureaucracy, language, and rule of law, had at least the legal 
function of protecting something beyond one person’s profit. Despite all the problems of 
the imposed modern nation-states in the colonies, it was better to protect the larger 
number of people. I started realising that the problem was not about the public company 
per se, but the relationship between the public and the capital. With a contractual mindset, 
my understanding of the nature of the problem in infrastructure enterprises was still 
superficial. 
 For my masters’ dissertation I chose to research the investor–state dispute Águas 
Del Tunari v Bolivia (2000). This dispute arose from the alleged breach by the 
government of Bolivia of the contract it had with the infrastructure company Águas del 
Tunari, a subsidiary of the North-American giant Bechtel Corporation. The contract was 
a long-term agreement for the installation and operation of water and sewage systems in 
the city of Cochabamba; the project was funded by the World Bank in a scheme called 
Structure Adjustment Programs (SAPs). The Bolivian government interrupted the 
contract after a couple years of massive uprisings against the water company in 
Cochabamba. The population was protesting against the fact that water prices had 
increased by more than 50% and, that by a contractual clause, the population could not 
store rainwater or drill artesian wells. As water became unaffordable, the people in 
Cochabamba started storing water ‘illegally’, which came to be severely repressed by the 
police. When public authorities started openly protecting the company to the detriment 
of the population, the situation became worse. The protests became bigger and more 
violent, leading to the murder of a young man by the police in April 2000. This series of 
events came to be known as the Bolivian Water Wars.  
 This case was very interesting for me because it involved exactly what had been 
disturbing me while working as a construction lawyer: the fact that the contract was more 
powerful, under the eyes of the law, than the survival/vital needs of an entire population. 
I had an ethical question with the dispute, which became a jurisdictional battle between 
the Bolivian government and Bechtel Corporation on an ICSID arbitration. The fact that 
the dispute was settled by arbitration was disturbing. How could a private settlement of a 
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dispute restore justice to the people of Cochabamba? How could some compensation for 
breach of contract be fair, if the problem was caused by limiting poor people’s access to 
water? The rule of law does not protect the masses, but the owners of power; I knew that 
from my research on the historical origins of public institutions in Brazil, back in 2007. 
What was I doing in a Dispute Resolution course in London? None of what I was doing 
in my course was helping me to get into a discussion of the reality and the painful 
distortion of values that infrastructure was about making large amounts of money at the 
expense of the poor but justified in the Global South ostensibly by the promise of 
development of the poor. 
I was disillusioned. In a conversation with my sister Áurea, she advised me to 
search for peers in the institution, to find someone who would understand the academic 
disappointment with private law and give me some ideas about the real meaning of those 
infrastructure contracts. Searching within the institution, I found Radha D’Souza. 
Radha’s work involved disputes over water and the violence of dam building and 
development as a general subject. I emailed her asking for some support. Meeting her 
gave me hope: a coloured woman, from the Third World, focusing on subjects that, for 
me, were what really mattered. I enrolled for her module on International Law and 
Development; in the module, I learnt, among other things, to critically observe ‘human’ 
rights, the structure of the United Nations, the relevance of understanding NATO, the 
FAO agreements, and, most importantly, I found passion. Radha agreed to co-supervise 
my dissertation. Sometime later, she also agreed to be the director of studies of my PhD. 
 
Work to Fund the PhD 
I finished the LLM and went back to Brazil in January 2015, as my contractual 
obligation with the Scholarships Office demanded. I had decided to apply for the PhD 
and go back to London to keep working with Radha. I wanted to research the 
contradictions in the Belo Monte concession contract, a massive hydropower complex in 
the Xingu river basin, also in the state of Pará, Brazil. I filled in the application and was 
accepted by the university. This time, however, I did not get funding for the PhD. I was 
devastated. This fact turned out to be crucial for the development of my PhD research. I 
did not know at that time, but it turned out to be a good decision to critique Eurocentric 
academia and research methodologies and to link the heartfelt ethical concerns I had with 
dam building in Brazil with the ethics of energy planning. 
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 It was the end of October when my mother said that she would sponsor my PhD. 
She did not have the money, but she would get a loan and figure it out. I hesitated; she 
could not afford it. In addition to the fee, I knew that the cost of living in London was 
very high and, on top of that, I would not be able to afford fieldwork and other expenses 
related to the research. My mother said that I had six months to get myself a job to pay 
for my living costs and that I should find a way to sponsor the fee because she could only 
pay for the first year. It was a very risky bet, but she never doubted that I could make it. 
She worked on weekends and holidays for years to enable me to start the doctoral studies. 
 I arrived back in London in January 2016, feeling the pressure. All I knew was 
that, before I started anything, I needed a job to make sure my mother’s efforts were 
worthwhile. I believed that the Department of Property and Construction would be a place 
for me to align work experience with academic knowledge. On 27 January 2016, I wrote 
an e-mail to the course leader of the undergraduate programme at the Department of 
Property and Construction, asking for an opportunity or, at least, a meeting to discuss 
possibilities. They offered me a Part Time Visiting Lecturer position to work one hour 
per week. In June 2016, I applied for the post of part-time Senior Lecturer in Construction 
Law. I passed the interview and became a member of staff. July 2016 was the first month 
I could actually sleep after starting the PhD. I worked and studied during the whole time 
of the PhD, teaching undergraduate and postgraduate modules. Lecturing and researching 
in two very different subjects was challenging, but widened my understanding of both 
construction enterprises and the academic life. 
 
Bad Contracts or Colonial Laws? 
In the meantime, my PhD topic had become problematic. Since I did not have 
funding, I realized I would not be able to do any fieldwork; so my initial project had to 
be completely reconsidered. With time, I realised that fieldwork was not only dispensable, 
but not recommended for the critical framework and methodology I chose to follow. But 
I will explain this further. At that moment, I came up with the idea of working on ‘the 
role of states towards their citizens when celebrating concession contracts of major 
development projects through the case-study of Belo Monte’. I intended to understand if 




 The choice of the Belo Monte hydropower complex as the case study was because 
of the historical relevance of the Brazilian government’s decision to carry on with the 
construction of that power plant. Localized in the heart of the Xingu river basin, affecting 
the Xingu indigenous peoples’ reservation area, Belo Monte was one of the most 
controversial decisions made during Lula’s second presidential mandate. The kickoff of 
the construction of the dam in 2011 destroyed 40 years of indigenous resistance against 
the appropriation of the Xingu lands.  
 
 
Figure 2 - “You are a liar!” Tuíra Kayapó, warpainted, running a machete across the face of Jose Muniz Lopes, 
engineer defending the construction of Belo Monte. Credit: Paulo Jares Interfoto. 1989. 
 
I first considered the problem regarding Belo Monte as a bad contract, in which 
the government was ‘too generous’ to the companies and lacked concern for the 
population. I was following a reasoning in which there was an apparent dichotomy 
between the need for development and economic growth and weakness in enforcing 
human rights, protection measures, and inspection of the works. The state should ensure 
that the rule of law balanced the rights of private owners and the public good. These ideas 
led me to believe that the problem were the national elites, a group that included the 
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infrastructure barons, historically lobbying with governments to take advantage of 
concession contracts and using the territory for their own enrichment.  
The perception that the elites were the reason why enterprises like Belo Monte did 
not pay attention to national development was misguided. To analyze the specificities of 
the Brazilian case in the management of natural resources by understanding the harm 
done by Belo Monte, I had to study its colonial origins. The very existence of Brazil as a 
nation-state is grounded in the exploitation of natural resources – the main reason why 
the territory and the peoples were colonized. I started looking at the national elites as a 
consequence of imposed geopolitical, economic, and racial hierarchies.  
This way, I was in a theoretical transition. At the end of the first year of my PhD 
programme, the doctoral project was a proposition to establish the link between the power 
and influence of national elites and the energy policy decision-making scheme in Brazil, 
through the case study of the Belo Monte hydropower complex in Amazonia. At that 
point of my research, I argued that projects like Belo Monte would benefit a specific 
group in society and would not exist without the effort of such a group, in the sense that 
lobbying would be the main factor guiding political decisions to build large dams.  
In the second year of my PhD programme, I was completely focussed on unveiling 
those power relationships when I ‘met’ the Latin American Decolonial Community of 
Argumentation. Through the Community, I was introduced to the analysis of the global 
system of power from the perspective of those who suffered the Latin American 
experience of colonization. I realised that most of my understanding of the relationship 
between power, the state, and the economy were shaped by Eurocentric perceptions that 
prevented an accurate observation of the Brazilian political, social, and economic 
phenomena. The Brazilian elites were part of that configuration of power. However, the 
dichotomy between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ was a Manichean simplistic dualism 
that would only lead me to fighting lobbying with ‘anti-corruption laws’. It was not the 
core problem, but a theoretical placebo repeating the mainstream scholarship that the 
colonized world was more corrupt and, for this reason, poor.  
I started realizing that my questions involved the whole political–economic–
scientific language that would endorse and encourage enterprises like Belo Monte. I 
needed to deepen my understanding of that language, transitioning to questioning the 
reason why that was the only possible way to perceive energy enterprises. 
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The theoretical transition involved intense study of literature on the formation of 
society, class, and bureaucratic institutions in Brazil, covering the last 60 years of 
strategic energy planning but with reference to the first colonial enterprises in the country. 
The historical and institutional theoretical reconstruction was necessary as a reflection of 
the imposition of a global configuration of power after the colonization of the Americas.  
From the Latin American Community of Argumentation, I learned two concepts that 
changed that contractual mindset I had: coloniality and colonial difference.  
Coloniality is a global pattern or matrix of power, co-constitutive of the European 
modernity, transposed to the Americas as the hidden ideology of colonialism, the obscure 
side of modernity. Such a pattern of power survived after the end of colonialism as a 
political system and remains, through time, as an ideology until the present day, 
naturalizing and normalizing the imposition of hierarchies and legitimating oppressions 
and inequalities. It was the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano who named this pattern 
coloniality of power to explain how mimicry of the European culture, behaviour, and 
violence would give access to power. The present time’s configuration of power is global, 
the modern–colonial world-system, established from the European colonial enterprises at 
the end of the fifteenth century. In such a configuration of power, the Global North and 
European-like peoples are geopolitically allocated the centres of economic/cultural/ 
technological annunciation, whereas the Global South and their ‘ethnic’ peoples are at 
the periphery, depending on the centre to survive.  
 
In Search of Decolonial Languages and Methodologies 
To critically write on coloniality of power, I had to understand the difference of 
doing research as a colonized person instead of mimicking Eurocentric values and 
methodologies as academia would encourage and reinforce. The colonial difference 
became my referential for research and analysis of the modern–colonial world-system, 
from the externality of the European legacy – perennial modernity. It meant that the 
standpoint of observation and the locus of annunciation of knowledge should be from the 
colonized world, not from the European imposed perspectives. I realized that the 
Eurocentric knowledge system and framework transposed to Latin America did not 
prevail naturally, but intentionally through the annihilation of the native peoples, their 
knowledges, memoirs, ancestry, beliefs, and culture. By shifting the intention to do 
research from Eurocentric frameworks to the Latin American’s own science and 
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experience, another ‘language’ could be applied for the comprehension of the phenomena 
of power.  
By language I mean the ‘code’, the way we know knowledge and the way 
institutions are presented in Brazilian society as a legacy of European impositions. This 
included the knowledge institutions, the rule of law, the bureaucracy, the military, the 
revenue, and, mainly, the fundamental capitalist character of such institutions. As 
uncomfortable as liberating, I fell into a reality that my research was about this 
‘code/language/way-of-knowing’, not about the institutions per se, but about the way they 
were legitimized and the modus operandi of a system of oppressions that used institutions 
to legitimate power. Their legitimacy happened (and happens) through violence. Then, I 
comprehended that unveiling the ‘code/language/way-of-knowing’ was understanding its 
epistemological origins. The hierarchization of peoples, territories, and places happened 
through the imposition of Eurocentric epistemologies. This way, Eurocentric 
epistemologies imposed for the naturalization of hierarchies were violent. My core issue 
became the epistemic violence of developmental enterprises like Belo Monte. Such 
enterprises were defended, encouraged, and planned in the Brazilian Energy Expansion 
Plans. To contrapose the epistemic violence of the Energy Plans, I needed to work with 
decolonial epistemologies.  
Researching and writing from the colonial difference involved a daily practice of 
grasping and developing decolonial epistemologies. This had to be done 
methodologically, by giving central attention and preference to works of subalternized 
peoples, especially women, feminist authors, and the racialized subjects such as 
indigenous, black, Latino, and others. I had to intentionally choose works geopolitically 
located in and produced from and for the Global South. I should be doing research 
unchained from the linear historiography and chronology of the oppressor to 
acknowledge the past and the ancestry and to stop living in search of the modern 
fetishized future. This would only be possible by understanding and embodying the fact 
that oppressions are correlated and undetachable, so they should be studied in a combined 
– intersectional – way. I also had to acknowledge that the production of works from the 
colonial difference perspective included a vast range of sources that were predominantly 
Eurocentric and the use of such sources would demand critical approaches. To 




The Original Vice: The Energy Plan’s Epistemology  
All this needed to be observed in something practical. At the time, I thought there 
was an epistemic problem with the energy plans that encouraged enterprises like Belo 
Monte. For this, I needed to find examples of epistemic violence in the Energy Expansion 
Plans. The first notorious example was the collection of scientific data and the 
compilation of convenient studies and international reports (as “reference shopping”) to 
manufacture consent to violent enterprises. Studies are used to endorse the Energy Plans, 
the governmental actions it required, and the benefits arising from those actions. I learnt 
that manufacturing consent is a relevant problem in energy planning. It means that the 
Plans artificially induce their targeted audiences and the general public to accept the 
Plans. This is the most latent type of epistemic violence consistent with Energy Plans. It 
is violent because it leads the understanding of what should be planned in order to justify 
the means that would enable the established goals. It operates on the reasoning that the 
ends are necessary and they, therefore, justify the means, where, in reality the ends or the 
goals – are not really necessary, and the means would demand more investment in a 
certain sector of the economy or encourage a certain area of industry, privileging these 
sectors. This way, by focusing on epistemic violence, I learnt that the Energy Plans 
‘choose’ who to protect and support, grounded in biased ‘unchallengeable’ research.  
Therefore, I decided to focus on one Energy Plan, so I could illustrate aspects of 
epistemic violence that would evidence the violent approach to energy futures in the 
country. I chose the Decennial Energy Expansion Plan 2015–2024, which I refer to as 
DEEP.  
Although manufacturing consent is the most latent type of epistemic violence in 
the DEEP, there are subtler and more dangerous forms of violence that go unnoticed when 
analyzing the document with naked eyes. I am referring to the ideology behind a plan for 
‘energy expansion’, in which the language intentionally detaches the ‘social’ and 
‘environmental’ from the ‘economic’, while never directly mentioning the ‘political’. 
Presented in a technocratic way, the document is a collection of economic jargon 
advocating for the country’s development and economic growth, which would only 
happen with the expansion of industry and agriculture and producing commodities for 
export, all of which needs energy. The expansion of industry and agriculture would only 
be viable with investments in the infrastructure sector. Hence, the alleged development 
and economic growth depend heavily on energy systems, which depend heavily on the 
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infrastructure sector. While the industry, agriculture, and infrastructure are private 
businesses, the energy systems are of public interest. The DEEP presents that energy is 
solely about the economy, in which the private sector’s success is part of the country’s 
development, the ‘national economic growth’. There is a mismatch of what is to be 
considered public and what is to be considered private in the energy business, but all of 
it should be for the country’s development.  
The justification for planning energy for the pursuit of economic growth is not 
natural, nor is it the obvious consequence of the relationship between private enterprises 
and energy systems. It is intentional. It nourishes the country’s dependency on the 
production of commodities for export. Such dependency is historical and geopolitical, 
part of the formation of the country as a nation-state, a fundament of the political, legal, 
educational, and economic institutions. The Energy Expansion Plans give directives and 
present the action-plan for the expansion of the energy sector. It prevents even 
consideration of ‘stability’ or ‘contraction’ of the energy sector. It prevents the 
consideration of life (peoples and ecosystems) when planning energy futures. It solidifies 
the understanding that the only possible way to improve the country’s economy is by 
producing more and more commodities for export. It assumes that improving the 
country’s economy is the exclusive intention when planning energy futures. This is very 
colonial.  
This perception became central for the critique I wanted to make. The most 
dangerous epistemic violence of the Energy Expansion Plan is the use of an alleged need 
for economic growth to perpetuate coloniality of power, the ideology that structures the 
energy systems in Brazil.  
The identification of epistemic violence in the public documents that set the 
directives for energy futures in Brazil widened the scope under which my critique fell. 
The centrality of my concern and critique was not exclusively the violence of hydropower 
dam concession contracts. It was about the naturalization of violent discourses, 
procedures, and justifications for maintenance of the colonial ideology of power. I 
recognized, especially by analysing the DEEP, that the Energy Expansion Plans 
intentionally prevented social and environmental discussions in the agenda of economic 
and growth expansion of industry. In doing so, the most important part of planning the 
future was not in the plan: the production and reproduction of life.  
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This led me to change my research methodology. There was no need to produce 
evidence through fieldwork about the harm caused by the imposition of the hydropower 
complex in the Xingu river basin. Such data had already been extensively produced not 
only about Belo Monte but also about several large socioenvironmental harmful energy 
enterprises. Above all, I did not want to collect data for the sake of data, to make my 
research fit into the Eurocentric academic standards that push the social science research 
to look more technocratic and therefore more reliable, as hard science experiments.  
Researchers from various areas, as well as activists, indigenous movements, national and 
international organizations were capable of evidencing how prejudicial enterprises like 
Belo Monte were all over the globe. The core problem is that the intention to carry on 
such enterprises remains through time. Armoured against any evidence to the contrary, 
large dams and the oil economy are considered the saving sacrifice necessary for the 
country’s economic growth, imposed and naturalized as the only possible way to perceive 
energy futures.  
 
We Need to Talk About Ethics 
In the third year of the PhD programme, the research was no longer about Belo 
Monte’s concession contract. It was about the epistemic violence of the Energy 
Expansion Plans, verticalized in the DEEP. Other epistemologies should be presented to 
contrapose the colonial reasoning that commodities must be produced regardless of the 
people and the ecosystems, that is, regardless of the existence of life. The scope of my 
PhD became the proposition –: decolonial epistemologies for energy planning in Brazil. 
This perspective reinforced my perception that the research methodology should be non-
empiricist, questioning the theoretical grounds for the violent epistemologies consistent 
with the Energy Plans.  
Deepening the understanding of the activity of planning the future regardless of 
the production and reproduction of life took me to a philosophical dimension of the 
research. The production and reproduction of life is the content of ethics. The elaborations 
of the doctoral research then turned into a deep reflection on the ethical system we live 
in.  
At first, when reflecting on ethics, I considered that energy planning in Brazil was 
unethical because it is epistemically violent. The language-code, the targeted audience, 
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and the purpose of energy planning were to please the relationship between the public 
good and capital, to the detriment of the majority of people and the environment – to the 
detriment of life.  
The reflection on ethics raised another internal conflict. The violent epistemology, 
the scope of my critique, is the narrative of the modern–colonial world-system. This 
narrative naturalizes the hierarchization of bodies, territories, and knowledges as the only 
way to exist in the world. This (violent) narrative is part of the colonial ideology of power. 
The imitation of the colonial ideology creates and reinforces inequalities and also gives 
access to power. In the modern–colonial world-system, access to power shadows the 
‘ugly’ side of the colonial ideology, which is the creation of victims. Actions to the 
detriment of life become the ‘saving sacrifice’, in the sense that every person in the 
modern–colonial world system must experience the ‘necessary evil’ in order to survive. 
Coloniality of power entails that, after surviving, it is possible, on a meritocratic manner, 
to be able to achieve the laurels of power.  
Surviving cannot be unethical, since the content of ethics – its material moment 
or the very definition of ethics – is the production and reproduction of life. This was the 
bed of my conflict: I wanted to affirm that the Brazilian Energy Plans were unethical, but 
I could not say that working-class persons employed in the construction or working of a 
hydropower dam were unethical because they were able to get a formal job in the 
modern–colonial world-system. A worker, working to survive, somehow enables the 
epistemically violent goals of the Energy Plan. It does not necessarily mean that they are 
intentionally privileging the lives of owners of businesses to the detriment of their own 
lives or to the detriment of the ecosystem. They are also victims of a system that draws 
dignity from formal work. Eventually, those workers will repeat the same practices, not 
because they aim to preserve inequalities, but because it is considered ethical to ascend 
hierarchically. Hierarchization is assumed as a means to be able to live instead of 
surviving. 
Many questions were spinning around in my head. Are we living unethically? In 
the patriarchal, racist, classist, destructive world we live, is it ethical to behave like the 
oppressor in order to survive? Is there an ethics of ‘the peoples’ and an ethics of ‘the 
masters’? Would it be possible that, in the ethical system we live in, not every life matters?  
The Energy Plans have the ultimate neoliberal justification that, if the ‘pie grows’, 
it is possible for the pie to be shared. For the economy to grow, more energy is needed. 
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To enable more energy, investments in infrastructure are needed. All this is justified with 
‘the greater good to be achieved in the future’. Overall, I recognised that the Energy Plans 
‘aim for the greater good’, that is economic growth. I realised that the production and 
reproduction of life in the modern–colonial world-system, is about saying that life is 
intended, it does not need to be achieved. Epistemic violence elevates discourse over 
reality. A blatant lie or a partial truth forces us to believe that life is the ultimate goal. In 
coloniality of power, this would be ethical enough.  
I needed to improve my knowledge about the ethical system. In order to sustain a 
decolonial methodological coherence, I needed to work with Latin American filosofia 
própria and ciência própria (own philosophy and own science). This way, I found the 
amalgam for the entire problematic put in front of me: the works of the Argentinian-
Mexican philosopher Enrique Dussel on the Ethics of Liberation. For Dussel, the ethical 
system we live in started in the late fifteenth century with the European incursions 
towards the Atlantic. For the first time in the history of humanity, an ethical system 
became global through the success of colonialism. By analysing the content, form, and 
feasibility of ethics, Dussel evidences how such ethical systems became global and have 
remained so through time.  
Dussel points out that the modern–colonial world-system’s ethics unintentionally 
creates victims. For Dussel, the way this ethical system is formally morally constructed 
makes the achievement of the means–ends of ethics incoherent, that is, its goodness 
claim: the feasibility of producing and reproducing life. Building on that, the author calls 
for the liberation of the victims of such a system, the Ethics of Liberation. The victims 
result from the negation of the material aspects of ethics. Hence, Dussel presents that the 
victims, negated by the ethical system, should carry the burden of liberation. In this way, 
the author points out the necessity to evidence another ethics that would arise from 
perceiving the reality of the victim’s condition, which could only be made by the victims 
themselves.  
 The Dusselian philosophical framework threw light on the heart of the problem I 
was facing. Notwithstanding, I could not agree that the ethical system was contradictory 
in negating the victims while aiming for the production and reproduction of life and, even 
less, that the victims should be in charge of the burden of their liberation.  
From my perspective, the victims are the very reason why such an ethical system 
is possible, not a mischance or incoherence in achieving the goodness claim. Without the 
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victims, the fundaments of the system’s formality would not be possible since the moral 
formality is the rule of law, which is forged in violence. The modern–colonial world-
system’s ethics is grounded in the transference of life from the victims to those who 
benefit from such a system. The fundament of such an ethical system is this unilateral 
transference of life (work, energy) so the hierarchizations can take place. The victims are 
not solely human; they consist of all kinds of life: people and ecosystems, interconnected 
by natural phenomena and human intervention. In the modern–colonial world-system, 
every kind of life works for maintenance of the hierarchized human life. The main 
beneficiaries of the modern–colonial world-system’s ethics are the wealthy white men 
and their apparatus to remain in power. Hierarchically, everything beneath the wealthy 
white man must give life (work, energy) to maintain his place of power. In order to 
survive or ascend hierarchically, the wealthy white man’s behaviour and violence must 
be imitated by those in lower hierarchies.  
In the current global ethical system, the goodness claim is not production and 
reproduction of all life. Instead of aiming at the creation of life, it aims to take advantage 
of the victims’ vital energy so certain life prevails at the cost of other lives. Ergo, this 
ethical system’s materiality, formality, and feasibility are only possible at the expense of 
the life taken from the subalternized peoples and ecosystems. This way, such ethics does 
not aim at balance, but at exhaustion.  
Notoriously, the ethical system prevents the capacity of people to live a full life. 
It corroborates and reinforces the exhaustion of persons through their physical and mental 
tiredness; of ecosystems by using everything up to please economic and power 
relationships; and of possibilities of existence by narrowing the scope of what is 
understood as life to economic aspects, in which survival overrides a full life. I understood 
the modern–colonial world-system’s ethics as the ethics of exhaustion.  
 
Energy Planning is About Life 
I grasped that energy planning in Brazil is not unethical. In harmony with the 
ethics of exhaustion, the Brazilian Energy Plans are legitimated by the epistemically 
violent rule of law, the sanctified economic growth, and scientifically manufactured 
consent. Therefore, my PhD research is not about a legal problem per se, whether in 
public or contractual law, because the rule of law is a legitimizing agent of epistemologies 
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that impose the agenda of colonialities. This thesis is not about the problem regarding the 
activity of planning, because in order to plan something there must be an objective to be 
achieved – economic growth, which is forged in violence. This PhD is not about an 
economic problem either, since energy planning involves a much broader dimension of 
human occupancy of the planet than the production of commodities and the necessary 
energy inputs to enable them.  
Ultimately, my doctoral thesis is about the modern–colonial world-system’s ethics 
of exhaustion that naturalizes the ideology of colonialism – coloniality of power – through 
the imposition of violent epistemologies, formalized in the Brazilian Energy Expansion 
Plans (and for the verticalization of the analysis, I focus on the DEEP). The materiality 
of the DEEP allows me to challenge the violent colonial epistemologies and to propose 
decolonial epistemologies for energy planning in Brazil.  
Decolonial epistemologies include ways of perceiving life, the relationship 
between humans and the territory, fauna, flora, and natural phenomena from lenses other 
than the Eurocentric ethics of exhaustion. Decolonial perceptions unlock the narrow 
selfish Manichean dualism of the individual existence inside the mind. In doing so, the 
personal is political, and existence is only possible if the collective is coherent with the 
available resources in a balanced way. I learnt about the possibility of decolonial 
epistemologies from indigenous ways of living, ‘philosophies’ about respect and balance 
in the long term. A balanced relationship among humans and between humans and nature 
is not only about planning the future but also about acknowledging the past. And this is 
not utopian. Utopian is to think that some invisible hand will distribute the concentrated 
wealth, fixing a relatively recent historical problem with a fairy tale in a (neo)liberal dope 
that confuses hope with illusion in order to oppress.  
To propose such decolonial epistemologies for energy planning, I went after 
knowledge about indigenous ways of living with the territory such as the Guarani way of 
well living, Tekó Porã, and the Kichwa way of well living, Súmak Kawsay. These 
ancestral indigenous knowledges and practices taught me that the very recent exhaustive 
ethics can no longer prevail. The first step towards the epistemic decolonial turn on 
energy planning is the inclusion of life, transforming the current violent episteme of 
energy about the production and reproduction of the lives of peoples and ecosystems in 
harmony with the territory.  
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I imagine how it would be if people like my mother, who knows so much about 
the multiple facets of the harm of energy enterprises, had the possibility of working on 
energy projects that do not aim at capital accumulation and commodity export but aim 
instead at the well-being of the communities. Instead of working to be exhausted, people 
could work for abundance, like the Guarani people do.  
Energy planning in Brazil directly affects the present and the future of life in the 
country, while it annihilates ancestry. This thesis is a heartfelt effort to evidence that the 
ethics of exhaustion, translated into violent epistemologies, legitimated by the rule of law, 
and materialized in the Energy Plans, has been steadily leading us to irreversible social 
and environmental catastrophes.   
I remember the sentence of a famous Brazilian rap song from Racionais MCs that 
says ‘every poor person’s dream is to be rich’. It is true. Being rich may prevent others 
from belittling one’s ability to live a full life. It is ethical to desire power as a means to 
survive. But imagine if the central task of life were not to survive humiliation, but to work 
for abundance? Energy planning can foster this organization, provided that it is based on 
the ethics of full life, elaborated from decolonial epistemologies.  
I hope this work contributes to the application of theoretical reflections to practical 
matters. Energy is structural in the contemporary capitalist system. As Audre Lorde said, 
the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. By tackling the structure with 
decolonial tools, it is possible to dismantle the master’s house. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis opens up theoretical pathways for decolonial epistemologies for 
energy planning in Brazil. The critical analysis is verticalized from the 2015–2024 
Brazilian Decennial Energy Expansion Plan (DEEP) to better highlight the 
epistemological problems in energy planning.  
Epistemological challenges demand a critical understanding of the ethical system 
we live in – the ethics of exhaustion – to enable a comprehensive radical transformation 
of the consideration of energy futures, since epistemology is part of the formalization of 
ethics. 
Energy is one of the pillars of the contemporary capitalist system, central to the 
discussion of the socioenvironmental catastrophes of the present times. Treating energy 
exclusively as an economic–political issue that leads to socioenvironmental dilemmas 
prevents a comprehensive analysis of the problematic of energy, limiting thinking on 
energy futures within the constraints of energy as a commodity. In order to unlock the 
possibilities of energy futures from hegemonic understanding, the configuration of the 
global dynamics of power must be grasped from outside of the Eurocentric canon of the 
annunciation of knowledge.  
Energy planning is analysed in this thesis as deriving from the coloniality of 
power, a structural pattern of power in the formation of Brazilian institutions. Challenging 
colonialities demands the rescue of epistemologies that were annihilated by the violent 
imposition of Eurocentric epistemologies that enable the persistent character of the 
colonial agenda of power. Coloniality of power is substantiated in the modern–colonial 
world-system’s ethics of exhaustion. The content of such ethics is the production and 
reproduction of the life of a fetishized ethical subject at the cost of the life (vital energy, 
work) of the majority of people and the ecosystems. By enabling the life of a few by 
exhausting other people and the environment, the ethical system, i.e., the ethics of 
exhaustion (via epistemic violence) naturalizes the sacrifice of people and environment 
as existence.  
This thesis argues that energy planning in Brazil is based on the ethics of 
exhaustion to epistemically impose the colonial agenda of power. Energy futures are 
planned as necessary harm to achieve the fetishized good, normalized as the ethical 
intersubjective and human–environment relationships. Critically analysing the ethical 
system enables understanding the epistemologies for energy planning in Brazil as the 
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formal moment of the ethics of exhaustion, which can only be challenged in an 
intersectional manner by framing the multilateral and collateral aspects of the violence 
consistent in planning energy futures regardless and to the detriment of the existence of 
life. 
Epistemic diversity is the first step towards decolonizing energy planning. It 
comprises: the inclusion of indigenous and communal perspectives when elaborating the 
energy plans; having persons directly affected by energy enterprises as the majority of 
the personnel involved in the activity of planning; setting the priority of energy planning 
as the production and reproduction of all lives in a non-hierarchized manner; recognizing 
the necessary balance in the human–environment relationship; privileging local needs in 
relation to transnational markets; and intentionally de-hierarchizing the benefits of energy 
exploitation by delinking energy studies, production, and distribution from financial 
capital.  
This work challenges colonial epistemologies, based on the ethics of exhaustion, 
from the standpoint of the colonial difference, proposing epistemic diversity as the 
impulse for decolonial energy planning in Brazil. It is an urgent academic task to perceive 
epistemic decolonization to transform the present in order to stop condemning the future 
to social and environmental catastrophes.  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is developed through seven chapters. The thesis’ objectives and main 
concepts are introduced in this first chapter, briefing the reader with the need to carefully 
understand each theoretical elaboration before entering the specific analysis of the 
Brazilian energy planning. For the complex historical and philosophical explanation, the 
theoretical foundations are deployed from three central concepts: coloniality of power, 
epistemic violence, and the ethics of exhaustion. After setting the theoretical grounds, 
academic perceptions of the energy issue are discussed in a critical manner. In this way, 
the first five chapters prepare the theoretical framework for the verticalization of the 
critique of the DEEP in Chapter 6. The last chapter will discuss how to decolonize energy 
planning in Brazil from the perspective cautiously presented and conceptually put 
together in the previous chapters. 
Decolonial epistemologies for energy planning in Brazil first demand 
comprehension of the coloniality of power and its multiple facets that structure 
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institutions in Brazil. Chapter 2: Colonized Skin, Colonizers’ Masks sets out formulations 
that serve as the standpoint for the epistemological and ethical critiques. The conversation 
starts by acknowledging that the whole discussion proposed in this thesis is in a place of 
academic discomfort since Eurocentric academia pushes away non-Eurocentric 
knowledges and methodologies. Recognizing diverse canons of annunciation of 
knowledge implies the recognition that academia plays a fundamental role in 
underpinning and maintaining historical oppressions. While fighting structures of power 
without including itself as a structure, Eurocentric academia carries on in the comfortable 
position of targeting critiques as outsiders, dodging the possibility of being targeted. 
Bringing up possibilities of better futures demands a fundamental endogenous force from 
within the academia to place itself as a powerful agent against oppression. Therefore, this 
thesis is about the perversity of the comfort of those in privileged positions who do not 
recognize their own roles in the processes of victimization. The linkages between the 
position of the privileged and the processes of victimization should be historically 
perceived and epistemically evidenced in order to be ethically challenged, and this brings 
unprecedented levels of discomfort. 
In this sense, Chapter 2 expatiates on the acknowledgment of the victims, which 
must be made in the context of the present day global configuration of power, the 
modern–colonial world-system and its ideology. The ideology consists in the global 
pattern of power established by the European colonial enterprises at the end of the 
fifteenth century that continues to perpetuate specific modes of hierarchization of 
peoples, places, and knowledges, trivializing oppressive realities as the only way to exist 
in the world. Aníbal Quijano named this pattern the coloniality of power, to explain how 
European culture, behaviour, and violence give access to power.  
Coloniality of power includes geopolitical, economic, intersubjective, and 
epistemic oppressions; in this context, the chapter outlines institutions, modi vivendi, and 
the relationship between humans and the ecosystems. It comprises three overlapping and 
co-constitutive aspects that are analysed in three separate sections for didactic purposes. 
The first aspect is coloniality of power itself, strictu sensu, the political–economic aspect, 
with respect to the geopolitical dynamics of power relationships for the establishment of 
capitalism, historically formed. The second aspect is coloniality of being, the ontological 
aspect of coloniality of power, referring to the formation of the colonial subject, the way 
a person exists in the context of coloniality of power and how subjective and 
intersubjective relationships take place in time and space. Coloniality of being is analysed 
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in two main strands: the creation of the idea of race and the imposition of gendered 
relationships, becoming normative tools and mimetic forces in the establishment of 
complex long duration oppressions, permeating every facet of human life in the present. 
The third aspect is coloniality of knowledge, the epistemological aspect of coloniality of 
power that informs the annihilation of non-European knowledges, perspectives, social 
organizations, practices, and common identifications for the imposition of the one valid 
(or legitimate) possibility of understanding the world and announcing knowledge. 
Coloniality of knowledge takes place mainly via ethnocide, the imposition of the colonial 
rule – the rule of law – and the reduction (or simplification) of legitimate knowledge into 
institutional Eurocentric production. Colonialities of being and knowledge are 
underpinned by the Cartesian Manichean sceptical dualism that reduces existence to a 
consequence of the Eurocentric-forged rationality. The Cartesian ego cogito is deployed 
from the Eurocentric ego conquiro, since Modern rationality obscures the way it becomes 
viable, namely, colonial violence. 
The three overlapping and inseparable aspects of coloniality of power enable the 
persistence of Eurocentric Modernity to shape global structures of domination in the 
present. This perception clarifies the identification of the links between economic, 
gendered, racial, and epistemic privileges – tools that are power in themselves and also 
means to access power – and the victims. Conceptualizing coloniality of power is 
fundamental to the understanding of energy systems in Brazil. The taking of land, the 
imposition of property laws, the exploitation of natural resources for export, and the 
violent relationship among people and between people and the environment are 
consequences of the imposition of the colonial ideology of power that defines the way we 
know energy in the present Brazilian context. This understanding is a prerequisite for the 
discussion of decolonial epistemologies in Chapter 3: Epistemology and Energy. 
Therefore, Chapter 3 explains why energy discussions cannot be confined to the 
limited understanding imposed by the colonial ideology of power for its own viability 
and permanence. The move towards energy futures in Brazil must be disengaged from 
the Eurocentric canon of annunciation of knowledge to include perceptions that are 
intended to dismantle the established power relationships. Decolonizing epistemologies 
demand the acknowledgement of the violence caused by the imposition of Eurocentric 
knowledges, symbols, subjectivities, as well as items of cultural construction in 
configuring collective and institutional knowledge. Epistemic violence consists in direct 
coercive ways of imposing meanings to legitimize agendas that ensure positions of power. 
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It informs the intentionality in the domination, hence the intentionality in creating 
victims. Affirming that energy planning in Brazil is epistemically violent means that the 
lack of epistemic diversity condemns planning energy futures to subserve the 
maintenance of colonial power. 
There must be a conscientious intentional action in academia to decolonize 
epistemologies. The decolonizing action can only be made from the standpoint of the 
colonial difference in order to recognize Eurocentrism and, methodologically, search 
for/produce/include decolonial knowledge. In this sense, we list six fundamental colonial 
differences to be considered as methodological pathways to do decolonial research and 
to infuse institutions, such as energy planning, with decolonial meanings, symbols, 
cultural organizations, and perspectives. The first colonial difference is the identification 
of the androcentric character of Eurocentric epistemologies that becomes a normative tool 
and, through the coloniality of gender, a means to access power. Therefore, step one is to 
bring the perspectives of women, especially coloured women, into the configuration of 
institutional meanings. De-masculinizing knowledge is identified as the ultimate and 
most difficult barrier to epistemic diversity, which is discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
The second colonial difference is to write back the idea of race, created to impose 
hierarchies to enable domination. The third colonial difference is the epistemic 
geopolitical awareness to contextualize the reality of diversity against the universalization 
that sets the Eurocentric truth as the one-size-fits-all knowledge. The fourth colonial 
difference is historiographic or chronological: to disengage the understanding of the 
human experience on the planet from the linearity of the Eurocentric explanations. 
Hegemonic chronologies are grounded in the annihilation of ancestry, forcing a people 
with no past to produce meanings in search of the Modern fetishized future. The fifth 
colonial difference is the constant perception of the intersectional character of research, 
in which all the colonial differences are co-constitutive and inseparable and, therefore, 
cannot be applied separately. This difference is complex because singularizing 
oppressions works to benefit the oppressor (discussed in greater depth in the section 
Defeating the Lernaean Hydra in Chapter 7). Finally, the sixth colonial difference is that 
even while taking a critical approach to established Eurocentric knowledges, we do not 
‘throw away the baby with the bath water’. As epistemic diversity is the corollary of 
decolonial epistemologies, the use of Eurocentric concepts, theories, and studies is not 
‘forbidden’ but must be critically used in the context of production and application. 
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Having presented the theoretical grounds on coloniality of power and the 
structure, object, and methodology for decolonial epistemologies, Chapter 4: Energy and 
the Ethics of Exhaustion, plunges deep into philosophical dimensions of the 
epistemological transformation. Epistemology is part of the formal moment of ethics. 
Therefore, a critical understanding of the ethical system we live in is fundamental to the 
epistemic decolonial turn. Following the theoretical pathways in challenging coloniality 
of power and the methodological reference of researching from the colonial difference, 
the discussion of ethics is expatiated on the framework developed by Enrique Dussel in 
The Ethics of Liberation in the Age of Globalization and Exclusion.  
The chapter begins with the links between energy, ethics, and epistemology and, 
in addition for the coherence of the argument, the need for philosophical elaborations of 
the colonial difference. The Dusselian philosophy is of paramount importance for Latin 
American decolonial studies. Dussel analyses ethics from three moments: the material 
moment or the content of ethics, that is the production and reproduction of human life; 
the formal moment, that is the norms and institutions that confer intersubjective validity 
to the content of ethics; and the moment of feasibility of the ethical system, the means–
ends of ethics, the goodness claim of producing and reproducing human life. From this 
analytical framework, Dussel presents that the global ethical system negates the victims 
of the very system. The critical-negative aspect of the material principle of ethics 
confirms the existence of victims – to whom the capacity of producing and reproducing 
life is negated. From this finding, Dussel develops the Liberation Principle for the 
achievement of a society without such historical victimhood.  
The Dusselian critical-negative aspect of the material ethics is relevant for the 
understanding of the ethical system. However, we add to the Dusselian critique the 
intentionality of the creation of victims of the ethical system. This reasoning is 
fundamental to grasp the central argument of this thesis: the need for decolonial 
epistemologies for energy planning in Brazil. It means that without the victims, there is 
no system – the victims are not merely the consequence of an adverse ethical system, but 
in fact necessary for its existence. The feasibility of the hegemonic ethical system lies in 
the legitimation of the use of the victims’ life (energy, existence). We expand the concept 
of victims used by Dussel to include the non-human living beings and the territory, 
violently hierarchized and at the disposal of the Modern man, as part of the modern–
colonial world-system’s ethical viability. Without the victims, the system collapses. 
 
 7 
Therefore, pushing for the inclusion of subalternized bodies, territories, and knowledges 
into the goodness claim of the ethical system does not change the ethical system.  
This ethical system exists due to the exhaustion of the lives of the victims. The 
life (energy, work) is unilaterally transferred to enable the production and reproduction 
of the lives of those in privileged positions in the hierarchized modern–colonial world-
system’s society. This happens at the same time as the exhaustion of all possibilities of 
existing outside the ethical system or in parallel to it. The prevention of the victims from 
producing and reproducing their own lives is the result of the erosion of their capacity to 
produce their symbols, images, knowledges, traditions, and vital links between life and 
the land. Hence, this ethical system is the ethics based on the exhaustion of many persons, 
living beings, ecosystems, and possibilities of existence to facilitate the production and 
reproduction of the life of some. Notably, Chapter 4 conceptualizes the ethics of 
exhaustion that substantiates the colonial ideology of power, formalized and legitimated 
by violent epistemologies.  
The ethics of exhaustion is a theoretical elaboration that enables clarification of 
the specific challenges of working with decolonial epistemologies for energy planning in 
Brazil. It evidences the complexity of epistemological underpinnings of planning energy 
for the production and reproduction of all lives. Historically, economically, and 
politically detached from the existence of life, the energy issue in the ethics of exhaustion 
is rationally reduced to problems of supply and demand. This way, Chapter 5: The 
Problematic of Energy, brings this epistemological reduction of the energy issue into an 
economic issue within academic discussions of energy.  
Both mainstream and critical scholars have tremendous difficulty debating the 
energy issue from a non-economic perspective. Substantiated in the ethics of exhaustion, 
the existence of victims is naturalized, trivialized, and therefore, formally and morally 
accepted. Most scholars do not acknowledge the hierarchization of bodies, territories, and 
institutions and, in addition, do not grasp the problematic of human superiority above all 
existing things, ethically claiming that everything is at the service of the Modern man. 
This way, Chapter 5 presents mainstream and critical scholarships on the energy issue. 
This is an important exercise that clarifies the mainstream analysis of energy consistent 
with the Brazilian energy planning and the androcentric perceptions, conceptualizations, 
and orientation in academia that prevents real analysis that comprises the holistic 
phenomenon of existence as energy in itself. The chapter concludes with the idea that the 
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gift of life and the relationship with the land cannot be one of domination, but should be 
one of balance.  
Building on the theoretical foundations to challenge decolonial epistemologies for 
energy planning, Chapter 6: The Brazilian Energy Planning applies the three central 
concepts – coloniality of power, epistemic violence, and ethics of exhaustion – to the 
Brazilian case.  Divided into four main sections, Chapter 6 explains the relevance of 
analyzing the Brazilian case in challenging violent epistemologies for energy planning. 
The first section discusses Brazilian energy in the geopolitical context, given the 
country’s vast energy potentials and key role as a player in the transnational energy 
business, contrasted by the peripheric subaltern place of a commodity exporting country 
completely dependent on foreign investment and the stability of the economy of the 
centre. The second section discusses Brazilian energy planning in the historical context, 
a fundamental part of this thesis. The Brazilian colonial history informs the formation of 
the administration and the relationship between the idea of ‘public good’ and the 
management of natural resources in the country. Observing the historical origins of the 
relationship between administrative bodies and the production of commodities for export, 
it is clear that the present configuration of energy systems is completely forged in the 
colonial ideology of power.  
The third section explains the legal nature of energy systems and the activity of 
energy planning in Brazil, bringing a historical background exclusively for the energy 
issue, dating from 1960 to the present. It contextualizes the Brazilian decisions about 
energy systems in the national and international panoramas.  The comprehensive analysis 
of energy planning briefly explains various political changes in the country in the last 60 
years to get to the present configuration of institutional energy planning, materialized in 
long- and middle-term energy plans. There are two main Brazilian energy plans: the 
National Energy Plan 2030 (PNE) and the DEEPs. To verticalize the analysis, the 
theoretical framework is applied to the DEEP. Section four scrutinizes the DEEP in 
relation to its premises, goals, and methodology. From such analysis, the epistemic 
problem is pinpointed and the critique developed. The main epistemic problems identified 
with energy planning in Brazil are in two critical strands: energy futures are planned for 
industrial and economic growth, underpinned by economic research carefully put together 
to manufacture consent for the need of energy expansion; and energy futures are planned 
regardless and to the detriment of the existence of life.  
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Finally, Chapter 7: The Decolonial Plan, brings up ways in which it is possible 
to elaborate a decolonial energy plan. The challenges of the Decolonial Community of 
Argumentation are to bring the decolonial possibilities into decolonial praxis. Piercing 
colonial institutions such as energy planning with decolonial epistemologies are part of 
such praxis. However, the action towards structural changes must be taken in a holistic 
manner to tackle the persistent character of the coloniality of power and its capacity to 
re-establish oppression through time. Chapter 7 lists these challenges and opens up the 
grounds for decolonial energy plans substantiated on communal principles of abundance 
such as the Guarani Tekó Porã and the Kichwa Súmak Kawsay. These are examples of 
indigenous practices of good living that perceive life in the complexity of existence.  
Hence, the propaedeutic structural change is ethical. Instead of exhaustion, the 
ethical system must aim for abundance, that is, the production and reproduction of life in 
a non-hierarchized manner. This is effected by considering the non-human living beings 
and the ecosystems as fundamental to human life. In the same manner, inter-human 
relationships cannot be hierarchized. The victims must occupy protagonist positions in 
deciding the structural institutional change. This shift from being victims to being 
protagonists of change is an ethical change. The chapter concludes with propositions for 
the practical epistemic shift.  
This work is innovative. There are no examples of decolonial energy planning in 
the world. Being realistic, there are no examples of relationship between decolonial 
studies and the structural pillars of the contemporary capitalist system: energy, industrial 
complexes, the financial system, and the legal system. This thesis opens up grounds for a 
vast range of research that is intended to dismantle the master’s house. It is not possible 
to think about better futures without a plan. It is not possible to have a plan without a 
method. It is not possible to have a method without understanding the meanings of 
phenomena in time and space. It is not possible to understand meanings without grasping 
the ethics from which meanings are derived. Although innovative, this study is about 
ancestry, because learning with history is the only way to organize the future. From this 
work, it is possible to understand the relevance of decolonial epistemological 
underpinnings in promoting social change. To do so, we focus the epistemic decolonial 
turn on energy. Dismantling energy – this very important pillar of the capitalist system – 





Chapter 2: Colonized Skin, Colonizers’ Masks  
 
Discomfort  
A recurring question in the conversations about coloniality is why are you still 
blaming Europe for the misery in the Global South, as colonialism ended long ago? It is 
not a simple question. It involves many layers of collateral and multilateral oppressions. 
The core problem in this question is the lack of empathy with the condition of the victims 
– the misery of the victims. Asking ‘Why blame someone else for your problems?’ 
affirms ‘You are responsible for your misery’. In doing so, the historical 
construction/creation of victims is dismissed, as also the links between the past and the 
present, the oppressed and the oppressor. By framing the responsibility for poverty on the 
poor, for racism on the indigenous or black person, or for sexism on women, the 
predicament of the victim is denied. Denying the existence of the victim nullifies the act 
of oppression, making the oppressor a winner and the victim a loser – someone who has 
not tried hard enough. The act of winning is embedded in the meritocratic legitimacy of 
a said effort in pursuing interests – it is about a battle for surviving and living well, 
morally approved and reinforced by the ethics of exhaustion of the modern–colonial 
world-system. Disregarding the means to win is oppressive, part of the task of keeping 
the victims in their condition, and disabling the possibilities of overcoming the 
predicament of oppression by the negation of the victim – how do victims stop being 
victims if victims do not even exist? It is something like saying believing in victims is 
like believing in the tooth fairy or in Santa Claus; it is just in the imagination of a naïve 
or delusional person and, therefore, no action is required. 
 This chapter deals with the creation of victims by discussing the concept of 
coloniality and its multiple facets. Acknowledging the victims must make those in 
historically comfortable positions uncomfortable. Comfort is secured when one 
benefiting from a system of oppressions ignores a set of privileges and, therefore, 
normalizes both privileges and oppressions. Nobody wants to carry the historical 
responsibility for poverty, genocide, or slavery. In freeing oneself from guilt, life becomes 
a more pleasant journey. In the patriarchal world-system in which we live, to affirm that 
every man benefits from patriarchy (a.k.a. systemic violence against women) sounds like 
an offense, instead of information. Generally, men react to this sentence saying ‘Not me, 
I respect women!’ or ‘I am not a rapist, I have a mother, a sister, a wife…’ or even ‘Not 
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me, I believe that women and men should have equal rights’. How comfortable is that? 
‘Not being a racist is not enough, we have to be anti-racism’, as Aurea Carolina, 
paraphrasing Angela Davis, said in one of her speeches in the Brazilian National 
Congress1. 
 It is also comfortable for the oppressor to learn of the existence of victims without 
feeling responsible for their existence. It is very uncomfortable for the victims to have, 
on top of suffering oppressions, the obligation to explain what constitutes oppression in 
order to substantiate their suffering, its historical and social foundations, the links 
between the oppressor and the oppression and, at the end, to still preserve the oppressor 
from being uncomfortable with this reasoning. It means to place causes of oppression in 
the past, making oppressions given situations and irreversible.  
Acknowledging the victims and the oppressions is to create discomfort – we all 
have to be uncomfortable with the ethics of exhaustion that necessarily creates victims. 
Such discomfort starts from finding out what the oppressions are and delineating the 
genealogy of present oppressions. These actions do not have an end in themselves – 
finding a murderer does not resurrect the victim. The end of creating such discomfort is 
to put a stop to oppressions by gradual reduction of the victim’s discomfort, which 
necessarily increases the discomfort of the privileged. That, in historical time, will enable 
reducing discomfort for all the parties. Linking the oppressor and the oppressed in 
academia is an epistemological discomfort. Considering that the number of victims of the 
modern–colonial world-system’s ethics is much bigger than the number of privileged 
(framing ‘accumulated privileges’ in a combination of capacity to exercise power, to 
exist, and to announce knowledge), we start from an unprecedented level of discomfort 
for those at the top of the ethical pyramid of privileges. To do so, it is necessary to 
confront the reality that without victims ‘everything’ would not exist2. 
Colonialities are those multiple levels of collateral and multilateral forms of 
oppression consistent with the pattern of power of the world-system. The following 
sections are dedicated to unfold colonialities in the light of the ethics of exhaustion. 
Within the macro topic of Coloniality of Power, Quijano’s concept is explained here, the 
terminology that grounds the whole theoretical framework of the thesis. In order to 
develop the issue, we bring in the notion of ancestry in the section Luzia’s Children, since 
observing the past from the colonial difference perspective is consistent with the 
                                                        
1 Aurea Carolina is a Brazilian congresswoman, black, feminist. This was published in her social media. 
2 Referring to Djonga’s song “Corra!” from the 2018 album O Menino Que Queria Ser Deus. 
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perspectives to shift discomfort. Thereafter, some of the conceptual axioms of Quijano’s 
concept are explained in the section The Modern–Colonial World-System. Finally, 
coloniality of power will be didactically disassembled to help comprehend the colonial 
subject and the colonial epistemic violence in the sections Coloniality of Being, 
Coloniality of Gender, and Coloniality of Knowledge. 
Decolonial epistemologies for energy planning are definitely institutionally 
uncomfortable. Such a proposition is ahead of what is considered (narrow) possibilities 
for managing natural resources and energy production in Brazil. Decolonial 
epistemologies for energy planning reverses the proposition of value attributed to energy 
that sets the grounds for the current epistemology for energy planning, informed by the 
DEEP.  
 
Coloniality of Power 
The present configuration of power is the modern–colonial world-system, 
consistent with a global pattern of power established by the European colonial enterprises 
at the end of the fifteenth century and perpetuating a specific modus of hierarchization of 
peoples, places, and knowledge, naturalizing oppressive realities as the only way to exist 
in the world. Aníbal Quijano named this pattern the coloniality of power, to explain how 
European culture, behaviour, and violence – substantiated by what we call the modern–
colonial world-system’s ethics of exhaustion – gives access to power (Quijano 1992, 12). 
This means that the non-powerful could, somehow, change their social and economic 
status by mimicking the colonial power, thereafter the imperial power, and then the 
financial power. Such mimetic force is in place in many spheres of individual and 
communal life, from the self-recognition of each individual and the recognition of social 
identity to the production of legitimate valid knowledge. The European culture became a 
universal cultural model. The imaginary in non-European cultures today can hardly exist 
and, above all, does not reproduce, outside of European imposed relationships of 
domination. 
 Such imposition of Eurocentric standards happened in different ways across the 
globe. For Quijano, the worst impact took place in the Americas, due to the centrality of 
the domination of the Americas for the configuration of European hegemony. The 
European presence in the Americas caused a mass genocide that wiped out a great part of 
the American indigenous populations in a very short period of time and continues to 
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massacre the very few remaining indigenous people even now. Energy production is key 
to these continued massacres as it is the land of the indigenous that continue to be taken 
for the building of large dams and transmission systems (Campos 2012; Magalhães et al. 
1996; Santos 2007). The global character of the Eurocentric domination – that is, beyond 
America – was shaped by other levels of domination on the cultures previously known 
by European imaginaries (what Dussel called the interregional ethical systems that 
existed before the modern–colonial world-system), being configured through political, 
military, and technological impositions on cultural values.  
 For Quijano, cultures could not be destroyed in Asia and the Middle East to the 
intensity and depth to which the American cultures were decimated. In those places, the 
relationship of subalternity imposed through political, military, and technological power, 
existed even before the coming of European culture and configured hierarchies not only 
in relation to Europe but also locally by the assimilation of power among the elite. Europe 
became the guiding norm for cultural and artistic development, partly constitutive of the 
conditions of production of those societies and cultures, ‘pushed towards Europe in whole 
or in part’ (Quijano 1992, 13).  
In Africa, the cultural destruction was undoubtedly much more intense than in Asia; but smaller 
than in America. The Europeans also failed to achieve the complete destruction of expressive 
patterns, particularly of objectification and visual formalization. What they did was to deprive 
them of legitimacy and recognition in the world cultural order dominated by the European patrons. 
They were locked in the category of “exotic”. That is, without a doubt, what is revealed, for 
example, in the use of the products of the African plastic expression as a motive, as a starting 
point, as a source of inspiration, of the art of the Europeanized African western artists, except as 
a proper mode of artistic expression, of a hierarchy equivalent to the European norm. And that is, 
exactly, a colonial look (Quijano 1992, 13–14). 
  
The centrality of the domination of the American peoples and territories in the 
configuration of the global pattern of power deserves specific attention here for the 
analysis of decolonial epistemologies for energy planning in Brazil. The critical historical 
view enables the deconstruction of a historiographic version that condemns the present.  
 
Luzia’s Children  
In the Americas, coloniality of power was imposed though multilateral and 
collateral types of oppression, starting from the intentional annihilation of the native 
peoples. As Dussel argues, the hallmark of the domination of the Americas is the arrival 
of Columbus in the Caribbean in 1492. It is estimated that about 35 million indigenous 
people were decimated in the area of the Aztecs, Mayas, and the Caribbean in the first 50 
 
 14 
years of conquest (Quijano 1992, 13). In the territory where Brazil is today, it is estimated 
that the original population was about (up to) 8 million inhabitants3 of more than a 
thousand ethnicities, reduced today to a couple of hundred thousand individuals (Arruda 
2001, 133; Moonen 2008, 7). It is believed that when the Europeans arrived, the total 
population in the American continent was about 70 million inhabitants (Crosby 1989, 25). 
The indigenous holocaust (Ribeiro 2016; Moonen 2008) took place due to the European’s 
free and conscious will to dominate, conquer, and take over, what Dussel calls ego 
conquiro.  
 Despite the history of humanity being marked by conflicts, the colonization of the 
Americas experienced an unprecedented type of wilful domination, grounded in the 
dehumanization of the indigenous peoples, aimed at their decimation and the erasure of 
their histories with the intention to steal minerals, natural resources, technologies, land, 
and whatever could be produced on the land, as well as to use unpaid labour from enslaved 
indigenous and African peoples. The imposition of European values and institutions was 
made in a way that would justify their violence, especially the imposition of European 
property laws (Maine 1872) and thereafter ‘public’ laws (tax and criminal laws) in the 
colonies. The making of international law, followed by the laws in the colonies, was 
justified by the intention to protect thieves and murderers who would steal and kill away 
from their home states.  
One could hardly conceive modern European colonialism without international law. From the 
sixteenth century (Francisco de Vitoria in Spain), to the early seventeenth (Hugo Grotius in the 
Netherlands) and the late seventeenth century (John Locke in England), the legal foundation of 
land expropriation and appropriation was established. That was the nature and function of 
international law (Mignolo 2016, 182). 
 
 Obviously, the Europeans did not discover the Americas. The Spanish, on behalf 
of their kingdom, ‘found’ the American continent, trying to reach the commerce route to 
India (the ‘Oriental Indias’), officially in 1492, in an attempt to become players in the 
international mercantile commerce, then dominated by the Persians and the Muslims, who 
                                                        
3 Studies present different numbers of inhabitants at the time Europeans started colonizing Brazil, because 
counting the number of inhabitants was not a concern of the colonizer because the native peoples migrated 
towards the west, running away from the violence and diseases brought by the invaders; and because 
indigenous peoples were dying at a fast pace due to diseases and conflicts. The numbers vary from 3 to 8 
million inhabitants, but there is no accurate number. What matters is that the local inhabitants of the 
Brazilian territory had little use for the colonizer if they did not want to be enslaved or to give up their 
lands. Contrary to what happened in Spanish America, the Brazilian indigenous peoples did not work for 
the colonizer in the encomiendas scheme, partly because there was no central empire to which the Brazilian 
indios would serve, as happened in Mexico (with the Aztecs and Toltecs) and in the Andes (with the Incas) 
(Dussel 1997). They were enslaved in different ways (Moonen 2008). 
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were actively interacting with India and China (Dussel 1997). Until 1492, Western 
Europe was the periphery of the Muslim world4, enclosed by the walls from Seville to 
Vienna (Dussel 1994a, 103).  
In the work 1492: El Encubrimiento del Otro: Hacia el Origen del ‘Mito de la 
Modernidad’, (translated into English in 1997 as The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse 
of ‘The Other’ and the Myth of Modernity), first published in 1994, Dussel explains why 
1492 is the beginning of Modernity; and Quijano refers to 1492 as the commencement of 
the imposition of coloniality of power as a means to access power. The Eurocentric ego 
conquiro of the late fifteenth century unfolds into the Cartesian ego cogito, the 
enlightenment, the scientific and philosophical revolutions, the renaissance art 
movement, and the theories of state power. From a Eurocentric perspective, such 
phenomena are specifically analyzed as happenings from eighteenth-century onwards, 
whereas such movements were enabled from the primitive accumulation of capital, that 
is, mainly the precious metals stolen from the Americas and the production of goods in 
the stolen land using enslaved labour. Hence, the standpoint of Modernity is colonial 
violence, with coloniality as its ideology, as Dussel frames it: 
 (…) It will be instead for Portugal (which in 1415 takes Ceuta in Africa) and Spain, that Europe 
will expand in the West and unlock the Europe of the Muslim site that had begun in the seventh 
century A.D., since the death of the Prophet Muhammad. That Spain, which after Western Europe 
will forget and despise – and that Hegel does not consider Europe – is the one that begins 
Modernity. The conquest of Mexico, on the other hand, will be the first “strong” experience of the 
                                                        
4 According to Dussel, ‘Latin-Germanic Europe, did not surpass the totality of one hundred million 
inhabitants (inferior to the population of the single Chinese empire at the time). It [Western Europe] was 
an isolated culture, which had failed with the Crusades because it could not recover a certain presence in a 
neuralgic pole of the Euro-Asian continent's trade: the conquest of the place where the Holy Sepulcher was 
located was, in fact, the place where the trade of the caravans that arrived at Antioch from China (crossing 
Turan and the Chinese Turkestan) and they were united with the navigation routes of the Red Sea and the 
Persian in the present Palestine. The Italian cities of Genoa (the city of Columbus and of so many 
clandestine discoveries since 1474 on Atlantic coasts), Venice, Naples, Amalfi, needed these 
communication channels to reach tropical Asia, spices’ India. Rejected Europeans in their attempts to 
control the Eastern Mediterranean, had to remain isolated, peripheral of the Muslim world. The Muslim 
kingdoms ran from North Africa - with the Almoravids and their flourishing cities of Morocco, the Maghreb 
or from Tripoli, which connected with the caravans to the south of the Sahara, and from there with the 
kingdoms of the savannah: Mali , Ghana, etc., with the current Libya and Egypt (later occupied by the 
Ottoman Empire), with the Caliphate of Baghdad, until Iran (later conquered by the Safawi Empire), 
reaching the Mongolian kingdoms that will occupy the north of the India – with the capital Angra, and then 
Delhi, and with works of splendid beauty such as the Taj Mahal – extending to the control over Malacca 
carried out by Muslim merchants, to reach the southern Philippines, since the island of Mindanao It will be 
Muslim from the end of the 14th century. So Dar-el-Islam (the house of faith) came from the Atlantic Ocean 
to the Pacific. It is true, that the Turkish invaders had broken the backbone of the Arab-Muslim trade world, 
although they themselves were Muslims. The Turks, who occupied the Balkan peninsula, Greece and 
Turkey, had isolated the western part of the eastern part of the pre-Turkish Muslim world. China had fallen 
by itself into a deep economic crisis. For its part, the Golden Horde of the Mongols had dominated Russia 
(1240-1480). The occupation of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453 meant for Europe, then, to be besieged 
and reduced to the minimum expression.’ (Dussel 1997, 103–4) 
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European ego of control of another empire, of the Other as a servant, as colonized, as dominated, 
as exploited and humiliated (Dussel 1994a, 104–5). 
 
The silver stolen from the mines in Potosí in Bolivia and throughout Mexico 
(which  yielded to the Spaniards more than one hundred thousand tons of silver between 
1540 and 1820 [Garner 1988, 898–99]) changed the face of the entire transnational 
economy in the world from the fifteenth century onwards (Dussel 1997). This was 
because of the stability of silver, the prevailing currency at that time and used for centuries 
throughout the Muslim world in commerce with India, China, and Bantu Africa. The 
abundance of precious metals stolen from the Americas is definitely one of the main 
factors that enabled the scientific and technological discoveries of Modernity (Mignolo 
2016; Dussel 1997).  
Indeed, the Portuguese in Africa and Asia and the Spaniards and Portuguese in 
Latin America sought gold and silver, the world money that allowed them to enrich 
themselves on a global scale.  
The global market, or Wallerstein’s “world-system” invented by Portuguese and Spaniards, 
organized its tentacles, which, as a world-wide plot, allowed the “sacrificial myth” to consume its 
new victims in all corners of the earth. The mimetic desire of the conquest moved these first 
modern individuals to try to possess, excessively, the universal “measure” of power of the new 
system: money, the nascent universal equivalent, gold and silver – in the time of the primitive 
accumulation of capital. Money, in effect, an abstract equivalent of all value (in the Arab world, 
in Bantu Africa, in India or in China) will be managed by Europe as a way of accumulating 
exchange value, a means of transferring value, of exercising effectively the new North-South 
domain, center-periphery domain (Dussel 1994, 146).  
 
Primitive accumulation of capital, then, killed not only the peoples in the 
Americas but also their ancestry. The myth of Modernity replaced ontological and 
metaphysical relationships (political, social, economic) by systematic suppression of 
beliefs, ideas, images, symbols, and knowledge that was not conducive to accumulation 
of capital and hence global domination. The suppression was felt, above all, over the 
modes of knowing and producing knowledge, of producing perspectives, images and 
systems of images, symbols, modes of signification, over resources, patterns, and 
instruments of expression, intellectual or visual; this repression was followed by the 
imposition of Eurocentric patterns of expression, including metaphysical patterns. 
According to Quijano, these beliefs and images had to be suppressed and discredited 
because they impeded the cultural production of European domination; further, this was 
‘a very efficient means of social and cultural control, when the immediate repression 
ceased to be constant and systematic’ (Quijano 2007a, 169). Eurocentric epistemologies, 
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forged in violence, became the most efficient mechanisms of social control and 
domination. 
This type of imposition of power survived through time and became persistent 
because it killed ancestry, forcing a people with no past (since the past was annihilated) 
to be converted into a people in search of a future in the intra-European phenomenon of 
Modernity. In the projection of the Eurocentric way of life, ‘success’ is in the future, 
through the attainment of certain material goods, social status, and individual freedoms 
that, if mimicked in keeping with the coloniality of power, would allow any person to 
become ‘European’, a conqueror, or a winner. It is what Quijano and Wallerstein called 
the deification and reification of newness.  
The new system was new, that is not old, not tied down to tradition, to a feudal past, to privilege, 
to antiquated ways of doing things. Whatever was new and more modern was better. But more 
than that, everything was always defined as being new. Since the value of historic depth was 
denied morally, its use as an analytical tool was dismissed as well (Quijano and Wallerstein 1992, 
551–52). 
 
The annihilation of history, and ancestry above all, ensured the loss of the link 
between the communal practices of existence and the occupation of the territory, since, 
from the colonial perspective, the occupancy of the territory began when the colonizers 
arrived5. It is not the object of this work to recover the missing link, but it is necessary to 
reinforce that the historiography of the oppressor makes it impossible for communal 
practices to have their political utility in the socioeconomic relations of the present. Thus, 
a brief report on the occupation of American territories, specifically of the Brazilian 
territories (for the purposes of this study), is necessary so that the political construction 
of ancestry is recognized in the political relationship with the territory through lenses 
other than the Eurocentric one. 
It is clear that the existence of peoples in the American continent is much more 
than 500 years. According to Bonatto and Salzano (1997) the first humans to enter the 
American continent came from Asia (Siberia) through the Beringia (the land and maritime 
area bounded on the west by the Lena River in Russia, on the east by the Mackenzie River 
in Canada) and into what is now Alaska between 40,000 and 16500 years ago’ (Bonatto 
and Salzano 1997), and then migrated to the south. Those people were named 
Paleoindians, the first Americans (Neves, Bernardo, and Okumura 2007). Although 
disputed, there are studies referring to different moments of incursions into the continent, 
                                                        
5 This is the main narrative taught in schools in Brazil to this date; history is the version of the victor. 
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such as Paul Rivet’s version that the first inhabitants of South America came from 
Polynesia through navigations across the Pacific Ocean (Wauchope 1944). As Walter 
Neves argues, ‘it is possible to know how many differentiated Asian populations 
contributed to the formation of the native American peoples, but not in how many 
migrations these contributions occurred. In other words, the same Siberian biological 
population may have contributed to the occupation of America through various 
migrations, or rather, through various expansion events in the east’ (Neves, Bernardo, and 
Okumura 2007, 11). 
 The largest and oldest archaeological evidence of Paleoindians is concentrated in 
South America, especially in the south-eastern region of Brazil (Lagoa Santa) (Garcia 
2012), where the skeleton of Luzia was found. Luzia is considered the most ancient 
human skeleton ever found in Brazil, and one of the oldest in the Americas, about 11,000 
years old. Researchers have evidence that Luzia’s skull has features and DNA similar to 
the Australian Aborigines, with negroid patterns: ‘the paleoamerican morphology is very 
similar to the one that characterized the first Homo sapiens, that of Africa dispersed all 
over the planet, from 50 thousand years, before the racialization process had occurred’ 
(Neves, Bernardo, and Okumura 2007, 12). Although Luzia’s ‘race’ could be 
controversial for some (Gaspar Neto, Valle, and Santos 2009), since her features were 
similar to the first homo sapiens (before the racialization process had occurred), it is 
profoundly important to perceive from Luzia – the most ancient reference ever found of 
human occupancy in Brazil – the similarities of that skeleton with the first humans on the 
planet. Luzia is relevant here for the primary history of the peoples in the land as evidence 
of an erased ancestry and for the comprehension of a much broader spectrum of belonging 
to the territory and developing communal practices. This idea of descending from Luzia 
is far from being a shallow attempt to find the missing link between myself and the first 
woman, it is the recognition of an ancient history. The archaeological studies evidence 
the economic cycles (specially from the use of ceramic and other artefacts), the logistics, 
the non-predatorial agriculture, and the relationship between the native peoples and the 
land, (Machado 2006; Garcia 2012; Souza 2002) dating back to 5,000 to 2,000 years B.C.  
We are all Luzia’s children, not in a metaphorical way, but in a historical–political 
elaboration. Ancestry is politically constructed; it is in the imaginary that the possibilities 
of existing in the present time can be found; and unlocking the possibilities of existing 
demands an exploration of what and who we were, are, and will be. 
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 The native peoples of the territory where Brazil is today had social, political 
ecological, spiritual, and economic organizations grounded in millennia of occupancy of 
the territory. Archaeological evidences indicate various communal practices such as 
agriculture, logistics, and the use of natural resources for their communities (Melià 1990). 
Some of this knowledge was useful for the European’s specific type of production for the 
accumulation of capital – specially in agriculture and mining (Moonen 2008; Melià 1990, 
36). However, the indigenous relationship with the land was completely different from 
the European way of relating to the land. Let us briefly analyze the example of the 
Guarani.  
 Litaiff informs that, among the peoples of the Americas who came into contact 
with Europeans since the early days of colonization, the Guarani are an example of those 
who have survived to this day, preserving important aspects of their culture and social 
organization. However, these índios6 had entire populations decimated and continue to 
suffer a violent process of ethnocide, which is evidenced by the installation of energy 
enterprises like large dams, transmission lines, and mining, as well as by the 
environmental catastrophes caused by the collapse of dams7. Currently there are four 
Guarani groups located in South America: Chiriguanos (60,000), Kayowa (40,000), 
Chiripa or Nhandeva (30,000), and Mbya (30,000), located in Bolivia, Paraguay, 
Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil respectively, i.e., distributed in the continent’s midwest, 
south and southeast (Litaiff 2008, 115–16). Tekó porã is the Guarani philosophy of good 
living, which establishes precepts for communal existence and the relationship with the 
land, knowledge, and the soul. Epistemologically, teko is related to ‘a way of being, way 
of existing, law, culture, norm, behavior, habit, condition, costume’ (Montoya 1876). 
Teko porã is the ‘good being, well-being, good spirit’ (Melià 1990, 43). Tekoha or tekoa 
is the land or living in the land, which is undetachable from and intrinsic to the way of 
living, necessary for the very existence of the Guarani. The arandu, the knowledge or 
wisdom, begins with the xara’u, which is the dream, and the omoexakã, which is the 
revelation of the nhe’ẽ (when a woman finds out that she is pregnant). The soul, ã, also 
                                                        
6 Brazilian indigenous peoples, original inhabitants of the territory. 
7 The irreversible damage caused by the collapse of the Fundão dam by the Doce river, in the city of Mariana 
MG affected several indigenous communities. ‘The indigenous communities living in demarcated 
territories and located in the affected area are: the Krenak community, whose lands confront the Doce river 
in the municipality of Resplendor, and the Tupiniquim and Guarani communities, which live on the lands 
of Caieiras Velhas II, Comboios and Tupiniquim, on the coast south of the mouth of the Rio Doce. About 
350 Krenak live on their 4,040-hectare land; already the coastal indigenous lands shelter about 3,000 
guaranis and tupiniquins’ (Sánchez et al. 2018, 11). 
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means energy and the atmosphere, ‘what is together with you all the time, as if it were a 
shadow’, and does not have a sacred connotation (Benites 2015, 12). This way, teko porã, 
the Guarani well-being, relates axiology, metaphysics, and ontology, presenting land, 
knowledge, and life as co-constitutive and coexistent. 
When the Europeans first met the Guarani, in the early sixteenth century, they 
found ‘abundance of groceries [agricultural products] (…) not only for the people who 
live there, but for 3 thousand men upstream”8 (Melià 1990, 35). The Guarani ‘divine 
abundance’9 could not be practised by the Europeans because they had expelled the 
natives from their lands, killed them, and taken over the natural resources; so their 
knowledge was lost forever and could not be shared or passed on to others or to future 
generations.  
Colonization killed ancestry and imposed exhaustive ways of living, in complete 
opposition to a culture and way of living that worked for abundance. In capitalist times, 
proposing decolonial epistemologies for energy planning does not aim to go back to 
indigenous practices of 2,000 years ago. These practices exist even in the present times, 
known outside Eurocentric violent epistemologies with the exhaustive economic 
perspectives. The Guarani peoples’ struggle10 in the present evidence non-violent 
epistemologies that enable other perceptions of relationship with life and territory. What 
is necessary is to involve such practices in the activity of planning. Doing so necessarily 
replaces the current way of planning energy that takes place regardless of the existence 
of life. In this sense, energy planning in Brazil today involves the appropriation and use 
of the land, the watercourses, and the agriculture, the very means to access the basics for 
life with dignity. The current epistemologies for energy planning in Brazil repeat the 
European colonizer’s incapacity to practise abundance, reinforcing the modern–colonial 
world-system’s ethics of exhaustion, as discussed in depth in Chapter 3.  
 The extermination of indigenes takes place in four macro spheres (Moonen 2008). 
The most evident one is the biological extermination, in which the colonial ‘encounter’ 
causes an enormous depopulation among the colonized, either by the introduction of 
hitherto unknown diseases or because of genocidal practices. Countless indigenous 
peoples have been exterminated; others have had their population drastically reduced. 
Another form of extermination is the territorial invasion and conquest, in which the índios 
                                                        
8 Governor Martínez de Irala, 1541 (Revello 1941). 
9 As described by European historians of the sixteenth century (Melià 1990, 35). 
10 For the Guarani struggle see Pereira 2012. 
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lost not only their lands, which are necessary for their subsistence, but, what is more 
serious, also their territories and their homelands, necessary for their survival as peoples, 
as indigenous nations. The fourth dimension of the extermination is the political 
domination; with the colonial rule, the índios lost (and keep losing) the elementary right 
to decide their own destiny and were governed by their colonizers. This political 
domination is achieved through decrees and laws and through colonial administration 
bodies, specially created for this purpose. The invasion and occupation of indigenous 
territories is not only a phenomenon of the colonial period of centuries past, but continues 
to the present day, and on a scale and intensity even greater than before (Moonen 2008, 
7–16).  
Hence, the articulation of power initiated by colonialism, the ideology of 
colonialism – coloniality of power – remains as the structure of power configured from 
the European conquest. The villainous character consistent in the intentionality of 
annihilation of the colonial subject that decimated millions of us is divided into two 
distinct fronts, the invasion and domination and the obscuring of colonial violence and its 
direct relation with the viability of Modernity. For conceptual clarity, it is now pertinent 
to show, within the subject of coloniality of power, how such a complex structure 
becomes global and persistent by bringing to light the constitutive lines that unfold in the 
concept of the modern–colonial world-system.  
 
The Modern–Colonial World-System  
The terminology modern–colonial world-system is used throughout this work to 
refer to an analytic unit that comprehends the configuration and structures of power of a 
global character, with interstate and subjective hierarchizations, as was initiated in the 
late fifteenth century legitimating European domination. Such an analytic unit consists, 
in  addition to the concept of world-system developed by the North American sociologist 
Immanuel Wallerstein in the 1970’s (Wallerstein 2011), the concepts proposed by the 
Latin American community of argumentation, especially by Walter Mignolo (Mignolo 
2003), Aníbal Quijano (Quijano 2007a), and Enrique Dussel (Dussel 1997). This 
approach recognizes the impossibility of detaching the element of coloniality in the 
configuration of European Modernity.  
Wallerstein’s world-system concept and theory was strongly influenced by the 
Dependency Theories developed in the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America (Cardoso and 
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Faletto 1979) and by the works of Ferdinand Braudel on the analysis of history (Braudel 
1965). From the Dependency theories, Wallerstein derived the relationship between the 
centre and the periphery, which creates subaltern relationships of geopolitical 
dimensions. From Braudel, Wallerstein derived the long duration historiographic 
analysis. The world-system brings with it the legacy of Modernity, through a combination 
of five mandatory elements: the installing of capitalism as the economic system; the 
flowering of sciences and technologies as fruits of exchanges between Europe and other 
societies, such as the Amerindian, Arabic, and Chinese societies; the secularization of 
social life, giving more importance to rational ways of explaining things in the realm of 
political governance; the creation of nation states as a consequence of the process of 
constitution of the world-system, a scheme of political organization in which European 
societies took centre place in the system while the colonies the place of peripheries; and 
the universality, the Eurocentric pretence of considering everything that was proper for 
Europe and for the European peoples as universal and as the role model for the rest of the 
world. The central critique proposed by Wallerstein is that the world-system was the 
legitimization of a highly unequal system, both within European societies and in the 
colonies. The place that Europe won in the context of the nascent system made it the 
centre of power in the world context for the following centuries. 
 In 1992, Wallerstein and Quijano published together an article called Americanity 
as Concept, or the Americas in the Modern World-System (Quijano and Wallerstein 
1992), in which the authors clarify the core features of the world-system in the creation 
of the Americas and the American identity, with respect to the international division of 
labour, institutional racism, consumerism, and the problematic of hegemonic knowledge. 
Such issues are raised in the concepts of coloniality, ethnicity, racism, and the deification 
of newness, as co-existent and complementary to the world-system’s oppressive 
character. Together, they reinforce the hegemony of capitalism that originated in the 
accumulation of capital from the colonization of the American continents.  
 However, the Decolonial Community of Argumentation feels Wallerstein has 
been trapped in a few Eurocentric assumptions that limit his approach (Restrepo and 
Rojas 2010, 77). This way, decolonial studies are separated from subaltern studies (the 
dependency theories and the centre–periphery analysis consistent with Wallerstein’s 
world-system), despite bearing in common the historical materialist approach in the 
analysis of the configuration of structures of power. Hence, it is necessary to establish the 
distinctions between decolonial studies and post-colonial/subaltern studies, in order to 
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highlight the originality and independency of the decolonial epistemic contribution and 
affirm the terminology of the Modern–colonial world-system, instead of applying 
Wallerstein’s approach. 
The constitutive lines of the decolonial inflexion belong to the scholarship that 
challenges Eurocentrism and Modernity from the colonial difference perspective, 
concepts that are deepened further for the proposition of decolonial epistemologies11. In 
this sense, going through the experience of colonization provides the standpoint for the 
critical approaches that compose the Decolonial Community of Argumentation. The 
community encounters common aspects with the post-colonial and post-imperial 
movements in south-eastern Asia and Africa from the standpoint of the colonial wound. 
It differs, though, from the post-colonial / post-structuralist / post-modernist approaches 
that were developed in the United States and England after World War 2. For Mignolo, 
there must be epistemic and geopolitical distinctions between subaltern studies (from the 
colonial wound) and post-colonial studies (in the United States and United Kingdom), in 
which   
(…) the first originates mainly from the impulse and fury of the colonial wound, while the second 
originates mainly from the impulse and conditions of the western academy and the concomitant 
market of publications. I am talking about the geopolitics of knowledge and the historical-
structural dependence between the metropolis and the colonies, between imperialism and 
colonialism on all planes: economic, political, epistemic and in the formation of subjectivities 
(Mignolo 2005, 49). 
  
In this sense, the epistemic independence from the constitutive lines of the centre 
makes the decolonial community of argumentation capable of challenging Modernity 
from another standpoint – , the colonial difference. As Restrepo concludes,  
Between Wallerstein's notion of the modern world-system and that of Mignolo of the modern / 
colonial world system we find a substantial difference: the latter's emphasis on coloniality. This 
emphasis is not a simple insubstantial addition. On the contrary, the emphasis on coloniality 
transforms the very notion of modernity. While in Wallerstein it operates as an adjective 
indicating contemporaneity or more recent world-system, in Mignolo and other authors associated 
with decolonial inflection it operates as the visible side of coloniality. From the decolonial 
inflection, coloniality is constitutive of modernity, not only in the past but also in the present; 
it is the product of the process of colonial expansion of Europe and a constitutive part of 
modernity: “[...] there is no modernity without coloniality [...]” (Mignolo 2003, 34) (emphasis 
added in bold) (quoted in Restrepo and Rojas 2010, 79). 
 
 This way, coloniality of power is the configuration of the structure of power for 
the last 500 or so years. It is a constitutive element of European Modernity. Challenging 
Modernity from the standpoint of the colonial difference demands challenging its obscure 
                                                        
11 See Chapter 3: Six Colonial Differences. 
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side, coloniality. For this reason, we use the terminology modern–colonial world-system, 
framing the element of coloniality as fundamental to the configuration of global power in 
the present.  
For Mignolo (Mignolo 2003), the modern–colonial world-system’s ideologies are 
distributed between four visible ideologies, Christianity, conservatism, liberalism, and 
socialism, and one invisible basic ideology, coloniality. On the one side would be the 
visible face of this world-system: Modernity, with its apologists and internal critics. On 
the other, there would be a face that is not made explicit, not visible, not recognized as 
immanent to this world-system, coloniality. These ideological operations feed 
Eurocentrism as one of the central premises of the modern–colonial world-system. 
 Coloniality of power constitutes three overlapping spheres of direct oppression in 
the several hierarches created and underpinned by the modern–colonial world-system 
ideologies. The first sphere is the configuration of power in capitalism, which has become 
a global system and engages political and military apparatus for the maintenance of 
hegemonic places, consisting in the invasion and domination of territories, the stealing of 
goods, the imposition of European institutions in the colonies (religious, legal, and 
bureaucratic) – the political–economic aspect of the coloniality of power (Quijano 1992, 
2000). This aspect is very clear in energy planning. When analysing the DEEP, economic 
growth is the main goal of energy futures, substantiated in legal and scientific documents. 
Capital is at the top of the hierarchy of power in energy planning in Brazil. Such power 
is exercised over the ecosystems and peoples, diminishing their relevance, and even 
existence, to privilege transnational financial relationships. 
The second sphere of coloniality of power is about the creation of the colonial 
subject, in which 1) intra-European gender relationships are transferred to the colonies, 
making the European patriarchal family structure and European patriarchal political 
relations the prevailing ways of living, occupying the territory, and dividing labour 
(Lugones 2008; 2012), and is aligned with 2) the racial hierarchization, in which peoples 
are separated and governed by their racial identity, denying the humanity of the non-
European, determining a specific social organization in which the subjectivity, history, 
customs, ontology, and relationship with the territory of the colonized persons are 
violated and annihilated (Césaire 2000; Fanon 2001, 2008; Mariátegui 2007; Quijano 
2007b; Ribeiro 1998; Maldonado-Torres 2007). These are the ontological and subjective 
aspects of the coloniality of power, which Maria Lugones (2008) called coloniality of 
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gender and Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007) called coloniality of being (following 
Mignolo’s propositions).  
Energy planning in Brazil privileges capital to the detriment of life, treating 
energy futures as a task related to business management. The detachment of life from the 
activity of planning is part of the structural patriarchal political relations. The content of 
the DEEP informs that landscapes and resources exist at the disposal of market interests, 
regardless of who or what exists in the territory. It also reinforces the racist character of 
energy planning, since the installing of these enterprises affects mostly indigenous and 
quilombolas12 populations. Nonetheless, the perception of energy futures condones the 
injustices of the Brazilian division of labour, in which all the wealth produced from 
energy businesses is operated in international markets. The DEEP does not propose 
initiatives for local development, but affirms a ‘general gain’ of national economic 
growth. The only relationship between the working class and energy planning in Brazil 
is via the workforce, which is not part of the planning or decision-making process, but 
part of the necessary labour that enables businesses. 
The third sphere of coloniality of power is about the annihilation of the past, the 
ancestry, and the history of the indigenous people for the imposition of  Modern values/ 
categories/ perceptions/ perspectives/ knowledge, so that accepting such values would be 
the only way to exist and understand the world in a legitimate way, a way that is 
institutionalized and universal (Castro-Gómez 2005a; Walsh 2007b, 2012; Grosfoguel 
2006, 2007; Mignolo 2012; Dussel 1997). This configured the epistemological dimension 
of coloniality of power, which Catherine Walsh (2007b) and others called coloniality of 
knowledge. In this sense, energy planning in Brazil privileges scientific underpinnings for 
market-oriented energy production. Grounded in the narrative of economic development 
and sustainable development, the DEEP is biased towards a liberal defence of 
relationships of capital. As indigenous and communal knowledges are annihilated, there 
is no involvement of the population (especially the population most vulnerable to the 
                                                        
12 Quilombolas are inhabitants of quilombos, a typical phenomenon of the Americas. While in the period 
of slavery, the term referred to African and Afro-descendant slaves who fled sugar cane mills, farms, and 
small estates to form small villages called quilombos, it now refers to the descendants of these enslaved 
peoples who live in rural, suburban, and urban communities characterized by subsistence agriculture and 
cultural manifestations that have a strong link with the African past. More than fifteen thousand quilombola 
communities scattered throughout Brazil remain alive and active, fighting for the right to property of their 
lands enshrined in the Federal Constitution since 1988. These communities are scattered throughout the 
Brazilian territory in the states of Alagoas, Pernambuco, Paraíba, Pará, Bahia, Maranhão, Amapá, Mato 
Grosso do Sul, Goiás, Rio de Janeiro, Mato Grosso, Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Paraná, Espirito Santo, Santa 




harm caused by energy enterprises) in the development of the energy plans. Coloniality 
of knowledge is also about academic works (even the critical ones) that continue 
reproducing Eurocentric axiology, epistemologies, and methodologies while critiquing 
energy plans. As discussed further in the section The Problematic of Energy, even critical 
scholars have difficulties in shifting the Eurocentric canon of the annunciation of 
knowledge. 
 The structure of power of the modern–colonial world-system is then forged on 
colonialities of power, didactically divided into three categories: coloniality of power 
itself, coloniality of being (which includes Lugones’ definition of coloniality of gender), 
and coloniality of knowledge.  
 The subdivision of coloniality of power into such categories is didactic because 
colonialities are entrenched and inseparable, one leads to another in a co-constitutive 
manner. The categorizational separation between power, race, gender, and class, as well 
as the separation between economic sciences and political sciences, or even between the 
‘hard’ and social sciences are Modern constructs that work in favour of the relationships 
of oppression. The detachment of the subject who speaks and suffers from the object of 
analysis creates the idea that the object exists in itself without links to historical, social, 
and political analysis. 
 Exemplifying this, let us briefly highlight the elements in energy planning in 
Brazil, advancing some of the points that are discussed in Chapter 6. Energy planning is 
historically, politically, and academically treated as a combination of hard sciences – 
roughly about availability of resources and technological development, and political–
economic factors, such as national or international necessity or availability of investment, 
national trade balance, commodity price oscillation, industrial production, and 
transnational financial risk. Such recognition, understanding, and praxis of energy 
planning is a matter of coloniality of power, independent of whether or not a state is in a 
position of subalternity in relation to the nations of the economic and political centre. In 
this coloniality of power, the prioritization of the hard sciences denotes attention to 
industrial and financial issues in the eyes of the international markets, evidencing stability 
of the national industry and hence, stability of investments. 
Being technologically avant garde is not only a constant hangover of the myth of 
Modernity (the deification of newness that Quijano and Wallerstein describe), it also 
means political intention to attract investments and the capacity to negotiate (in search of 
parity of forces) in the transnational financial markets. The disregard of the human and 
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ecological factors is intentional since they bring uncertainty to the investment, thereafter 
political instability. Energy planning must inform economic stability for investments in 
the long term, as it is evidenced in the DEEP’s chapter named ‘Socioenvironmental 
Analysis’, which treats ecosystems and populations as challenges ‘related to other 
sectors’ (meaning not related to the energy sector) that must be studied ‘in order to assess 
the real risks and opportunities associated with decisions on the various possibilities of 
using available resources’. Such stability is achieved 1) through the prioritization of 
modern–colonial nomos in political economy – coloniality of power; 2) through the 
annulment or invisibility of the subject, namely the persons (active and passive in the 
action of planning) and ecosystems – coloniality of being; and 3) through the separation 
of the social aspects of energy planning from the political economy aspects of it, in a way 
that social consent is manufactured in favour of industrial growth and stability 
underpinned by scientific research – coloniality of knowledge.  
This way, energy planning in the capitalist economy demands the annulment of 
the subject and scientific endorsement. The subject is negated by scientific ‘objectivity’ 
and ‘impartiality’ that analyzes energy planning – the object – for its ends, economic 
growth and funds for research from public and/or private sponsors. Scientific research 
brings legitimacy to political decisions. Political decisions enable scientific research; 
these two factors separate the living beings who occupy the territory from the matter for 
analysis and the decision-making process.  
We follow with brief theoretical constitutions of colonialities of being and of 
knowledge to conclude the expatiation on the topic of coloniality of power, so that we 
establish the necessity of the epistemological discussion. 
 
Coloniality of Being  
The concept of coloniality of being was first proposed by Walter Mignolo as the 
fruit of conversations within the Decolonial Community of Argumentation in the early 
2000’s. It is referenced in Dussel’s developments about exteriority to Modernity, in which 
the presupposition is the consideration of being from a focus other than the self-
referenced understanding of being of the post-renaissance European white man. The 
recognition of the non-Europeans first as non-humans and thereafter as inferior races 
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creates the colonial subject/being. As non-European, the colonized is made to appear 
irrational, primitive, and damned13.  
The concept of coloniality of being takes shape with Maldonado-Torres’ work 
(Maldonado-Torres 2007), which was itself an elaboration of the Heideggerian ontology 
on the question of the identification of the “being”. In Heidegger, ontology is the 
primordial philosophy since the understanding of the individual enables comprehension 
of the total, in the sense that the ‘being’ is the ‘being in place’, or Daisen (Heidegger 
1996). Heidegger localizes the individual in time and space (Daisen) to configure the 
perspective of the collective (they) in search of authenticity, which can only be found by 
resoluteness, and hence, by the certainty of death. This way, death is a singular 
individualizing factor. The anticipation of death provides the means for the achievement 
of authenticity at an individual level (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 250). Death establishes 
the conditions of possibility of one’s own authenticity and the notion of ‘oneself’ that is 
incarnated in the leader as the authenticity factor of the collective.  The possibility of 
dying for the country in a war becomes a means for individual and collective authenticity 
(Maldonado-Torres 2007, 250)14. Maldonado-Torres confronts the Heideggerian death 
by pointing out that this view is interesting for the victor in the war, not for the conquered 
colonized subject. For the author, in the colonial war, 
(…) it must be admitted that the encounter with death is no extra-ordinary affair, but a constitutive 
feature of the reality of colonized and racialized subjects. The colonized is thus not ordinary 
Dasein, and the encounter with the possibility of death does not have the same impact or results 
than for someone whose mode of alienation is that of depersonalization by the One or They. 
Racialized subjects are constituted in different ways than those that form selves, others, and 
peoples. Death is not so much an individualizing factor as a constitutive feature of their reality. It 
is the encounter with daily forms of death, not the They, which afflicts them. The encounter with 
death always comes too late, as it were, since death is already beside them. For this reason, 
[decoloniality] emerge(s) not through an encounter with one’s own mortality, but from a desire 
to evade death, one’s own but even more fundamentally that of others. In short, while a 
vanquished people in war could achieve authenticity, for subjects who are not considered to be 
part of ‘the people’ the situation is different (emphasis added in bold) (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 
250). 
  
Not being considered part of ‘the people’ is a consequence of colonization. The 
Brazilian energy plans which state that economic growth (the ultimate goal of energy 
planning) benefits ‘the people’, are produced regardless of the life of ‘the people’. 
                                                        
13 As Fanon describes Les Damnés de la Terre – The Wretched of the Earth (Fanon 1990). 
14 In Maldonado-Torres’s reading, Heidegger’s views on ontology as a first philosophy follow in an 
argument that ultimately legitimizes Nazism, which was consolidated in those years and to which 
Heidegger received with enthusiasm. For Immanuel Levinas, a Jewish who had to run away to escape the 
holocaust, Heideggerian philosophy does not confront oneself  and the other, which is a matter of ethics. 
(Maldonado-Torres 2007; Restrepo and Rojas 2010, 159–60) 
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Nevertheless, the Brazilian people, especially women, indigenous people, quilombolas, 
black people, and poor people, is not involved in the activity of planning. Such people – 
the vast majority of Brazilians – are damned, facing death, and experiencing survival as 
existence. Being does not exist in the context of energy planning. The subjects are 
challenges for the success and stability of the energy business. ‘The people’ benefitting 
from energy planning are the conquerors, the rationalized subjects who exist because they 
think, because they are [self]endowed with the capacity to plan. 
Maldonado-Torres then questions the ‘being’ of the ego cogito using the 
Dusselian approach, highlighting the Manichean scepticism in the Cartesian philosophy 
that places the colonized subject – ‘the barbarian’ – as the reference for the analysis of 
subjectivity and reason. This way, the author applies Dussel’s conceptualization of the 
ego conquiro as a pre-condition of the very existence of the ego cogito. 
The barbarian was a racialized self, and what characterized this racialization was a radical 
questioning or permanent suspicion regarding the humanity of the self in question. 
(…) 
Unlike Descartes’s methodical doubt, Manichean misanthropic skepticism is not skeptical about 
the existence of the world or the normative status of logics and mathematics. It is rather a form of 
questioning the very humanity of colonized peoples. The Cartesian idea about the division 
between res cogitans and res extensa (consciousness and matter) which translates itself into a 
divide between the mind and the body or between the human and nature is preceded and even, one 
has the temptation to say, to some extent built upon an anthropological colonial difference between 
the ego conquistador and the ego conquistado  (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 245). 
 
This way, for Maldonado-Torres, the ego conquiro means that the conquerors’ 
actions were regulated by the ethics of war (or the non-ethics of war), which created a 
long-standing reality of damnation. The word damned makes reference to Fanon’s 
Wretched of the Earth (Fanon 2001) to define the creation of the colonial subject as the 
defeated in the war of the conquest. Hence, Maldonado suggests that ‘coloniality can be 
understood as a radicalization and naturalization of the non-ethics of war’ (Maldonado-
Torres 2007, 247). As pinpointed in the introduction (and developed further in Chapter 
3) we named the ethics of the modern–colonial world-system the ethics of exhaustion, 
which adds to Maldonado-Torres’ non-ethics of war the fact that it is not only about the 
damnation of the people but also includes, in the ideology of coloniality within the 
context of patriarchal relationships, the intention to exhaust the ecosystem, ancestry, and 
knowledges for the benefit of the project of Modernity, transforming the ethics of the war 
into a political–ideological way of being. The ethics of exhaustion is ontological, 
epistemological, ideological; it is affirmative of the intention to transfer energy from 
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living beings and the natural phenomena to empower those who mimic colonial power. 
This exhaustive character is clear in the Brazilian energy plans as discussed in Chapter 6. 
The configuration of the colonial subject as the damned in the war is not only 
about killing and enslaving. It involves a particular treatment of sexuality that permeates 
the specific modus of exercise of power that informs the whole establishment of morality 
in the colonial society. As Maldonado-Torres informs, ‘racialization works through 
gender and sex and that the ego conquiro is constitutively a phallic ego as well’ 
(Maldonado-Torres 2007, 248). 
Coloniality is an order of things that put people of color under the murderous and rapist sight of a 
vigilant ego. And the primary targets of rape are women. But men of color are also seeing through 
these lenses. Men of color are feminized and become for the ego conquiro fundamentally 
penetrable subject. 
(…) 
Misanthropic skepticism posits its targets as racialized and sexualized subjects. Once vanquished, 
they are said to be inherently servants and their bodies come to form part of an economy of sexual 
abuse, exploitation, and control (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 248–49). 
 
Hence, for Maldonado-Torres, coloniality of being must be understood in the light 
of the ego conquiro, in which ‘being’ is comprehended as philosophical deployment of 
Descartes ego cogito, which evades recognition of the ego conquiro in the consciousness 
of the European. It thus naturalizes the inhuman treatment of the colonized peoples. ‘The 
Cartesian formulation privileges epistemology, which simultaneously hides both what 
could be regarded as the coloniality of knowledge (others do not think) and the coloniality 
of Being (others are not)’ (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 252). In this sense, Maldonado-
Torres establishes the difference of ‘being’ in Heidegger (ontological difference) – the 
being and beings, self and the other, delving into the studies of Immanuel Levinas and 
Franz Fanon on the fundamental ontological differences.  
In Levinas, the ontological difference is elaborated in the sense of exteriority to 
being, what is beyond being, or trans-ontological difference. In this sense, the act of 
giving and receiving, the metaphysical exchange is what enables the communication 
between the self and the other, hence the trans-ontological relationship (Levinas 1999). 
For Levinas, the metaphysical act of giving, the trans-ontological, is the foundation of the 
ontological, the ‘radical givingness and reception’ (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 258). 
Hence, Levinas callenges the Cartesian rationality by framing the issue in terms of one-
for-the-other relationships as fundamental to ontology and to “being”. This would 
ultimately have an effect on responsibility and justice. In the Cartesian rationality, being 
presents itself as the foundation of reality when it is not. 
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What seems incomprehensible in a humanity of flesh and blood to the Cartesian conception - the 
animation of a body by thought, which is non sense according to the intelligibility of a system, in 
which animation is understood only in terms of union and dovetailing and requires a deus ex 
machina – outlines signification itself: the-one-for-the-other. In the subject it is precisely not an 
assembling, but an incessant alienation of the ego (isolated as inwardness) by the guest entrusted 
to it.  
(…) When thematized, synchronized, the one of the-one-for-the-other would be betrayed, even if 
it showed itself with the stigmata of the betrayal and would then lend itself to reduction. What will 
show itself in a theme said is the unintelligibility of incarnation, the “I think” separated from 
extension, the cogito separated from the body. But this impossibility of being together is the trace 
of the diachrony of the-one-for-the-other. That is, it is the trace of separation in the form of 
inwardness, and of the for-the-other in the form of responsibility. Identity here takes form not by 
a self-confirmation, but, as a signification of the-one-for-the-other, by a deposing of oneself, a 
deposing which is the incarnation of the subject, or the very possibility of giving, of dealing 
signifyingness (italics in the original) (Levinas 1999, 79). 
 
In this sense, in Levinas, ontology is the philosophy of power, and philosophical 
accounts that attempt to reduce the-one-for-the-other relation (the trans-ontological 
relation) to knowledge or being, reduce the significance of giving, hospitality, generosity, 
and justice (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 258). 
In Fanon, elaborating on being as being a colonial subject, the ontological 
difference is the ontological colonial difference or sub-ontological difference, that is, ‘the 
difference between being and what lies below being or that which is negatively marked 
as dispensable as well as a target of rape and murder’ (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 254). 
The colonial subject is created by its damnation via the normalization and naturalization 
of the violence of war, in which bodies are at the service of the conquerors. Fanon states 
that the life of the colonized is a ‘permanent struggle against the omnipresent death’ that 
‘tends to make life something resembling an incomplete death’ (Fanon 1965, 128). The 
condemnation of the colonized is then the denial and the invisibility of their very 
humanity. With Fanon, we perceive the persistent intention in the energy plans to make 
the [colonial] subject disappear from the analysis presented, whereas their bodies are at 
the service of the beneficiaries of energy expansion. 
The constant state of war and the naturalization of the ethics of war is shaped by 
the imposition of gendered relationships. Joshua Goldstein, in How Gender Shapes the 
War System and Vice-Versa (2009), explains (from a masculine perspective) how the 
domination of women in wartime is constitutive of the conquest, making mandatory the 
analysis of three central features: 1) male sexuality as a cause of aggression; 2) the 
feminization of enemies as symbolic domination, and 3) dependence on exploiting 
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women’s labour (Goldstein 2009). In this aspect, the colonized men are feminized, that 
is, made even lesser than human – women (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 248)15. 
Transposing this analysis to the present time economic orientation of energy 
planning, which is elaborated regardless of the existence of life, we observe the intrinsic 
and fundamental patriarchal character of the energy plans’ exhaustive intention. Nature, 
nurture, families, children, balance, earth – these are feminine things, perceptions. On the 
other hand, construction enterprises, business management, transnational finance, 
economic language, privileging the economy to the detriment of life are masculine things, 
rational and stable. The idea that bodies and territories exist at the service of the energy 
business is part of the androcentric perception of the relationship between humans and 
nature. Genderization and racialization are part of the inferiorization of the colonial 
subject.  
Although this perspective brings to light the specific treatment of women and the 
feminine as disposable (as the inferior being that can be raped), there is a problem in the 
identification of women that comes from the normalization and naturalization of the 
biological binary dichotomy, which is a western (intra-European) perception that is 
imposed in the colonies. Decolonial authors assume a binary gendered perspective which 
reveals the depth of common patriarchal elaborations. Male authors are comfortable 
analyzing classist and racist oppressions, but not so, the entrenched patriarchal lens in 
society that governs interaction and co-existence of different sections of society. Race 
and gender issues overlap in a way that blinds observers from seeing the two phenomena 
in a co-constitutive manner, forcing an analytical separation of gender and race; in turn, 
and since, additionally, male authors cannot see themselves as beneficiaries of this system 
of oppression, it prevents the observation of patriarchy as the most perverse and invisible 
oppression. We move forward to bring the perspective of decolonial feminists of color to 





                                                        
15 (…) men of color represent a constant threat and any amount of authority, any visible trace of the phallus 
is multiplied in a symbolic hysteria that knows no limits Mythical depiction of the black man’s penis is a 
case in point. The black man is depicted as an aggressive sexual beast who desires to rape women, 
particularly White. The black woman, in turn, is seeing as always already sexually available to the raping 
gaze of the white and as fundamentally promiscuous (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 248). 
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Coloniality of Gender 
In the gendered colonization, Maria Lugones brings the perspective of the 
feminists of color, framing within the terminology of coloniality of being the necessary 
approach to gender. According to Lugones, despite the intersectionality between violent 
domination and exploitation, men do not place themselves with any kind of recognition 
in the complicity or collaboration that lends to the exercise of violent domination of 
women of color (Lugones 2008, 74). There is an epistemic comfort in masculine 
scholarship in denying or distancing that patriarchy of the past and the relationships of 
oppression of women in the present. It is easier to perceive and engage in the depth of 
such relationships of domination when being concerns race and/or inhumanity or 
subalternity. However, masculinity is also a way to ascend in power; it is power in itself, 
and this must be evident in the conceptualization of the colonial subject. 
 Therefore, Lugones makes a critique of Quijano’s concept of coloniality of power 
since he understands that power is structured in relations of domination, exploitation, and 
conflict between social actors who dispute the control of ‘the four basic areas of human 
existence: sex, work, collective authority and subjectivity/intersubjectivity, its resources 
and products’ (Quijano 2000b). For Quijano, the struggle for the control of ‘sexual access, 
its resources and products’ define the scope of sex/gender as organized by the axes of 
coloniality and Modernity. Lugones denounces the limitations of such an analysis of the 
modern/colonial construction of gender, scrutinizing Quijanos’s presuppositions, built 
behind the veil of patriarchy, affirming that ‘Quijano has not become aware of his own 
acceptance of the hegemonic meaning of the gender’ (Lugones 2008, 78): 
Quijano’s gaze presupposes a patriarchal and heterosexual understanding of disputes over the 
control of sex and its resources and products. Quijano accepts the capitalist, Eurocentric and 
global gender understanding. The framework of analysis, as capitalist, Eurocentric and global, 
veils the ways in which colonized, non-white women were subordinated and deprived of power. 
The heterosexual and patriarchal character of social relations can be perceived as oppressive in 
unmasking the presuppositions of this analytical framework (emphasis added in bold) (Lugones 
2008, 78). 
 
 The hegemonic meaning of gender comprises the biological dimorphism – 
man/woman dichotomy and the patriarchal/heterosexual organization of social relations 
that is fundamental to the analysis of the colonial subject – racialized within gendered 
hegemonies. The spectrum of coloniality of power is broader than the creation of races 
(as a biological fiction) that globally hierarchize social relations. It is more 
comprehensive than the Eurocentric theories of social classes and must include, beyond 
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the racialized elaboration of power, control of sexual access, collective authority, work, 
and subjectivity/intersubjectivity, and the production of knowledge from the inside of 
these intersubjective relationships (Lugones 2008, 79). 
A central element of the gendered/racialized domination is in the capitalist 
division of labour. As Quijano explains, capitalism refers to the structural articulation of 
all historically known forms of control of labour or exploitation, slavery, serfdom, petty 
commodity production, wage labour, and reciprocity under the hegemony of the capital–
wage relationship (Quijano 2000a). Lugones points out that such a structure of the 
hegemonic model is discontinuous, since not all labour relations under Eurocentric and 
global capitalism fit into the model of capital/salary relationship (Lugones 2008, 80). The 
decolonial critique that draws from the elaboration on coloniality of power (and its 
spheres of domination, being and knowledge) enables a complex comprehension of labour 
relationships from gendered/racial and geopolitical hierarchizations. Such 
hierarchizations, however, cannot be perceived separately, but must be seen from an 
intersectional perspective in order to make visible the complexity in the victimization of 
women of color. As Lugones argues evoking the conceptual dimension of the feminists 
of color,  
[a]lthough in the Eurocentric capitalist modernity, we are all racialized and assigned to a gender, 
not all of us are dominated or victimized by this process. The process is binary, dichotomous and 
hierarchical. Kimberlé Crenshaw and other feminist colored women have argued that the 
categories have been understood as homogeneous and that they select the dominant, in the group, 
as their norm; therefore, “woman” selects heterosexual white bourgeois females as a norm, “man” 
selects heterosexual white bourgeois males, “black” selects black heterosexual males, and so on. 
Then, it becomes logically clear that the categorical separation logic distorts the beings and social 
phenomena that exist at the intersection, such as violence against women of color. Given the 
construction of the categories, the intersection mistakenly interprets women of color (Lugones 
2008, 82). 
 
 The dynamics of indigenous societies takes place from other perceptions of 
‘gendered’ relationships that compose intersubjectivity. The binary identification of 
man/woman is relative, and social roles are determined according to spiritual and 
metaphysical perceptions. For Oyéronké Oyewùmi, ‘gender was not an organizing 
principle of the Yoruba society before western colonization’ (Oyěwùmí 1997, 30). The 
genderization of the Yoruba society is an example of western domination since the 
‘investigators always find gender when they search for it’ (Oyěwùmí 1997, 31). 
According to Lugones, ‘Oyewùmi notes that the introduction of the Western gender 
system was accepted by the Yoruba males, who thus became accomplices, conspired with 
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the inferiorization of the female’16. Therefore, thinking of the indifference of non-white 
men to violence against non-white women enables the understanding of some of what 
happens through the collaboration between non-white male and western colonizers 
against the females of colour (Lugones 2008, 88).  
We have to constantly bear in mind that coloniality is also about mimicking the 
colonial power as a means to access power, which is also repeated by poor and/or colored 
men. The present form of energy use perpetuates violence against women, placing colored 
women in the most vulnerable situation in facing such violence. Patriarchy is a system 
that discredits women from fighting for their own land. For women of color, in addition 
to the denial or hindering of institutional access to the protection of fundamental rights 
and dignity, they must still escape violence from their own husbands, companions, 
employers, authorities, and others in power. In many situations of the struggle against the 
violence of energy enterprises, for example, women must be represented by men, facing 
patriarchal violence in several collateral aspects. In the energy issue, this has to do with 
the difficulty for women of color to get employment in energy enterprises or in positions 
of planning; with the dangers they face in the forefront of the struggle for land while 
raising children, surviving poverty, and police violence, as well as suffering mental health 
problems specifically caused by the condition of being colored women. As a strategy of 
struggle and survival, they must preserve the unity of feminist anti-racist movements, 
which is a challenge in itself. 
 Paula Gunn Allen researched gynocratic indigenous societies (societies led by 
women) and their spiritual, political, economic, and sexual organizations (Allen 1992). 
In Lugones’ analysis, Oyewùmi and Allen are interested in the collaboration between 
indigenous men and white men to weaken the power of women, framing the reflection on 
the indifference to the struggles of women against multiple forms of violence against 
them and against their own racialized and subordinated communities. ‘The white 
colonizer built an internal force in the tribes co-opting the colonized men to occupy 
patriarchal roles’ (Lugones 2008, 90). 
                                                        
16 Oyewùmi explains that ‘the usual gloss of the categories Yoruba obinrin and okunrin as “woman/female” 
and “man/male”, respectively, is a mistranslation. These categories do not oppose in binary form nor are 
they related by means of a hierarchy’  (Oyěwùmí 1997, 32–33). Lugones complements explaining that ‘the 
prefixes obin and okun specify an anatomical variation that Oyewùmi translates as pointing to the male and 
female in the anatomical sense, abbreviating them as anamale and anafemale. It is important to note that 
you do not understand these categories as binary opposite’ (Lugones 2008, 87). 
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 The creation and imposition of gender is the determinant for the comprehension 
of the colonial subject and for decolonization. This happens though the problematization 
of biological dimorphism and its implications in the modern–colonial world-system (or 
as Lugones says, the colonial/modern gender system). 
The reduction of gender to the private, to control over sex and its resources and products is an 
ideological question presented ideologically as biological, part of the cognitive production of 
modernity, which has conceptualized race as ‘gendered’ and gender as racialized in particularly 
differentiated ways between the European/whites and the colonized/non-white people. Race is 
neither more mythical nor more fictional than gender – both are powerful fictions (emphasis 
added in bold) (Lugones 2008, 94). 
 
 Within such intersectionality in the formation of the colonial subject, the existence 
of women of colour is marked by allocating them to the female gender, but denying them 
the characteristics of femininity and treating them in a manner different from the way 
white bourgeois women are treated. Although both white and coloured women were 
considered ‘animals’ at the service of men, white women were identified with nature, 
children, and with small animals17, whereas coloured women had no humanity at all 
(Lugones 2008, 94). Hence the difference between the feminist struggles of white 
bourgeois women and coloured women as well as the importance of the recognition of 
the rhetoric and the praxis from women of colour in decolonizing being. This has been 
intensively discussed in social and political movements of the present, stressing the 
relevance of coloured women in political representation and participation. Silencing the 
intersectionality of gendered, racial, and classist social allocations results in the women 
of colour being allocated the lowest place in the social hierarchizations of the modern–
colonial world-system. Such silencing is a political–ideological project (Ribeiro 2018) 
with devastating consequences18. 
 
 
                                                        
17 As Lugones explains, ‘[i]t is important to distinguish between what it means to be thought of as if there 
were no gender by virtue of which one is an animal, and what implies not having, even conceptually, any 
gender distinction. That is, having a gender is not a characteristic of the human being for all people’ 
(Lugones 2008, 94). 
18 An example of such a silencing is the assassination of the councilwoman Marielle Franco in Brazil, on 
the 14th March 2018. Black, lesbian, human rights activist, Marielle represented the unfolding of the 
visibility of black women’s struggles (echoing in all the oppressed struggles) in Brazil. Marielle Franco 
was murdered by paramilitary organizations that had pillaged land in slums in Rio de Janeiro and whose 
crimes were being investigated and constantly denounced by Marielle. Hence the importance of the struggle 
of politicians that pierce the overlapping spheres of coloniality of power. The relevance of the assassination 
of Marielle resides in the fact that her cause was disturbing the beneficiaries of a system of oppressions, 
similar to the struggles of indigenous people, quilombolas, and rural women for the right to land and against 
the forced eviction for the instalment of energy enterprises. These are causes that cannot be silenced. 
Marielle Franco’s voice cannot be silenced. Marielle, Presente! See Ramalho 2019.  
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Coloniality of Being: Racial and Gendered Oppressions 
Coloniality of being is then the pattern of power of the modern–colonial world-
system that naturalizes systemic oppressions related to the subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity of persons, transformed into colonial subjects by the imposition of 
gendered and racial hierarchizations. Energy planning in Brazil is grounded in such 
systemic oppressions, in which condition of the victims is denied and life is disregarded 
when contemplating energy futures, whereas life should be the central in the activity of 
planning.  
Such oppressions are persistent and cumulative, mainly suffered by women of 
colour, and result in structural impediments to altering the condition of victim. This 
means that by mimicking coloniality of power, the victim in the modern–colonial world-
system may be able to ascend to another social class, but will be incapable of changing 
the inner ontological condition of being, incurring the oppressive cycle of repeating 
oppressions against similar others, reiterating the ideology of the colonial power. One 
cannot be simplistic and think that it is just a matter of resistance, since the burden of 
liberation is necessarily a social burden, the reason why elements of coloniality cannot be 
analyzed from a single perspective. As Fanon writes in Black Skin White Masks, 
In other words, the black man should no longer be confronted by the dilemma, turn white or 
disappear; but he should be able to take cognizance of a possibility of existence. In still other 
words, if society makes difficulties for him because of his color, if in his dreams I establish the 
repression of an unconscious desire to change color, my objective will not be that of dissuading 
him from it by advising him to ‘keep his place’: on the contrary, my objective, once his motivations 
have been brought into consciousness, will be to put-him in a position to choose action, (or 
passivity) with respect to the real source of the conflict – that is, toward the social structures (Fanon 
2008, 100).  
 
Hence, the structural problematic demands understanding the structures. The 
denial of the multilateral and collateral violence that accompanies ascending in the social 
hierarchy through financial or intellectual capacity pulls the being back into the wheel of 
oppressions. Accumulation of capital – profit – is a trap because it generates death, it 
increases social disparity and poverty. The Brazilian Energy Expansion Plans, by having 
economic growth as the ultimate goal of energy planning, perpetuate the sorry condition 
of the victims, forcing them to work for the system that oppresses them, while suffering 
the consequences of the violence of their own sustenance.  
Intellectual development is even more of a trap: to think that accumulating titles 
of western oriented knowledge, it is possible that one can perceive the world in a critical 
manner and subvert patterns of oppression. However, institutional knowledge – the one 
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that  enables a the colonial subject to obtain a better job – is, in its very formation, a strong 
apparatus to reinforce Eurocentric standards and perceptions; is imposed against non-
Eurocentric ways and recognitions; is universal; justifies, endowed by its self-legitimacy, 
the violent functioning of legal and political institutions; and protects the accumulation 
of wealth through complex theories that justify the subsuming of a people/territory to the 
will of the conqueror. This is the reason why there is a severe epistemological problem 
with energy planning in Brazil: non-Eurocentric knowledge is not efficient, does not 
dialogue with the standard models of capital accumulation, and does not intend to please 
the colonizer. Knowledges that aims for abundance and balanced ways of living are not 
welcome in the energy business.  
In the twenty-first century, the conqueror is the self-made man (who can be a 
woman or no-binary person, who mimics coloniality of power to be able to survive in 
financial capitalism) who has acquired institutional legitimacy to oppress. We move now 
to the discussion of how knowledge is an oppressive weapon and how, by manufacturing 
unchallengeable consent built on scientific research, colonial knowledge determines who 
deserves to benefit from the modern–colonial world-system. Colonial knowledge, 
disguised in the aim of a universal good, cynically oppresses while affirming the ability 
to tackle all forms of understanding in the world. 
 
Coloniality of Knowledge 
The implications for non-Western societies and for subaltern and excluded subjects around the 
world would be quite different if colonialism, imperialism, racism, and sexism were thought of 
not as regretful by-products of modern Europe, but as part of the conditions that made the modern 
West possible (Lander 2000, 525). 
 
Decolonizing knowledge is the heart of this doctoral thesis. To propose 
Decolonial Epistemologies for Energy Planning in Brazil is to affirm that the knowledge 
about energy planning in Brazil is colonial, therefore violent, reinforcing and perpetuating 
the overlapping spheres of coloniality of power. Knowledge is geopolitical. In Brazil, 
knowledge institutions are forged by the imposition of Eurocentric standards via the 
annihilation of all non-Eurocentric symbols, knowledges, philosophies, and technologies. 
All the social and economic phenomena in Brazil are observed with Eurocentric lenses, 
in order to mimic colonial power.  
 In the modern–colonial world-system, knowledge is hierarchically determined by 
the structure of power that legitimizes it, privileging certain types of knowledge over 
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others, according to its place of annunciation and its political–economic interest. It is also 
the concealment of the subject who [speaks] produces knowledge, giving the false idea 
that any scientific production is made in an impartial way, delocalized, entailing its 
application erga omnes. If the subject who produces knowledge is hidden, it is perceived 
as ‘neutral’, suggesting that the person behind the science is neither  a man, nor a woman, 
nor a non-binary individual; is neither black nor white nor indigenous; is neither German 
nor Malawian nor North American, nor Indian; is neither wealthy nor poor; is neither 
from a rural area nor from an urban area; and it does not matter how this person had access 
to institutional knowledge production. It is the researcher/author/writer/scientist 
analyzing a distant object.  
 The standpoint from which to understand coloniality of knowledge is 
Eurocentrism. Restrepo explains that, for the configuration of Eurocentrism, it is 
interesting to combine ethnocentrism and sociocentrism. Ethnocentrism refers to the 
perception of other ways of life and conceptions from one’s own cultural formation; and 
the conviction that one’s own cultural formation is intrinsically superior to those of other 
cultural formations. Anthropologists have shown widespread ethnocentrism among the 
most varied cultural formations; some groups even refer to themselves as ‘humans’ and 
others as not human. Sociocentrism considers the customs and ideologies of different 
social sectors unfortunate or in bad taste and, therefore, disqualifies and rejects them. In 
ethnocentrism and sociocentrism, then, both cultural and social differences are considered 
inferior. (Restrepo and Rojas 2010, 135).  
 Eurocentrism is the naturalization of a universal paradigm of the centralization of 
Eurocentric historical facts, culture, politics, institutionalization, aesthetics, and all forms 
of existence. The imposition of modern philosophy and the sciences had the pretence of 
universality, overriding all forms of knowledge production that would not apply the 
Eurocentric standards. As Mignolo explains,  
Eurocentrism only arises when the particular history of Europe (and, in the second half of the 
twentieth century, that of the United States) and the subjective concomitant order are promoted 
and imposed as a universal model, and colonial subjects accept them in their adhesion to a model 
to be what they are not. The coloniality of being operates by conversion (to the ideals of 
Christianity, of civilization and progress, of modernization and development, of Western 
democracy and the market) or by adaptation and assimilation (as seen in the desire of the elites of 
the colonies to embrace the designs and imperial values that have led to the colonial subjective 
formation) (Mignolo 2012). 
 
Considering that the non-European is inhuman (or a colonial subject), only 
European men could have the capacity of producing knowledge. In the colonies, as any 
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trace of ancestry and knowledge was destroyed, the history became the history of the 
future, now told by European men. For the colonized peoples to be able to produce 
legitimate knowledge (that is, according to Eurocentric standards), they should belong to 
the colonial elite to be accepted in the social circuit of knowledge production. This would 
happen only by mimicking the colonial power and by using the conditions available to 
become capable of producing knowledge. For Grosfoguel, Eurocentrism is a 
fundamentalism that does not tolerate or accept the possibility that there are other 
epistemes or that non-Europeans can think (Grosfoguel 2007, 210).  
 As mentioned previously, coloniality of knowledge is the epistemic dimension of 
coloniality of power. According to Catherine Walsh, ‘coloniality of knowledge not only 
established Eurocentrism as a unique perspective of knowledge, but at the same time, 
completely discarded indigenous and Afro intellectual production as “knowledge” and, 
consequently, [discarded] their intellectual capacity’ (Walsh 2007a, 104). It is about the 
epistemic arrogance of Eurocentric knowledge. Santiago Castro-Gómez called the 
Eurocentric epistemic arrogance La Hybris Del Punto Cero (The Hybris of the Point 
Zero) (Castro-Gómez 2005a). Castro-Gómez informs that:  
[The hybris of the point zero refers to] geopolitical constructions that, as such, appear ordered 
according to extra-scientific imperatives. Europe – as had already happened with the T/O map of 
Isidoro de Sevilla – continues to act as a producer and distributor of culture, while Asia, Africa 
and America are considered as ‘reception’ places. This continental and geopolitical separation of 
the world will be, as we shall see, the epistemological basis on which the anthropological, social, 
and evolutionist theories of the Enlightenment will rise. 
(…) 
In this way, by denying their own material conditions of possibility, the ‘hybris of the point zero’ 
legitimizes an ideological separation between the economic universe (from which the 
observer can calmly ‘be abstracted’, because he had it already guaranteed) and the universe 
of symbolic production (which is the “real” world, which must be conquered by means of 
genius and intelligence) (emphasis added in bold) (Castro-Gómez 2005a, 60). 
 
 Knowledge production in the colonized world is then marked by the hybris of the 
original legitimate knowledge, the dominant geopolitics of knowledge. All knowledge 
produced in the modern–colonial world-system has, at some level, Eurocentric influence. 
This is a constitutive part of the colonies’ institutional formation. The implementation of 
educational institutions in the colonies necessarily mimics the colonial power, once non-
Eurocentric knowledge is not valid/legitimate knowledge. This way, in order to produce 
knowledge that ‘dialogues’ with the colonizer, with Europe, with the hegemonic powers, 
the colonized must fit into the ‘scheme’, or not be heard at all. Education was necessary 
to understand the novel bureaucratic and legal systems installed in the colonies. Such 
systems were intra-European, since the ontology and subjectivity of the colonized were 
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annihilated for the establishment of the colonizer’s institutions. Hence, critical and 
hegemonic institutional knowledge in the colonies shared the same locus of annunciation: 
Eurocentric philosophy and sciences. 
 Therefore, many academically recognized Latin American critical thinkers and 
theorists (even anti-colonial ones) also reproduced Eurocentric theoretical and ideological 
frames. The critique of critical thinkers in the colonized world must be delicate to avoid 
‘friendly fire’. Decolonizing knowledge is also about bringing the constitutive lines of 
the present into critical decolonial thought. Finding the problematic Eurocentrism in those 
constitutive lines is necessary for the epistemic decolonial turn. The problematic is not 
the geographical allocation of the production of knowledge, but mainly its geopolitical 
and subjective character. This is the case of the Peruvian philosopher Jose Carlos 
Mariátegui, for example. 
The works of José Carlos Mariátegui are important contributions to the study of 
social change in Latin America. His Seven Essays on the Interpretation of the Peruvian 
Reality (Siete Ensayos de Intepretación de la Realidad Peruana) (Mariátegui 2007), first 
published in 1933, consisted of a deep critique of the establishments of  political economy 
in Peru; it interconnected the elements of class, (indigenous) race, politics, land, religion, 
and knowledge to apply Marxian theory from the perspective of the new Peruvian 
republic to analyze the structure of the colonial and imperial times prior to its 
independence from Spain. Following the Marxian comprehension of historical 
developments and the constitution of the society in Peru, Mariátegui perceived the 
division of land and labour relationships in the colony as feudal in character and the 
difficulties of developing an advanced capitalism as a result of the inheritance of the 
decadent Spanish economy and its precarious capitalism when compared to that of 
England and North America.  
Mariátegui’s Seven Essays draw the mismatch of institutions of power 
legitimating and reinforcing oppressions, from the division of land to the enactment of 
laws, highlighting that the separation of class was also separation of race, the imposition 
of religion, and the suppression of the self-recognition of indigenous people in society. 
Studying Mariátegui is definitely enlightening for the comprehensive analysis of the 
present energy systems in Brazil, where the oligarchs and the bourgeois form the 
economic, political, and intellectual classes that create the violent character of energy 
systems and condone the violent character of energy planning. 
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Mariátegui denounces the inheritance from the colonial power of a system of 
privileges that frames not only formal institutions but the definition of life as a whole. In 
the fourth and seventh essays, ‘The Public Education Process’ and ‘The Literature 
Process’, the author lists the problem of independent education and literature, 
respectively, as the emancipatory potential of knowledge that, in the system of hierarchies 
and privileges, becomes the opposite force to an emancipatory force (Mariátegui 1988, 
86–133; 191-). 
Nevertheless, as Dussel argues, feudalism is an intra-European phenomenon. 
There was no feudalism in Latin America; since the European invasion of the Americas 
feudalism is already a constitutive element of Modernity (Quijano 2007a), which Dussel 
called first Modernity (Dussel 1994; Dussel, Krauel, and Tuma 2000). In this sense, 
primitive accumulation of capital (mercantile capitalism) enables the second Modernity 
(the enlightenment and so on). In other words, the colonial enterprises, as Modern 
phenomena (ideologically, politically, and economically), do not reproduce feudal 
relationships in the colonies. In the Americas, the division and ownership of land takes 
place in a completely different manner than in feudal Europe19. It is important to perceive 
the relationship between the exploitation of natural resources and the transnational 
monopoly finance, which shapes the present energy systems in Brazil. Transnational 
capitalism is the determinant for the configuration of the Brazilian nation-state, grounded 
in the production of commodities for export. This is crucially a Modern phenomenon. 
In recognition of this system of privileges, Mariátegui points out the features of 
the gamonale and the capitalist bourgeoisie; the former refers to the landowner, patriarch, 
oligarch, exercising power through the exploitation of his latifundio using a slave 
                                                        
19 The distribution of titles of land ownership – sesmarias – was made following the domination of the 
territories. Every institutional apparatus is set in place after the conquer (including the wars against 
indigenous peoples). According to José Murilo de Carvalho (1997), there is a correlation between 
clientelism, coronelism (caciquismo), and mandonismo (the specific phenomena of the relationship 
between political and economic power in Brazil) and patrimonialism and feudalism, but the crucial 
differences lie in the subordination of landowners to a very powerful state. This is not the case in Brazil or 
in the other colonies in Latin America. ‘Insisting on the weakness of the rural lordship before the State and 
from there deducing the existence of a representative state of the same lord seems in fact somewhat strange’ 
(Carvalho 1997). ‘The important thing in the whole debate is not to discuss whether there was or there is 
domination. No one denies this. The problem is to detect the nature of domination. It makes a huge 
difference whether it comes from a movement centered on the dynamics of class conflict generated in the 
market society that emerged from the transformation of feudalism into modern industrial society, via 
contractualism, representation of interests, political parties, political liberalism; or whether it is based on 
the slow expansion of state power that gradually penetrates society and encompasses classes through 
patrimonialism, patronage, coronelism, populism, corporatism. It is this difference that makes Brazil and 
Latin America not the United States or Europe, which are the Other West, in the happy expression of José 
G. Merquior.’ (Carvalho 1997). 
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workforce for large scale export; the latter refers to the merchant class, as the core of 
imperialist capitalism that becomes the economic system after the Peruvian independence 
(Mariátegui 1988, 17–19). The capitalist bourgeoisie and the gamonales had, at the same 
time, convergent and conflicting interests. On the one hand, the elimination of oligarchic 
privileges was necessary for the implementation of liberal markets. On the other hand, 
the entry and consolidation of a class of capital demanded an alliance with the 
landowners, because they had power in the current political structure and the monopoly 
of capital from the slave-owning exploitation of the land and natural resources. This topic 
is analyzed in the Brazilian context in Chapter 6 to tie the historical construction of 
Brazilian administrative institutions to the context of energy planning in the present. 
The transition from (what Mariátegui calls) a ‘feudal’ to a ‘liberal’ economy in 
Peru is achieved by the meeting of imperialist and monopolistic interests of national elites 
focused on international trade, especially with North America and Europe. Hence, for 
Mariátegui, the gamonale ‘becomes’ the capitalist, merging the current power 
configuration with the interests of imperial capitalism, holding the best positions in trade, 
political, military, juridical, religious, and academic institutions. Capitalism in Peru took 
root through the protagonism of such elites, who maintained the whole set of inequalities 
and their legitimations via capital and political power. The figure of the gamonale reflects 
the colonial system and is perennial, being very representative of the Latin American 
elites in the present times. 
The importance of revisiting Mariátegui for the study of social change in Latin 
America is highlighted by Anibal Quijano in the prologue of the 2007 edition of the Seven 
Essays: 
(...) What does it mean to reflect on Mariátegui today? In the Peruvian sphere, it is above all the 
irrefutable testimony of the reunion, each day deeper, after several decades, between the 
revolutionary movement of a proletariat that advances to the conquest of its political maturity and 
the direction of the struggles of the other exploited Peruvians, and the memory of the man to whom 
we owe the central contribution to the birth of his first trade union organizations and national 
policies, and the still fruitful matrix of a revolutionary theory and strategic orientation in Peruvian 
society (Mariátegui 2007, IX).  
 
Quijano highlights the need to realize the contribution of non-European 
revolutionaries to the development of Marxian thought, beyond the Eurocentric barriers 
that constrained Marxian occidental thought, illustrating that the ‘most intense and 
decisive revolutionary struggles happened in scenarios distant from Europe’ (Mariátegui 
2007, X), in which ‘(...) [t]riumphant or defeated, these have revealed in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America, a new territory of revolutionary thought (...)’ (Mariátegui 2007, X). This 
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way, Mariátegui brings to light the debate regarding the relationships between materiality 
and intersubjectivity of social relations and historical relations between the ways of 
production (Mariátegui 2007, CXVII). 
 Notwithstanding, there are many problems with Mariátegui’s approach. The 
obsession with explaining Peruvian history as a feudal history forces the interpretation of 
the class struggle critique in intra-European frames. As Catherine Walsh points out,  
For Mariátegui, the central concerns in Latin America were the struggles of nationhood, culture, 
and class, understood from the frame of Marxism, applied and thought from the particularity of 
the Andes. The attention Mariátegui gave to the plight of the peasantry afforded a visibility 
previously negated. Yet, by elevating the struggles of class over race, converting indigenous 
peoples to campesinos or peasants, and denouncing blacks as barbarians with nothing to contribute 
to these struggles, Mariátegui not only reproduced Marxism’s racial blindness but also the racist 
sentiments propagated by many key European thinkers, most notably Kant and Hegel20 (Walsh 
2007b, 224). 
 
 Obviously, the matter discussed here is not to debate with Mariátegui or discount 
his critical contribution21. The core problematic is to challenge ‘its centeredness in 
western paradigms, frameworks, and theory’ (Walsh 2007b, 225) and bring to light the 
unspoken element of such frameworks: coloniality. The unfolding of decolonial 
epistemologies must be made from the perspective of the colonial difference, that is, 
pensamiento próprio, ‘own thinking’. As mentioned previously, it does not imply 
isolation of indigenous cultures, experiences, and perspectives from other epistemic 
traditions, but seeks the development of a ‘political conscience’ (Martínez 2005). For 
Walsh,  
The ‘political conscience’ here is not the same as that conceived by Marxism or by Eurocentric 
critical thought. Instead it is a consciousness whose roots derive from the lived experience of 
colonial histories and millenary struggles to confront the social, political, epistemic, racialized, 
and existential effects of these histories. It is what the Afro-Ecuadorian intellectual Juan García 
refers to as the building of a collective sense of belonging, an unlearning of what the dominant 
society has inculcated and a relearning of past and present ancestral knowledge, a focus on the 
                                                        
20 Walsh refers to Mariátegui’s El Problema de las Razas en América Latina (The Problem of Race in Latin 
America), in which the author makes innumerous racist statements, such as: ‘[t]he contribution of the negro 
that arrived as a slave seems less valuable and negative [in comparison to the indigenous]. The negro 
brought with him his sensuality, superstition, and primitive nature. He is not in conditions to contribute to 
any culture, but rather threatens to obstruct culture through the crude and living influence of his 
barbarianism’ (Mariátegui 1995). 
21 There is tremendous relevance of Marxist authors in theorizing and politicizing class struggle in Latin 
America. Mariátegui writes in the late 1920s and the 1930s, the period in which Marxist/Leninist theories 
and the Second International crucially influenced the unionization of rural and urban workers in Brazil, 
especially the luta campesina and the miners’ movements (like the Morro Velho Mine Union, among 
others). This way, beyond the theoretical contribution, Marxist writers like Mariátegui, as well as South 
American communist movements, influenced political organizations to fight for worker’s rights and for the 
right to land. These movements sowed the seeds for important organizations of the anti-dam movement in 
Brazil, such as the Pastoral Committee for the Land (Comissão Pastoral da Terra) in 1971. Likewise, the 
Theology of Liberation, which was inspired by catholic organization spawned the MAB and the Movement 
of Peoples Affected by Dams (Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens) in 1991. 
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social, political, and epistemic work that needs to be done within (emphasis added in bold) (Walsh 
2007b, 231). 
 
 Decolonizing knowledge means to bring in ‘other’ critical thought from the 
ongoing struggles – epistemic and political. ‘Such shift is important for what it helps 
reveal, including the subjects left out or marginalized by much of critical theory and their 
socio–political and epistemic agency, but also the association between thought and social 
and political intervention’ (Walsh 2007b, 232). 
 Colonialities of power, being, and knowledge are co-constitutive and 
interconnected, configuring subjectivities and power relationships in the modern–colonial 
world-system. Bringing in the element of coloniality as central to the historical creation 
of victims uncovers the genealogy of the oppression. It means no longer perpetuating the 
oppressor’s understanding of economic and political relationships, the annulment or 




 In this chapter we focused on acknowledging the existence of victims in the 
modern–colonial world-system’s configuration of power in order to challenge the 
colonial epistemologies for energy planning in Brazil. Coloniality of power is the 
ideology of the modern–colonial world-system, which naturalizes economic and political 
oppressions, patriarchal and racist social organizations, and hegemonic knowledges.  
We set theoretical grounds for the understanding of the concept of coloniality as 
the ideology of power that via historical hierarchization of territories, persons, and 
knowledge, imposes a mimicry of the colonial system’s violence as a means to access 
power. This ideology takes place via capitalist, racist, patriarchal, and militarized 
violence, setting up economic and political systems, social relations, and relationships 
with the ecosystems. The elements of coloniality of power were highlighted in the light 
of the Brazilian DEEP 2015–2024 with reference to: 1) coloniality of power itself, that 
is, the Brazilian historical and geopolitical dependence on the exploitation of natural 
resources for export; 2) coloniality of being, in which peoples are hierarchized according 
to gender, race, and class and exposed to vulnerabilities created by the exploitation of 
energy inputs by ethnic cleansing and/or non-inclusion of the populations’ demands and 
culture in the activity of planning, and by siphoning the profits from energy exploitation 
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to the wealthy business owners and (international) investors; 3) coloniality of 
knowledge, in which the definition of energy and energy futures are narrowed to 
Eurocentric epistemologies that legitimate the imposition of agendas that ensure positions 
of economic and political power. 
 Challenging the violence of energy planning in Brazil involves all those aspects. 
First, it is necessary to challenge the ethics of accepting the exhaustion of bodies, 
ecosystems, and knowledges. Second, it is necessary to challenge the specific 
oppressions: patriarchy, racism, epistemic violence, subalternity, and the developmental 
agenda. Third, it is necessary to apply the theoretical elaborations in order to design a 
decolonial plan, spelling out the type of energy planning that, instead of causing 
exhaustion, brings abundance. The naturalization of oppressions is part of an ethical 
system that exists due to the imposition of places of subalternity, which we called ethics 
of exhaustion, and which is detailed in Chapter 4. The modern–colonial world-system’s 
ethics of exhaustion must be epistemically challenged to transform subjectivities, social 
relations, and political organizations in order to include the point of view of the victims 
of a system of oppressions in planning for the future. We proceed to the theoretical 





Chapter 3: The Epistemic Decolonial Turn on Energy 
Planning 
 
What Does Decolonial Mean? 
Decolonial approaches and practices are concerned with challenging colonialities 
entrenched in the ways of existing with our bodies in territories, with the ways of knowing 
from inside or outside institutions of knowledge, and with the ways of establishing 
political and economic relations in society. Applying decolonial methodologies (Smith 
2013) and epistemologies (Grosfoguel 2007; Walsh 2007b) enables the perception of a 
vast range of possibilities to discuss the social and environmental catastrophes of present 
times that cannot be perceived using the Eurocentric lens imposed on institutions of 
knowledge.  
 
Throwing Away the Master’s Tools and Dismantling the Master’s House22 
Epistemology is a branch of philosophy concerned with the foundations of 
knowledge. The way knowledge is historically and geopolitically established defines its 
application in the material (practical/praxis) world. Thus, the way energy is known in the 
realm of ideas or a given approach to the concept of energy (the idea of energy) will 
define the methodology for its attainment in the material world. The activity of energy 
planning is, hence, a consequence of the epistemological approach to the subject. The 
activity of energy planning involves the methodology for obtaining and distributing 
energy as well as the specific procedures or techniques used to identify, select, process, 
and analyze information about energy – the information used in planning for energy. 
To illustrate the need for epistemological challenges, let us didactically borrow a 
metaphor from the legal doctrine of the fruits of the poisonous tree23, which says that if 
the original seed contains a poison, there will be poison in the final product produced by 
the tree, that is, the fruit. Hence, if the concept of energy is corrupted, planning for it will 
yield a vicious product. If energy is conceived of, as imposed by colonial [violent] 
epistemologies, as the spine of industrial–financial capitalism, planning for it will be a 
                                                        
22 Reference to Audre Lorde’s text The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, first 
published in 1979. 




set of practices to underpin, reinforce, and enhance industrial–financial capitalism with 
the violence entrenched in it. On the other hand, if energy is conceived and perceived 
from a decolonial perspective, as a need of all the peoples respecting the limitations of 
persons, living beings, and the planet, its planning will be a set of practices for the benefit 
of all the persons, living beings, and the planet. Although this is a simple argument, to 
epistemologically challenge the understanding of energy (or, in other words, to 
decolonize the comprehension of energy) is a complex task, demanding a scrutiny of its 
philosophical, historical, political, territorial, ecological, and economic meanings.  
The present understanding of energy interferes with the whole collective of 
people, living beings, natural resources, and natural phenomena on the planet. Our earth 
is a complex interconnected system (Shiva 2016; 2010; 2001). Modern forms of energy 
inputs are the results of ‘human’ interventions in the planet over the last 500 years 
(Bellamy and Diamanti 2018) – the Modern/Eurocentric/colonial interventions (Mignolo 
2016). Independent of the character of such interventions in the ecological systems, 
whether they are ‘sustainable’24 or not, it is possible to assert that humans have been 
intervening in the planet’s ecology to obtain energy inputs.  
To discuss energy planning in this thesis, we start by discussing the meaning of 
energy in the present – the epistemological discussion – to understand the relationship 
between the epistemology of energy and the production and reproduction of human life. 
This reasoning leads to the primordial issue of discussing the meaning of energy: its 
ethics. The production and reproduction of life is the content of ethics, the material aspect 
of ethics. The content of ethics gains intersubjective validation through formal social 
outcomes, like norms and institutions. The intersubjective validation must aim to fulfil 
the content of ethics, that is, must make the production and reproduction of life feasible. 
This way, the discussion about the epistemology of energy – the way energy is historically 
and geopolitically defined in the present – is useful whether the epistemology of energy 
in the present supports the production and reproduction of life or not. Accordingly, 
understanding the ethics of energy is essential to the discussion of energy planning.  
                                                        
24 The idea of sustainability is dealt with later in Chapters 5 and 6 (section The DEEP’s Premises). Roughly, 
it is argued that there is no sustainable way to use natural resources in the current ways of production. While 
there is industrial production for profit, it is not sustainable. The idea and acceptance of surplus value as a 
mandatory feature of capitalist relationships cannot coexist with a sustainable human intervention in the 
planet. Profit is gained by the expenditure of energy without exchange and balance, a single pathway of 
donation without reward, with the exclusive purpose of accumulation of capital.  
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The epistemological critique of energy is illuminated by the theoretical 
elaborations on the coloniality of power. The relationships of power over the economic, 
political, institutional, and intersubjective social dynamics is fundamental to the 
epistemological discussions. Coloniality must be challenged in the spheres of power, 
being, and knowledge, the reason why the epistemological critique that is proposed here 
is decolonial. The decolonial epistemological critique enables questioning the ethical 
validity and acceptability of the modern–colonial world-system’s epistemology of energy 
in meeting the ethical criteria.  
To expatiate on the modern–colonial world-system’s ethics, as dealt with in 
Chapter 4, the ethics of exhaustion, let us delineate the decolonial epistemological 
perspective. It aims to contrapose the Eurocentric definitions of the global legitimate 
knowledge and the global geopolitics of power by focusing on the analysis of 
accumulation of capital as the central feature of the European colonial expansion. In the 
Eurocentric understanding of the world’s political economy, class analysis and economic 
structural transformations are privileged over other power relations. Attacking the energy 
problem exclusively as a consequence of economic relations, leading to social and 
environmental catastrophes, misreads the dimension of the problem, blurring the 
visualisation of any other perspective outside the Eurocentric/Modern frameworks. 
The epistemological critique proposed here must be from outside the modern–
colonial impositions on knowledge, as discussed earlier on the issue of coloniality of 
knowledge. Such impositions dictate Eurocentric perspectives or, as described by the 
Puerto Rican philosopher Ramon Grosfoguel, fundamentalisms. ‘What all 
fundamentalisms share … is the premise that there is only one sole epistemic tradition 
from which to achieve Truth and Universality’ (Grosfoguel 2007, 212). The epistemic 
decolonial turn is the unlocking of other ways of knowing – epistemologies other than 
the fundamentalist ones (Grosfoguel 2007).  
The critique of Eurocentrism cannot be made from within Eurocentric 
establishments, whether postmodern, poststructuralist, or postcolonial perspectives 
(Dussel 2013, 55–107). Eurocentric establishments are grounded in the theoretical 
developments that reduce subaltern studies to technique, genealogy, subaltern 
consciousness, and agency, as Ilena Rodriguez argues in the Latin American Subaltern 
Studies Reader (Rodriguez 2001). Rodriguez makes reference to Florencia Mallon’s 
critique (Mallon 1994) that subaltern works ‘keep trying to ride the four horses of the 




(…) Have we, as [Mallon] argues, reduced subaltern studies to ‘half of its complexity: the methods 
and techniques of postmodernism’ (1504)? In other words, has our political project been buried 
beneath our postmodern vocabulary? Are we really capable of ‘marshalling semiotics and 
postmodern techniques for emancipatory purposes’ (1498)? Can we combine the ‘politically 
positive liberating potential of subaltern histories’ (1498) with poststructuralism and 
deconstruction? Are we capable of maintaining ‘the irresolvable tension… between technique and 
political commitment, between a more narrowly postmodern literary interest in documents as 
“constructed texts” and historians’ disciplinary interests in reading documents as “windows”, 
however foggy and imperfect, on people’s lives’ (1506)? (…) (Rodriguez 2001, 4). 
 
Rodrigues herself answers such questions objectively: no. With due respect and 
consideration to the works of the people mentioned here, the ‘four horses of the 
apocalypse’, the whole idea of the epistemic decolonial turn is to bring in perspectives 
other than Eurocentric androcentric universal fundamentalisms (Amorós 2000; 1991; 
Lugones 2016).  
What then, is outside of Eurocentric fundamentalisms? It is fair to say that 
academic institutions are Modern/Eurocentric constructs, which makes it impossible to 
find ‘pure’ decolonial epistemologies. Searching for pure theory is a very violent pursuit 
because these Modern/Eurocentric constructs prevent epistemic diversity, using material 
ethics and formal morality as instruments to explain the world by simplifying existence.  
The assumption that something exists in its untouched original conception, 
disregarding ‘human pollution’, history, constitutive elements, or the object which is 
being theorized about, is an epistemic fallacy. In Hans Kelsen’s work to create a Pure 
Theory of Law, he describes what is meant by ‘pure’: 
It is called the pure theory of law because it only describes the law and attempts to eliminate from 
the object of its description everything that is not strictly the law: its aim is to free the science of 
law from alien elements. This is the methodological basis of theory (Kelsen 2005, 1). 
 
Kelsen’s attempt to free the science of law from alien elements is the typical 
pursuit of legitimacy for the one-size-fits-all epistemic rule that will bring theoretical 
validation in order to be universal and apply to all the peoples in all places at all times. 
His pretension in informing the fundamental rule of the legal system ignores its Christian/ 
Roman origins and the manipulation of ‘god’s will’ to dominate peoples and territories 
and install a formal morality, institutionalizing appropriation of foreign property with the 
victims unable to resist (Anghie 2005, 1996; Mignolo 2016). The Kelsenian epistemic 
purity is an accurate example of a fundamentalist approach that denies constitutive lines 
and the context of theoretical production. In this sense, being anti-European, anti-Modern, 
and anti-Western are clearly not the aims of decolonial epistemologies. On the contrary, 
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the acknowledgement of what is Eurocentric and how Eurocentrism is embedded in the 
very concept of epistemology enables an even sharper critique. 
For the study of energy planning, the collection of non-fundamentalist 
possibilities will follow the Latin American Community of Argumentation’s25 
observations: 1) to ‘bring a broader canon of thought than simply the Western canon 
(including the Left Western canon)’; 2) to avoid perspectives ‘based on abstract universal 
[global] design’, but bring in ‘the result of the critical dialogue between diverse critical 
epistemic/ethical/political projects towards a pluriversal as opposed to a universal world’; 
and 3) to ‘take seriously the epistemic perspective/is cosmologies necessary/insights of 
critical thinkers from the Global South, thinking from and with subalternized 
racial/ethnic/sexual spaces and bodies’ (emphasis added in italics) (Grosfoguel 2007, 
212).  
Fundamentalist epistemologies are those produced in the Global North (as a 
geopolitical concept) or by revered authors from the Global North. They are written by 
men who revere masculinity and masculine authors and are necessarily androcentric; are 
white or revere whiteness; and impose an abstract universal truth. They are written in the 
third person without reference to the author’s geopolitical context; pretend not to be 
linked to any social custom, spirituality, or feelings (a-ontological); accept and internalize 
the superiority of human beings over other living beings and natural phenomena; have 
their specific comprehensive methods, exclusively challengeable by the same methods; 
prioritize the use of data in relation to experiences and social demands, manufacturing 
consent through scientific results; hierarchize the validity and legitimacy of types of 
knowledge; privilege political-economy paradigms; and announce knowledge to be 
applicable to all the peoples, in all the places, for all times.  
Hence, fundamentalist epistemologies are hegemonic thoughts to the detriment of 
the majority of people, the non-human living beings, and the ecosystems. Fundamentalist 
epistemologies are therefore violent. Epistemic violence is the use of such epistemologies 
to shape scientific discoveries, it is the ground for extensive hegemonic research and 
underpins political decisions over social dilemmas in the use of natural resources. 
Therefore, epistemic violence is not only a matter of exclusively observing economic 
relationships but also the reason why economic relationships are privileged in relation to 
                                                        
25 Castro-Gómez 2005ª; 2005b; Dussel 2013; 1994; Grosfoguel 2007; Icaza 2015; 2010; Icaza and Vázquez 
2013; Lugones 2016; 2012; 2008; 2007; Maldonado-Torres 2007; 2004; Mignolo 2016; 2012; 2011; 2010, 
2005; 2003; 2000; Quijano 2007ª; 2007b; 2000ª; 2000b; 1992; Walsh 2007a; 2007b; 2002. 
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all other relationships and their imposition is the main problem leading to the planet’s 
catastrophe.  
Challenging colonial epistemologies is to challenge epistemic violence from the 
standpoint of the colonial difference. Violent epistemologies are direct coercive ways of 
imposing meanings in order to legitimize agendas that ensure positions of power. Such 
violent epistemologies are perceived from the critical–negative analysis of their ethical 
content, that is, the impossibility of producing and reproducing life from the attributed 
meaning. The critical–negative analysis of the content of ethics is a theoretical tool to 
identify the victims of ethical systems, that is, those who are being prevented from living 
a full life (of producing and reproducing life) as a consequence of the structure of the 
ethical system. Referring to violence is referring to the creation of victims.  
Epistemic violence occurs by limiting the use of knowledges, symbols, 
subjectivities, and items of cultural construction in configuring collective and institutional 
knowledge. This limitation refers to identifying knowledges, symbols, subjectivities, and 
items of cultural construction that are interesting for the agenda of power and annihilating 
the non-interesting elements. In the colonial context, epistemologies are formed for the 
imposition of colonial power, which claims universality, that is, to be imposed erga 
omnes. The colonial subject must abide by the imposed meanings since those meanings 
shape institutions and social relations. As the colonial subject is not part of ‘the people’ 
(as explained earlier in the topic on coloniality of being), social inclusion is made through 
forced imitation of colonial knowledge production and abdication of any meanings 
produced before colonization. The colonial subject’s knowledge production is 
marginalized, disabling the possibility of self-recognition, own history, own norms, and 
own science and philosophy. The colonial subject is then a victim of this system because 
she/he cannot live a full life, cannot produce or reproduce their own life, and are forced 
to fit into the system of knowledges, symbols, and subjectivities of the colonizer – the 
Eurocentric system. In this way, epistemic violence prevents epistemic diversity, aiming 
for the imposition and establishment of an agenda of power over time. This is a 
fundamental feature of the success of the colonial enterprise, a determinant of the 
permanent character of colonial power.  
Over time, as the coloniality of power imposes this violence, its victims are 
naturalized. The modern–colonial world-system trivializes the creation of victims as the 
downside of modern developments, as if the existence of the victims was incidental and 
unintentional. Notwithstanding, there would be no colonial power without the victims. In 
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this sense, epistemic violence is the intentional creation of victims by denying them the 
independence to define and determine institutional and social relations from diverse 
epistemic possibilities. 
To counter epistemic violence, it is necessary to discuss and apply the contribution 
of feminist and racial/ethnic subaltern perspectives. It is also crucial to apply decolonial 
methodologies to expand the field of research from the ‘scientific’ and ‘economic’ 
languages, that is, intentionally de-hierarchize the focus on political economy so other 
possibilities can arise from experiences that historically did not/cannot/will not reach 
places of power/institutional knowledge.  
In 1979, black and chicana feminists in the United States got together to rise 
against the whiteness and maleness of literature, academic production, political 
organizations, and white wealthy feminist movements, an outcome of which was the 
remarkable work edited by Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa, This Bridge Called my 
Back – Writings by Radical Women of Colour (1979). In this work, the central purpose 
was to question why the same methods and approaches were being applied even when 
new solutions to old problems were sought? The book contains the inspirational historical 
text by Audre Lorde, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House 
(Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983, 98). The text is Audre Lorde’s presentation in the panel The 
Personal and the Political, at New York University Institute of Humanities in 1979, an 
event that commemorated the 30th anniversary of Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex. 
Lorde’s argues for the acknowledgement and embodiment of the difference between the 
various women and the various feminist movements, and against trying to club all 
feminist movements as a single struggle. She asks: ‘Why aren’t other women of colour 
found to participate in this conference?’ in which she calls for the difference, for other 
people, (not masters) and other tools (epistemic turn) to make the necessary change to 
stop sexism, homophobia, and racism, as well as their terrible structural (the house) 
marks. 
From Audre Lorde’s critique we learn that the epistemic decolonial turn demands 
the identification of the subject who speaks and the location from where that is being said, 
as well as the identification of the tools used to elaborate that issue. The relationship 
between the subject and object of the analysis also gains a decolonial approach. This 
means that the object of study (or the approach/relevance given to it) changes when the 
subalternized (colonial) subject gains moral/formal legitimacy in producing non-violent 
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epistemologies. If ‘the woman from the mines in Bolivia is allowed to speak’26, the form 
she speaks in will be different from the Eurocentric academic form, but, centrally, the 
object of her speech is related to her perspectives and demands. In the same fashion, the 
Xingu women displaced by the forced construction of the Belo Monte dam in Amazonia 
will not discuss the country’s economic growth based on the expansion of energy 
production or on the price of the enterprises’ shares in the stocks market. Access to energy 
from the indigenous perspective has nothing to do with the international trade balance 
since the priority is the preservation of the livelihood in the territory, which will enable 
the healthy occupancy of the land, production of food, logistics, and interactions with 
non-indigenous perspectives. In this sense, decolonizing energy planning demands 
shifting the objectives of energy planning that, instead of aiming at Brazilian economic 
growth, should aim for the production and reproduction of life, enabling the people to 
live a full life. 
Such identifications are central, representing the distinction between the 
hegemonic episteme and the decolonial one. Gendered, racial, territorial, political, and all 
the colonial differences must be acknowledged. 
The difference then is the point of departure for the decolonial turn. In his works 
“Diferencia Colonial y Razón Postoccidental” (Colonial Difference and Post-Occidental 
Reason) (Mignolo, 2000) and “Local Histories, Global Designs” (Mignolo 2012; 2003) 
the Argentinian sociologist Walter Mignolo defines colonial epistemic difference. As 
Restrepo and Rojas, by quoting Mignolo’s work, describe,  
(…) the colonial difference alludes to the place and to the experiences of those who have been 
object of inferiorization on the part of those who, in the middle of the colonial enterprise, consider 
themselves superior. Knowledge, beings, territories and colonized populations (or that are 
colonizable, one might add) are epistemic, ontologically and socially inferiorized by the colonialist 
look. These are places and experiences that are constituted as an exterior to modernity (not 
modern), in a logic of negativity (of inferiority). Hence, the colonial difference is the result of this 
logic that ‘[...] consists in classifying groups of people or populations and identifying them in their 
faults or excesses, which marks the difference and inferiority with respect to who classifies’ 
(quoted in Restrepo and Rojas 2010, 132). 
 
The colonial difference is not about ‘cultural differences’ (Walsh 2012; 2002) 
from the non-modern to the modern, as included in a ‘cultural category’ of a postmodern 
or cultural relativism. The difference in question has been passed off as some cultural 
dissemblance to mask the difference in power relations, the coloniality of power. The 
conceptual core of the colonial difference is the annihilation of 
                                                        




ontological/epistemological perceptions of the non-modern and their replacement by the 
hierarchizations imposed thereafter by the invaders; as Maria Lugones explains, the 
dichotomous hierarchy between human and non-human is the central dichotomy of the 
colonial modernity (Lugones 2016). 
 
Six Colonial Differences 
There are many differences that must be brought to light in order to understand 
around what, specifically, the decolonial turn takes place. Six central differences are 
listed here for the epistemic decolonial turn on energy planning in Brazil. The first 
difference to be pointed out is the perception that places of existence, recognition, 
annunciation of knowledge, and political power are historically occupied by men, as well 
as the outcomes of such occupancy are addressed to men, not exclusively the man as a 
male person, but masculine genealogies and relationships – androcentric perceptions, 
which are mimicked by any person in order to belong or occupy a place of power (Amorós 
1991). This involves the marginalisation of women in the division of labour and 
commodity production, encompassed by the derecognition of their work. The market 
related ideas of the value of labour are patriarchal. 
Patriarchy is at the heart of the structures of domination. Although patriarchy is 
older than modern European structures and exists across different cultures including non-
European ones, it is part of the intra-modern and intra-European impositions, transposed 
to the non-modern world as part of the ‘combo of tools’ for the establishment of 
hierarchies, as framed in the topic of coloniality of gender.  The hierarchical distinction 
between men and women is part of the broader hierarchical distinctions of the 
dichotomous hierarchy, human/non-human. As Maria Lugones explains, 
[t]his distinction [human to non-human] became the mark of the human and of civilization. Only 
the civilized were men and women. The indigenous peoples of the Americas and the enslaved 
Africans were classified as non-human in their species-like animals, uncontrollably sexual and 
savage. The modern European, bourgeois, colonial man, became subject/agent, apt to govern, for 
public life, a being of civilization, heterosexual, Christian, a being of mind and reason. The 
bourgeois European woman was not understood as his complement, but as someone who 
reproduced race and capital through their sexual purity, their passivity, and their attachment to the 
home in service to the bourgeois European white man. The imposition of these dichotomous 
categories was interwoven with the historicity of relationships, including intimate relationships. 
(…) 
The hierarchical dichotomy as a mark of the human also became a normative tool to condemn 
the colonized. The behaviours of the colonized and their personalities/souls were judged as bestial 
and therefore non-gendered, promiscuous, grotesquely sexual, and sinful. Although at this time 
the understanding of sex was not biomorphic, the animals differed between males and females, 
the male being perfection, the female the inversion and deformation of the male. Hermaphrodites, 
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sodomites, viragos27 and all colonized were understood as aberrations of male perfection 
(emphasis added in bold) (Lugones 2016, 106). 
 
The exclusion of women as protagonists of history, philosophy, and science took 
place against European (white) women. The non-white women were animalized, being 
part of objects of the conquest28, turned ‘into various modified versions of “women” as it 
fit the processes of global, Eurocentered capitalism’, (Lugones 2007, 206), but never as 
agents. The naturalization of masculinity frames the modern–colonial world-system, 
imposing the materiality of a conceived androcentric reality. To illustrate, masculinity is 
clear in exploitative labour relationships (starting from the very nuclear family) 
(Flatschart 2017); agricultural methods that impose the will and need of men, 
disregarding the natural cycles (Shiva 2004); conflict resolution methods that privileged 
war and murder to the detriment of communal relationships (Icaza 2010); and the idea 
that everything on the planet should be used to its exhaustion to benefit men29.  
Androcentric narratives underpin a certain way to occupy and use the territory by 
hierarchizing the living beings, placing the wealthy white man at the top (and everything 
else at his service: the white women, the coloured men and women, the plants, animals, 
the mountain, the minerals, the river, the air, the rain – everything). All the energy 
produced in the planet is to serve modern man. This way, the first step towards the 
epistemic decolonial turn in energy planning is to prioritize conceptions, definitions and 
understandings of energy, natural phenomena, and the occupancy of the planet created by 
women, especially by coloured and indigenous women from subaltern places, and 
feminist authors in general.  
The Cartesian Manichean sceptical dichotomy between human and non-human 
also substantiates the idea of race, the second difference to be identified in the epistemic 
decolonial turn. Quijano argues that the idea of race is built in three distinct moments in 
history: the first goes back to the sixteenth century, that describes ‘differences of 
biological nature’ between Europeans and non-Europeans30 (Quijano 1999), the second 
moment refers to the foundations of the myth of modernity in the seventeenth century, in 
                                                        
27 Noisy, masculine, dominant women. 
28 Rape was a colonial weapon, as explained by Lugones in Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern 
Gender System (Lugones 2007, 206). 
29 Here masculine and feminine are discussed as ontological principles – as opposed to epistemological and 
scientific classifications. 
30 In his paper, Que Tal Raza?(1998-9), Quijano is controversial and slightly contradictory in accepting 
that biological nature could be a feature for othering gender, but not race. Quijano’s lack of attention to the 
relationship between coloniality and oppressions of gender and patriarchy as a complex system is strongly 
condemned by Lugones in Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System (2007).  
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a linear evolutive explanation of the development of the world from barbarism to 
civilization, in which the definition of ‘colour’ and ‘race’ is established. The third 
moment, for Quijano, is solidified in the mid nineteenth century with Gobineau and his 
Moral and Intellectual Diversity of Races (Gobineau 1856), justifying white superiority 
and, hence, the need to colonize. 
Race is then created to highlight the powerlessness of the colonized, informing 
the psychological complexity of an annihilated person, who is no longer a person, 
becoming merely a non-white man. Moreover, as Aimé Césaire writes, the creation of 
races, as a consequence of colonialism, ‘decivilize[s] the colonizer, (…) brutalize[s] him 
in the true sense of the word, degrade[s] him, awakens him to buried instincts, to 
covetousness, violence, race hatred, and moral relativism’ (emphasis in the original) 
(Césaire 2000). The imposition of the notion of ‘better race’ manufactures collateral 
violence and incites the feral reaction to violence (Fanon 2001). The racial difference has 
little to do with the idea of ‘colour consciousness’ but has to do with the overall perception 
of the experiences that constitute the baggage that racialized subaltern peoples carry.  
The third difference to be identified for the epistemic decolonial turn is 
geopolitical. What is meant by the decolonial turn on epistemologies is to stress the 
territorial differences and the need for preservation of such differences, instead of 
persisting with the colonial agenda of the (capitalist) ‘use’ of all territories, the 
transformation of all places in the name of some so-called progress. This means that not 
only must knowledges that are produced outside of the said legitimate places of 
annunciation (Eurocentric standards) be included, as also ‘good sources’, but also main 
sources, the unheard, silenced voices from the ‘underdeveloped’ places – the voices of 
the majority of people. Geopolitically, such places are either outside of academia or in 
their periphery; outside of the central areas of access to goods and capital, namely, the 
hard sciences, the economy (and political economy), and the mainstream (fundamentalist) 
philosophy. They are peripheral voices that tell stories about livelihoods, either organized 
by resistance in occupying the uncomfortable master’s house (academia, political 
institutions, economic activities) by social movements or other types of 
literature/storytelling that are inconceivable for the hegemonic epistemological canon. 
This aspect involves both the geographical location of knowledge production and the 
epistemic locus of annunciation of knowledge: it is futile to write from the University of 
São Paulo repeating the same mainstream agenda of the MIT or to spend one year with 
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the Xingu peoples to conclude how profitable their land could be (Macedo 2017). As 
Grosfoguel writes,  
[…] the success of the modern/colonial world-system consists in making subjects that are socially 
located in the oppressed side of the colonial difference, to think epistemically like the ones on the 
dominant positions. (Grosfoguel 2007, 213) 
 
It is the aim of this thesis to collect and apply peripherical voices to understand 
and discuss energy planning since the mainstream dominant positions cannot perceive 
energy planning outside of the exhaustive modern–colonial framework. 
The fourth difference to be identified is historiographic or chronological. 
Whereas hegemonic epistemologies naturalize the linear evolutive definition of 
existence, decolonial epistemologies call for a broader perception of the human 
experience as well as the natural phenomena on earth (Pérez 1999, 11–14). Hence, the 
way modern sciences and technologies, modern ways of occupying territories, modern 
conflicts, modern spiritual beliefs, humanism, and social Darwinisms (Guha and 
Martínez-Alier 2013, 26) shape historiography to confine time into the modern–colonial 
framework violates all non-modern possibilities. Worse than that, modern–colonial 
chronologies are self-referenced and self-describe Modernity (a Eurocentric 
phenomenon) as the great moment of the revolution of knowledge (Mignolo 2012).  
As Dussel explains in his (aforementioned) book 1492 – El Encubrimiento del 
Otro: Hacia el Origen del Mito de La Modernidad (The Eclipse of the Other: Towards 
the Origin of the Myth of Modernity) (Dussel 1994), Eurocentric historiographic linearity 
is wilfully created, not inherent to the situation eventual, and sets aside any other 
knowledge, science, or experience that is different from the European. As an example, 
Dussel cites the destruction of the Aztec libraries and museums at the end of the fifteenth 
century, an act that was intended to erase their history (Dussel 1994, 154–58). From a 
decolonial epistemological perception, history is not linear, nor did it start when 
Europeans could record their narratives and their intra-European historical facts but 
covers what is called pre-Columbus or pre-colonial ‘civilizations’ in the Amerindian 
continent and the Interregional Systems that unfolded as a world-system after 149231. In 
                                                        
31 Dussel notes that before the modern–colonial world-system, that is, before a global pattern of power, 
there were three stages of the Interregional System (intra-continental system). Stage I as the Egyptian 
Mesopotamian (from 4th millennium BC); stage II as the Indo-European (from 200 BC); stage III as the 
Asiatic-Afro-Mediterranean (from 4th century AD); and stage IV unfolds as the worldsystem after 1492, 
comprising Western Europe, the United States (after WW2), Japan (from 1945 to 1989 with Russia) in the 
center, and Latin America, Bantu Africa, Muslim world, India, Southwestern Asia, and Eastern Europe in 
the periphery, as well as two semi-autonomous regions in Russia and China (Dussel 2013, 3). 
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this sense, it may sound irreverent to reinforce that aliens did not build Machu Picchu (as 
it needed to be explained) (Reynolds 2015), but it is necessary to highlight that the South 
American history before the European invasion was not a pre-history of ancient 
civilizations, but simply South American history. In the epistemic decolonial turn, 
indigenous ways of perceiving the needs of collective livelihood such as energy 
production, logistics, and agriculture, which were erased by colonial violence, are given 
their due importance, like the concepts of buen vivir, the Kichwa expression sumak 
kawsay, (that means living well), or the Guarani tekó porã.  
The fifth difference to be highlighted is the combination of all the four elements 
mentioned earlier: androcentrism, racism, geopolitical positions, and historiography are 
co-constitutive elements of the colonial violence, and cannot be observed through 
analytical eyes separately but have to be viewed as a holistic complex phenomenon. They 
are part of the violent colonial combo, and bring, as consequence, the violent acquisition 
of land and exploitation of resources for commercial purposes, the annihilation of peoples 
(who were non-Europeans or non-Modern), their histories, and cultures, the imposition 
of hierarchies in social institutions, and the imposition of the very social institutions 
themselves. This way, the nation-state, the rule of law, the military organizations, the 
institutions of knowledge, the destruction of ontology for the imposition of Eurocentric 
rationality, and the idea of sectarian societies are inseparable elements of the same 
structure of power: coloniality.  
The impossibility of separating the different elements of such oppressions is 
crucial for the analysis hereafter proposed. One cannot conceive capitalism without 
patriarchy and racism or the implementation (imposition) of rule of law without the 
crimes committed. It is the Modern oppressive reasoning to hierarchize one element of 
progress and minimize the violence involved in making it viable. As Angela Davis 
explains, gender, race, and class are undetachable elements that, if analysed separately, 
yield results that work for the convenience of the privileged (Davis 2011).  
Hence, every time this work refers to economic advantage in a certain way of 
planning energy, it also refers to the androcentric perception of the economy, to the 
superiority of men over living beings, to the destructive way of relating to natural 
resources, to the hierarchy of labour necessary to obtain inputs, to the manufactured 
consent obtained through convenient collection of scientific studies to underpin the need 
of a certain intervention in the environment, and so on. If the analysis of political 
economy is limited to the relationships of power imposed in capitalism, the solutions for 
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capitalist oppressions will be in the realm of economic policies and labour laws. Such an 
analysis ignores a big chunk of the exploitative nature of the accumulation of capital, 
which includes the rule of law per se.  
Finally, the sixth difference to be framed is about “not throwing away the baby 
with the bath water”. In this sense, there is no intention to deny or refute everything 
produced to create and sustain the modern–colonial world-system, to disqualify every 
intra-European critique of Modernity, or much less, to establish new thought that will 
replace all the philosophical thinking with subaltern perspectives. No universal truth is 
being imposed with the epistemic decolonial turn, making it different from the intra-
European perspectives. As Fanon writes in Black Skin, White Masks,  
(…) 
I do not come with timeless truths. 
My consciousness is not illuminated with ultimate radiances. 
Nevertheless, in complete composure, I think it would be good if certain things were said. 
These things I am going to say, not shout. For it is a long time since shouting has gone out of my 
life. 
So very long... 
(…) (Fanon 2008, 9) 
 
As the idea of evolutive historiography is a fallacy, there is much to be learnt from 
the various understandings of power. In particular, the hermetic imposition of knowledge 
prevents diversity of perceptions, becoming epistemically violent. To develop the 
epistemic decolonial turn for energy planning, a range of propositions and theories 
considered by intra-Europeans will be applied; this includes the Marxian [historical 
materialist] definition of capital accumulation as the core challengeable feature of the 
current (present) epistemologies of energy (since energy is treated as energy input – 
commoditized and hence fetishized, making energy planning a tool for economic growth). 
Much of the materialist critique is useful here and applicable to point out the weakness in 
the misuse of natural resources for profit.  
Having said that, epistemic diversity does not mean being cautious. A sharp 
critique of oppressive knowledge can be made considering the collection of anticolonial 
perceptions that, for example, help us challenge the academia (and coloniality of 
knowledge) by writing a doctoral thesis – the privileged top of the academic hierarchy in 
the production of nouveau knowledge. The way to do this is by awareness of the multiple 






In this chapter we explained what is the epistemic decolonial turn as well as the 
six colonial differences that make it viable. To adopt the epistemic decolonial turn, the 
epistemologies for energy planning in Brazil must be anti-patriarchal and recognize the 
institutional androcentric genealogies to be able to move towards the inclusion of feminist 
perceptions. Decolonial epistemologies must be anti-racist, that is, acknowledge the racist 
character of the current planning for the future of energy systems. Energy planning 
naturalizes ethnic cleansing, the whiteness of the institutional production of the energy 
plans, the lack of humanity in determining the value of labour (especially women’s 
labour), and the lack of regard for indigenous communities as externalities32 for energy 
expansion. The production of the energy plans must include non-white perspectives, the 
relationship between natural resources and community solidarities, and the vital 
relationship between communities and the land.  
A decolonial comprehension of energy futures in Brazil cannot ignore the 
country’s peripheral position in global capitalism, in which the useless pursuit of 
economic growth steals the country’s democratic character in deciding over natural 
resources. The endless catching up with the rich economies works to the detriment of a 
balanced relationship between the use of natural resources and better life conditions in 
Brazil. When thinking about energy futures – elaborating a plan for energy systems – we 
must learn from history in order to avoid repeating colonial mistakes. This can only be 
made by acknowledging the various definitions of energy systems in the territory, not 
exclusively the intra-European perceptions imposed on the country. By understanding the 
limitations of Eurocentric historiography, possibilities for energy planning are unlocked 
from a framework and a version of history in which Eurocentric perceptions are not the 
only possible ways of projecting futures.  
Therefore, energy planning must be intersectional, taking into consideration all 
these elements without hierarchizing them, giving the same importance to each of these 
aspects, in a co-constitutive and inseparable way of establishing the premises, priorities, 
and goals. The epistemic decolonial turn demands a complex analysis in order to give 
decolonial meaning to established Eurocentric definitions and critiques, that should be 
                                                        
32 Or, as the Brazilian Energy Expansion Plan 2015-2024 defines, “issues that could increase the uncertainty 
associated with the planning of important developments for the expansion of the country’s energy supply” 
(MME and EPE 2015, 33). 
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applied to the Brazilian case only after the listed colonial differences are carefully 
considered.  
Now it is necessary to clarify how decolonial epistemologies will help the problem 
of energy planning in Brazil. Challenging the violence of energy planning in Brazil calls 
for comprehending the ethics of interference in bodies and in the planet’s ecology for 
obtaining energy inputs. The ethics of energy is a primordial issue to understand 
epistemologies for energy planning. The critical ethical framework is grounded in the 
Ethics of Liberation, a Latin American framework proposed by Enrique Dussel, which 
establishes a critique of the hegemonic ethical system. Chapter 4 – Epistemology and the 
Ethics of Exhaustion brings in the Ethics of Liberation and the unfolding of the ethics of 




Chapter 4: Energy and the Ethics of Exhaustion  
The ethics of energy refers to how energy is part of the universal human aim to 
produce and reproduce life. With this background, we examine the way energy has been 
historically and geopolitically formalized and defined in the present: the current 
epistemology of energy. The modern–colonial world-system’s own ethics is related to the 
viability and prevalence of the colonial ideology of power (considering the spheres of 
coloniality of power, being, and knowledge), whose aims do not extend to the production 
and reproduction of every life in the planet and which intentionally creates victims. I 
named the modern–colonial world-system’s ethics the ethics of exhaustion. In this way, 
the concept of energy is epistemically violent, grounded in the ethics of exhaustion. 
The ethics of exhaustion permeates every aspect of human occupancy of the planet 
in this, the early twenty-first century, even as I write this in the year 2019. It is the 
hegemonic ethics in the recognition and understanding, by humans, of all living beings; 
it is the ethics of the institutions of knowledge; and the ethics of the political and 
economic institutions. Such ethics is the acceptance and naturalization of well-known 
historical oppressions, and with the denial of both their violence and the possibility of 
immediate change in the modus humans are left to occupy only such territory as they are 
allowed in which to survive.   
The fundamentals of the ethics of exhaustion are built on the fact that the 
exhaustion of the planet and societies are for the ‘greater good’ (Dussel 2013, 158) – that 
one cannot survive without capitalism, the state, the laws, and the [hegemonic] 
knowledge. In this case, the downside of such social institutions is that we all have to 
sacrifice to achieve the future social equality we need – the idea that exhaustion today 
will lead to regeneration tomorrow. It is also the reformist thinking that supposes we must 
improve what is not working well, instead of dismantling the master’s house. While such 
ethics continues to govern conduct of persons we are moving steadily towards social and 
environmental catastrophes, still believing that we are doing the right thing, that is, 
making it great again by reinforcing the same practices. 
The concept of the ethics of exhaustion is drawn from the critical-negative aspect 
of the Dusselian Ethics of Liberation, deployed from the definition of the Universal 
Material Principle of Ethics. To get to the critical-negative aspect it is necessary to explain 
the Universal Material Principle of Ethics. Before that, let us introduce the Dusselian 
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Ethics of Liberation to contextualize the critical-negative aspect that leads us to define 
the ethics of exhaustion. 
 
The Dusselian Ethics of Liberation 
The works of Enrique Dussel are of paramount importance for the studies and 
elaboration of Latin American philosophy. His analysis of the ontological fundaments of 
Latin American self-recognition and philosophy is a huge contribution to philosophical–
ethical studies in the region. His first proposition of the Ethics of Liberation was 
published in 1972 in the three volumes of the book Para una Ética de la Liberación 
Latinoamericana (Towards an Ethics for the Latin American Liberation), where he 
discusses not just the conditions for a possible Latin American philosophy but the very 
Latin American philosophy33.  
Dussel’s perceptions and methodological approaches were part of the Latin 
American liberation movements arising from or somehow influenced by the 
developments of the Dependency Theories in the 1960s and the Theology of Liberation 
in the early 1970s. Those movements had exponents such as the Brazilian pedagogue and 
philosopher Paulo Freire, with his remarkable work The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 
originally published in 1970 (Freire 2000), and the Peruvian sociologist mentioned 
earlier, Aníbal Quijano, who published around the same time Tendencies in the Class 
Struggle in Peru (Quijano 1980) and Crisis Imperialista y Classe Obrera en América 
Latina in (Imperialist Crisis and Working Class in Latin America) (Quijano 1974). Such 
movements were contemporary and had a dialogue with the world-system theories, with 
the North-American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein as an exponent, having published 
in 1974 his work  The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of 
the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (Wallerstein 2011). 
Developing his philosophical works, Dussel published Introducción a la Filosofía 
de la Liberación Latinoamericana (Introduction to the Latin American Philosophy of 
                                                        
33 In that work, Dussel elaborates on methodological pathways for the Latin American philosophy. In 
volume I, he works on the foundation of ‘the Other’, what he called the ‘dialectical ascension’ of the body 
to the foundation (of ethics), ‘demonstrative decline’ of the foundation to the body, and the metaphysical 
passage of the body, which is the transposition of ‘the face of the Other’ to the ‘Otherness’. In volume II, 
he elaborates the grounds of the ethically deemed ontological project from the perspective of the Other, the 
analytic morality of praxis as a ‘duty’. In volume III, he brings the methodological developments to the 
Latin American reality and in the alternative movement (the ‘changing towards’), gestated between the 
male–female (the erotic), parents–children (the pedagogical), brother–brother (politics), Totality–Infinity 
(the theological) (Dussel 1973). 
 
 65 
Liberation) in 1977 and re-edited and published it again in 1988 as Introduccíon a la 
Filosofía de la Liberacíon (Introduction to the Philosophy of Liberation) (Dussel 1988). 
In this work Dussel presents the theoretical framework of the Philosophy of Liberation 
that he further elaborates as the Ethics of Liberation. 
The theoretical framework of the Philosophy of Liberation and the Ethics of 
Liberation follow a coherent Dusselian stamp, starting from the historical analysis, the 
(initially) metaphysical analysis (which becomes the Ethical Analysis), the observation 
of the praxis or the practical world analysis (which becomes the material aspects of 
ethics), and poiesis, referring to the actual action towards liberation.  
The author established a sequence from philosophy, theology, and history to 
develop a Latin American theory from its own perspective, recognizing the specific 
singularities of the condition of being Latin American. This is done by challenging the 
Modern philosophers, especially Kant, whose (Cartesian) dualism and philosophical 
formalism are severely criticized. The core critique of Kantian philosophy, however, was 
presented  in the moment of the critique of the Material Criterion and the proposition of 
the Material Universal Principle of Ethics (Dussel 2013) in the Philosophy of Liberation. 
In this sense, the early Dusselian philosophy meets Paul Ricoeur, in his 
phenomenological and personalist line, linking the understanding of the mythical to the 
rationality of philosophy. Influenced by Ricoeur, Dussel focused on giving relevance to 
the mythical as part of the elaboration of Latin American culture, imagination, and 
philosophy in the history of global thinking. ‘The Latin American recovery required me 
not to discard the religious phenomenon and, therefore, an Augustine, Bartolome de las 
Casas or Cura Hidalgo should be assumed in an integrative vision (Dussel 1988, 86)’.  
Heidegger’s philosophy also had a strong impact on the early Dusselian 
philosophy. Dussel clearly applies Heideggerian terminologies to the ontological 
analysis. When Dussel met Levinas, he dropped the Heideggerian ontology for 
metaphysics, analyzing the subject from the perspective of the collective, a more practical 
aspect of philosophy than the categorical instruments. In the Philosophy of Liberation, 
Dussel goes from ontological thinking (the exclusive categorical Heideggerian 
hermeneutics) to analysis of the praxis. By analyzing the three main moments of the 
Dusselian philosophy of Liberation (1972, 1988 and 1998), it is interesting to perceive 
how the author arrives at the conclusion that there is a need to return to ethics as the 
standpoint of liberation. The return to ethics is evident from the focus on the studies on 
Hegel, from which the Hegelian dialectic appears, as well as from the focus on ethics in 
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the post-Hegelians: Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, and Marx, evidencing the practical–material 
analysis.  
In 1998, Dussel published the first edition of La Ética de La liberación: en la edad 
de la globalización y de la exclusion (The Ethics of Liberation in the Age of Globalization 
and Exclusion); it was published in English in 2013 (Dussel 2013). In this work, the 
debate between the Dusselian works of 1972 and those of 1988 influenced by Karl Apel, 
Jurgen Habermas, Levinas, Hinkelammert, Kant, as well as his extensive analysis of 
Marxian works and special attention to the historical subject of transformation in Freire, 
became evident. This made the Ethics of Liberation a very detailed philosophical work 
from Latin America to Latin America.  
Dussel’s historical and philosophical works are crucial to challenge the 
hegemonic oppressive ethics of the modern–colonial world-system. For Dussel, the 
hegemonic ethics negates the victim. He counterposes the hegemonic ethics to the Ethics 
of Liberation. The author positively affirms that the Ethics of Liberation is the ethics of 
the oppressed, and considers the whole structure of oppressions in the historical context 
of actual transformation. 
The historical perspective is crucial in Dussel’s analysis. By adopting a historical 
perspective, Dussel introduces his critical ethical analysis. The historical background 
aims to ‘situate the ethical problematic within a global horizon, in order to remove from 
it the traditional interpretation that has been merely Helleno- or Eurocentric, in order to 
open up the discussion beyond contemporary Euro-North American philosophical ethics’ 
(Dussel 2013, 1).  
Dussel describes four historical stages of interregional ethical systems that 
unfolded as a world-system (for the first time the global ethical system) after 1492. The 
first stage is the Egyptian–Mesopotamian interregional system that had no political–
cultural centre, from the fourth millennium BC. The second stage is the ‘Indo-
European’ from second century BC, with the centre located in the Persian region and the 
Hellenic world (Seleucidic and Ptolemaic) from the fourth century BC, having China in 
the eastern extreme, the Indian kingdoms in the south-east, and the Mediterranean New 
World in the western region. The third stage is the Asiatic-Afro-Mediterranean system, 
from the fourth century AD. This interregional system had the Persian region and Tarim 
and thereafter the Muslim world from the seventh century AD as its centre of commercial 
connections. The productive centre was China, having Bantu Africa in the southwest, the 
Byzantine–Russian world in the west, and Western Europe in the extreme west. The 
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fourth stage is the world-system, having Western Europe in the centre from the late 
fifteenth century AD to the present, including the United States and Japan (from 1945 to 
1989 with Russia). The world-system has as periphery Latin America, Bantu Africa, the 
Muslim world, India, Southwestern Asia, and Eastern Europe. China and Russia have 
been considered as two semiautonomous systems from 1989. 
Cultures without direct links to the interregional systems are also discussed, 
explaining cultural ethical traditions in the Mesoamerican and the Inca worlds. Since the 
Neolithic period, there were frequent contacts of the American peoples with the 
Polynesians, who, in their transoceanic voyages, arrived at the coast of America.  
Here I should deal with India (…) and China (…); both cultures are prior to the appearance of the 
horsemen and the mastering of iron. (…) I simply indicate their ‘place’ within a general history of 
the Neolithic, which moves to west to east – a direct-contrary to Hegel’s ideological proposal. 
(…) 
In the Euro-Asiatic steppes are an area of contact, the Pacific Ocean (with its Polynesian cultures) 
must be considered (…) another area of contact. In a global vision of ethical lives, reductionistic 
naiveté (...) cannot be repeated. In the history of ethos, the ethical vision of the Aztecs, Mayas, 
Chibchas and Incas, at the very least, should always be included (Dussel 2013, 9–10).  
 
Through historical contextualization, Dussel evidences that the intra-European 
ethical systems, that became the world-system after 1492, were influenced by many 
ancient cultures (Dussel 2013, 25). The Cartesian separation between body and mind has 
reference in the Egyptian (Osiris) immortality of the soul (Dussel 2013, 8), which in turn 
influenced the Greek philosophers (Plotinus AD 204–70, in Alexandria, where the Roman 
and the Greek traditions converged, and also Plato), in the division into the evil – 
body/material, and the pure – divine/immortal (Dussel 2013, 8–15).  
It is thus that from Greece and Rome to the Persians, from the empires of India and Taoist China, 
an ontology of the absolute as One, a dualist anthropology of the superiority of the soul over the 
body (which is always in some way the cause of evil), establishes an ascetic ethics of ‘liberation’ 
from material plurality as a ‘return' to the original one. This is the moment of Neoplatonic 
ontology, and later of German idealism, specially of Hegel’s Logic. This is the logic-ethics of the 
Totality. 
(…) Empirical death is, for this ethical view of the world, the ‘birth’ to true life (Dussel 2013, 16–
17). 
 
Referring to Confucian ethics34, Dussel explains the formal morality that 
consolidated the then existing contemporary ethics, that justified the then prevailing 
                                                        
34 Confucius (551-479 BC, China) wrote: “The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue 
throughout the kingdom, first ordered well their own States. Wishing to order well their States, they first 
regulated their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first 
rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts, they 
first extended to utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things. 
Things being investigates, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts 
were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their 
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institutionality, political organization, economy, pedagogy, and domination in the 
genders (of male over female). These concepts travelled to Europe along with Oriental-
Mediterranean commerce over centuries. On that, Dussel goes on to say that ‘everything’ 
that is traditionally labelled as the European medieval or Renaissance ‘internal’ factors in 
the genesis of Modernity, had been accomplished with the resources of the Muslim world, 
centuries earlier (Dussel 2013, 21).  
The current ethical system, the hegemonic Eurocentric Modern/Colonial/ 
Androcentric/Capitalist world-system, was then created. Modernity, ‘that is, perpetual, 
compulsive, obsessive and addictive modernization’ (Bauman 2013). This has produced 
wasted humans; modernization at the cost of lives in the Periphery. The Periphery in its 
philosophy, needs to understand Eurocentrism in order to be able to criticize the world, 
shedding the lenses implanted by domination (Dussel 2013, 52).  
We move now to the theoretical framework that is the foundation of the Dusselian 
ethics, and so, on a second moment, we can establish the critical ethical criterion for the 
present relationship between ethics and energy planning. For the application of the 
Dusselian framework for the analysis of energy planning in Brazil, the author’s 
foundation of ethics will be discussed so that the argument can be elucidated.  
 
Ethics  
Understanding of epistemologies for energy planning in Brazil requires 
understanding the ethics of energy. To do so, we follow the analytical pathway proposed 
by Dussel in his work Ethics of Liberation – In the Age of Globalization and Exclusion 
(2013). In this work, Dussel contextualizes, grounds, and defines the Ethics of Liberation, 
the critical ethics lying outside the Modern hegemonic ethical system. The Ethics of 
Liberation establishes a framework for the ethical critique of the modern–colonial world-
system from the perspective of the victims who have their bodily reality negated by the 
empirically impossible universal goodness claim of the dominant (Modern) ethical 
system (world-system). 
Let us explain this reasoning. Knowledge is a human mental process through a 
collection of brain impulses stimulated by a set of sensations and experiences in the 
                                                        
persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being 
regulated, their Stated were rightly governed. Their States being rightly governed, the whole kingdom was 
made tranquil and happy” (Dussel 2013, 17). 
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empirical world. Epistemology is the philosophy of knowledge, concerned with the 
investigation of the material manifestation of thoughts and how they acquire meaning. 
Ethics interfaces with epistemology as a primary issue in the externalization of thoughts 
that become knowledge. Such a primary issue refers to the ethical way thoughts are 
intentionally (rationally) externalized and hence formalized. The content of ethics refers 
to understanding the elaborations of the mind in the material world; for Dussel it is the 
‘principle of the obligation to produce, reproduce and develop the concrete human life of 
each ethical subject in the community’ (Dussel 2013, 55–56). Epistemology is part of the 
form of ethics, when thoughts gather social validity through customs, norms, and 
institutions. According to Dussel,  
[t]his principle claims universality. It is actualized through cultures and motivates them from 
within, as well as the values or the different ways to accomplish the ‘good life’, happiness, and so 
on. Cultures, for instance, are particular modes of life, modes that are moved by the universal 
principle of human life of each subject in community from within (Dussel 2013, 55–56). 
  
That is to say that ethics is produced collectively in a given space and time aiming 
at abstract universality, forming historical ethical systems. The principle of the 
reproduction of human life, in some way, has been an ethical content for more than fifty 
centuries, surviving up to the present time. Therefore, the decoloniality critique is within 
this tradition that seeks to reproduce the conditions for human life – aimed at the 
liberation of all human beings, including white European men, from the standpoint of the 
victims. 
 Concrete ethical systems affirm the fact of human life. That is the Dusselian 
universal material principle of ethics. The Dusselian Ethics of Liberation is an ethics of 
life from the perspective of the victims, claiming that the hegemonic material ethics 
negates the oppressed, the ones who cannot benefit from the hegemonic ethical system of 
the modern–colonial world-system that obeys the criterion of practical truth and the 
goodness claim. The negation of the existence (creation) of victims (the concealment of 
the evil) (Dussel 2013, 284) due to the fetishized hegemonic ethical system makes it 
contradictory, reinforcing violence where it claims goodness. The Ethics of Liberation, 
by focusing on the perspective of the oppressed, affirms the negation and exposes the 
ethical problematic. We will use the Ethics of Liberation to get to the critique I named as 
the ethics of exhaustion fundamental to the epistemological critique of energy planning 
in Brazil. To do so, we extend the critical examination of the negative aspect of ethics to 
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frame the ethics of exhaustion as the violent ethical problem that leads to violent 
epistemologies for energy planning.  
In order to apply Dussel’s framework to critically analyse the ethics of the 
knowledge about energy, the three aspects of the universal material principle of ethics are 
framed: the material aspects, that is, the ethical content; the formal aspects, that is, the 
moral configuration of ethics through epistemological, methodical, philosophical, and 
rational discourse; and the practical aspects of ethics, or the ethical feasibility claim of 
instrumental reason – meaning the meeting of successful ends, that is, the ‘goodness 
claim’ or the reproduction of human life.  
We argue that the hegemonic ethical system – the ethics of exhaustion – aims at 
death instead (the critical-negative aspect). By not taking the structures that would enable 
life into consideration when defining the concept of human life, the hegemonic ethical 
system presupposes that everything in the planet exists for the service of human life – not 
as a cycle of interactions between human/nature/natural phenomena. Magnifying the 
importance of human life happens to the detriment of all the other forms of life and, as a 
consequence, causes human death. It is a one-way street in which everything exists in the 
service of human life: life-bearing beings such as plants and animals as well as “non-
living things”35 such as the land, the minerals, the air, the water, the sun, and the natural 
phenomena. Human life is specifically hierarchized since it does not include peripheric 
peoples, traditional communities, indigenes, women, and peoples of colour and it locates 
wealthy white men at the top of the hierarchy and the poor coloured women at the bottom.  
This critique will be expanded further, but a short explanation is necessary to 
guide the reader on what is meant by the ethics of exhaustion. From a decolonial 
perspective, the Earth is an interconnected system and the life of the mountain is as 
relevant as the life of the new-born and the snail, in the sense that one cannot exist without 
the other, in a balanced cyclic way. By focusing exclusively on the life of the fetishized 
ethical subject, the hegemonic ethical system forces the exhaustion of everything else so 
that one type of individual can reproduce his own life. In a physical, psychological, and 
spiritual way, it exhausts the labourer who sacrifices her life to produce the commodity 
and gives her vital energy for the maintenance of the capitalist system. It exhausts nature, 
by removing the mineral from the land without considering the natural resilience time for 
                                                        
35 From decolonial perspectives, such as the Patchamama philosophy or the Guarani Tekó Porã (well-
being), the land, the water, the sun, and the natural phenomena are part of the life cycles and bearers of life 
(Melià 2016; Zaffaroni 2010) 
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its reorganization and re-creation, or by changing the course of a river without considering 
the plants and animals that live from that water source, condemning all forms of life to 
‘evolve, adapt’ and survive under the new conditions. In truth, this is exhausting their 
vital energy to the limit that they have to compete among themselves to exist on what is 
left. It exhausts the energy cycles by human alienation, not permitting the reconciliation 
between the human mind and the territory (Marx and Engels 2009), leading to the 
predatorial relationship that places human beings as the villains responsible for limiting 
the very conditions that reproduce their lives (for example, contributing to global 
warming by increasing production). The hegemonic ethical system is consistently aiming 
at exhausting humans’ physical, psychological, and spiritual energy; all forms of non-
human life including natural resources; and the energetic interconnection between 
existing things, the natural phenomena, thus creating disequilibrium with catastrophic 
results.  
The critical-negative aspect paves the way by expatiating on exhaustion, the 
application of the critical ethical principle of the Ethics of Liberation. The following 
sections explain Dussel’s philosophy to enable specific analysis of the critical-negative 
aspects of material ethics in order to unfold the ethics of exhaustion. 
 
The Dusselian Foundation of Ethics 
The foundation of the ethics of liberation consists in analyzing the moments of 
philosophical elaboration on ethics that lead to a level of complexity that seems to 
sufficiently explain ethical validity. Dussel argues that such sufficiency can never be 
reached fully, ‘given that it would encompass the totality of human actions in the entire 
history of the world’ (Dussel 2013, 53). The author then develops a non-linear complex 
explanation that forms the fundamentals of the Ethics of Liberation on the critical-ethical 
reason. The separation of ‘thought/being’ and ‘reality’ enables to identify, on a first 
moment, the victim of a given ethical system. On a second moment, this separation 
enables, from critical analysis, to adopt the perspective of the victims in order to be 
liberated from the fetishist (and for that reason violent and oppressive) ignorance that 
arises from of the non-acknowledgement of the existence of victims.  
The non-linear elaboration for the foundation is made in three stages: from the 
identification of the reality – the material moment, the intersubjective validation of formal 
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social outcomes – the formal morality, and the possibility of meeting the aims of the given 
ethical system, the meeting of its ‘goodness claim’ – the ethical feasibility.  
 
The Material Moment  
The material moment of ethics concerns the content of ethics. The universal 
material principle is the production and reproduction (or the conservation) of human life. 
The content of ethics follows the perception of formal rationality, the dualistic 
reductionist separation between the body and the mind, in which ethos, postulated in the 
real world through the aims of a person or group of people, becomes a nomos. It is a 
constituent element of the physis – the primary nature of a person that depends on their 
actions to become a fact, a praxis. The physis, as the human nature, consists in vice and 
virtue, and ethics is the ‘good half’ of every person that must manifest itself for the benefit 
of the whole group of people. In order to become nomos, vice and virtue are brought into 
a rational framework. The bad and the good, existent in every person, would have to be 
rationally framed so that the ethics can be perceived. 
To comprehend the functioning of the mind to contrapose the dualistic paradigm, 
Dussel explains how the brain needs the body to realize the ‘self’, the ethos. Neurological 
processes, then, are concrete, ‘not intangible and vaporous qualities that many presume 
them to be’ (Damasio 2006, 164)36. In this sense,  
The negation of the “body” in favour of the decorporealized “soul” (from the Greeks up to Modern 
ethics) speaks to us a very specific tradition, following a mythical path of the resurrection of the 
flesh with the Egyptian Osiris, or the Semitic or Muslim tradition, and culminates in the 
neurobiological sciences that allow us to recover the unity of the corporeal, within with the higher 
functions of the brain require that the highlight definitively the extremely ambiguous 
simplification in ethics of a substantial independent “soul” (Dussel 2013, 66–67). 
 
At this point, Dussel follows on an extreme rationality, affirming that human 
survival includes reason as its ability: ‘[t]he reality of the human life of the ethical-
cerebral subject has a permanent vigilance of requirements, obligations, an “ought-to-be” 
that internally incorporates motives, and that integrates itself constitutively in all the 
activities of the practical and theoretical levels of all possible behaviour’ (Dussel 2013, 
69).  
Dussel then argues against a utilitarian analysis of ethics of European 
enlightenment thinkers like, among others, Adam Smith, John Locke, David Hume, 
                                                        
36 In Descartes Error, the Neurologist Damasio describes the co-constitutive articulation of affective and 
reason: without affectivity there is no reason.  
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Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. The empiricist approach of utilitarian ethics that 
attempted to defeat rationality by the elaboration of ethics as the pursuit of happiness, as 
in Bentham’s fundamental axiom: ‘it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that 
is the measure of right and wrong’. Dussel identifies four problems of the utilitarian 
approach: 1) the ambiguity of the hedonistic meaning of the concept of happiness; 2) the 
empirical impossibility of a strictly hedonistic quantitative calculus; 3) the materiality of 
the transposition from individual to collective happiness, in the sense that individual 
happiness may represent aspects of a developed society but to the detriment of the 
happiness of others (e.g., slavery systems); and 4) the utilitarian happiness, defined 
through the calculus of instrumental reason, is reached through consumption, or the 
satisfaction of the preferences of the buyer in the market, by means of capitalist 
distribution of goods. ‘There is then an abstract and perverse circle: capital is the absolute 
a priori condition for the fulfilment of the ethical end (happiness)’ (Dussel 2013, 73–74). 
For Dussel, the utilitarian subjective material criterion is a ‘model of impossibility’ 
(Dussel 2013, 186), since  
[i]n capitalism, objective wealth is accumulated (thus allowing the owners of capital to obtain 
subjective happiness) in the hands of few, while augmenting the ‘poverty’ of the majority (that is 
to say, ‘pain’ and ‘unhappiness’).  
(…) 
Utilitarianism does not discover the contradiction of its utopia since it does not recognize the 
essence of capital. But, at least, it makes sense when it indicates a relationship between economics 
and ethics (Dussel 2013, 75).  
 
Utilitarianism is relevant for indicating the importance of one aspect of the 
subjective material criterion of ethics – happiness;  but it cannot define criteria that can 
classify other material aspects of ethics, ‘such as values, the logic of drives, and so on, 
that could be grounded or developed as the universal ethical principle; for [Dussel], this 
criterion will be concrete “human life”’ (Dussel 2013, 77).  
 By reviewing the exponents of material ethics, Dussel highlights the importance 
of Communitarianism (on Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer) to 
the ethical question, that is, history, the concrete good of a given culture, and the different 
spheres of justice, within which the authentically ethical good ought to be situated in 
accordance with its content. Although such aspects of Communitarianism are necessary, 
they are materially insufficient for the universal material principle of ethics (Dussel 2013, 
92).  
 To build his universal material principle of ethics, Dussel grounds in Hegel the 
need to look at  systems of ethical life as the place in which practical life ‘is lived 
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factually’ (Hegel 2004, 10). As Dussel recognizes, ‘Hegel proposes a concept of the 
cultural–historical ethos to which all the contemporary material ethics cannot cease to 
refer (…) but interprets it Eurocentrically’ (Dussel 2013, 88). It is also clear that the 
universal material principle is built on the formal moral principle of Kant’s ‘conditioned 
value’ (Kant 2003, 275), making evident that there are no values without cultural 
intersubjectivity, and for this reason they constitute an essential part of the content of a 
historical-concrete ethical  life (Dussel 1973, 126).  
 The material criterion is based on what Dussel called practical truth37, by 
asserting that the Ethics of Liberation is grounded in empirical judgements that are 
descriptive of fact, not value, that is neither instrumental nor formal but a statement of 
reality – material, compatible with rationality and means-ends, the latter relating to the 
reproduction of human life. No human action can be detached from a cultural–linguistic 
concrete way of institutionalizing the ethics of enabling human life in general. Therefore, 
epistemology is the form of institutionalizing ethical demands. For Dussel, this claim [or 
demand] is absolutely universal (Dussel 2013, 105). Schools of thought on material ethics 
earlier to Dussel (material formality, dualism, utilitarianism, communitarianism, and the 
Kantian values) were, unlike Dussel’s, insufficient to explain the universal principle, 
bearing contradictions that could not meet the ends of the production, reproduction, and 
development of human life.  
 The universal material principle is an abstract construct that must be applied in 
the real world to prove its feasibility. This way, another principle – the moral formal 
principle – is combined to the material one, aiming at practical, intersubjective, discursive 
rationality that must achieve validity through effective argumentation making explicit and 
incorporating the values/means for accomplishing the ends envisaged.  
 
                                                        
37 The Dusselian universal material ethics is then grounded on the criterion of practical truth, in which ‘(…) 
human life is the mode of reality of the ethical subject (that is not of a stone, or a mere animal, or the 
Cartesian angelic “soul”), which gives content to all of its actions, which determines the rational order and 
also the level of its needs, drives and desires that constitute the framework within which ends are fixed. 
(…) That is to say, insofar as the human being is a living entity, it constitutes a reality as objective (…) in 
the exact measure in which it is determined as the mediation of human life. (…) The life of the subject 
delimits it within certain fixed parameters that it cannot exceed under the threat of death. Life is suspended, 
in its precise vulnerability, within certain limits and requiring certain contents: if the temperature of earth 
rises, we will die of heat; if we cannot drink water because of the desiccation of the planet (…) we will die 
of thirst; if we cannot feed ourselves, we will die of hunger; if our community is invaded by a stronger 
community, we are dominated (we will live but in degrees of alienation that are measured from a life lived 
almost animalistically to the point of extinction itself, as in the case with the indigenous peoples after the 
conquest in America). (…) Human life is an ethical mode of reality (Dussel 2013, 92–93)’. 
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The Formal Moment  
Formal morality has the ethical function of applying in concrete terms the norms, 
ethical judgements, decisions, normative statements, epistemological elaborations, and 
different moments of material ethics. It is how intersubjectivity gains validity – material 
ethics is applied in the social sphere from ethos to nomos.  
To elaborate on the intersubjective validity of the universal material principle, 
Dussel refers to Kant’s transcendental morality, in which material ethics is a hypothetical 
scenario, that is, the reconstruction of the material (content) of ethics, without which 
formal morality is not possible. It Transcendental morality also clarified the distinction 
between the Discourse Ethics of Karl-Otto Apel, the normative–rational reconstruction 
of history and the self-catching-up principle of subjects as agents performing 
transformation with the material principle. Instead, the material principle proposes that 
such reconstruction must be made simultaneously and systematically by both the 
positivity of the institutions and ethical lives that have developed the life of the human 
subject. The material principle is also a critique of the structures that make impossible the 
reproduction or development of each subject’s life in community.  
The material principle is distinguished from the Habermasian Formal Morality. In 
Habermas, the public sphere – communal life – the intersubjective validity of 
argumentation ‘free of coercion’ is the democratic institution of legitimation. The crucial 
difference between Habermasian Formal Morality and the universal material ethics is the 
latter’s recognition of the impossibility of achieving the universally understood moral 
content, in which rationality cannot be detached from the ethical subject in historical 
social contexts.  
The moral principle of validity consists in acknowledging a procedure of 
application of ethical, material contents that must be evidently differentiated from its 
theoretical underpinning. As Dussel writes,  
The application of the ethical-material principle is carried out by means of the moral principle of 
formal validity, then a “synthesis” between the material and formal has been produced. The 
“decision” of the ultimate norm, moral judgement, or concrete normative statement, and the 
“fulfilment” or real integration of the selected judgement in the carrying out of human action on 
praxis (institution, historical structure, values, etc.) is the unity of the material (the mediation with 
“practical truth” based on the principle of reproduction and development of the life of the human 
subject) and the formal (the autonomous symmetrical, free, and responsible participation of each 
affected subject) that, only now, constitutes from real feasibility what we can denominate the 




 In this sense, materiality refers to the life of each person in reality and universally 
(as Dussel’s practical truth); and formalism refers to intersubjective capacity of genuine 
free consent (with universal validity). Material ethics then claims formal validity, that in 
turn, demands ethical feasibility.  
 
Ethical Feasibility  
The Dusselian concept of the goodness claim is a combination of the material 
moment of ethics and the formal moment of morality, for the feasibility of both in 
achieving the ends of ethical life through appropriate means. It is the moment of the 
fulfilment of the object of ethics. This aspect is crucial to the definition of the ethics of 
exhaustion, which is configured from the contradiction between the hegemonic ethics in 
its untruth and its impracticability given the confrontation of instrumental rationality and 
utopian rationality. The criterion of feasibility is then the possibility that the object of 
ethics to exist in the material world, by applying strategic-instrumental reason to achieve 
an abstract truth – the reason of the object’s definition and the how it will exist in reality. 
However, strategic-instrumental reason is not sufficient for the means-ends of ethical 
life38. In evidencing that, Dussel argues that the abstract truth is not necessarily practical, 
such as the ‘model of the market of perfect competition’, in which perfect market means 
no monopoly, whereas essential elements of markets’ performance are types of monopoly 
(such as know-how, greater capital, and so on). If all the competitors in the market share 
all the knowledge and have complete equality, there will be no competition, thus 
evidencing the impossibility of such an abstraction (the capital model). There can be, 
however, a logically possible abstraction that is empirically impossible, such as the idea 
that an object can keep moving in a straight line, at constant speed when no forces act 
upon them, remaining in motion indefinitely (the inertia principle). Also, something 
empirically possible can be technically impossible, and something technically and 
economically feasible may not necessarily be an ethical or moral possibility. Here, Dussel 
moved from abstract feasibility of the ethical principle to concrete feasibility, which he 
                                                        
38 ‘The ethical problem takes shape when this formal sphere [empirical truth and intersubjective validity] 
of means-ends becomes autonomous, is totalized, when what can be done with “efficacy” (technically and 
economically) determines what is used as the ultimate criterion of theoretical “truth” and “validity”. When 
this happens, one falls into a formal absolutization, in the error indicated by Horkheimer, Adorno, or 
Marcuse, namely, giving priority to “instrumental reason” (…). Marx called this inversion “fetishism”: 
things are taken as ends (mediations of feasibility), and persons as mediations (the life of the subject and 
its free autonomous participation)’ (Dussel 2013, 186). 
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called ‘principle of ethical feasibility’. ‘Without instrumental-strategic reason, ethical-
discursive reason falls into utopian illusions’ and does not achieve the ends of ethical 
behaviour, that is, the production and reproduction of (human) life (Dussel 2013, 188–
90). 
Such aim is the combination of the practical truth, the formal morality, and the 
feasibility of ethical life, resulting in the general good. 
The justified “good” is then an act, an institutional set of acts, or ethical-cultural totality that 
effectively integrates a condition of possibility and constitution of its ethical materiality, moral 
formalism and concrete operability.  
(…) What makes a goodness claim is not indefinable (…), nor is the mere incarnation of values 
(…), nor is simply the normatively valid (…) nor the “just” (…) (Dussel 2013, 201). 
 
Therefore, ethical feasibility is about a set of specific circumstances under which 
a norm, act, institution, or system operates with a ‘goodness claim’. An act is good when 
it applies the material component of practical truth, reproducing and developing the life 
of the subject within a given culture; it realizes the formal component of intersubjective 
validity with personal validity; and it realizes the feasibility component, deliberately 
considering with instrumental rationality the empirical, technological, and economic 
conditions of possibility framed a priori within the ethical requirements (Dussel 2013, 
202–3).  
 
Ethics and Energy Planning in Brazil 
Combining the three moments of ethics (materiality, formality, and feasibility), 
we can analyze the specific circumstances under which the Brazilian governmental 
institutions project the future of energy systems in the country. Justified in the pursuit of 
economic growth, energy planning aims at energy expansion. Economic growth is said to 
benefit every person in the country (argument that will be countered in Chapter 6). The 
materiality of the ethics of energy planning is the greater good arising from economic 
growth. The formality is the institutional and legal nature of energy planning, the 
epistemological realm of ethics. The feasibility is explained throughout the plan that 
informs the premises, priorities, and goals for energy planning defining each sector. The 
problematic is that the ethics of energy planning hierarchizes the type of life to be 
produced and reproduced in the universal material principle of ethics. This type of life is 
epistemically defined, historically negating gendered and racialized subjects, and 
explained within the limited Eurocentric colonial knowledge. Epistemology is the form 
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of institutionalizing ethical demands. Eurocentric epistemologies impose meanings for 
the prevalence of an agenda of power. The agenda of power behind energy planning in 
Brazil is coloniality of power.  
Therefore, the ethical demands of energy planning hierarchize life, as will be 
discussed in the following section. Epistemology of the modern–colonial world-system 
materially shapes such demands, imposing coloniality of power (didactically separated in 
power, being, and knowledge) by preventing epistemic diversity. Challenging epistemic 
violence in energy planning in Brazil involves challenging the ethical demands of the 
ethical system: the ethics of exhaustion. 
 
Ethics of Exhaustion  
The Ethics of Exhaustion is grounded in a critique forged in the Dusselian critical-
negative aspect of the Universal Material Principle of Ethics to frame the real ethics of 
the modern–colonial world-system. Critical-ethical reason emerges from the separation 
from the person – the combination between logos and ethos  “thought/being” (in 
Heidegger following a critique of Hegel’s Entzweiung – dissociation or separation of 
ethical substance) (Hegel 1978; Heidegger 1970, 32–34); and ‘reality’, the materiality of 
thought/being in the praxis. In this sense, Dussel asserts that the only way to be able to 
‘critically judge the “totality” of a system of ethics’ from the standpoint of the ‘alterity of 
the system’ without ‘ethical complicity’ is by adopting the ‘perspective of the victims’ 
(Dussel 2013, 207). 
In the light of the simple presence of the victims as victims, an inverted relationship occurs in the 
context of the exercise of critical-ethical reason: the dominant system of ethics, which to a naïve 
consciousness (…) was the measure of “good” and “evil”, becomes in the presence of its victims, 
in systemic terms, something perverse (evil). 
(…) 
This negative material-ethical judgement is possible from the positive sphere of the affirmation of 
the life of the human subject, as an ethical principle and criterion, and also from the standpoint of 
the recognized dignity of the subject, which is denied to the subject when he or she is reduced to 
a victim (Dussel 2013, 207–8).  
 
 The hegemonic ethical system (the ethics of the modern–colonial world-system 
or Modern ethics) is not capable of recognizing the alterity of the victims because of the 
concealment of the other (Dussel 1997) by the modern–colonial world-system that 
necessarily creates the victims. The negative critique is then towards the ethical systems 
(the norm, action, institution) revealing them to be perverse and unjust because they are 
the cause and origin of the victim’s condition.  
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The empirical truth (material reason), the formal morality (formal reason) and 
ethical feasibility (reason concerning feasibility) are combined for the elaboration of the 
Dusselian critical-ethical reason. By analysing such elements critically, we acknowledge 
the human reality that such aspects make sense in a theoretical framework but dot not 
correspond to the reality of the majority of people in the world. If the goodness claim is 
the aim of ethics, why are there exclusions, femicides, genocides, poverty, racism, and 
environmental catastrophes? Where is the universal material principle of producing and 
reproducing life? Would it mean that humans are living unethical lives and not applying 
any ethical principles? If so, humans have not detached themselves from the Eurocentric 
medieval Roman–Biblical condemnation to hell when living in sin. Moreover, it would 
mean that ethics is materially impossible in institutions forged in the modern–colonial 
world-system. 
This is not the case. It would be superficial to think that this is a fundamental 
contradiction: having an unfeasible ethical system. The feasibility of the hegemonic 
ethical system derives from the endorsement of the use of the victims’ life (energy, 
existence). This is the reason why there is no possibility of a reformist approach to the 
hegemonic ethics – something like the empowerment of the victims or the liberation of 
the victims. The Dusselian liberation proposes not only ‘breaking the chains’ (the 
negative moment), but also ‘developing human life’. At this point, Dussel calls for the 
construction of a possible utopia (or strategic-instrumental utopia) by applying the praxis 
of liberation, that is, the fulfilment of the principle of liberation, by transferring the 
burden of responsibility for the liberating act to the very community of victims, which he 
called the self-liberating act: 
(…) [T]he liberation principle can be described more or less as follows: one who operates in an 
ethical-critical manner should (is ethically obliged to) act to liberate the victim, as part (either by 
“location” or by “positioning”, according to Gramsci) of the same community to which the victim 
belongs, by means of (a) a feasible transformation of the moments (norms, acts, microstructures, 
institutions, or ethical systems) that produce the material negativity at issue (which impede a 
certain aspect of the reproduction of life) or its formal discursivity (a certain asymmetry or 
exclusion with regard to participation) for the victim; and (b) the construction, through mediations 
with strategic-instrumental critical feasibility, of new norms, actions, microstructures, institutions, 
or even complete ethical systems, where victims could live, as full and equal participants. (…) 
The liberatory interest is grounded in the regulatory idea of a society without victims 
(notwithstanding the empirical impossibility of such a society) and, concretely (and this is 
empirically possible) without this specific historical type of victim; each of these victims is 
empirically responsible for, and must struggle on behalf of, this society without their kind of 





We follow with a critique of the Dusselian Ethics of Liberation by the epistemic 
decolonial turn. The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house, and for such 
a radical perception, there must be a sharp and radical critique. The proposition of the 
ethics of exhaustion, built on the critical-negative aspect of the material ethics, does not 
intend to focus on the pessimistic problematic of the creation of victims. The critical-
negative aspect is necessary for the acknowledgement of the real nature of the hegemonic 
ethics and the impossibility of maintaining any of its principles. 
It is argued here that humans are not living unethically. The system of ethics in 
which we live – the ethics of exhaustion – is actually very coherent about the creation of 
victims, as Dussel points out throughout his critical-negative theoretical framework. 
Above all, the hegemonic ethical system is the very reason why the majority of people, 
the non-human living beings, and the ecosystems are hierarchized and victimized for the 
benefit of a few people. The hegemonic ethical system needs such hierarchization for the 
unspoken (or, as Quijano puts, “the dark side of Modernity”) general aim of exhausting 
life. 
Exhaustion is not about destruction of life and the environment per se. It is prior 
to the material action of destruction, as a general aim to use everything for one’s 
satisfaction, without considering the consequences of the annihilation of a people, an 
ecosystem, and natural resources. Even worse, it is the assumption that peoples and things 
have the capacity to adapt to the circumstances created by exhaustive norms, actions, 
and institutions and react against them. If the hegemonic ethical system presupposes the 
creation and reproduction of life by fuelling itself from the energy produced by something 
or someone else, it is, in fact, creating and reproducing death by exhausting the other’s 
vital energy. The hegemonic ethical system transfers (meaning that it does not ‘create’ or 
‘produce’) life (energy, work) to a privileged minority of people to the detriment of a 
victimized majority and the ecosystem. Such transference is made unilaterally, 
demanding the vital energy that is impossible replenish. In doing so, the hegemonic 
ethical system not only endorses or fosters the exhaustion of life [energy, work] of the 
other living beings and the ecosystem, it exists only because of such exhaustive behaviour.  
 Hence, the Dusselian critical analysis of the material principle of ethics allows the 
acknowledgement of the victims. In Dussel’s framework, the victims are persons because 
ethics is fundamentally for the production and reproduction of human lives. The human-
centred ethics is an Eurocentric-androcentric hegemonic perspective of existence and 
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philosophy (Amorós 2000, 68–72)39. We argue further that the exhaustion of the other 
forms of life, as well as the structures that enable human life, also cause human death. In 
this sense, the preservation, production, and reproduction of the life of non-human living 
beings and ecosystems are mandatory for the preservation, production, and reproduction 
of human life. If humans, animals, plants, and the land are not hierarchized, they co-exist 
in balance. Once hierarchized, their existence is exhausted for the benefit of a minority 
of human beings. Therefore, everyone and everything that are not benefiting from the 
positive aspects of the hegemonic ethics become victims. This is the reasoning of the 
ethics of exhaustion.   
There is no possible liberation from the hegemonic ethical system through the 
utopian attempt to fix such an ethical system because it does not change its exhaustive 
character. Such a critique can only be made from the standpoint of the colonial difference, 
which, as delineated supra, must propaedeutically be made from a non-androcentric look. 
The androcentric character of the Dusselian philosophy prevents him from experiencing 
liberation. This way, the twin  aspects of the Dusselian liberation are the  critique in the 
light of the ethics of exhaustion and that coming from a radical feminist place of 
observation, struggle, and critique (Lorde 2017, 16–17). 
The first aspect is the intentional (wilful) creation of victims in the ethics of 
exhaustion. The Dusselian liberation acknowledges the impracticality of the goodness 
claim of the dominant system that unintentionally creates victims and proposes the 
liberation of such victims through the anti-hegemonic validity that allows a praxis of 
liberation. Dussel calls for the realization of the ‘bad side’ of ethics as the negative 
moment of the exercise of ethical-critical reason. We expatiate on the critical-negative 
aspect in relation to the creation of the victims. However, we add the non-human victims 
(plants, animals, the water, the mountain, and other aspects of nature) to the Dusselian 
framework and frame the intentionality of the hegemonic ethical systems in creating such 
victims, operating on a system of production and reproduction of death, preserving the 
                                                        
39 Celia Amorós, understanding the entrenched nature of the androcentric philosophical thought: ‘(...) the 
excluded and oppressed are more pressured to enter the universal and to rescue the garments that have been 
taken from them than to do the meticulous and subtle critical examination of the marks that in those same 
garments have remained of the usurper and that constitute them in the body of the crime. For the time being, 
it is urgent to have them in their power: there will be time - for now, the task of conquering them is so 
absorbing that they do not even consider it - to trace the traces of imposture. In the face of the itching of 
hunger, the refinement of smell is postponed in order to discern what, logically, of manly nature had left 
its impregnations in the usurped universality’ (Amorós 2000, 71). 
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ethics that hierarchizes [certain] humans above everything else, having as the modus 
operandi the exhaustion of every source of energy, including human life. 
The second aspect is the victims’ burden of liberation. If the victims (or the 
community of victims) are the ones in charge of the praxis of liberation, they will be even 
more exhausted for carrying the burden of oppression and of having to adapt, survive, 
and change the exhaustive circumstances. Such praxis does not free the victims of being 
exhausted. The standpoint of the colonial difference enables the inclusion of the non-
human victims and the realization of the weight of the burden of liberation because it 
looks at the hegemonic ethics with radical feminist eyes. As Audre Lorde stated,  
What does it mean when the tools of a racist patriarchy are used to examine the fruits of the same 
patriarchy? It means that only the most narrow perimeters of change are possible and allowable.  
(…) 
Within the interdependence of mutual (non-dominant) differences lies that security which enables 
us to descend into the chaos of knowledge and return with the true visions of our future, along 
with the concomitant power to effect those changes which can bring that future into being. 
Difference is the raw powerful connection from which our personal power is forged (Moraga and 
Anzaldúa 1983, p. 98). 
 
For Dussel, liberation (praxis of liberation by the victims) seems feasible because, 
entrenched as he is in the primordial privilege of the ethical system, he is blind to the fact 
that patriarchy permeates the structure of knowledge, the conditions of living, the 
structural institutional life, and the formal morality. This is understandable, but patriarchy 
must be acknowledged and challenged. So, the praxis of liberation would include 
evidencing the androcentric character of philosophy and ethical systems, which makes 
the burden of liberation even heavier and more exhausting for the victims, especially for 
poor coloured women  (Davis 2011). Such burden will exhaust her vital energy before 
the liberation starts. Audre Lorde continues on this point, teaching the unforgettable 
lesson of the feminist struggle: 
Women of today are still being called upon to stretch across the gap of male ignorance and to 
educate men as to our existence and our needs. This is an old and primary tool of all oppressors 
to keep the oppressed occupied with the master’s concerns (Lorde 2017, 20).  
 
The ethics of exhaustion is the hegemonic ethical system that we live in, 
historically configured from the globalization of a specific pattern of power that operates 
by the reproduction of colonialities, forming the modern–colonial world-system post 
1492. The realization that the exhaustive relationships are androcentric and patriarchal by 
nature is point zero in the journey towards understanding the whole framework of human 
relationships. It is nice to observe ethics from the standpoint of the victim, but this will 
never be possible without acknowledging the complex collateral hierarchy of privileges 
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and, to do so, the primordial issue is the understanding of the androcentric nature of such 
an ethical system (Amorós 2000; 1991). Exhaustion and exhaustive behaviour are typical 
characteristics of patriarchal relationships, norms, institutions, and ethical systems. 
Cherríe Moraga, in the 1978 text called La Güerra, wrote: 
The danger [of the patriarchal academic establishment] lies in attempting to deal with the 
oppressions purely from a theoretical base. (…) Without an emotional, heartfelt grappling with 
the source of our own oppression, without naming the enemy within ourselves and outside of us, 
no authentic non-hierarchical connection among oppressed groups can take place. (…) He must, 
first, emotionally come to the terms with what it feels like to be a victim (Moraga and Anzaldúa 
1983, 29–30). 
 
Framing the hegemonic ethical system as the ethics of exhaustion happens when 
the Dusselian analytical understanding of ethics is applied to it; that is, putting together 
the material moment of ethics – the general intention to produce and reproduce human 
life; the formal morality – the intersubjective validity that institutionalizes materiality; 
and the ethical feasibility – the means-ends of ethical life. The three aspects (or moments) 
of the conception of ethics are exhaustive, because they bear the common aspect of 
privileging one over the whole – privileging a certain type of human life over the others, 
and human life over everything else. When this happens, all the energy flows are 
imbalanced and, nature cannot operate its perfect laws because some are using up the 
vital energy of others to the state where such energy will be used up – bringing life to its 
end, causing death.  
The following section expatiates the concept of exhaustion so we can return to the 
discussion of epistemology by analysing Brazilian energy planning in the light of the 
(modern–colonial world-system’s) ethics of exhaustion. 
 
Exhaustion  
Humanity is moving steadily towards social and environmental exhaustion. We 
can get no satisfaction. Exhaustion is a noun that means ‘1. A state of extreme physical 
or mental tiredness; 2. The action of using something up or the state of being used up; 3. 
The process of establishing a conclusion by eliminating all the alternatives’ (Collins Latin 
Dictionary, Oxford English Dictionary). Let’s apply the word’s three meanings to 
elucidate the concept of the ethics of exhaustion.  
First, the meaning deals with the exhaustion of persons: “a state of extreme 
physical or mental tiredness”. In this typical condition of the present times, the lives of 
people are subject to several concomitant oppressions that undermine the ability of a 
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person to live a full life. Such oppressions are related to social hierarchizations, gender 
violence, racism, poverty, labour, consumerism, private property, gun violence, inability 
to produce food, and political violence. It concerns all the limitations that makes people 
invest their vital energy to adapt and survive in the oppressive world-system. If all the 
energy is allocated to surviving, there will be no energy left to live a full life. People are 
exhausted because they use up all their vital energy for living just part of their lives. 
Second, exhaustion refers to the planet Earth: ‘the action of using something up 
or the state of being used up’. Using up the planet, its natural life, animals, water, and 
minerals are consequences of the Eurocentric concealment of the other (Dussel 1994) by 
the hierarchization of the existent things and the superiority of human beings (especially 
white men) above everything else. It is the lack of respect to the life cycles; human 
interference is not for survival but to produce surplus value. It is the reinforcement of 
human supremacy and social hierarchizations.  
Third, it is related to the arrogance of modern/colonial/patriarchal/capitalist 
deafness: ‘The process of establishing a conclusion by eliminating all the alternatives’. 
This aspect is related to epistemic violence, the exhaustive approach to the possibilities 
of change, narrowing the capacity of changing perspectives and mindsets, making it 
impossible to overcome Eurocentrism. It brings the intentionality of the act of exhausting 
someone or something by the imposition of epistemologies to sustain the colonial agenda 
of power.  
The critical-negative moment of ethics, in which it is possible to identify the 
victims brings the realization of the real aim of the modern–colonial world-system’s 
ethics (the hegemonic ethics): the production and reproduction of life for a few at the cost 
of the many. When the life aimed to be produced and reproduced is not every life, it 
creates an irreversible imbalance that causes death. Therefore, when the type of life 
protected by such ethics aims solely at the preservation of human life, regardless of the 
means to do so, it also causes human death, since it uses all the means for the satisfaction 
of human greed, disrupting the natural cycles, hierarchizing humans in their (capacity to) 
access the means of survival, creating cycles of collateral/multilateral violence that ends 
up, in the short term, generating life for a few and death for the majority and, in the long 
term, generating just death.  
In the following sections the three definitions of exhaustion are discussed in 
alignment with the argument proposed. This point is made so it is possible to move from 
ethics to epistemology. Thereafter, we expatiate on academic understandings of energy 
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systems, so we can enter the discussion of the epistemology of energy planning in Brazil 
by scrutinizing the Brazilian energy plans. 
 
We Are Exhausted! 
For the expatiation on the definition of exhaustion as ‘a state of extreme physical 
or mental tiredness’, we borrow the terminologies of Exhaustion Disorder (ED) and Vital 
Exhaustion (VE) used in psychology, neurosciences, and medicine to describe a person’s 
state of physical fatigue, tiredness, and incapacity to perform, emotional overwhelming 
stress, feelings of being overextended, and feelings of being depleted of one’s emotional 
and physical resources (Maslach, Schaufeli, and Leiter 2001, 399). ED and VE are 
characterized by the lack of energy, tiredness, feelings of demoralization, and irritability, 
apathy, and cynical behaviour and a lack of interest in life and social interaction. The 
combined situations of exhaustion can lead a person to burnout, that is a ‘chronic 
depletion of an individual’s energetic resources as a consequence of chronic stress’ taking 
place in three dimensions: ‘physical fatigue, emotional exhaustion and cognitive 
weariness’ (Grossi et al. 2015, 626). Initial studies on ED took place in the 1970s in the 
United States and Europe to evaluate the increased number of individuals who had 
emotionally and physically collapsed due to exhaustion. In the early twenty-first century, 
‘psychological ill health has become the main cause of absence due to sickness’ in  
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (OECD 
2013). 
Christina Maslach and others (Leiter, Maslach, and Schaufeli 2009; Maslach, 
Schaufeli, and Leiter 2001) have developed the term burnout to refer to the specific 
exhaustion-related occupational characteristics and work-related activities that lack 
community support and interaction, lack a feeling of fairness in the way effort is rewarded 
(especially regarding comfort and financial reward), create conflicts of values between 
the individual and the occupation, and cause feelings of frustration, inefficacy, or reduced 
personal accomplishment. By definition, burnout is as a ‘syndrome of emotional 
exhaustion, depersonalization and reduced professional accomplishment, mainly 
afflicting highly motivated employees working in helping professions. While emotional 
exhaustion refers to the depletion of positive emotions towards the recipients of one’s 
care, depersonalization implies an excessively callous, detached and cynical attitude 
towards them. The third component, reduced professional accomplishment, refers to an 
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increase in self appraisals as ineffective, incompetent and/or inadequate for the job’ 
(Grossi et al. 2015). In the International Classification of Diseases (ICD 2010; WHO 
2010), burnout is classified as a ‘State of vital exhaustion’ (Z73.0) under ‘Problems 
related to life-management difficulty’ (Z73)” (Grossi et al. 2015, 627).  
ED is related to causes of physical health problems such as cardiovascular 
diseases and diabetes (Bacqué 2015; Bonet 2013; Marrau 2004) and severe psychological 
conditions such as anxiety, depression, folie a deux (or ‘shared psychotic disorder’), and 
causes of suicide (Fuentes and Rodante 2013; Grossi et al. 2015; Leiter, Maslach, and 
Schaufeli 2009; Maslach, Schaufeli, and Leiter 2001). Both ED and burnout have more 
incidence among women than among men (Grossi et al. 2015). 
The number of people complaining about stress or being diagnosed with clinical 
psychological problems related to ED has been growing steadily. Overall, mental health 
problems represent a large proportion of the global burden of disease (OECD, 2017). 
According to the OECD, an estimated one in two people will experience a mental illness 
in their lifetime, and around one in five working-age adults suffers from mental ill health 
at any given time (OECD 2013; OECD 2017). Depression affects millions of individuals 
each year, especially women. In 2017, the OECD reported that women have higher rates 
of depression in all member countries. In serious cases, depression and other mental 
illnesses, such as bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, can lead to people harming 
themselves or even committing suicide. There is evidence of more incidence of 
depression during economic crises (European Commission 2010). 
There is clear relationship between socio-economic conditions and ED. Moreover, 
oppressions related to racism and sexism, which leads to increased ED, result in violence 
(as in the case of black young men who do not have formal jobs); more persecution by 
the police; more incarcerations; and violent death (Rossi, 2013). Hence, there is a 
hierarchization, even of the varying impact of ED on different segments. When analyzing 
a person’s exhaustion, one must consider the combination of oppressive situations due to 
gender, race, and class that a person goes through when analyzing a person’s exhaustion.  
This is something fundamental to the existence of a person in the modern–colonial 
world-system. The concomitant characteristics of a person existing in the territory, her 
gender, colour, and the mandatory condition of being a worker in a capitalist economy 
are draining her vital energy in simply continuing to survive. The ethics of exhaustion 
historically takes place through the viability of coloniality of power. Coloniality of being 
(considering gender and race) is the annulment of the subject for its transformation into 
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colonial subject. It prevents the being-in-place (Daisen) to live a full life, and isolates the 
subject to preclude communal life as the-one-for-the-other, diminishing the relevance of 
giving, hospitality, generosity, and justice whereas it places one’s success as the general 
aim in life. When the one-for-the-other becomes the one-for-success, it is ethically 
exhaustive. It is an ethical system that forces every subject to become the self-made man, 
regardless of the necessary conditions of existence in social life. The exhaustive ethics of 
the self-made man is even more destructive to poor coloured and indigenous women since 
the nature of their work involves a broader communal aspect of raising children, 
developing domestic education and culture, and providing for the family while 
marginalized from so-called professional life. Coloured or indigenous women do not 
benefit from the exhaustive character of the non-communal work (capitalist work), but 
must prepare their children for this kind of work because it is a strategy for survival. The 
condition of being a worker in the ethics of exhaustion can be analysed from what Marx 
called the alienation of labour40. Adapting to the system as a strategy for survival results 
in the production of profit at the cost of the labourer’s life. 
The condition of the labourer (whether a woman, an indigene, one who works 
formally or informally to provide the capitalist his/her means of survival) implies the 
‘denial of the worker’s own fulfillment’ (Marx and Engels 2009) and, as Dussel 
concludes, ‘what is the contrary to human life is death itself’ (Dussel 2013, 226). The 
objectification of the worker for the achievement of capitalist profit (as means-ends), 
‘aims at sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external end. […] It is 
satisfaction from a limited standpoint; while the Modern gives no satisfaction; or, where 
it appears satisfied with itself, it is vulgar’ (Marx 2015b, 412). Such a condition is 
                                                        
40 First, the fact that labour is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in 
his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but is unhappy, 
does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The 
worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He feels at 
home when he is not working, and when he is working, he does not feel at home. His labour is therefore 
not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely 
a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no 
physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague. External labour, labour in which 
man alienates himself, is a labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification. Lastly, the external character of 
labour for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else’s, that it does not belong 
to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity 
of the human imagination, of the human brain, and the human heart, operates on the individual 
independently of him – that is, operates as an alien, divine, or diabolical activity – so is the worker’s activity 
not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self (emphasis added in bold) (Marx 
and Engels 2009, 30). 
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oppressive per se, acquiring greater levels of oppression to the extent that the specificities 
of the worker will deny her capacity of living a full life.  
In countering Smith’s thesis in presenting happiness and labour as conflicting with 
each other, Marx uses the interesting term ‘curse’41 (that is explored further in the 
‘resources curse’). Marx goes on to explain that Jehovah’s curse on Adam is not only for 
‘Smith’s slaves of capital’ (Marx 2015b, 534). The sacrifice is a purely negative 
characterization, also for the capitalist: 
Labor regarded merely as a sacrifice, and hence value-positing, as a price paid for things and hence 
giving them price depending on whether they cost more or less labor, is a purely negative 
characterization. This is why Mr Senior, for example, was able to make capital into a source of 
production in the same sense as labor, a source sui generis of the production of value, because the 
capitalist too brings a sacrifice, the sacrifice of abstinence, in that he grows wealthy instead of 
eating up his product directly. […] Something that is merely negative creates nothing. If the 
worker should, e.g. enjoy his work – as the miser certainly enjoys Senior’s abstinence – then the 
product does not lose any of its value. Labor alone produces; it is the only substance of products 
as values. Its measure, labor time – presupposing equal intensity – is therefore the measure of 
values (emphasis added in bold) (Marx 2015b, 535). 
 
This way, the exhaustive character of working in the modern–colonial (capitalist/ 
patriarchal) world-system is identified by the transference of life from the worker to the 
accumulated capital, creating a negative balance for the one who sacrifices and surplus 
value for the one who benefits from it42. The need to survive drains one’s capacity to live 
a full life, leading to several EDs and to VE. It affects people in different ways, 
considering each specific condition within the social group, resulting in different 
                                                        
41 “Whether I obtain much or little for an hour of work – which depends on its productivity and other 
circumstances – I have worked one hour. What I have had to pay for the result of my work, my wages, is 
always the same hour of work, let the result vary as it may. ‘Equal quantities of labor must at all times and 
in all places have the same value for the worker. In his normal state of health, strength and activity, and 
with the common degree of skill and facility which he may possess, he must always give up the identical 
portion of his tranquility, his freedom, and his happiness. Whatever may be the quantity or composition 
of the commodities he obtains in reward of his work, the price he pays is always the same. Of course, this 
price may buy sometimes a lesser, sometimes a greater quantity of these commodities, but only because 
their value changes, not the value of the labor which buys them. Labor alone, therefore, never changes its 
own value. It is therefore the real price of commodities, money is only their nominal value.’ […] In the 
sweat of thy brow shalt thou labor! Was Jehovah’s curse on Adam. […] And this is labor for Smith, 
a curse. ‘Tranquility’ appears as the adequate state, as identical with ‘freedom’ and ‘happiness’. It seems 
quite far from Smith’s mind that the individual, ‘in his normal state of health, strength, activity, skill, 
facility’, also needs a normal portion of work, and of the suspension of tranquility” (emphasis added in 
bold) (Marx 2015b, 533–34). 
42 The law, finally, that always equilibrates the relative surplus population, or industrial reserve army, to 
the extent and energy of accumulation, this law rivets the labourer to capital more firmly than the wedges 
of Vulcan did Prometheus to the rock. It establishes an accumulation of misery, corresponding with 
accumulation of capital. Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation 
of misery, agony of toil slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole, i.e., on the 
side of the class that […] produces its own product in the form of capital. This antagonistic character of 
capitalistic accumulation is enunciated in various forms by political economists, although by them it is 
confounded with phenomena, certainly to some extent analogous, but nevertheless essentially distinct, and 
belonging to pre-capitalistic modes of production (Marx 2015a). 
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outcomes, whether more or less violent, more or less suicidal. Above all, it never renders 
happiness, which is part of a full life. It creates impossible means-ends logics and thus 
ties in with the promise of the impossible in the hegemonic ethics; e.g., women work hard 
for their children, but in doing so, they do not get time with their children; this circularity 
of means and ends is where the promise of impossibility becomes central to the ethics of 
exhaustion. This is also the problem of reduction: reductive understanding of happiness 
which argues that more money will bring more happiness; but in the process of making 
money, one is exhausted and unable to be happy.  
When studying the impact of energy enterprises, for example, the necessity of a 
large dam is justified by arguing that it will bring economic growth, which, in turn, will 
enable more formal jobs – formal employment, narrowing dignity to the possibility of 
becoming part of the economic-bureaucratic system. In this way, the indigene and/or poor 
woman will suffer the downsides of displacement, of erasure of her means of life and 
culture, which she is sacrificing for the possibility of employment. This promise of 
impossibility is the critical-negative aspect of material ethics and the central feature of 
the ethics of exhaustion.  
Franz Fanon, Algerian psychiatrist, studied the relationship between colonial war, 
violence, and mental disorders during the independence war in Algeria (1954 to 1961). 
In the remarkable work The Wretched of the Earth (first published in 1961), Fanon 
explains the exhaustion of a people struggling for liberation, which led to, among all the 
other consequences of the war, collateral violence. Fanon writes: 
Because it is a systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the 
other person all attributes of humanity, colonialism forces the people it dominates to ask 
themselves the question constantly: “In reality, who am I?” 
The defensive attitudes created by this violent bringing together of the colonized man and the 
colonial system form themselves into a structure which then reveals the colonized personality. 
This “sensitivity” is easily understood if we simply study and are alive to the number and depth 
of the injuries inflicted upon a native during a single day spent amidst the colonial regime 
(emphasis added in bold) (Fanon 2001, 249).  
 
In this passage, Fanon makes clear that both the ‘violent’ and ‘pacified’ colonized 
respond to the violence of colonialism with some sort of mental disorder due to the loss 
of self-identification by their transformation into a colonial subject, their beastialization 
(Carvalho 1987); this was similar to what happened with the land, nature, and the 
resources – all transformed due to the constant catching-up with the colonial power43. 
                                                        
43 ‘We shall deal here with the problem of mental disorders which arise from the war of national liberation 
which the Algerian people are carrying on. (…) We cannot be held responsible that in this war psychiatric 
phenomena entailing disorders affecting behavior and thought have taken on importance where those who 
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There is no way to live a full life in the modern–colonial world-system. We are being 
exhausted before that happens. 
 
Exhausting the Planet 
The planet’s exhaustion refers to a number of problems caused by human greed 
that are making the ecosystems unbalanced, leading to the extinction of animal and plant 
populations, scarcity of resources, increased global temperature, polluted water and air, 
and causing severe health problems in an irreversible way. The ecological issue is not a 
thing of privileged white wealthy environmentalists hugging trees and begging to save 
the Arctic whales (Guha and Martínez-Alier 2013, 59); it is also of concern to ‘not-really-
environmentalists’ such as mainstream economists, business investors, the World Bank, 
governments, and mineral exporting companies. Although some would say that there is 
no risk of resource scarcity or mineral exhaustion (Arndt et al. 2017), a common concern 
is expressed in all publications about the future of resource availability, whether by 
pessimists or optimists: the way the exploration of natural resources has been happening 
in the last 150 years and the need of ‘some regulatory framework and policies’ for the 
extraction of minerals.  
There are clearly different approaches between ecologists and economists when 
using ecological/environmental-related terminologies. Ecological and mineral 
exhaustions are, in fact, economic indicators (Auty 2007; Bachmann, Carneiro, and 
Espejo 2013) to assess businesses’ viability, investment feasibility, and rate of return 
(Bachmann, Carneiro, and Espejo 2013, 43–45). Mineral-depletion or mineral-exhaustion 
problems refer to the availability of mineral commodities (the transformed mineral 
resources) over the coming decades and centuries, as Tilton explains in his book On 
Borrowed Time? Assessing the Threat of Mineral Depletion (2010). ‘Availability’ reflects 
the extent to which mineral depletion is a growing threat to the long-term welfare of 
society. Environmentalists measure availability by what has to be given up in terms of 
                                                        
carry out the "pacification" are concerned, or that these same disorders are notable among the "pacified" 
population. The truth is that colonialism in its essence was already taking on the aspect of a fertile purveyor 
for psychiatric hospitals. We have since 1954 in various scientific works drawn the attention of both French 
and international psychiatrists to the difficulties that arise when seeking to "cure" a native properly, that is 
to say, when seeking to make him thoroughly a part of a social background of the colonial type. (…) In the 
period of colonization when it is not contested by armed resistance, when the sum total of harmful nervous 
stimuli overstep a certain threshold, the defensive attitudes of the natives give way and they then find 
themselves crowding the mental hospitals. There is thus during this calm period of successful colonization 
a regular and important mental pathology which is the direct product of oppression.’ (Fanon 1990, 249–50)  
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other goods and services to obtain a mineral commodity, whereas economists refer to this 
sacrifice as the opportunity cost (Auty 2002; Tilton 2010). ‘Shortage’ is an economic 
term used to reflect an excess of demand over supply at the prevailing market price for a 
particular commodity. According to Tilton, such situations can happen ‘(…) if 
governments or companies control prices. They are, however, unusual, because normally 
when demand exceeds supply price rises, bringing the two back into balance. (…) If rising 
prices are needed to keep supply equal to demand, consumers are likely to find the 
commodity more and more difficult to afford. (…) A growing shortage or increasing 
scarcity is the same as declining availability, and may occur even though demand and 
supply remain in balance thanks to rising prices’ (Tilton 2010).  
Economists also established a difference between things that are renewable and 
non-renewable, referring to things that may be exhausted one day [or not, for some], and 
things that are ‘inexhaustible’. For us, such difference is somehow relevant for the use of 
the available terminologies in literature. It is also relevant to analyze the treatment given 
to what is considered non-renewable. Such differentiations are Modern constructs that 
hierarchize the power of men over other existing things (Guha and Martínez-Alier 2013, 
26–27; Shiva 2010). The ethics of exhaustion allows men to have a ‘self-proclaimed’ 
authority (universality and la hybris del punto cero, part of the arrogance of Modern 
knowledge that results in coloniality of knowledge) in determining what can be used up, 
and for how long. On this, Tilton explains: 
Mineral resources are the legacy of geologic processes that take place over geologic time, 
measured not in decades and centuries, but in hundreds of millions of years. Because the time 
required for their formation is so vast from the perspective of any meaningful time scale for people, 
mineral resources are considered nonrenewable. In contrast, many other resources, such as water, 
air, forests, fish, and solar energy, are considered renewable. Fish caught in the sea and trees cut 
in the forest can be replaced within a much shorter period of time. So their current use need not 
result in less being available in the future. Just how significant the difference is between 
nonrenewable and renewable resources, however, is debatable, because renewable resources, like 
nonrenewable resources, can suffer from depletion if overexploited (Tilton 2010, 59). 
 
Hence, ecological exhaustion is about ‘non-renewable’ resources such as minerals 
or the soil, and ‘renewable’ resources such as agriculture practices, even the harmful 
practices that destroy the rivers and modify the seeds causing immeasurable impact on 
the future of food production (Shiva 2010). For energy planning, both kinds of resources 
matter since mineral commodities (considered non-renewable) and hydropower 
(considered ‘renewable’) are energy inputs in the Brazilian Energy Plan.  
The problem of the irresponsible use of natural resources is not merely about 
regulation. The model of political and economic institutions in the modern–colonial 
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world-system – specially the regulatory institutions – contains the original vice and 
contradiction of existing [solely] to enable exploitation elsewhere without retaliation 
(Anghie 2005; 1996). The number of rights to protect individuals and/or the environment 
do not really represent a gain against the predatorial nature of international relations 
interfering in domestic legislation as Radha D’Souza has explained in What’s Wrong With 
Rights? (D’Souza 2018). It includes domestic regulation that aims at economic growth 
and development. Regulating the exploitation of the territory in the modern–colonial 
world-system means that the masters care only about their businesses. In other words, the 
regulatory model is epistemically violent, as well as research on the advocacy of infinite 
endless mineral exploitation. Regulation does not mean the end of the cause of 
environmental harm (system of oppressions), it means control over the resources that, 
despite belonging to everyone, fall under the fallacious label of representativeness and 
democracy in which resources are being ‘managed’ (Shiva 2016, 25).  
The idea that mineral resources are endless is hurtful. The issue Geochemical 
Perspectives, published in 2017, is, to say the least, irresponsible. Written from the 
standpoint of exhaustive ethics, the work seems to be a sponsored report to guarantee that 
investments in mining in the short future will be worthwhile. The authors argue that 
‘current reserves of [copper and aluminum] are larger than in 1972, despite four decades 
of continually increasing yearly production’ (Arndt et al. 2017). They argue on the 
reasoning of reducing the carbon footprint (highly criticized elsewhere [Guha and 
Martínez-Alier 2013]) by digging deeper and ‘more responsibly’ to increase ‘efficiency’ 
and applying more up-to-date technologies: ‘[r]ecent technological advances allow low-
grade mass mining to depths of 2–3 km to recover many of these deeper deposits, which 
will reduce the surface footprint and impact of mining’ (Arndt et al. 2017).  The work 
asks a rhetorical question (for the purposes of their targeted-audience’s publication) ‘[i]s 
it then reasonable to warn of imminent peak production of important mineral 
commodities?’ We believe that the answer to their self-referenced question is obvious: ‘it 
is all good, we can keep mining and drilling as much as we want to profit from it’, so the 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) risk would be stable, the price of commodities would 
not suffer the environmentalist threat and the BHP Billiton shareholders would sleep well.  
In the modern–colonial world-system’s ethics of exhaustion, the idea that humans 
must radically change their relationship with the environment means going backwards in 
all the technological advance, against development and improvements on quality of life 
indicators. Mining and the consumption of mineral resources is not a thing that came up 
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after 1492, when the invaders made their wealth out of the silver mines in Bolivia and the 
gold mines in Brazil (Guha and Martínez-Alier 2013, 27). The problem is the pace of 
exploitation in the light of industrial financial capitalism and the modus operandi, 
regardless of the impact on communities and ecosystems (Shiva 2010; 2001; Gudynas 
2011; Escobar 2015).  
For example, the disasters of Mariana (5 November 2015 [Gormezano, Protti, and 
Cowie 2016]) and Brumadinho (25 January 2019 [Carneiro 2019]) consisted in the 
collapse of two tailing dams (dams used to hold the toxic waste from the activity of 
mining iron ore using water) of the mining company, Vale. These are considered the worst 
environmental catastrophes in Brazilian history to this date. Thousands of people, 
animals, and plants were murdered, communities (especially traditional communities 
such as Quilombolas and indigenous and riverine traditional peoples) vanished, 
agricultural lands were devastated, rivers irreversibly destroyed, and toxic mineral waste 
spread through thousands of kilometres of rivers up to the Atlantic sea. The intentionality 
of the outcomes of these disasters is framed in the ethics of exhaustion’s intentionality in 
creating victims.  
Tailing dams are part of the mining business. They create irreversible 
interventions in the environment. The mining business aims at producing commodities 
for surplus value. The means to produce commodities – labour exploitation and 
environmental destruction – are necessary for the business’ success. In the ethics of 
exhaustion, such ‘downsides’ are necessary, therefore naturalized and hence, invisible. 
The victims are not perceived before the catastrophe, but they are fundamental – co-
constitutive – for the implementation of the mining business. Therefore, the profit from 
mining only exists because of the victim’s sacrifice. The naturalization of mining as a 
‘saving sacrifice’ transforms the predatorial character of the activity into the only possible 
way to obtain mineral inputs: large scale, labour intensive, environmentally harmful, for 
commodity export. This naturalization is epistemically violent. As framed supra, violent 
epistemologies are direct coercive ways of imposing meanings to legitimize agendas that 
ensure positions of power. When the tailing dams collapse, the number of victims is 
bigger, but the victims – persons and the environment – were already part of the business. 
The collapse ‘looks different’, it looks like it is not intentional, looks like an accident 
exclusively because it does not bring profit to the owner: dams collapsing is not part of 
the business, therefore not naturalized in the ‘saving sacrifice’ epistemically violent 
discourse. The violence entrenched in the imposition of large-scale mining is 
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epistemically naturalized, softened until it becomes not-perceptible. The predictably 
unwanted consequences of large scale-mining are intentionally detached from the 
business’ predictably wanted consequences. It is like committing a crime in which the 
agent not only produces the initially intended result but also goes beyond and produces 
the worse result. The business owner intended to create victims, but did not intend to lose 
capital. When victims are created without generating profit, the results are accidental. 
The accident is about money, not about the victims. The victims are fundamental to the 
business’ success. 
Mariana and Brumadinho are examples of the modern–colonial world-system 
ethics, what is impossible to fix with severe legislation, transparency, and compliance. 
There is no catch-word in economics that will bring the river back to life; there is no 
carbon footprint remedy that can restore the lives and livelihoods in the affected 
communities, there is no socio-impact study that can assess a better performance and 
efficiency of the existent remaining iron ore waste dams in the region, because it does not 
matter. Every year there are numerous environmental crimes like this around the [Third] 
world, caused by criminal actions of transnational corporations but, due to the legal 
characteristics of such businesses, the ones that benefit from the prejudicial enterprise are 
not held liable when predictably unwanted consequences of their actions or omissions 
cause incalculable harm. Protected by the corporate veil, the masters benefit from the law 
that encourages their types of businesses in the domestic environment, ‘in the name of 
progress’. They say it is the saving sacrifice. It is not. It is just death.  
There is no excuse for the exhaustive relationship with the environment. Resource 
abundance does not mean an economic escape against poverty in the sense that it could 
promote economic growth and enable a country’s economic development. As a curse, 
resource-rich countries (generally in the geopolitical south) experience the contrary, as 
evidenced in Richard Auty’s book Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies – the 
Resource Curse Thesis (1993). Auty analysed economic development in what were 
considered ‘mineral economies’ (defined as those developing countries which generate 
at least 8 per cent of their GDP and 40 per cent of their export earnings from the mineral 
sector) in countries in the Americas (Bolivia, Chile, Jamaica and Peru), Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Zambia), and south-eastern Asia (Papua New-Guinea). The study evidenced that 
‘a favorable natural resource endowment may be less beneficial to countries at low- and 
mid-income levels of development than the conventional wisdom might suppose. (…) 
[N]ot only may resource-rich countries fail to benefit from a favorable endowment, they 
 
 95 
may actually perform worse than less well-endowed countries’ (Auty 2002, 1). Although 
Auty (a World Bank economist searching for the promotion of the Bank’s SAP policies 
in the ‘developing world’, a.k.a. the periphery, especially in countries where there are 
easily tradable commodities, necessary for the economies of the centre) gets to the 
conclusion of poor managerial performance in the international pricing of commodities, 
weak regulatory environment, and the need for structural changes, he finishes his work 
championing  sustainable development (the type of development that attends to the 
Bank’s regulatory framework and goals). There is a clear evidence that mineral 
abundance is proportional to greed and leads to misery – economic and spiritual. 
The resource curse has little to do with the fact that there is natural abundance of 
hard minerals. The curse is not mystical, but a consequence of the exhaustive behaviour 
that cannot conceive the possibility of a rich ecosystem untouched by the masculine 
dominant ego conquiro. The curse is, as Marx referred to Smith’s nature of work as the 
contrary of tranquility, a disturbance, humiliation, submission. The curse is the exhaustive 
ethics of the modern–colonial world-system, that will annihilate the one that has 
something to offer, if that one can be dominated, whether a coloured woman or a river.  
 
The Exhaustive Possibilities of Knowledge and Knowing Existence 
The definition of exhaustion as ‘the establishment of a conclusion by eliminating 
all other alternatives’ refers to making one single alternative prevail to the detriment of 
all the others. Applying this definition in a historical–political context, in which the 
imposition of the modern–colonial world-system takes place by a series of concomitant 
events – the colonial combo – involves the colonial violence of murdering or enslaving 
non-Europeans, the taking of land and resources, and the imposition of the European race, 
values, institutions, normative organizations, and knowledge.  
The epistemic aspect of the exhaustion of (non-Eurocentric) alternatives remains 
to the present time, being shaped on the idea that what is Eurocentric is the 
normal/natural/good, whereas the other possibilities are rudimentary, non-sophisticated, 
not capable of establishing ‘the truth’, embedded in mystical (or folkloric, as said Walsh 
[2007b]) traditions that are considered ‘not rational’ and, for that reason, non-legitimate. 
The establishment of Eurocentric knowledge and rationality happens by banishing all 
knowledge and reason that are non-Eurocentric, by becoming naturalized as the only 
possibility of knowing knowledge (the only epistemic possibility) through the claims of 
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universality, objectivity, and neutrality (Castro-Gómez 2005a). Such claims are 
impossible since there is no ‘neutrality’ in domination. Hence, Eurocentric epistemic 
superiority does not happen naturally (Dussel 1997), but intentionally, as part of the 
modern–colonial world-system ethics.  
The exhaustive approach perceives non-academic knowledge as non-serious 
knowledge, annihilating ancestral comprehensions of existence, which include political 
praxis – communal life. Living politically as a colonial subject forces ignorance of 
communal knowledges and practices of well-being as survival becomes paramount. To 
survive, the imperative is to ‘catch-up’ with the colonizer. Epistemic violence is then a 
condemnation of the victim since it does not allow the production and reproduction of a 
full life but, instead, the production and reproduction of the life of the colonizer.  
This is the central argument of the whole thesis, and how the transposition of the 
theoretical groundwork, proposed in Chapters 2 – 5, and its application to the concept of 
energy, will enable the epistemic decolonial turn for energy planning. The elimination of 
all possible (ontological/ epistemological) ways of knowing energy by the imposition of 
one single possibility of ‘rationally conceiving energy’ as the core element of capitalist 
societies not only prevents thinking about energy from another locus of annunciation of 
knowledge, but also decides the use of energy, the management of energy sources, and 
the political action vis a vis energy futures in a violent manner. It entails research that 
advocates for the production of more and more energy inputs, under the threat of scarcity 
that may result in the collapse of the energy business’ conglomerate: from viability 
studies, political lobby for the profitable use of land, mining, energy-generation 
businesses, energy transmission and distribution businesses, pricing of commodities, and 
negotiation in international markets. The whole chain is supported by the necessity of 
energy, whether sustainable or not is immaterial. What matters is to show, at the directors 
and stockholders’ meeting, the chart with increasing numbers in production and 
profitability, expansion of markets and reach of consumer markets, in parallel with the 
chart of decreasing numbers of impediments such as environmental costs, delay in 
obtaining licenses, import and export taxes, and blaming and shaming from stakeholders. 
The epistemic violence concerned in energy planning in Brazil is what the 
Decolonial Community of Argumentation frames into coloniality of knowledge, the 
epistemic aspect of coloniality of power. The epistemic dimension of the ethics of 
exhaustion enables the understanding of energy through the violent lens of the world-
system, so the theoretical constructs can be applied in Chapter 7: The Decolonial Plan.  
 
 97 
Such a transposition happens through the acknowledgement of the epistemic 
difference as explained in Chapter 3, that is, the other locus of annunciation of knowledge 
(Escobar 2003; 2002). As Catherine Walsh presents,  
To speak of an ‘other’ critical thought then is to give credence to ongoing struggles – struggles 
that are epistemic as well as political in character – to confront coloniality, thus marking a 
positioning radically distinct from that which locates critical theory simply within the histories 
and experiences of modernity and the narratives these histories and experiences have fostered and 
created. Such shift is important for what it helps reveal, including the subjects left out or 
marginalized by much of critical theory and their socio-political and epistemic agency, but also 
the association between thought and social and political intervention. Said differently, what 
this ‘other’ thought brings to light is both a political use of knowledge and an epistemic acting on 
the political from the colonial difference. It is an intellectual production not aimed at individual 
accomplishment or limited to the confines of the academy, but rather at the shared need to confront 
the colonial-racist structures, systems, and institutions of society through a collective praxis that 
finds its meaning in the condition of the colonial difference (emphasis added in bold) (Walsh 
2007b, 232).  
 
The process of establishing a conclusion by eliminating all the alternatives is then 
the epistemic dimension of the ethics of exhaustion. To decolonize energy means to 
understand it from the perspective of the colonial difference.  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter we discussed the relevance of understanding the ethics of energy 
planning to enable the comprehension of the necessity of decolonial epistemologies for 
energy planning in Brazil.  
The analysis proposed is grounded in the Dusselian philosophical developments 
of the Ethics of Liberation. Dussel’s framework was chosen because of the author’s 
paramount importance in Latin American philosophy and decolonial critique, part of the 
methodological coherence in writing from the colonial difference perspective. Through 
the specificities of the Latin American condition and perspective, the Dusselian 
philosophy acknowledges the ethical system that negates the victims. The Dusselian 
analytical framework lists three moments for the construction of an ethical system: the 
material moment of ethics – ethos, the content of ethics that is the production and 
reproduction of human life; nomos, the formal moment of ethics – the norm or institution 
that materializes the demand of ethics; and praxis, the means-ends of ethics, the feasibility 
of achieving the goodness claim of ethical systems. Epistemology is part of the nomos, 
the materialization of the ethical demands. Therefore, challenging the colonial 




From the critical-negative aspect of the Dusselian Universal Material Principle of 
Ethics, that is, from what is negated by the general aim of producing and reproducing 
human life, it was possible to identify the victims of the ethical system. By adopting a 
feminist perspective, we identified that the modern–colonial world-system’s ethics is 
androcentric and only exists because of the hierarchization of certain lives over the others. 
This means that the ethical system we live in is only viable due to the victimization of the 
majority of peoples (especially poor coloured women) and the ecosystems. In this way, 
privileges are naturalized as structural to the ethical system, in which the production and 
reproduction of the privileged lives happens at the cost of the victims’ lives. Therefore, 
the transference of life (energy, capacity of doing work) from the victims to the privileged 
enables the means-ends of ethics for some individuals in society, exhausting other people, 
the environment, and the possibilities of rethinking the ethical systems.  
The main feature of the modern–colonial world-system’s ethics is exhaustion, 
reason why I named it the ethics of exhaustion. We listed the three main aspects of 
exhaustion that compose contemporary lives. The first aspect is people’s emotional and 
physical exhaustion, fundamental for the maintenance of gendered and racial oppressions, 
indispensable for the very existence of the capitalist system (including the system of 
private property and division of labour). The second aspect is the environmental 
exhaustion, in which the victimization of the ecosystems is also the victimization of the 
poor and the racialized. The third aspect is the intentional limitation of possibilities of 
knowledge to Eurocentric frameworks, in which Eurocentric perspectives of the 
relationship with the land and with the other (non-European) peoples become the only 
way to occupy the planet, to perceive historiography, and communal identity. The three 
aspects form the ethical system that, to enable the life of some, impose their ways of 
living, culture, symbols, representations, and meanings of power, co-constitutive of 
European Modernity and perpetuate colonial oppressions even after colonialism (as a 
political system) has ended. The ethics of exhaustion is an ethical system because it 
contains a goodness claim, which takes place through a saving sacrifice.  
The saving sacrifice is the illusion that something will be achieved, for the general 
good, if victims are created now. The ethics of exhaustion substantiates the meaning of 
energy planning in Brazil, which, by its turn, is forged in colonial epistemologies. Energy 
is one of the pillars of the contemporary capitalist system. Energy planning is not seen as 
a tool to dismantle the system because of the difficulties in challenging epistemologies 
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substantiated in an entrenched ethical system. This is the reason why decolonial 
epistemologies for energy planning are so necessary to dismantle the master’s house.  
But what is known about energy and how does it become the spine of the 
oppressive system? When was the ancestral relationship between peoples and the 
environment replaced by the exhaustive ethics of energy? The following chapter: The 
Problematic of Energy deals with historical panorama of some concepts of energy, 
bringing a few academic perceptions of energy for the epistemic rescue and re-
signification – a re-encounter for further encounter – of communal understandings and 




Chapter 5: The Problematic of Energy  
The word energy entails many aspects of human existence on the planet. Energy 
could be calories, the sun, the mystery of the seed that germinates, or the strength to wake 
up every day to carry on vital activities. Some would think about energy as the immediate 
empathy that a person would transmit through a collection of senses, such as body 
language and mood: ‘Chimamanda has a good energy’. For others, energy could be 
related to spirituality. Physicists would define energy as the capacity to do work; they 
speak of electrical, chemical, nuclear, potential, kinetic, mechanic, and thermal forms of 
energy. From an indigenous perception, energy represents the very existence of life, 
entails the life-cycles, love, and the capacity to survive on the land.  
In the light of the modern–colonial world-system’s ethics of exhaustion, it is 
reasonable to relate energy to power, violent acquisition of land, mass food production, 
transnational monopoly finance, exhaustion of resources, warfare – the list goes on and 
on.  
Energy is also the spine of the contemporary capitalist system. In this perspective, 
energy studies intentionally separate the social and technical aspects involved in 
generating energy. To grasp the technicalities of energy, the subject is analysed in terms 
of compound nouns: energy input, energy asset, energy source. In the modern–colonial 
world-system’s narrative, the relevant aspects of energy are its supply and demand to 
provide economic growth and foster industry. This way, energy studies become the 
consequence of the economic treatment of a group of commodities that have their costs, 
values, and prices determined by the transnational financial system. In the modern–
colonial world-system’s epistemology, the definition of energy is narrowed to fit the 
purposes of market dynamics.  
As a consequence, knowledge about energy is hierarchized in a way that the 
narrative, relevance, legal protection, and the investments in research are limited to 
treating energy as commodity. In the age of the ethics of exhaustion, energy cannot be 
legitimately perceived in its broader sense. The invisibility of the non-economic aspects 
of energy is epistemically violent. At the top of the hierarchy of the ‘possible legitimate’ 
production of knowledge about energy, reside the aspects of economic analysis and 
viability, followed by the military aspects (that derive from a country’s economic 
advantage over energy inputs), then followed by the socio-economic aspects (since they 
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interfere directly in the economy); and, at the bottom of this hierarchy, is the 
‘environmental issue’.  
The ‘human’ factor, i.e., all the interferences in people bodies, the relationship 
with the landscapes, and labour will be dealt with in other branches of knowledge, in 
separate places as a secondary analysis for the understanding of energy. Even so, 
expanding the comprehension to include non-hegemonic knowledge, such as the South 
American indigenous ways of life like the Súmak Kawsay (the Kichwa “good living”) or 
the Tekó Porã (the Guarani “good-living”) that have plural perceptions of energy, is far 
from any possible dialogue with hegemonic energy studies. Among the Guarani, ã – the 
soul – carries energy that influences the others in the community and the environment. 
For example, they prepare the energy of the house for the birth of a newborn (Benites 
2015, 11). Despite all the decolonial intention44 in academia in the recent times, giving 
living beings priority in energy studies remains a difficult task. It is argued here that this 
detachment is violent and can no longer be the ethics guiding energy studies.  
The technical/social dichotomy is violent per se. Analysing epistemologically, it 
can be seen that the modern–colonial world-system’s narrative of energy is ideological. 
In this narrative, natural resources are economic inputs. The scientific approach to energy 
is narrowed to this episteme. This limited perspective ignores the relationship between 
living beings and the production of energy. Therefore, the epistemology of energy 
planning ideologically excludes the existence of life to serve a project of power that needs 
energy for the expansion of wealth. In the Brazilian Energy Expansion Plan 2015–2024 
(DEEP), e.g., the environment and indigenous communities are spoken of as ‘challenges’ 
for energy expansion.  
The epistemological analysis reduces energy to a narrow contemporary meaning 
as a commodity, i.e., private property. Although it is widely accepted by both mainstream 
and critical scholars that energy production and distribution interfere negatively with the 
environment, energy is never treated as the environment. In this way, the scientific 
                                                        
44 There is a decolonial intention in academia. Many universities across the globe have opened a 
‘decolonizing dialogue’. In 2019, the word decolonial is trendy. But intention is not enough – there must 
be decolonial praxis: viable application of decolonial studies and perceptions to the hard 
sciences/economics/political science. It is useless to have a decolonial intention kept in the ‘intercultural 
studies’ department, as Catherine Walsh points out (Walsh 2007a). The cultural category is necessary, 
informative, and legitimate, but it is treated as mystical, folkloric, or ‘interesting’ by the hard sciences. 
Piercing the hard sciences with actual decolonial practices is a task that finds barriers in investments for 
research and political support, as we have said at the ABEP-UK X Conference in March 2018 (Association 
of Brazilian Researchers in the UK) (Freitas e Silva 2018), and at the OISE Decolonizing Conference 
(University of Toronto – Ontario Institute for Studies in Education) in November 2018 (OISE 2018).  
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analysis may establish a link between energy production and environmental harm and 
may propose more effective and sustainable ways of production. The existing 
epistemological approach treats energy as an economic/technical issue and sees socio-
environmental harm as a consequence of energy production; however, it is necessary and 
valid to perceive the socio-environmental consequences as part of the process of obtaining 
energy inputs for economic purposes. In this reasoning, socio-environmental harm is 
necessary for the production of commercial energy as condition to it, not as consequence. 
Every energy plan contains the veiled premise that the socio-environmental harm will 
happen. The DEEP, however, does not include the necessary socio-environmental harm 
among its premises. The DEEP’s premises are the macroeconomic scenario, the expected 
industrial growth, the foreign markets, and so on. The ignorance of some of the conditions 
for energy production informs the DEEP’s ideological character since it is not a 
coincidence that unspoken premises are precisely those that will limit the indiscriminate 
business expansion and profitability. The Energy Expansion Plan that chooses which of 
the conditions to produce energy will be informed, and which will not, is epistemically 
violent.   
The following section is a critical historical literature overview on energy matters, 
with an introduction to a critique of hegemonic knowledge, discussing epistemic violence 
and the limitations of academia in decolonizing knowledge, i.e., in bringing in non-
Eurocentric knowledge. Thereafter, some examples of mainstream scholarship about 
energy will be discussed. For the purpose of this study, the mainstream approaches to 
energy are divided into two main categories: the liberal (or neoliberal) branch of study 
and the hegemonic–environmentalist (or ‘sustainable development’ environmentalist) 
branch of study.  In the sequence, a literature overview on some critical lines on energy 
matters will be presented. This literature overview is presented with a historical 
perspective in order to clarify the element of coloniality in the approach to energy, 
explicated in the ethics of the modern–colonial world-system.  
 
Mainstream Scholarship and Energy  
Mainstream scholarship about energy assumes that there is an ‘energy paradigm’. 
In this paradigm, energy is necessary to maintain and foster industrial and economic 
growth, and, as a subject, must be thought of accordingly to meet industrial demands. 
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This generates a whole elaborate framework to justify energy studies that underpin 
industrial expansion. 
The energy paradigm in the 21st century contains two main categories: the 
developmental framework and the sustainable (or sustainable development) framework. 
As two approaches to the same industrial practice, paradigmatic studies on energy do not 
intend to tackle the privilege and monopoly of energy sources by few individuals in 
society. They are concerned with market flows, regulation, and business feasibility, 
fomenting the idea that transnational capital flows and the transnational energy business 
are necessary for human existence. 
The developmental framework is grounded in the liberal agenda of privatization, 
liberalization, and competition in the energy business. Focusing mainly on fossil fuel 
energy and electricity production, the largely accepted mainstream literature on energy is 
concerned with market efficiency, regulation, and policy. In these works, it is challenging 
to find any mention of people, animals, or landscapes, while the vast majority of works 
are declared advocacy [or supplication] for capital intensive investments from public and 
private investors (Green 2001; Moutinho, Vieira, and Carrizo Moreira 2011; D. D. 
Anderson 1981; Pérez-Arriaga, Jenkins, and Batlle 2017; Siano 2014; Tesfatsion 2018).  
Historically, the constitutive lines of the developmental theorizations on energy 
get central importance from the European industrial and scientific revolutions, from the 
sixteenth century onwards. The industrial and scientific revolutions cannot be detached 
from the hierarchization of power, European expansion, and the violence entrenched in 
it. These facts are direct consequences of the formation of the nation-states and their 
secularization, the emergence of colonial powers and capitalist international trade, the 
accumulation of capital through the exploitation of enslaved and semi-enslaved labour, 
and the exploitation of natural resources on an industrial scale in Europe and around the 
world (Dussel 1997; 1994; Mignolo 2011; Grosfoguel 2013).  
The emergence of Newtonian mechanics in the 17th century, the theorization of 
property laws (and its derivatives for the exploitation of the soil, above and below), and 
the nineteenth century’s laws of conservation of energy and thermodynamics influenced 
the mainstream perspective of energy, naturalizing the shift from human and animal work 
to sources of energy from natural resources. This naturalization was necessary for 
separation of the technical from the social aspects of energy: the economy directly 
influenced the scientific discoveries, whereas its social relevance and consequences 
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would be dealt with in other branches of knowledge. Technological developments 
became assets and technology became industry.  
The theory of energy as it unfolded in this crucial decade did not descend from the heavens, but 
bubbled up from the hidden abode of industrial production (Bellamy and Diamanti, 2018). 
 
Energy production, from this perspective, has always been a capital-intensive 
business that involves occupancy of land, the need of easements for transmission and 
logistics, and exploitation of natural resources such as coal and water (and from the 
second half of the 20th century, oil). Hence, it is accurate when Bellamy and Diamanti 
inform that ‘(t)he emergence of the doctrine of energy […] is implicated in industrial 
phenomena’ (Bellamy and Diamanti 2018, xiii), but it must be mentioned here that the 
industrial phenomena in question is the European one, and that it happened  through the 
victory of colonialism (Dussel 2013, 1994). 
The theories of conservation of energy and the exponential industrial growth of 
the late nineteenth century followed the modern–colonial world-system’s ethics of 
exhaustion, substantiating the image of inexhaustible energy and capacity for industrial 
growth. During the 20th century, energy studies evolved from the technological 
deployments of the world [European] wars, becoming issues of national defence with the 
discovery of nuclear power and the shift into the oil economy. From the 1950s onwards, 
nations used the discourse on international development to reframe the colonial rule of 
usurpation of land and resources as a new agenda of the development of the Third World. 
The idea that energy reserves and enhanced national industry should be seen as 
national guarantees in the face of international military threats was very useful for the 
imperial and colonial powers. However, it was not in the interest of the expansion of the 
economy and liberalization of markets in the former colonies, after the end of colonialism. 
The independence of the colonies created the need for a different type of exploitation that 
would ensure that the imperial powers continue to rule the international economic game. 
Therefore, instead of the direct control of colonial production, there would be financial 
monopoly, and, instead of colonial powers settled in the colonies, foreign direct 
investment, disguised as national investments and national development, would replace 
the colonizers in the newly independent nations.  
With the cold war in the background, from the 1960s onwards, the expansion of 
industry and energy technologies had a political connotation that forced nations to choose 
the expansion of industrial economy via its liberalization or nationalization. Either way, 
the growth of industrial capacity was necessary in the New Economic Order, and hence 
 
 105 
the need for reliable energy reserves. While oil became a great asset for industrial 
expansion, production of electricity from hydro or nuclear power plants boomed all over 
the world, dragging in the whole infrastructure business with it. Nations would 
demonstrate economic stability by building huge concrete-heavy capital-intensive power 
plants; this happened in both socialist and capitalist economies (Pahuja 2011). The 
development of technologies for energy guarantees perpetuated the colonial practice of 
absurd use of the territory. In Brazil, for example, the military dictatorial regime made 
massive investments in infrastructure for the construction of large hydropower dams such 
as Itaipú and Tucuruí, for opening of roads in Amazonia, and for the expansion of the 
mining sector. Alongside the infrastructure, dozens of viability studies were carried on 
for building dams in the Amazonian region.  
The increased investment in scientific discoveries and new technologies sprang 
from the need to sustain economic and military power during the cold war. In the 1980s, 
the scholarship on energy was embedded in the discourse of development, underpinned 
by the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) in 1964 and 
followed by the ECOSOC (United Nations Economic and Social Council). Massive 
research was carried out by the institutions within the ECOSOC, as also by the World 
Bank. The advent of the Human Right to Development was one example of the United 
Nation’s attempts to foster the developmental agenda following the 1970s global oil and 
financial crisis. 
 
The Liberal and the Hegemonic-environmentalist Branches of Study 
The advocacy for the liberalization of markets and foreign direct investment in 
the Global South culminated in the neoliberal agenda after the overthrow of the socialist 
block. The 1990s were marked by intense research, mainly sponsored by private 
institutions, for new energy technologies and, specially, for understanding market 
dynamics, markets regulation, and transnational capital flows. Yet no environmental 
concern was evidenced during the neoliberal decade, mostly because it was said to be a 
concern of the states, not of private investors, as echoed at the Earth Summit in 1992 and 
the Agenda 21. Up until the 2000s, the ‘energy paradigm’ disregarded the environmental 
issue as a problem of businesses owners, which led mainstream research on energy to the 
new energy paradigm (Helm 2007). 
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The self-proclaimed ‘new energy paradigm’ is a derivative of the ‘old paradigm’; 
it suggests that energy be re-politicized to stop treating energy exclusively as a 
commodity and to oversee problems related to energy from beyond the agenda of 
security-of-supply. Despite these attempts to evidence concerns for the so called 
‘environmental issue’, it assumes that the ‘old paradigm’ of liberalization of markets, 
privatization, and competition worked well in the 1980s and 1990s, but now it is no longer 
sufficient (Helm 2007, 10). Bringing examples of capital exporting nations such as the 
United Kingdom, Helm states that the energy-intensive industry business was replaced 
by financial services and other intensive activities because of the problem of energy 
efficiency and volatility of energy prices.  
The new energy paradigm relates to the concern in the transnational monopoly 
financial system over the instability and the low rate-of-return in energy investments, 
representing an unwelcome emerging trend in the era running on the agenda of 
liberalization. Energy investments became risky and minimally profitable and prices too 
volatile, which brought back the figure of the state to handle the energy problem. 
However, such a line of argument is not clear for the liberal scholars of the new energy 
paradigm. The central argument is that climate change and environmental catastrophe 
demand more investments in new technologies to guarantee more reliable supply and 
demand and hence, more stable prices. The new paradigm calls for more investments, 
more capital flows, more technologies, and for a transition from the old energy economy 
to a happier efficient reliable energy market with assured rates of return (World Bank 
2014).  
The new school on energy seems to believe that embedding the word 
sustainability in order to foster more investments and technologies would change the 
previous model of risky energy business. Their line of argument is that the decades of 
liberalization were good while the profits were high. Now, there is a need for a better 
regulatory framework in the transnational energy markets that would make investments 
more stable. This role should be played by the states that would absorb the risk and make 
energy markets a better field for investors to play in (‘making energy markets great 
again’). Then, being sustainable would mean investments in technologies other than fossil 
fuel or nuclear power, but not abandoning the oil economy and not changing the systems 
of distribution or sale of energy in the regulated markets. It is almost obvious that coal, 
oil, or even hydropower are environmentally problematic businesses. However, it does 
not help in any way to simply change the type of technology without changing the system 
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of energy sales, distribution, use, and its relationship with individuals and land. 
Furthermore, energy planning – the future projections about energy – does not involve 
any change in the industrial modus operandi, in the economic growth expectations, or in 
the market dynamics to control energy assets. The future remains a projection of the past, 
underpinned by cutting edge research. It sounds contradictory, but it is, in fact, the 
substance of the system of oppressions that uses both energy planning and scientific 
discoveries to protect power relationships. 
The core refutation for this kind of research is that they consist of complex 
elaborations to maintain the same system of exhaustion of resources and social 
inequalities. There is no novelty in discussing how markets should be regulated or 
efficiency be increased in businesses models for more profitable energy markets. The 
difference between the old and the new paradigm of energy is the addition of the 
environmental issue, made regardless of any actual change in the capitalist ways of 
production, which remain ethically exhaustivist. The tautology of finding more beneficial 
ways of investing in the predatory transnational finance energy business is, in itself, 
prejudicial to public well-being. Moreover, when closely observed, it is possible to detect 
the element of fear among investors from capital exporting countries, when foreseeing a 
decline in industrial production. The more exhausting and destructive, the better. The 
colonial ‘techno-utopian mastery of nature’ (Bellamy and Diamanti 2018, xx), which 
emerged  in prominence in the course of World War 1(WW1), remains as the long-term 
energy paradigm. The colonial project continues, it is the ethics of the modern–colonial 
world-system.  
 
Critical Scholarship and Energy 
For the purposes of this study, the critical lines on energy are the ones that 
challenge the industrial–financial–capitalist perception of energy. Originating from the 
materialist critique of industrialization in the nineteenth century, there is a large number 
of different critical, philosophical, and scientific approaches to the issue of energy, 
namely the studies in subaltern perspectives, anticolonial and postcolonial studies, 
feminist and decolonial works, and the Latin American Decolonial Community of 
Argumentation. None of these works, however, approach the specific issue of energy 
planning, let alone take an epistemological approach to energy planning. Critical studies 
 
 108 
also share a common problem – the difficulty of interfering with the agenda of 
exhaustivist exploitation of energy inputs.  
To start this discussion on critical scholarships, it is relevant to discuss the 
importance of historical materialism for the critique of energy. It is also fundamental to 
the developments that led to the decolonial critique, historically grounding the material 
part of the theoretical framework to propose decolonial epistemologies for energy 
planning. The standpoint of historical materialism is that the dialectical method 
presupposes the understanding of things, their interactions, and changes and the material 
world and its processes of transformations. The understanding of energy must begin by 
considering that bodies and the environment have no existence apart from the totality of 
the processes out of which they are constituted, which is not a mere critique of capital per 
se. According to Bellamy and Diamanti,  
(h)istorical materialism is born in the same breath as the doctrine of energy conservation, not as a 
version of it, but as a rejection of its uncanny claim on value, history, and labor. For a political 
economic framing of energy and capital, one might search out the technical location and impact 
of energy in general on the composition and scientific critique of capital (Bellamy and Diamanti 
2018). 
 
In looking at energy dialectically, the environmental aspect of energy production 
and distribution gets central importance because of its relationship with the exhaustion of 
natural resources and global distribution of wealth. During the twentieth century, 
orthodox economists did not frame the environmental issue as the economic 
incommensurability of existence and interaction between humans and ecosystems in the 
planet, raising a false dichotomy of monetary values versus environmental values. Such 
dichotomy is false because there is no monetary economy isolated from the use and 
occupancy of territories and labour, which are environmental discussions per se. 
However, the dichotomy remains in shaping policies and studies about energy; hence, the 
relevance of the historical materialist critique. The Brazilian DEEP, for example, clearly 
claims that certain socio-economic and environmental ‘impacts’ (the euphemism for 
harm) are necessary for alleged socio-economic benefits (MME and EPE 2015, 395). 
Marxist studies and environmentalist studies went through a period of difficult 
interaction, in which the latter was seen by southern Marxists as a ‘romantic industrial 
trend’, some sort of western ‘play’ to keep the Third World underdeveloped (Guha and 
Martínez-Alier 2013, 23). During the second half of the twentieth century, 
environmentalism was immediately related to a frivolous upper-class trend, in the sense 
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that one can only be concerned about the environment if properly fed, accommodated, 
and living with minimal dignity.  
Authors like Ramachandra Guha and Joan Martinez-Alier focused on the 
ecological distribution of conflicts in a transition from political economy to political 
ecology, as well as an economic ecology based on the impossibility of attributing [market] 
value to life (Guha and Martínez-Alier 2013; Martínez-Alier 2014). The proposition of 
political ecology and economic ecology critiques the alleged neglect of ecology by Marx, 
stating that Marxists have resisted the introduction of ecology into historical explanation 
perhaps because of the fear that this could ‘naturalize’ human history.  
Although Marx and Engels were contemporaries of the physicists who established the laws of 
thermodynamics in the mid-19th century, Marxian economics and economic history were based on 
social and economic analysis alone. (…) [T]he debate on whether growth of the economy goes 
together with a parallel growth of the use of energy and materials is still very much alive today 
(Guha and Martínez-Alier 2013, 26). 
 
Instead of naturalizing human history, Guha proposes the necessity to historicise 
ecology, on the counter movement of the social Darwinisms that are still in vogue in the 
ecology/economy tension. Ecology is not a ‘longue dureé backdrop to human history’; 
sometimes, it changes more rapidly than economic or political systems, as in many 
regions of the Americas after 1492 and again today with global warming and mass 
biological extinction (Guha and Martínez-Alier 2013, 27). The idea of ecosystems’ 
incommensurability opens a broad political space for environmental movements; the idea 
may be recent for the scientific and social critique of capitalism, but it has been the core 
of the ontologies of the colonized peoples of the world. The separation between the social, 
environmental, and technical aspects of the economy is a modern phenomenon, as well 
as part of modern science and social determinisms, as part of the ethics of the modern–
colonial world-system configured from the late fifteenth century.  
The rise of the ‘environmentalism of the poor’, or the environmentalism of the 
Global South, in contrast with the movements that originated from wealthy nations 
clamouring for the reduction of pollution, the preservation of forests, and the saving of 
whales, happens simultaneously with the colonial invasion of territories and acquisition 
of land. The academic use of social movements’ claims has to do with the visibility of 
specific movements in specific places. In a Eurocentric academia, the environmental 
movements that take place in Europe and in the United States would be visible, while the 
vast majority of the world’s population claiming their indigenous lands, their ontological 
relationship with the landscape, and their political organization to co-exist in the natural 
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environment producing food, having commerce, and livelihoods would be ignored. 
Furthermore, a bigger problem happens when European environmental groups project 
their own environmental problems as global ones. The problem of large dams, for 
example, was seen in Europe as an environmental one, whereas in the Global South, it 
was always one of subsistence, agriculture, rural economies, and displacement of rural 
people. 
The spread of conflicts reveals such historical processes. Central to this is the 
ownership as it is held of places and discourses is to the detriment of the actual occupiers 
of the environment. As an example, in the twenty-first century, Europeans have exceeded 
their rightful per capita carbon dioxide allowance to a great extent; they act as if they own 
a sizeable chunk of the planet outside of Europe, but “nobody is charging them a fee” for 
this (Guha and Martínez-Alier 2013, 31).  
The association of energy production and distribution with economic growth and 
economic development (or sustainable development – a branch of the same predatory 
system), aligned with the necessity of attracting investments and increasing 
industrialization for the economic catch-up of the poor, led to the late industrialization of 
the colonized world. When the environmental movements of the rich came out in the mid 
1960s, the wealthy countries’ industrialization had been in place for at least a century, 
together with the environmental and social catastrophe necessary for industrial expansion. 
The imperialist expansions of the twentieth century, the discourse of economic growth 
and development, and the discourse of sustainable development forced the predatorial 
industrialization of the North to migrate to the political South as the ‘salvation of the 
poor’. In the oppressive ethics of exhaustion, the goodwill of capital-exporting countries 
as well as their nationals’ precious investments in the host countries should be awarded 
with benefits in exchange for the investments, such as most favourable investment laws, 
tax incentives, more flexible labour legislation, and non-restrictive environmental 
legislation. This disguised colonial rule has increased and accelerated environmental 
degradation and poverty.  
A shallow observation of this phenomena, specially by mainstream analysts, 
operates in favour of the hegemonic system, in a cycle of oppressions that ends up 
blaming the victims, creating an impression of ‘the poorer, the dirtier, the more polluted, 
the more deforested’. That is, the oppressed (framing gender, race, and class), on top of 
everything, are also accused of devastating the environment. Thus, they would need 
international environmental scrutiny and control, more technologies to reduce 
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environmental catastrophe and, of course, foreign investment and international aid. This 
also informs an epistemological problem, in which legislation corroborates the oppressive 
narrative; and in which energy enterprises, for example, are legally degrading the 
environment and increasing social disparity through official legitimate mechanisms. 
The idea of sustainable development is linked to wealth in the mainstream liberal 
agenda of opening economies to operate in global markets. Wealth may or may not 
provide means to correct environmental damage, but unscrupulous economic growth is 
definitely a historical cause of environmental and social catastrophes.    
Observed as conventional attempts to blame the victims, the correlation between 
per capita income and some measures of environmental quality have been challenged by 
subaltern scholars as evidencing the opposite, how economic expansion of the hegemonic 
economies remains the absolute cause of accelerated annihilation of prospects of balanced 
ways of occupying the planet. By defining the concepts of human carrying capacity and 
population pressure, it is possible to understand the dynamics of abundance, waste, the 
need to supply foreign markets, and possibilities of more equitable distribution of 
resources, without pinning on the poor the tragedy of the modern–colonial world-
system’s ethics of exhaustion.  
Human carrying capacity and population pressure are important concepts for the 
study of energy planning. Associated with population growth, the concept of human 
carrying capacity is the maximum population size that the environment can sustain 
indefinitely, given the food, shelter, water, and other necessities of human groups 
available in the environment they occupy. Population pressure is the pressure exerted by 
deforestation and demand for arable land by a rapidly increasing and dense rural human 
population outside of protected areas (Ryan et al. 2017). Excess population could cause 
ecological degradation. From a decolonial perspective, however, the issues of population 
pressure on resources and carrying capacity are related more to historically reiterated 
multiple levels of socioeconomic and political oppressions at local, national, and global 
levels.  
Population pressure on resources in capitalism is immediately related to 
production pressure on resources. Large-scale production for export dates back to the 
introduction of the plantation systems and mining in the Americas in the sixteenth 
century, i.e., violent taking of land, ethnic cleansing, enslaved labour, and the invaders’ 
monopoly of local resources. In the twenty-first century, this system remains with the 
same structure and operates with the same methodology as of the colonial times. This 
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leads to a big question in challenging capitalism: is supplying foreign markets necessary? 
One cannot be fundamentalist on this, but there are obvious limits on how and what 
should be produced, and these limits define legitimate consumption and waste.  
The distinction between local and export agricultural production, for example, 
turns production pressure on resources into population pressure on resources. In South 
America, there is abundance of and capacity for production, but there is no way that the 
local population can use all the resources available. It could be a case of small-scale 
production for local consumption, which Liebig’s agricultural chemistry evidenced in 
1840. It cannot, however, co-exist with exponential industrial growth – it is related to the 
ethics of exhaustion. Increase in population numbers is not justification for the 
discrepancies in the distribution of resources. If that was the case, Europe would be 
responsible for the world’s inequalities, acknowledging that from the sixteenth to the 
twentieth century, the greatest demographic expansion was generated by Europeans, both 
within Europe and in the countries to which they emigrated (Boserup 2017, 55).  
Ester Boserup suggested that a way to overcome production pressure would be 
through the use of technology in modern agriculture in a sustainable way, for both the 
supply of goods locally and externally and for the production of renewable energy. Her 
thesis, however, implicitly excludes external subsidies to the agricultural economy, does 
not evoke the problem of ownership and occupation of land, and hence, does not tackle 
the agricultural economy in question – again, it is an ethical problem with the backdrop 
of the ways of occupying land and distributing wealth. Historically, energy inputs and 
minerals have flowed from the periphery to the centre, which must be cautiously observed 
in ecological history.  
Energy inputs are not appropriate measures for the distribution of resources and 
the supplying of foreign markets. In the transnational market economy, the liberal flag of 
freedom of contractual relationships reduces itself to the acceptance of prices as measures 
of value. This disregard the influence of monopoly in the distribution of income and 
pricing becomes an adequate measure for the value of shortage of resources and of current 
and future value of production (Guha and Martínez-Alier 2013, 56). Considering the 
economic history of humanity is the history of international trade and migration, it is 
observed that the colonial character of distribution of resources configures a pattern of 
power that endorses exploitation. The surplus economy is violent, manifested in the ethics 
of exhaustion.  
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Economic growth under capitalist production is much more a cause of 
environmental degradation than poverty. Nevertheless, Guha explains that poverty can 
cause environmental degradation because of the inability of the poor to afford better 
domestic fuels, for example, the unaffordability of energy inputs increases the use of 
firewood. This phenomenon was appropriated in the discourses of international aid such 
as the World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), and was, therefore, 
condemned by subaltern scholars and social movements. The SAPs evidenced a general 
idea that if the poorer sections and the more populated sections are given a territory, the 
higher the need for energy inputs, and hence, the more degraded the environment. Such 
a discourse was widely accepted in countries from the centre and from the periphery, 
because the former wanted to send ‘aid’ in the form of exporting capital or the peripheral 
countries’ liberal elites were keen to expand markets and improve commercial relations 
in the transnational markets or the mainstream left-wing elements were convinced that 
aid could be useful for investment in social programmes. Embedded in colonialities of 
power and knowledge, the manufactured consent propagated by the World Bank through 
the SAPs convinced wannabe-European intellectuals in the Global South that poverty and 
environmental degradation were correlated; and this became a prejudicial common sense 
– implying that the ‘curse’ of the poor is bad management (Auty 2007). Although the 
critical environmental and social movements from the Global South had been historically 
complaining about ecological degradation, they did not speak the same language as the 
environmentalists from the North. The tension of speaking the language of the 
environmental movements of the poor to deaf liberals unleashed numerous conflicts 
caused by the imposition of the SAPs45. Again, this tension is epistemological, because 
the recognition of the non-hegemonic claims from Global South demands a language 
other than the imposed knowledges about the relationship between people and the 
environment.   
The idea that generalised economic growth is good for the environment is 
unacceptable because some forms of wealth are inseparable from resource exhaustion and 
pollution. Moreover, the close correlation between per capita income and the use of 
commercial energy makes economic growth and the increasing use of energy and natural 
resources inseparable (Guha and Martínez-Alier 2013, 70). From this perspective, the 
problem of private ownership of territories and resources becomes more evident. The 
                                                        
45 Like the Cochabamba Water Wars and others. 
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colonial rule of divide and conquer entrenched in the system of private ownership of land 
has been one of the main causes of social disparities and environmental catastrophes. This 
issue is fundamental to the epistemological critique of energy planning. Economic growth 
is the justification for energy expansion. The epistemological problem is the lie disguised 
as truth. Economic growth is harmful socially and environmentally and does not bring 
the alleged collective benefit that justifies its necessity. 
The conflicts between monopoly of production, expansion of production, and the 
incapacity to feed the population is discussed in Vandana Shiva’s work Earth 
Democracy: justice, sustainability, and peace. Through the concept of an earth 
democracy, Shiva proposes another type of relationship of the commons with the 
landscapes, food production, and trade – the ecofeminism, denouncing the limits of 
representative democracies within the global panorama of control of markets via 
commoditization of life and resources. By framing predatory and lethal anthropocentrism, 
patriarchal relations of power, and unscrupulous industrial agriculture, Shiva denounces 
the total failure of representative democracy; this, Shiva argues is because the constitution 
of representative democracy is a system that originated in the need to control international 
trade – co-constitutive of the modern–colonial humanist epistemologies of ownership of 
the world and human superiority over all other species. For us, ecofeminism, as well as 
traditional ways of living such as the Kichwa Súmak Kawsay and the Guarani Tekó Porã, 
is the counter-movement to the ethics of exhaustion (Benites 2015; Litaiff 2008; Zaffaroni 
2010). 
By criticizing the industrial myth that credits technology as the reason for the 
growth of the British textile industry, Shiva observes that, in 1750, the Chinese and the 
Indians produced 73% of the world’s textiles, arguing that it was the combination of 
tariffs and prohibitions that led to the growth of the industry in England (Shiva 2016, 28). 
The exploitation of energy inputs can be analysed in a similar fashion, considering that 
power plants and dams are built with public funds, but they aim to satisfy the energy and 
water needs of industry and the irrigation of large-scale export agriculture (Shiva 2016, 
30).  
Goods were traded across borders before colonialism. In fact, colonialism was caused by the desire 
to control that trade. 
(…) 
Globalization is, in fact, the ultimate enclosure of our minds, our hearts, our imaginations and our 




In Earth Democracy, the idea that environmental movements are luxuries of the 
rich is then challenged, being instead seen as survival imperatives for the majority of 
people whose lives are put at risk by the market economy and threatened by its expansion. 
Shiva’s work was severely criticized by Eurocentric ecologists and the mainstream 
‘sustainable development’ liberals, and even by environmentalists from the South for 
many reasons, but all of them were centred around the accusation of the ‘romantic 
character’ of Earth Democracy. This is because epistemic violence is not obvious, since 
the violence of the narrative to challenge the capitalist ways of production is hidden 
behind the veil of an ethical system that naturalizes the exhaustion of persons, 
ecosystems, and knowledges. It is also about the androcentric entrenched character of 
philosophy and academia in general. Critical scholars, as well as mainstream scholars, 
condone the ethics of exhaustion as the only way of existing, as a result of entrenched 
colonialities of power, being, and knowledge. 
It is interesting to identify coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being in the 
critique against Vandana Shiva’s Earth Democracy. First, because she writes in a 
different manner, addressing also women in communities, using a different language, 
including words such as compassion and love, which sounds unacceptable to the 
academic economic rhetoric. She also calls for ontological perceptions of social relations, 
involving livelihood, maternity, and spirituality, which, for the technocratic scholars of 
politics and economics, are nonsense because their rationality is forged in the colonial 
ideology. The epistemic violence of the legitimated discourses substantiated in the ethics 
of exhaustion then prevents the dialogue in other languages for economists. However, the 
central critique against Shiva’s work resides in the fact that she proposes total separation 
of the corporations that delineate life in the planet from the dynamics of the economic 
‘democratic institutions’.  
Shiva sharply criticizes the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank, Wall Street 
institutions, and the transnational monopoly finance. She also points out that cultural 
nationalism emerges as the twin of economic globalization, propagating the powerful 
structure of hierarchization of life in the planet. By linking liberal democracy to economic 
dictatorship, it is clear that political change does not imply changes in the economic 
policies. ‘No matter which party rules the office, in reality, corporations rule’ (Shiva 




Critical, But not That Critical  
Shiva’s Earth Democracy is a good contribution for the movements that search 
for ethics other than the modern–colonial world-system’s ethics, calling for communal 
approaches to life and the planet’s resources. However, observing the type of critique 
against possible communal approaches to existence, it is clear that energy as a concept is 
perceived as a commodity both by mainstream and critical scholars. Decolonizing energy 
planning means decolonizing knowledge, institutions, and territories, e.i., to bring 
epistemologies from others rather than the Eurocentric cannon of annunciation of 
knowledge.  Energy planning must aim at non-exhausting relationships; hence, the ethical 
discussion is of central importance.  
While the intentionality of the predatorial ethics is not questioned, scholars 
continue to search for the magical solution for social–environmental catastrophes. It is 
not enough to educate the oppressed about the oppressions they undergo. It is not enough 
to identify the harm of predatorial behaviour against living beings and the ecosystem. It 
is necessary to embody the understanding of the intention to exhaust of the world-
system’s ethics. It is necessary to acknowledge the victims, as Dussel says, but it is 
mandatory to confront the whole predatorial education that the oppressed and oppressors 
are raised on.  
Hence, it is fundamental for the epistemic decolonial turn to acknowledge the 
ethics existing in the modern–colonial world-system: the ethics of exhaustion. It is useless 
to identify the victim and the oppressor, without recognizing privileges. Such privileges 
are centred in patriarchal, racist, and classist structures for the identification of the place 
of annunciation of knowledge. How can one have empathy with the victims without 
acknowledging our own privileges? This also means that, as humans, it is difficult to 
perceive other living beings and ecosystems as victims, as we benefit from them. Having 
said that, the understanding of the ethics of exhaustion is fundamental to the perception 
of the victims as ‘others’, without trying to liberate them by some sort of ‘generosity’, 
‘white or patriarchal guilt’, or ‘Christian regret’. This way, it is possible to take the 
meritocratic burden of liberation from the victims’ backs: without pretending to 
understand their condition while living the same exhaustivist ethical life. As the great 
master Paulo Freire said: 
Any attempt to ‘soften’ the power of the oppressor in deference to the weakness of the oppressed 
almost always manifests itself in the form of false generosity; indeed, the attempt never goes 
beyond this. In order to have the continued opportunity to express their ‘generosity’, the 
oppressors must perpetuate injustice as well. An unjust social order is the permanent fount of this 
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‘generosity’, which is nourished by death, despair, and poverty. That is why the dispensers of false 
generosity become desperate at the slightest threat to its source (Freire 2000, 44). 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we discussed some academic positions about the definition of 
energy and pinpointed the fundamental difference between perceptions of energy in 
Eurocentric academia and non-Eurocentric communal ways of living. In chronological 
order, we covered the mainstream and critical [Eurocentric] scholarships that discuss 
energy. A common element between the two chunks of knowledge is the perception of 
energy as a commodity – energy inputs. As criticized earlier in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, there 
are limitations in perceiving energy without the technocratic lenses of Eurocentrism. This 
difficulty feeds the capitalist exhaustive approach to energy, which fears that applying 
indigenous and/or feminist perspectives would make energy studies less reliable or 
serious. Nevertheless, the Guarani perception of energy can be found in different words 
such as the ã (the soul) and the mbaretekue (environment, energy), including the 
phenomenon of life, the soul, the capacity to live in harmony with the land, and the land 
itself. This is the epistemic look that makes more sense when thinking of the future, 
instead of othering the ecosystems and fetishizing energy futures regardless of the means 
to enable it, in the example of the Guarani perspective, we are all included as energy. This 
way, we move towards a feasible future, in which we all exist – a look at the Guarani 
ethics of abundance, as opposed to the Eurocentric ethics of exhaustion.  
Understanding the ethics of energy is then a propaedeutic matter leading towards 
the decolonization of cultural, communal, scientific, and institutional meanings of energy 
planning, in a movement from abstraction to material application, from ethos to nomos, 
physis to praxis. Energy is a concept, and energy planning materializes it.  
Energy planning is then institutional machinery or apparatus for the obtaining of 
energy inputs in the light of the ethics of exhaustion. Such an apparatus is localized in 
time and space, demanding a case study and a specific analysis, since it must be studied 
considering historical, geopolitical, and human contexts. Once this is done, it is possible 
to bring back the concept of energy and organize decolonial epistemic pathways for 
energy planning. Hence the following chapter localizes the activity of energy planning by 




Chapter 6: The Brazilian Energy Planning 
Although the epistemological analysis of energy perceives the entire planet as a 
complex integrated system, energy planning is a localized phenomenon related to 
political, territorial, and social aspects, and reflecting the international political and 
economic scenario in a given period of history. This way, the study of energy planning 
must be framed in time and space. The choice of analyzing the Brazilian case is due to 
the specificities of the country’s geopolitics, history, and society. In the following 
sections, we contextualize Brazilian energy planning geopolitically, historically, and 
legally. Thereafter, a brief history of energy planning in the last 60 years will be used to 
link historical oppressions and the current epistemically violent Brazilian Energy 
Expansion Plans. Finally, the epistemological critique, the scope of the thesis, is brought 
to discussion by linking the Brazilian colonial origins and the entrenched coloniality of 
the management of natural resources that is configured in the DEEP; the ethical system 
that justifies the exhaustivist approach to energy; and the premises that define the goals 
for energy planning in Brazil.  
 
Brazilian Energy in the Geopolitical Context 
The first specificity for the choice of the Brazilian case is geopolitical, referring 
to the variety of possibilities in energy production and commercialization. In Brazil, the 
geography is favourable to the exploitation of various energy inputs (as evidenced 
throughout the DEEP), whether renewable or non-renewable energy46, – placing the 
country as one of the main players in the international energy business (World Energy 
Council 2019, 162–64). The geopolitical context also informs the peripheral position (on 
the centre–periphery model of the modern–colonial world-system) of Brazil as a host 
country for foreign (direct or indirect) investment, in which the economy is based on the 
exportation of commodities, vulnerable to market oscillations, and dependent on the 
economic situation of wealthy countries of the Global North. The Brazilian geopolitical 
position reflects its colonial history, in which coloniality of power permeates all the 
aspects of energy planning. 
                                                        
46 The definition of what could be a renewable energy source is questionable. Hydropower, for example, is 
considered a renewable source of energy in the DEEP, but severely challenged by specialists like Phillip 
Fearnside and others (see Fearnside 2009; 2004). In perspective, hydro is “more renewable” than fossil 
fuels, but the socio-environmental harms caused by large dams are irreversible.  
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Brazil’s energy potential includes vast oil reserves in the deep waters of the 
Atlantic coast – the PreSalt and underneath a large extension of the Brazilian Amazon – 
as well as reserves of natural gas and abundance of freshwater in its large and flowing 
rivers. Brazil is the largest producer and distributer of electricity in Latin America, 
occupying the fifth position in the international ranking of the most dammed countries 
(CIGB 2018). The country is also responsible for supplying some of the neighbouring 
South American countries with electricity, oil, and gas (Eletrobras 2016).  
Let us briefly illustrate the role of Brazil as a key player in the global energy 
markets, although peripheric in positioning its power. The DEEP informs that the 
Brazilian energy matrix is composed of 54.8% of non-renewable sources and 45.2% of 
renewables, as shown in Table 1. The non-renewables consist mainly of oil and gas but 
also include nuclear power and mineral coal. The oil and gas industry in Brazil accounts 
for 46.7% of the total energy production in the country.  
 










mil tep % mil tep % mil tep % Variance          
(% year)  
Non-Renewable Energy  172,074 57.5% 183,717 55.0% 218,793 54.8% 1.7% 
Oil and Derivatives  114,319 38.2% 122,109 36.6% 139,250 34.9% 1.5% 
Natural Gas 33,949 11.3% 33,305 10.0% 46,956 11.8% 1.3% 
Mineral Coal and 
Derivatives  
17,947 6.0% 19,320 5.8% 22,991 5.8% 2.7% 
Uranium (U308) and 
Derivatives 
4,038 1.3% 6,858 2.1% 6,986 1.7% 5.6% 
Other Non-Renewables 1,827 0.6% 2,125 0.6% 2,609 0.7% 3.7% 
Renewable Energy 127,289 42.5% 150,246 45.0% 180,659 45.2% 4.1% 
Hydro and Electricity 40,417 13.5% 45,073 13.5% 53,270 13.3% 4.3% 
Firewood and Vegetable 
Coal 
22,403 7.5% 22,993 6.9% 27,444 6.9% 1.0% 
Sugar Cane Derivatives 50,212 16.8% 60,171 18.0% 67,586 16.9% 3.5% 
Other Renewables  14,256 4.8% 22,009 6.6% 32,358 8.1% 9.9% 
Total 299,362 100.0% 333,964 100.0% 399,452 100.0% 2.7% 
Table 1 - Brazilian Energy Matrix in the Decennial Plan (MME and EPE 2015, 436) 
 
Oil and derivatives encompass 34.9% of the total energy production in Brazil. In 
2015, according to a survey made by the Brazilian Oil, Gas and Biofuels Institute –
Instituto Brasileiro de Petróleo, Gás e Biocombustíveis (IBP) – based on data produced 
by the Brazilian National Oil Agency – (Agência Nacional do Petróleo (ANP)) – the 
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largest company in the sector is Petrobras, followed by BG E&P Brasil Ltda, Repsol 
Sinopec, Statoil Brasil, Shell Brasil, Petrogal Brasil, Sinochem Petroleo, OGX and others.  
 
 
Chart 1 - Brazil's Total Energy Production - Renewable v Non-Renewable (MME and EPE 2015) 
 
 
Chart 2 - Oil Companies in Brazil by Production in 2015 (IBP 2015) 
 
Petrobras shares are traded in international markets. The company’s ownership 
structure is divided into common shares (shareholders with voting and decision-making 
powers) and preferred shares (shareholders with participation in profits and dividends, 
but with no voting powers), configuring the company’s total capital stock. As shown in 
Chart 3, the Brazilian Federal Government owns 50.2% of common shares, which gives 
the Brazilian government the largest number of shares with decision-making power in the 
company, making Petrobras a Brazilian public company. Other entities with voting 
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powers are the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) and ADR holders47. 
Petrobras preferred shares are predominantly owned by foreign investors (80.3%), as 
displayed in Chart 4. 
 
 
Chart 3 - Petrobras Common Shares Ownership (Petrobras 2019) 
 
 
Chart 4 - Petrobras Preferred Shares Ownership (Petrobras 2019) 
                                                        
47 ADR stands for American Depositary Receipts. They consist in shares issued by US banks, that represent 
security for investors who purchased foreign company’s shares in the US. It is a market tool to negotiate in 
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Chart 5 - Petrobras Capital Stock Ownership (Petrobras 2019) 
 
Petrobras’ capital stock ownership indicates that the company, despite its public 
character, has 53.93% of its capital stock owned by foreigners against 28.67% held by 
the Brazilian government. Petrobras is responsible for 83.5% of the total production of 
oil and derivatives in Brazil, meaning 29.14% of the total energy production in the 
country. This means that 15.7% of the total energy production in the country is owned by 
foreign investors.  
Petrobras is the one of the very few national companies in the Brazilian oil and 
derivatives sector. The other large companies are: BG E&P Brasil, that operates as a 
subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell plc, also known as Shell Global; Repsol Sinopec is 
60% owned by the Spanish Repsol and 40% owned by the Chinese Sinopec; Statoil is a 
subsidiary of the Norwegian Equinor; Shell Brasil is also a subsidiary of Shell Global; 
Petrogal Brasil is a subsidiary of the Portuguese Galp Group; Sinochem Petroleo is a 
subsidiary of the Chinese Sinochem Group.  
These are some of the world’s largest companies in the oil and gas sector. Brazil 
is one of the most important countries in the global oil markets. In 2019, Petrobras was 
ranked the ninth largest company in the oil and gas sector by Forbes. 
Brazil is also a giant player in the global electricity sector. According to the 
Energy Research Company (EPE) 2018 Statistical Yearbook of Electricity (MME and 
EPE 2018), in 2017 Baseline Year, Brazil is ranked the seventh largest electricity 
consumer in the world, the eighth in the world for installed capacity for electricity 
generation, and ranked third-highest in the world in hydroelectricity generation. Table 3 
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O&G Company Country Sales Profits Assets Market Value 
#9 #1 Royal Dutch Shell Netherlands $382.6 B $23.3 B $399.2 B $264.9 B 
#11 #2 ExxonMobil United States $279.2 B $20.8 B $346.2 B $343.4 B 
#19 #3 Chevron United States $158.7 B $14.8 B $253.9 B $228.3 B 
#22 #4 PetroChina China $322.8 B $8 B $354.3 B $198.7 B 
#24 #5 BP UK $299.1 B $9.3 B $282.2 B $149.5 B 
#25 #6 Total France $184.2 B $11.4 B $256.8 B $149.5 B 
#35 #7 Sinopec China $399.7 B $9.5 B $233 B $105.6 B 
#40 #8 Gazprom Russia $128.4 B $18.9 B $305.9 B $59.9 B 
#50 #9 Petrobras Brazil $95.7 B $7.1 B $222 B $91.2 B 
#52 #10 Rosneft Russia $112.9 B $8.7 B $191.3 B $72.2 B 




10 Largest Companies in Installed Capacity for Electricity Generation in Brazil 




1º Chesf Eletrobras Public Brazil 10.323.428,00 
2º Furnas Eletrobras Public Brazil 9.443.500,00 
3º Eletronorte Eletrobras Public Brazil 8.883.150,00 
4º Norte Energia Eletrobras / CEMIG / Iberdrola / Vale PPP Brazil + Spain 8.788.655,55 
5º Itaipu Eletrobras Public Brazil + Paraguay 7.000.000,00 
6º Petrobras Petrobras Public Brazil 6.323.528,15 
7º Engie Engie Private UK 6.188.467,73 
8º Copel-GT Eletrobras Public Brazil 5.374.529,55 
9º Rio Paraná Energia S.A. China Three Georges Coorp Public China 4.995.200,00 
10º Energia Sustentável do Brasil Engie / Mitsui & Co / Eletrosul / Chesf PPP 
Brazil + UK + 
Japan 3.750.000,00 




Chart 6 - Eletrobras Common Shares Ownership (Eletrobras 2019) 
 
 
Chart 7 - Eletrobras Preferred Shares Ownership (Eletrobras 2019) 
 
The largest electricity generation company in Brazil is the holding Eletrobras. In 
the same fashion as Petrobras, Eletrobras shares are also traded in international markets. 
The company’s ownership structure is divided into common and preferred shares, 
configuring the company’s total capital stock. As shown in Chart 6, the Brazilian Federal 
Government owns 51% of common shares, the minimum required to make Eletrobras a 
Brazilian public company. The federal government does not hold any preferred shares, as 
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Eletrobras capital ownership reflects, in ownership pattern, its nature as a private 
sector company vitally and organically linked to the international capital markets with its 
shares freely traded in the international markets. The Federal Government owns 41% of 
the company’s capital stock and the other 59% is split among multiple types of investment 




Chart 8 - Eletrobras Capital Stock Ownership (Eletrobras 2019) 
 
Both Petrobras and Eletrobras are large public companies, but dependent on 
foreign capital to operate their businesses. This illustrates that, despite the fact that Brazil 
has prominent companies in the transnational energy business, it is historically dependent 
on the internationalization of capital. As a reflection of the modern–colonial world-
system configuration of power, Brazil is rich in natural resources and explores such 
potential but is chained to the transnational finance monopoly. 
As shown in Table 3, the largest electricity generation companies in Brazil are in 
the hydroelectricity business. According to EPE, hydro accounts for 63% of the total 
electricity produced in the country (MME and EPE 2018, 58).  
Heading the list of the major hydroelectricity companies are Chesf, Furnas, 
Eletronorte, and Norte Energia. Chesf is an Eletrobras subsidiary, operating most of its 
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large Jirau hydropower dam (3.750 MW installed capacity) in the north region, the state 
of Rondônia, Chesf’s largest enterprise. Furnas is also an Eletrobras subsidiary, operating 
hydropower generation business all over the country, in which the largest is Santo 
Antonio hydropower dam (3.570 MW installed capacity), in the north region of Brazil, 
state of Rondônia. Eletronorte is also an Eletrobras subsidiary and operates the huge 
Tucuruí hydropower dam (8.300 MW installed capacity) in the state of Pará, northern 
region of Brazil; Tucuruí is Eletronorte’s largest enterprise. Norte Energia is a 
concessionaire formed from public–private partnerships for the construction and 
operation of the massive Belo Monte hydropower dam, the largest hydropower dam in 
the country with an installed capacity of 11.200 MW48, also in the state of Pará, located 
in the Xingu peoples’ reservation area. Large hydroelectricity production means large 
dams built in areas where they raise controversy such as the northern region of Brazil, 
which comprises entirely of an extension of the Brazilian Amazonian region. The 
northern region accounts for 16% of the total electricity production in the country. It is 
the largest region in territorial extension and the least populated. Industry is the largest 
consumer of electricity in the northern region, accounting for 44% of the total, whereas 
residential consumption is 27.5% of the total production (MME and EPE 2018, 89).  
To understand the problematic of damming the northern region of Brazil, let’s 
closely observe how the energy plans deal with the issue. The DEEP, for example, cites 
the approved projects for the construction of major hydropower dams in the Amazonian 
region (which is located in the northern region) as very positive things (MME and EPE 
2015, 82–86). The Plan informs that hydropower produces ‘clean energy’ (MME and 
EPE 2015, 392–94), i.e., it causes minimal environmental impact and allows a positive 
carbon footprint according to international standards of gas emissions. The DEEP 
‘celebrates’ the expansion of hydroelectricity to meet the targeted carbon emissions: 
The results show that the scenario of expansion of energy supply and consumption in the ten-year 
horizon is in line with the target expressed in terms of the absolute value of emissions in 2020 
(range 634-680 MtCO2eq). Even in 2024, emissions do not reach the lower limit of the PNMC 
target set for 2020. 
To a large extent this result is a consequence of the downward revision of the economic scenario. 
Even so, it can be said that the objective of PDE 2024 regarding GHG emissions is met. The 
measures incorporated in the plan such as the expansion of hydroelectricity, of other 
renewable sources in electricity generation, the use of biofuels, energy efficiency measures, among 
others, will allow Brazil to maintain the performance indicators of its energy matrix at the 
levels of the countries that emit the least greenhouse gases in production and energy 
consumption (emphasis added in bold) (MME and EPE 2015, 392). 
                                                        
48 Itaipú Binacional is the largest hydropower dam in terms of installed capacity, but it is built on the border 
of Brazil and Paraguay, owned by both countries in equal shares and participation. In Brazil, Itaipú 




This way, the DEEP argues that, to meet the demand for electricity and industrial 
growth expectations, it is necessary to build more large-capacity powerplants. The plan 
argues that if the electricity demand is not met, there will be an economic collapse (MME 
and EPE 2015, 14–15; 25). The demand comes mainly from the industry, the agricultural 
sector, and the services sector. The plan makes clear that, to enable the construction of 
more hydropower dams in Amazonia, there must be more investments in the 
infrastructure sector.  
This is a collection of arguments carefully put together to induce, justify, and 
encourage the damming of the Amazonian region. Such arguments are unsustainable 
when confronted with the downsides of damming Amazonia. The worse problems are 
socioenvironmental, but there are also economic, strategic, and political issues to be 
raised, and they are all correlated. The first issue is the displacement of peoples. The 
existence of indigenous communities and their protected traditional lands are threatened 
when forced to be relocated. The riverine communities and the population of villages are 
evicted, sometimes by force, and rearranged in poor temporary accommodations made 
hastily, later transformed into permanent (since after being relocated, those communities 
will no longer be a problem for the installation of the enterprise) settlements. To flood 
the reservoir area, vast extensions of land must be deforested, and again, as these works 
are carried out in the urgency of meeting contractual deadlines, some areas are ignored, 
which causes the lake’s eutrophication. Thousands of plant and animal species are 
threatened with extinction. The lakes of the dams emit methane gas, and the larger the 
lake, the greater the environmental damage (Fearnside 2009; Millikan 1992; Moreira and 
Millikan 2012; Hurwitz et al. 2011).  
On the economic strategic side, researchers have argued that hydropower dams in 
Amazonia produce electricity for specific industries (specific clients) and, even though 
the electricity would be distributed for an entire region, a single client often justifies the 
viability of installing a powerplant. The ultra-pollutive aluminum industry, for example, 
is the largest consumer of electricity in the Amazonian region (Fearnside 2016). This 
shows that the potential benefits of large dams are meant not for the community, but for 
industry.  
The idea that large dam building generates employment and stimulates the 
northern region’s economy is also false. Dam building may create seasonal jobs during 
the construction phase, but all the personnel will have to find other jobs when the 
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construction work is completed. It creates a transitory peak or surge in the villages and 
cities near the construction site, which does not bring proper infrastructure and 
development. Cities get over populated, disrupting water and sewage systems and the 
supply of food and medicines (Neto 2014). The employee profile, that is, the 
barrageiros49, are mostly men, far from their families, living by themselves in precarious 
accommodations, with limited possibilities of visiting their homes or having access to 
sports or entertainment. Their income and lifestyle do not allow them to buy property and 
have stability in the region. They live in a semi-confined regime to grasp the opportunity 
to save some money to send back home. These conditions of life make these men more 
likely to use alcohol and other drugs, to become violent, and to be exposed to diseases of  
confinement, like viral diseases that spread quickly in accommodations for thousands of 
people (Ribeiro and Corrêa 2018). It is common to have rebellions against such living 
and working conditions, in which workers set the accommodations on fire, or destroy the 
facilities in protest (Setti 2012). Such workers live in a loop, waiting for the next 
enterprise to have the dignity of being employed.  
The DEEP argues that damming the Amazonian Region is part of the major goal 
of the country’s economic growth. This reveals the epistemically violent character of the 
plan in negating the victims of energy expansion.  
Along with the electricity generation business, there are two essential businesses 
that ensure that electric power is reached to the final consumers: transmission and 
distribution. Transmission is generally related to generation, since reaching electricity to 
the final consumer is part of the viability of the enterprise. Thus, the largest electricity 
transmission companies in Brazil are part of the holdings of Eletrobras, namely 
Eletronorte, Chesf, Furnas, and Eletrosul. Let us briefly mention at least two problematic 
issues with transmission lines: the need for permanent easements and the efficiency of 
energy transmission.  
The negotiations for the use of right of way for transmission lines occurs 
disproportionally when comparing poor land owners, indigenes, quilombolas and riverine 
communities to wealthy agribusiness owners, as exposed by MAB (Movement of peoples 
affected by dams in Brazil) (IPEA 2014).  Whereas poor and traditional peoples are 
displaced, wealthy landowners get long-term concessions for the right of use of their land.  
                                                        




Concerning efficiency, the Brazilian Electric System – Sistema Interligado 
Nacional (SIN) – reports that electricity transmission lines incur technical losses of 19.2% 
(MME and EPE 2018, 69), occurring between the electricity generated in powerplants, 
passing through the transmission lines and distribution networks to reach the final 
consumer (Bermann 2004; 2003). In the northern region, losses are  28% (EPE 2018, 69–
70). The bigger the powerplant, the farther it will be from urban centres, residences, and 
hospitals. The farther the powerplant, the longer the transmission lines, and the bigger the 
loss. 
Hence, large dam building, as evidenced in the example analyzed here – the north 
region of Brazil, including the Amazonian region – does not contribute to local 
development or actual benefits for the country in general. It may generate economic 
indicators of economic growth, as expected in the Brazilian Energy Plans. This way, 
energy enterprises are likely to reflect more positively in terms of global financial 
indicators than in terms of any improvement of conditions of life for the country.  
As mentioned above, the electricity business also involves distribution to end-
consumers. We will not go deeper into the distribution business, but it is interesting to 
highlight the corporate structure of electricity distribution in Brazil in order to determine 
the geopolitical aspects of energy planning in Brazil. 
 
 
Chart 9 - Nature of Electricity Distribution Companies in Brazil (Abardee 2019) 
 
The distribution business is mostly held by private companies. As Chart 9 shows, 












market-based entities, with shares traded in international markets, whether companies are 
public or private. The largest private companies are: the Energisa Group, mostly owned 
by Brazilian investors (financial-rentier capitalists), but traded in international markets; 
the Enel Group, originally Italian; the CPFL group, subsidiary of the Chinese public 
company, State Grid; the Neoenergia group, subsidiary of the Spanish Iberdrola; and the 
EDP Brasil, subsidiary of the Portuguese EDP group. The largest public companies are 
the Eletrobras subsidiaries, concentrated in the northern region of Brazil, and the CEMIG 
group in the south-eastern region, all market-based entities being companies traded in 
international financial markets.  
There are two main reasons for listing the companies and their ownership structure 
when explaining the specificities of the Brazilian geopolitical position in the global 
energy business. The first reason is related to the large potential of energy sources that 
attracts a number of foreign investors to the country. The second reason is the fact that 
capital is transnational, financial, and only aims more capital, regardless of the means to 
produce it.  
The vast majority of companies in the energy business operate in transnational 
markets, which does not necessarily link the fortunes of the business with local 
development. The money does not stay where the energy input is obtained. Targeted 
profits are high in risky businesses like oil and electricity. But taxation is low even when 
large profits are realized. This imposes a blatant contradiction in Brazil: although the 
territory is rich, the populations who live in the territory and work in such enterprises are 
generally poor, vulnerable, and oppressed. This happens because energy in Brazil is not 
produced to diminish social / territorial / economic disparities. Energy in Brazil is 
produced for the profitability of transnational businesses. In this way, the pattern of 
energy planning remains unchanged, and the future is planned in terms of repeating the 
same mistakes. Despite being a key player in the international energy business, Brazilian 
energy planning reinforces the peripheral position of Brazil in the global economy.  
The transnational financial character of energy businesses effectively leads to   
transference of the ‘pains’ of industrialization from wealthy nations in the Global North 
to the Global South. It is a continuation of colonial methods of profitability, with minimal 
involvement with the territory and communities.  
All the companies listed in this part operate in international stock markets, 
generating money via investments, speculations, or the sale of intangible assets in online 
transactions. Buying a share from Petrobras, Energisa, or Royal Dutch Shell has nothing 
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to do with local development. Shareholders do not need to know about the communities 
displaced, the lack of running water, or the seasonal character of jobs created in large 
enterprises (that will end up creating unemployment in due course). All that shareholders 
need to know are the company’s balance and the portion of dividends. The transnational 
financial character of energy businesses is on a global scale. Brazil bears the contradiction 
between being the ninth largest oil producer in the world, the eighth largest electricity 
consumer in the world, and being a leading country in the world in socio-economic 
inequalities. This is a picture of the modern–colonial world-system’s division of labour 
and geopolitical transference of environmental damage from the rich to the poor. 
The DEEP ignores geopolitical discrepancies and insists on planning energy for 
economic growth. This reasoning underlies the historical development of the DEEP’s 
epistemological character, privileging transnational economic outlooks to the detriment 
of the population through the encouragement of the extractive industry for exportation. 
The epistemological character also consists in the invisibility of the geopolitical problem. 
The DEEP only explains the potential benefits of the given system, historically 
constructed. The victims of such a system are ignored and thereby silenced. When the 
energy expansion plan silences the victims, it reinforces the victim’s situation. 
In order to understand such geopolitical configuration, it is necessary to bring to 
light the Brazilian colonial past and present. For a full understanding of energy planning 
as the materialization of coloniality of power, lets elucidate how the configuration of the 
structures of power demand violent epistemologies to substantiate the colonial ideology 
that still dominates the present. This historical background is not about a ‘past that 
condemns the present’ but about a past that informs the present to enable change. As it is 
argued in this thesis, the perception of the epistemological problem allows the use of tools 
other than the master’s tools50.  
 
Brazilian Energy in the Historical Context  
The second specificity that justifies the study of the epistemology of the present 
energy planning in Brazil is Brazilian history: the formation of the Brazilian Nation State 
and its configuration in the present global geopolitics of power. As a colonized nation in 
the Global South, the Brazilian State is the result of a collection of imposed colonial 
                                                        
50 As Audre Lorde shows in The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House.  
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institutions and relationships of power. Therefore, the division of the territory, as well as 
the appropriation and use of natural resources are consequences of imposed geopolitical 
hierarchies, as well as hierarchies of gender, race, and class, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
The ideology or pattern of power imposed by colonization survives the end of 
colonialism as a political system, remaining as the continuation of political, economic, 
and social institutions, as well as knowledge and legal institutions. This way, coloniality 
of power is a fundamental concept for the understanding of the epistemology that 
structures energy planning in Brazil. The definition and deployments of coloniality of 
power were dealt with in Chapter 2. The concept is used as the theoretical ground for the 
expatiation of the historical formation of institutions in Brazil that lead to the present 
configuration of energy planning in the country.  
The imposition of the Eurocentric nation-state and its institutions is not a process 
that took place exclusively in Brazil. Every colonized territory and peoples went through 
some sort of annihilation of culture and history for the imposition of Eurocentric modern 
institutions, as well as the modern–colonial ethics (the ethics of exhaustion). The 
historical scrutiny enables the comprehension of how the ethics of exhaustion takes place 
as the naturalization in material terms (definition of what is ethics and ethical), in formal 
terms (the social validation of such ethics, corroborated through the institutions that 
impose values), and the feasibility criteria governing energy planning in the present 
Brazilian context. The historical formation of Brazil as a nation state is of paramount 
importance for understanding the complex structures that configure public administration 
in Brazil. Today, such structures stand as governmental institutions such as the Ministry 
of Mines and Energy and the EPE – which created the DEEP.  
 
Administrative Institutions’ Entrenched Coloniality of Power  
 It is relevant for the epistemological critique to understand the historical formation 
of the administrative institutions in charge of energy planning in Brazil. This is in turn 
requires an understanding of how coloniality of power is expressed in the Brazilian 
context. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the central feature of coloniality of power is the 
mimicry of the colonial ideology in order to have access to power. This must be 
considered in the context of the modern–colonial world-system, i.e., the peripheral and 
subaltern position of agents of power that underwent the experience of colonization in 
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relation to the hegemonic political, military, and economic powers. States formed from 
the colonial conquest are institutionally colonial after independence from the colonizing 
power. This happens because the imposition of institutions in the colonies was forged in 
the colonial ideology of power, implementing the ethics of exhaustion.  
Bureaucratic, educational, economic, military, and judicial institutions were 
formed to enable the colonizer’s aim to conquer and maintain a preponderant position in 
mercantile capitalism and, subsequently in industrial capitalism. The colonial enterprise 
was a private initiative that installed institutions, which took on, through historical time, 
a ‘public character’ to administer the colonial business and to have the financial and 
military support of the metropolis. After independence, such structures remained in the 
newly formed states to assist the trading of products; the state now had its own military 
organizations and expanded possibilities of commerce, unchained from the metropolis’ 
monopoly.   
 The formation of administrative bodies in the colonies took place around the need 
to control the monopoly over tradable products. In Portuguese America, colonial Brazil, 
the whole governmental apparatus was formed to protect the viability of economic 
activities. This is evident from the intensification of the “presence of the state” on the 
discovery of the gold and diamond mines in the late seventeenth century (Cotta 2006, 50). 
Justice, revenue, and military bodies had the same original constitution, with positions 
generally occupied by the local wealthy men, whose influence concentrated power in the 
local administration. Mining (as a means for the management of natural resources and 
energy inputs) was intrinsically related to the state’s power of punishment, fact evidenced 
by the presence of military bodies which could also exercise the functions of legislation, 
justice, and the collection of taxes (Silveira 1997).  
 For a better understanding of the constitution of a centralized administration in 
Brazil, let us briefly elucidate some relevant aspects of Brazilian colonial history.  
 
Brief History: The Origins of Administration in Brazil  
 Brazil was a Portuguese colony from 1500 to 1822. From 1822 to 1889, the 
independent country was a monarchic empire, governed by dissident members of the 
Portuguese royal family. From 1889 to the present, Brazil has become a republic marked 
by military and autocratic governments. The period called The First Republic endured 
from 1889 to 1930, with the first republican constitution, and with alternating military 
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rulers in power. The following period is known as the Vargas era, from 1930 to 1945, 
with a politics called the New State, of authoritarian nuances. From 1945 to 1964, Brazil 
was aligned with the external politics for development and economic growth, a period 
generally reported as the ‘democratic moment’, but under severe interference from 
international economic actors. The military dictatorship in Brazil from 1964 to 1985 was 
well supported by the international agenda of economic growth and development; it 
aligned politically with the United States during the Cold War. The country restored a 
democratic regime in 1985, enacting the current democratic constitution in 1988. 
Notwithstanding this, since the parliamentary coup in 2016 (Secco 2016), the Brazil’s  
democracy has been suffering from severe threats, which culminated in the election of a 
far-right government in 2018.  
To analyze coloniality of power in Brazil, we should recap some relevant facts of 
the colonial period, starting from Portuguese America – before the constitution of Brazil 
as a nation state. In 1494, Portugal and Spain signed the Tordesillas treaty to regulate the 
ownership of the recently invaded lands in the Americas. In April 1500, the Portuguese 
explorer Pedro Álvares Cabral arrived with his crew at Santa Cruz, north-eastern region 
of the South American territory (where the city of Porto Seguro is today). English, Dutch, 
and French expeditions were also officially installed in the north-eastern region of South 
America in the first 30 years of the 1500s51. The interest in that “new world” was initially 
centralized in the commercialization of brazilwood. To secure control over the territory, 
in 1534, the king of Portugal, D. João III, decided to divide the known lands (the eastern 
part of the South American continent) into 15 lots, or hereditary captaincies. The areas 
were ‘donated’52 for life, in hereditary character, to the citizens of Portuguese nobility, 
the grantees (Fausto 2006, 17–45).  
The grantees had the right to economically explore the territory as they wished, as 
well as to kill or enslave those who would claim the land. The grantees’ duties were, 
among others, to govern, colonize, protect, and develop the region with their own 
resources, that is, with the resources they would gather by exploiting the territory 
(Wehling and Wehling 2000). The commercialization of products was mainly for export. 
                                                        
51 Such European nations never actually left Brazil; they either the Portuguese stayed on in some territories 
or their presence was felt in the active contraband commerce of products from the colony. Relevant conflicts 
against the Portuguese control took place with the support of the Dutch, French, and English during the 
Brazilian colonial period(‘Frei Vicente Do Salvador - A História Do Brazil - Atlas Digital Da América 
Lusa’ n.d.).  
52 As if someone can donate something they do not own.  
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From 1530 onwards, the main commodity became sugar cane, with the implementation 
of the plantation schemes. The workforce in the plantations was predominantly enslaved 
African people, brutally kidnaped and brought to South America on vessels called navios 
negreiros, the slave ships. 
 The grantees had (under Portuguese laws or Ordinations53) the right over the land, 
ownership of everything produced in the territory, and ownership of the workforce. They 
had the right to conquer more territories (land yet unknown to the Portuguese Crown). 
They could organize themselves in wars54 against the native peoples, either to take over 
territories or to prevent attacks. For the first half of the sixteenth century, Portuguese 
America was administered by Portuguese nobles who would trade the main commodities 
produced in the territory with the Crown. The grantees would report directly to the king 
of Portugal.  
The decentralized administration and the distance between the colony and the 
metropolis were problematic for the Crown to closely observe its source of wealth and 
regulate the grantees’ activities. The captaincies system did not bring the profitability 
expected by the metropolis (Fausto 2006, 46). In order to centralize the administration, 
the king of Portugal, Dom João III, created the General Government (Governo Geral) in 
154855. The grantees would then report to the General Governor. Among the other 
administrative positions created in the General Government, we can highlight three: the 
Ouvidor-mor, or the Head of Justice, responsible for legal issues and for the application 
of Portuguese law in the colony; the Provedor-mor, or the Head of Revenue, responsible 
for the collection of taxes and control of the revenue in the colony; and the Capitão-mor, 
or Captain-in-chief, responsible for the development of the colony’s defences, whether 
against foreign attacks, internal rebellions, or against indigenous peoples. 
To clearly understand the colonial moment, it is necessary to keep in mind that 
the concept of Modern European administration that was transferred to colonial Brazil 
was distant from that clear division of powers and functions later understood in the 
                                                        
53 The legislation in force in the colony was the Ordinations of the kingdom: first the Afonsinas (1466), 
then the Manueline (1521), and then the Philippine Ordinances of 1603, which was the most important and 
of longest temporal scope in the colonial history (Lara 1999, 22). 
54 The just wars. See (Moonen 2008, 12–13) 
55 The historian Boris Fausto enumerates a series of factors that explain why King D. João III decided to 
implement the General Government in the territory that today corresponds to Brazil. First, there was the 
weakening of trade with the Indies, which forced the Portuguese to turn Brazil into a lucrative enterprise - 
a role that had not been fulfilled before in the Colony. In addition, Portuguese attempts to deploy an empire 
in the region of present-day Morocco were failing. Finally, the Portuguese were troubled by the success of 
the Spaniards in exploring Spanish America, where large quantities of precious metals were being found 
(Fausto 2006, 46–49). 
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concept of the bureaucracy. Such a concept in Brazil becomes meaningful after the 
Pombaline era (1750–1777)56 and, more precisely, in the first decades of the nineteenth 
century, when administration became more noticeable. In any case, bureaucracy, 
specifying its technical significance, is defined by Weber in the late nineteenth century. 
Far from this, in the villages and cities of colonial Brazil, there was no fully rational 
apparatus of careers, positions, and functions. According to Maria José e Arno Whelling, 
the colonial administration 
[...] is not a modern bureaucratic organization, but a set of tasks arising empirically and 
casuistically, according to specific interests and needs, often juxtaposed and often with competing 
competences (Wehling and Wehling 2000). 
 
 The colonial administration encompassed the attributions of justice, revenue, and 
war in the foreground, and other administrative activities on a second plane, just as it was 
organized in Portugal. The ofícios57, i.e., the colonial activities of ‘administrative 
character’ belonged to the king as an attribute of his sovereignty and could only be 
granted by the king (as Portugal was an absolutist state until the late eighteenth century). 
In that colonial society, holding an ofício was to hold a dignity attributed by the monarch: 
it would give the individual a certain social status and made it easier for the descendants 
                                                        
56 Pombaline era refers to the period from from 1750 to 1777 when Marquis of Pombal served as Portuguese 
Secretary of the State of Internal Affairs of the Kingdom in the government of Joseph I of Portugal. The 
term administration is used throughout this section to designate the activities related to the State for the 
functioning of the institutions responsible for the crown’s commandments. It was questioned whether it 
would be prudent to use the term public administration because it refers to the activity of the State or on its 
behalf, but in the period in focus it is difficult to establish a clear differentiation between the public and 
private spheres, since the venality of public ofícios (especially with regard to Portuguese America) was a 
common and even “institutionalized” practice (Silva 2006, 85). 
57 Instead of the term public adminstration, we use the term ofício, which fits more precisely to the analyzed 
period, so that a conceptual error or anachronism does not happen. Maria Jose and Arno Whelling point out 
seven main characteristics of the ofício. The first is patrimoniality: the ofício was understood as part of the 
king's patrimony, could be both donated and sold. “The venality of public offices, so criticized by the 
liberals of the nineteenth century, derived from the patrimonialist conception of the state and was one of its 
sources of income, both in colonial Brazil and in Spanish-American colonies”. The second characteristic 
was the private use of the public function: “the basic idea was that the ofício – with few exceptions – 
remunerated its holder, similar to an object of property, such as the right of use and the building lease 
contract”. The third characteristic was the predominance of personal fidelity: the service of the State was 
confused with the interest of the representative, being of personal fidelity to the monarch. The fourth 
characteristic was the multitude of functions: a single position could cover a varied number of functions. 
“The fact is explained by the improvisation and absence of planning of the public administration, with the 
attributions corresponding to needs dictated by the circumstances”. The fifth characteristic was stability, 
“if not vitality and even heredity in the occupation of positions (...) which cannot be generalized because 
the financial needs of the State have ended up reducing many ofícios to triennial mandates (...)”.  The sixth 
characteristic of the ofícios was the absence of professional specialization: with the exceptions of the 
positions of the superiors of the justice and the clergy (trained in civil or canon law by the University of 
Coimbra), the public functions did not require special professional qualification. Finally, the seventh 
characteristic of the ofícios was the association with ennoblement: “(...) in Brazil [the ofícios] had an 
important role as a vehicle of social ascension, giving the first occupant nobility de facto and significantly 
benefiting their dependents” (Wehling and Wehling 2000, 144–46). 
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to enter the public service as a sort of familiar ‘precedent’. The ofício represented an 
element of social ascension. 
 Hence, administrative functions of the military, justice, and revenue in Portuguese 
America were mismatched and most of the time self-regulated (Hespanha 2006, 24–38), 
operationalized by the nobles – generally the grantees and/or their relatives (Wehling and 
Wehling 2000, 147). The formation of the administration is entangled with the ownership 
of land, the capacity for defense, the collection of taxes, and the status of nobility.  
 With the discovery of gold and diamond mines in the midwest and southeast 
regions of the Portuguese America (where today are the Brazilian states of Goiás and 
Minas Gerais) in the late seventeenth century, the Portuguese Crown decided to observe 
the colony more closely. In 1719, for the first time in the Brazilian colonial history, an 
institutionalized, regular, and paid troop was sent to the colony, specifically to the mines’ 
region, the Dragões Del Rey (the King’s Dragons) (Cotta 2006, 47–50). The “official” 
troops, however, would have incomparably fewer contingents than local barons’ 
organizations, much less power, resources, structure, or influence (Silveira 1997, 166–
67). Hence, the military forces were intrinsically aligned with the local barons – not only 
in the context of the mines, but in the context of the whole colony. Thus, in the second 
half of the eighteenth century, the central administration was seen as a state of functional 
confusion with, on the one hand the laws of the kingdom and the private interest of the 
kingdom in theory to be defended by the holders of ofícios in the colony, and on the other 
hand, the reality of networks of power and patronage that ensured local private interests 
(Silveira 1997, 169–83). 
 Mining was the most profitable and hence most closely observed economic 
colonial activity during the whole colonial time. However, the representative institutions 
of the Portuguese state in the mines had developed much more emphatic influences than 
the power of the Crown, creating a local identity of private character. The administration 
in colonial Brazil was in misalignment with the judiciary, the police, and the municipal 
councils. An essential point in understanding this connection between military bodies, 
justice, revenue, and politics in the local sphere is the relationship between economic 
power – networks of patronage – and the royal ofícios. This institutional interaction 
allowed an exalted legitimacy to be shared by these organizations, leading to a different 
local reality from that envisaged by the laws of the Kingdom. Thus, the characteristics of 
the local dynamics demonstrate the difficulty to separate what would be specifically 
police, jurisdictional, political, or economic activities. 
 
 138 
 While wealthy businessmen who bearers of nobility titles and ofícios were 
controlling the colonial activities locally, they were also aiming at expanding their trade 
arms internationally. Despite the metropolis’ monopoly over the colony’s goods, 
everything could be contrabanded, especially by the English, who were interested in raw 
materials (especially for the production of wool, silk, and iron) (Fausto 2006, 122). 
 In 1808, running away from the Napoleonic invasions, the Portuguese royal 
family moved to the colony, taking with them the whole monarchic apparatus. Dom João 
VI, the king, took with him a crowd of administrative officials, members of the army, the 
navy, of the high clergy, as well as the royal treasure, the governmental files, several 
libraries, and other things, with the protection and support of the English navy (Fausto 
2006, 121–25). The first measures of the royal family in Brazil was the opening of the 
ports to ‘friendly nations’, the revoking of decrees that prohibited the installation of 
manufacturing units in the colony, the exempting of taxation on the import of raw 
materials for uses of industry, and the offering of subsidies for the local industrialization, 
especially for the purchase of machines. The main beneficiaries of such measures were 
the English, who, when Portugal fell to French invasion, took over the commerce of 
everything produced in Portuguese America and became the main suppliers of 
industrialized goods. The port of Rio de Janeiro became the point of entry for English 
manufactured products, which would be traded all over the South American continent, 
from the River Plate region (Río de la Plata) to the Pacific coast. Other beneficiaries of 
the measures were the plantation barons, who would export their large-scale production 
to whoever had interest in buying their products (Fausto 2006, 124).  
 Despite the presence of the monarchy in the colony, there was no fortification of 
the central political power. On the contrary, the local baronage got stronger and more 
powerful, especially in alliance with the English capitalists. It is understandable that the 
independence of Brazil happened 15 years after the opening of the commerce, in 1822, 
supported by the local capitalists who were also the politicians, public officials, justice 
officials, and generally held military patents.  
Brazil became an independent nation-state in 1822. The Brazilian people were not 
involved in this political transition. In fact, nothing had changed in the social aspect, since 
the networks of power remained unchanged. Slavery was legal until 1888. The economy 
remained predominantly agricultural (where the agricultural products were for export) 
and grounded in exploiting natural resources, again for export. This continues to the 
present, as evidenced in the premises in the energy expansion plans. Places of 
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political/institutional power remain occupied almost exclusively by white wealthy men, 
even in ‘democratic’ times. The fixation on developing a market-oriented political 
economy, focused on the competitiveness of the production of primary commodities, 
remains the main economic goal of the Brazilian state. This demonstrates that the 
configuration of the institutional arrangements for the management of natural resources 
– including the prospect, viability, and production of energy inputs – remains in the hands 
of the ‘sugar mill owners and coffee barons’, as Taliria Petrone58 would emphasize. 
 The formation of Brazil as a nation state is grounded on the patriarchal 
exploitation of the territory, natural resources, and enslaved workforce. This original 
formation is entrenched in the country’s institutional character. It is clear that the 
enactment of the first democratic constitution in 1988, which enabled for the first time 
direct democratic presidential elections in 1989, could not establish a democracy de facto. 
Because of the 322 years of colonial history, and 166 years of Brazil as a nation state, 
there was not a moment in which the Brazilian people could modify such solid control 
over the peoples, resources, and territory – aspects of the Brazilian coloniality of being. 
The independence from Portugal was not a people’s movement – it was a patrons’ 
capitalist independence. The attempts to implement a democracy in this context was 
nothing but a illusory pretence of the people’s participation in the economic dictatorship 
(Shiva 2016, 74).  
 Understanding the formation of administrative bodies for the configuration of 
energy planning in Brazil is of paramount importance to observe the priorities of energy 
planning and who is actually benefitting from such planning. Building on that, the history 
of the management of natural resources represents the private aim of controlling the 
‘endless’ sources of wealth. There is no evidence in history that the private control over 
mineral extraction or waters (for example) could bring a collective gain, but there is much 
evidence of the violence of such control. In Brazil, the idea of state ownership of such 
resources is also weak since the territory and the public institutions are historically 
divided into hereditary captaincies.  
                                                        
58 ‘Brazil remains under the control of the sugar mill owners and coffee barons’ says the historian and 
congresswoman Taliria Petrone, in many of her speeches to challenge the status quo in political 
environments in Brazil. In Portuguese: “O Brasil permanece sob o controle dos senhores de engenho e 
barões do café!”  
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 Building on the historical formation of administrative institutions in Brazil, let us 
analyse the management of natural resources by those institutions in the present, by 
focusing on the country’s energy planning.  
 
The Public Management of Natural Resources and Energy Planning in 
Brazil  
Energy management comprises a mix of public and private regulations. The 
management of energy sources in Brazil is the constitutional responsibility of the state, 
at the national level, up to the point of commercializing energy, when it becomes 
regulated by markets and by national (and international) laws. It is important to note that 
the energy business in Brazil is not restricted to the sale of energy inputs, but involves a 
number of different elements59. Analyzing energy management as an activity of public 
character that, in its rollout, involves ceding space to the private sector, prevents the 
comprehension of its multidimensional structure. The energy business is regulated and 
planned by public and private entities at the same time, with the common goal of fulfilling   
market expectations. The Brazilian state, although constitutionally sovereign over natural 
resources, has a neoliberal approach to development. By the enactment of laws, the 
concession of subsidies, and the impunity of enforcing the constitutional principle of the 
social function of property60, the institutional framework fosters the rolling back of the 
state simultaneously to the liberalization and privatization of the economy. 
                                                        
59 Such elements are: a) land, and everything it can offer above and underneath: mineral potential, oil 
potential, water, logistics, right of way and so on; b) infrastructure: concrete-heavy capital-technological-
intensive projects, for the viability studies, construction, commissioning, operation, transmission/transport, 
and so on; c) legitimacy/bureaucracy: legal provision, bids, tenders, concession contracts, subsidies, 
taxation, protection, insurance, dispute resolution and so on; d) financial/markets expectations: investment, 
inflation, risk, trade balance, supply and demand, rate of return, expectation of growth, profit and so on; e) 
workforce: managers, directors, lobbyists, accountants, lawyers, architects, civil engineers, mechanical 
engineers, electrical engineers, metallurgy engineers, automation engineers, chemical engineers, 
environmental engineers  (and as many engineers as possible), quantity surveyors, bricklayers, carpenters, 
electricians, master builders, instrument technicians, concrete technicians, janitors, secretaries, inspectors, 
cooks, helpers, machine operators, explosives operators, security guards, doctors, nurses, councillors, 
marketers, website designers, social-workers… and so on; f) governance: political intention to carry on 
energy enterprises and to protect them in case of markets pitfalls. 
60 The Brazilian Federal Constitution has the social function of the property as one of its general principles, 
mentioned in two distinct general titles. TITLE II - About fundamental rights and guarantees - Chapter I 
- Of Individual and Collective Rights and Duties - Art. 5 Everyone is equal before the law, without 
distinction of any kind, guaranteeing to Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country the inviolability 
of the right to life, liberty, equality, security and property, as follows: XXIII. property will serve its social 
function; (…) TITLE VII - From the Economic and Financial Order - Chapter I - Of the General Principles 
of Economic Activity - Art. 170. The economic order, based on the valorisation of human labour and free 
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Such a neoliberal approach makes difficult the differentiation between market 
regulation and state regulation of the economic activities related to natural resources’ 
exploitation. For Radha D’Souza, ‘the difference lies in the institutional framework for 
“the law” seen as a set of rules and principles. Markets undertake “enactment” and 
“enforcement” of law in very different ways from states’ (D’Souza 2006, 11). D’Souza 
explains that certain legal forms are essential features of state regulation, reinforced by 
(mainstream) social scientists, as follows: 
(a) conflating law with statute law;  
(b) an instrumentalist view of law that sees state agencies achieving certain outcomes mandated 
through statutes, rules, regulation and policies;  
(c) law as a set of imperatives for different social actors to abide by;  
(d) law as comprising two distinct domains, the “public” the “private” domains;  
(e) regulation through the institution of the civil service, the executive and in the final analysis the 
legislature, all operating under public law principles (D’Souza 2006, 11). 
 
 On the other hand, market regulation in neoliberal regimes is established via 
market institutions, that is, agencies/authorities/organizations not linked to the state’s 
civil service nor to the cogent erga omnes character of the state laws. Market regulation 
sets up regulatory authorities of private character to regulate each specific area of market 
relationships, such as competition, inflation, currencies, and even ‘social regulatory 
frameworks of markets’, including the fables of corporate social responsibility and labour 
market regulation. Whereas state regulation assumes a distinction between public/social 
and private/economic areas of the law, market regulation combines the economic and 
social spheres showing that economic regulation is social regulation, therefore benefits 
all society (D’Souza 2006, 12).  
 In the modern–colonial world-system, however, especially in places that 
underwent the experience of colonization – where the (Modern/Eurocentric) rule of law 
is imposed to enable and/or facilitate the colonial enterprise – state and market regulation 
share a common cannon of annunciation, the same origins, and hence similar or 
‘coincident’ attributes that include, according to D’Souza:  
(a) privileging of economic relationships over all other social relationships;  
(b) sanctifying private property rights;  
(c) creating and refining legal regimes, principles and instruments for appropriation of labour and 
environment;  
(d) legal policies and instruments for alienation of people from land, water, minerals and 
other nature resources by turning them into commodities for exchange in the market-place;  
(e) positive law underpinned by empiricism and positivism in social and physical sciences 
(emphasis added in bold) (D’Souza 2006, 12). 
                                                        
initiative, is intended to guarantee everyone a dignified existence, according to the dictates of social justice, 




 Economic regulatory instruments are then produced to detach the existence of life 
from the object of the law, giving the idea that the economy happens on a parallel 
dimension – completely separate from those who suffer the wrath of the law. In this sense, 
natural resources are perceived exclusively as economic affairs by the Brazilian law. They 
become objects of analysis solely due to their economic potential. Thus, natural resources 
are dealt with as vested with the potential to bring development to the collective (to the 
state and society) after being transformed into commodities. This process of 
commoditization of nature has colonial origins and ignores the existence of life. 
Regulation and planning are, thus, narrowed to economic outcomes.  
 The DEEP is an example of such a limited approach to energy potentials and 
energy inputs. The very nomenclature of the document reveals the intention of the 
document: energy expansion. It implies the need for economic growth and the availability 
of more energy inputs in the markets. In mainstream reasoning, including so-called 
‘socio-environmental plans related to energy activities’ in combination with the economic 
plan amounts to including life in the plan. Instead, we reinforce that the separation of life 
from the economic activities enhances the violence inherent to the indiscriminate 
supremacy of economic activities of the state and its institutions. There is no need for a 
separate plan that deals with the ‘non-economic matters’, but a plan that is grounded on 
the preservation of life that will guide the management of economic matters. 
Energy planning in Brazil has the state working hard for the maintenance of places 
of economic and political power – in which meeting market expectations is the reason 
why nature and everything else exist. Energy planning in Brazil, as materialized in the 
DEEP, is the report of the success of the colonial enterprise through time. The DEEP is a 
manual of mimicry of the colonial power as a means to access power disguised as some 
fetishized economic growth that somehow will bring some social benefit, but in reality, 
maintains the same historical owners of capital exercising political, institutional, and even 
military control over other people and nature. Hence, the DEEP must be extinguished 
because its principles, intentions, and priorities are violent. The violent content cannot be 
reformed. It demands an epistemic decolonial turn. In the section that follows, we explain 
what is energy planning in Brazil, detailing the history of the activity of planning for the 




 Energy Planning in Brazil 
Energy planning is part of the institutional design of the economic activities in a 
given state. In the modern–colonial world-system, energy planning is carried out in the 
ethics of exhaustion, which narrows energy planning to infrastructure, industry, and the 
management of energy sources. In Brazil, decisions regarding energy’s short and long-
term strategies are the responsibility of the executive power that delegates the activities 
of planning to the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME). Within the MME, energy 
planning is the responsibility of the Energy Research Company, EPE, a public company 
composed of a collection of institutions of public and private nature, which produces 
annual documents named Decennial Energy Expansion Plans – DEEPs (Planos Decenais 
de Expansão de Energia).  
 
Energy in the Brazilian Federal Constitution  
The Brazilian Constitution (Brasil 1988) defines in article 20 that the following 
belong to the Federal Union (the Brazilian Federation, as of public character): 
Art. 20. The following belong to the Union: 
V. The natural resources of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone; 
VIII. Hydraulic power potentials; 
IX. Mineral resources, including those of the subsoil; 
XI. Lands traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples (emphasis added in bold) (Brazil 1988). 
 
Declaring as constitutionally public the hydraulic potentials and minerals, and, in 
the same article, including indigenous lands looks odd. It means that such things can be 
used, traded, or disposed off based on the political decisions made at a given time in 
history. Such treatment given to indigenous lands is not something inevitable, but is the 
consequence of historical vilification and seizure of indigenous lands and the intentional 
annihilation of indigenous peoples and traditional communities; these are, apparently, 
dispensable when confronted with the need to build the nation, to enable the nation’s 
economic growth, and to facilitate the nation’s development. The historical nation, 
geopolitically inserted in the modern–colonial world-system, irreplaceable in the 
Eurocentric legalist model, sets priorities and hierarchizes, in the constitutional text, the 
sacred private property, denying indigenes autonomy over the sovereignty of their 
territory. This implies that, in energy planning, materialized in the DEEP, indigenous land 
is treated as a removable obstacle to the imposition of modern–colonial energy projects. 
The constitutional text reads as follows: 
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Art. 21. It is the responsibility of the Union: 
XII. To explore, directly or through authorization, concession or permission: 
b) Electric energy services and installations and the energy utilization of the watercourses, in 
conjunction with the States61 where the hydropower potential is located (Brasil 1988). 
 
The federal government has the responsibility of exploring energy potentials and 
the utilization of watercourses for energy generation purposes. Such responsibility can be 
delegated to public or private entities via concessions, authorizations, and permissions. 
By comprehending the formation of administrative bodies in Brazil, as explained above, 
it is understandable that decisions about the use of watercourses are in the hands of 
historical oligarchs controlling the land and the political decisions over the land. Although 
the constitutional text is grounded in the principle of a democratic nation, the features of 
political and economic structure in Brazil go beyond the population’s power to elect 
representatives and have everything to do with transnational capitalism. Article 23 has an 
interesting point that is immediately related to energy planning: 
Art. 23. It is common competence of the Union, the States, the Federal District and the 
Municipalities: 
XI. Register, monitor and supervise the concession of rights to research and exploit water and 
mineral resources in their territories (Brasil 1988). 
 
By linking rights to research and exploit water and mineral resources (energy 
inputs), the prospects of energy possibilities – energy futures – are in the hands of those 
who would potentially profit from the energy business. This aspect is central to the 
epistemological critique herein proposed: research is part of the energy business. The 
knowledge about energy possibilities and energy futures is narrowed to its economic 
framework. It gets more intriguing when it comes to the taxation of energy inputs and 
energy-related services: 
Article 155. It is incumbent upon the States and the Federal District to institute taxes on: 
II. operations relating to the movement of goods and on services of interstate and inter-municipal 
transport and communication services, even if operations and services are carried out abroad; 
Paragraph 2. The tax provided for in item II shall comply with the following: 
X. Shall not apply: 
b) On operations destined to other States for oil, including lubricants, liquid and gaseous fuels 
derived therefrom, and electric energy. 
Paragraph 3 - Except for the taxes dealt with in item II of the caput of this article and art. 153, I 
and II [related to import and export taxation], no other tax may be levied on operations related to 
electricity, telecommunications services, oil products, fuels and minerals in the country (Brasil 
1988). 
 
                                                        
61 States mean the federative units that compose the Brazilian federation. Brazil is composed of 26 States 
and the Federal District, where is located the country’s capital, Brasilia. 
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It is understandable that, given the country’s regional socio-economic differences, 
the Federal Constitution should encourage the facilitation of access to certain goods 
throughout the country, waiving taxation for movements of goods and services. However, 
as demonstrated in the section Brazilian Energy in the Geopolitical Context, the non-
taxation of energy inputs-related movements and services results in encouraging the 
centralization of the production, creating industrial zones, which may help transnational 
businesses but increase social disparities. In the case of the problematic damming of the 
Amazonian region and the installation of transmission lines, for example, the main 
beneficiaries are energy producing industrials since it does not impact the final price of 
electricity or fuel to the population. Support for transnational business is a corollary of 
the constitution of the Brazilian modern–colonial state. The language of the law imposes 
the agenda of economic growth in a ‘natural’ way. This is an epistemic problem. But the 
private ownership of natural resources is also included in the constitutional text, as 
naturalized from the imposed ideology of the modern–colonial world-system, coloniality 
of power: 
Art. 176. The deposits, whether or not mined, and other mineral resources, and hydraulic power 
potentials constitute property distinct from that of the soil, for the purpose of exploration or 
exploitation, and belong to the Union, granted to the concessionaire ownership of the product of 
mining. 
Paragraph 1. The research and mining of mineral resources and the utilization of the potentials 
referred to in the caput of this article may only be made upon authorization or concession of the 
Union, in the national interest, by Brazilians or a company incorporated under Brazilian 
laws and having its headquarters and administration in the Country, in the form of the law, 
which will establish the specific conditions when these activities are developed in borders or 
indigenous lands (emphasis added in bold and italics) (Brasil 1988). 
 
Article 176 allows the ownership of mineral inputs by private owners. It envisages 
that the exploitation of natural resources can only be made for the national interest and 
that foreign companies must have subsidiaries in Brazil. That is, the exploitation of 
natural resources by foreign companies in Brazil can only be made via foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and the foreign company will own the products extracted. We showed 
that profits and dividends of companies that operate in international markets (even 
national companies headquartered in Brazil) are not national. They belong to shareholders 
who cannot be reached by Brazilian regulations, protected by the corporate veil.  
Two things in article 176 are very pertinent for the critique herein proposed: first, 
the fact that the national interest includes the foreign company’s ownership of mineral 
inputs and the fact that the law will determine how this would happen. Again, the rule of 
law condones historical relationships of power, maintaining Brazil in the periphery as a 
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supplier country, identifying ‘national interest’ even in foreign investors taking 
ownership of commodities in the country, as it was in the colonial times. Second, this 
article also allows the exploitation of indigenous lands but under certain conditions. This 
is one example of how the ethics of exhaustion is manifested throughout the constitutional 
text: it aims to exhaust persons, the nature, and the possibilities of knowing the dynamics 
of the territory, effectively making the territory into something at the service of capital. 
In this case, for example, the Brazilian constitution intentionally creates victims since it 
is known that displacing indigenous communities from their lands causes irreversible 
damage and may lead to the extinction of peoples, knowledges, traditions, and 
philosophies that prioritize life. Furthermore, it shows that the displacement of indigenous 
peoples from their lands is for the profit of a company, which the Brazilian state 
authorizes to own whatever they can explore from the land. This is the definition of 
colonial violence.  
It is now necessary to explain what is meant by energy planning in Brazil and the 
reason to focus on the DEEP. To understand the DEEP demands a brief historical review 
of the activity of energy planning in Brazil, its institutional arrangements and legal nature, 
and the political background. The next section provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
legal nature and the institutional historical context of the energy plans. 
 
The Brazilian Decennial Energy Expansion Plans  
The DEEPs are joint documents that propose a combined analysis of the main 
components of the energy sector: the various sources of electric power (hydro, gas, oil 
derivatives, coal, nuclear, biomass, wind, and others), and non-electric power from oil 
and its derivatives, gas, and biofuels. They consider macroeconomic assumptions and 
projections by sector in order to quantify the demand; that is, it operates on a methodology 
of applying international currency and market parameters to determine the sum of 
investment to be made in each sector of the economy – mainly about capital-intensive 
infrastructure projects. Although the documents contemplate the national scope and 
predictions on energy security in the long-term, they do not refer to any social or 
environmental issue contemplated in the macroeconomic perspective, treating 
socioenvironmental structural problems as challenges in achieving energy expansion. 
The DEEPs are reports produced by the MME through EPE, attending to long-
term planning (National Energy Plan – PNE) 2030. In the Brazilian energy sector, it is 
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the responsibility of the National Council for Energy Policy (CNPE) to establish policies 
and guidelines aimed at ‘“sustainable national development’. The DEEPs are not 
environmental-friendly reports since the socioenvironmental analysis is contemplated at 
the end of the documents, as part of a subsequent analysis of all the macroeconomic 
assumptions considered.  
The DEEP proposes an integrated socioenvironmental analysis to list some of the 
‘socioenvironmental issues associated with the expansion of the energy offer’ (MME and 
EPE 2015, 426). That is, the expansion of energy must be guaranteed at any cost, and the 
consequences that ‘might’ cause socioenvironmental harm should be ‘mitigated’. This 
reasoning is ethically exhaustive, since the DEEP proposes energy expansion without 
setting socioenvironmental premises as the basis of planning. The plan perceives the 
‘socioenvironmental issues’ as ‘interferences’ and ‘regional sensitiveness’, which clearly 
rejects the value of life in favour of the need for energy expansion. The Chapter X – 
Socioenvironmental Analysis is the DEEP’s last chapter. Although it raises possible 
interferences with energy enterprises, it merely lists the issues, not bringing any 
discussion, or actual inclusion of actions in the plan that would privilege life over energy 
expansion. The DEEP presents, as the conclusion of the socioenvironmental analysis, 
nothing but the affirmation that energy expansion is the goal and in order to achieve that 
goal, all these challenges must overcome. Furthermore, the plan applies the catchwords 
of the economics vocabulary, considering the socioenvironmental problems as ‘risks’ for 
the energy business, that should be transformed into ‘opportunities’: 
The energy sector will continue to face a number of challenges that are in some way related to 
other sectors. The development of the country can be driven by better integration and compatibility 
of different sectoral policies. It is therefore important to discuss the socio-environmental issues on 
a broader scale in order to assess the real risks and opportunities associated with decisions on the 
various possibilities of using available resources (emphasis added in bold and italics) (MME and 
EPE 2015, 434). 
 
The DEEP does not innovate or suggest severe regulation or inspection of 
environmental and social harms caused by the expansion of industry. On the contrary, 
such aspects are dealt with as challenges to reduce investment costs. The essence of 
energy planning in Brazil attends to the developmental agenda aimed at opening up 
markets for inflows and outflows of capital so investors regulate and control demand and 
supply of energy (D’Souza 2006). The DEEP then calls for technical and legal-
institutional aspects that would protect projects that aim at the expansion of energy. 
In addition to indicating the socioenvironmental themes that must be observed in the planning 
process, it is believed that the most important contribution of the DEEP’s integrated 
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socioenvironmental is the selection of priority themes for environmental management. The 
objective is to highlight those issues that can increase the uncertainty associated with the 
planning of projects important for the expansion of energy supply in the country and, 
therefore, impose the need to channel efforts to address them adequately. It is important to 
remember that the analysis incorporates technical and legal-institutional aspects and considers the 
strategic importance of projects for the country’s energy security (emphasis added in bold and 
italics) (MME and EPE 2015, 433). 
 
However, as the centre of the epistemological critique proposed here, the narrow 
economic framework confuses the reasoning and disturbs the various facets to be 
considered regarding the preservation and recovery of the environment, the empowering 
of local communities, and the self determination of peoples, as well as the availability of 
essential needs such as water, land, and freedom of bodies. This study is focused on the 
Brazilian state as peripheral modern–colonial state, establishing a critique diametrically 
opposed to the idea of absolute profit and the need for economic growth and industrial 
expansion that guide strategic sectors of global capitalism (Gudynas 2019; Beveridge 
2017; Dussel 2006; Leme 2005; Escobar 2004; Marini 1992). It proposes the 
epistemological opening to the reality of the modern–colonial world-system: that there is 
no free and deregulated market; that the commoditization of essential natural resources 
and bodies is to the detriment of life and the environment, and that there may be other 
perspectives in planning energy.  
The Brazilian State exercises under the law, the functions of planning, whose 
targets are binding for the public sector and indicative for the private sector. For the public 
sector, the planning activity refers to the country’s inventory of energy enterprises and 
the perspective of economic growth. For the private sector, it indicates the country’s 
financial risks, indicating the benefits, risks, and opportunities for the existing businesses, 
as well as the prospect of inward investments and new businesses. The decennial plans 
constitute important instruments of planning of the energy expansion of the country. 
Having the first DEEP released in 2007, the plans are reviewed and updated from time to 
time, although the periodicity is not regular (generally every year). 
The critique herein proposed is focused in the analysis of one of the DEEPs, the 
2015–2024, the last report resealed before the parliamentary coup d’état in 2016. The 
reason for choosing the DEEP 2015–2024, and not the latest report released by the time 
of the conclusion of this research (DEEP 2018–2027) is due to the period of political and 
economic uncertainties after the coup, hampering the understanding of what is intended 
for the country’s energy sector from then on. From 2007 to 2015, eight DEEPs were 
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released. At the time of writing this study in 2019, two reports were released after the 
coup, the DEEPs 2017–2026 and 2018–2027. 
Broadly speaking, the DEEPs cover four broad areas of energy planning: 1) 
national and international contexts for energy demand; 2) electricity supply; 3) oil and 
derivatives, natural gas and biofuels; and 4) socioenvironmental aspects. Although the 
differences among the eight reports produced between 2007 and 2015 are minimal, 
considering macroeconomic and neoliberal premises in all of them, the reports released 
after the coup, the DEEPs 2017–2026 and 2018–2027 (before the finalization of this 
thesis), differ in being less cogent than the earlier DEEP documents. This is a reflection 
of the unstable political background that Brazil is facing since the parliamentary coup in 
April 2016 (Secco 2016).  
Michel Temer, the never-elected62 former Brazilian president (MPF 2015)63, 
composed his cabinet with the most conservative representatives64. The point made here 
is that a new privatization era in Brazil was inaugurated by the far-right allies in the 
Brazilian National Congress headed by Temer. For now, it is relevant to point out that the 
last DEEPs stress the informational character of the decennial plans and no longer have 
the directive function as an attribute and exercise of the MME’s energy planning function 
through the CNPE and the EPE.  
To bring a clear understanding of the institutional arrangements of energy 
planning in Brazil, it will be interesting to review the histories of the MME, created in 
1960, and of the DEEPs, created in the mid 2000’s. The following section summarizes 
the history and legal nature of energy planning, starting from the inauguration of the 
MME to the release of the DEEPs.  
 
                                                        
62 Temer was Dilma Rousseff’s vice president. The coalition between Rousseff’s PT (the Worker’s Party) 
and Temer’s MDB (the “center-right party, historically with the largest number of representatives in the 
national congress) resulted in an unsustainable political crisis due to the articulations against the PT 
governments. The crisis let to the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, charged of filling holes in her 
government’s accounts by taking loans from state banks without congressional approval. In 2019, Rousseff 
was found not guilty of any crimes, which makes the impeachment process illegitimate and illegal. Temer 
assumed the presidency without democratic popular vote, through obscure articulations in the congress.  
63 Michel Temer finished the mandate on the 31st December 2018. During his time as the president of the 
republic, Temer was denounced by the General Attorney’s Office for the crimes of active and passive 
corruption, involvement with criminal organizations and obstruction of justice. He was arrested on 21st 
March 2019, accused of leading a crime organization and corruption scheme in which he had received more 
than 1.8 billion Reais (0.5 billion US Dollars).  
64 Although Temer formed the most conservative cabinet, his successor, Jair M. Bolsonaro, elected 
president in the October 2018 elections, composed his cabinet with religious conservatives, military men, 
and declared sexist, racist, and homophobic individuals, considered the most undemocratic presidential 
cabinet since the military dictatorship that endured from 1964 to 1985. 
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Historical Context and Legal Nature of the DEEPs 
Decisions regarding long-term energy strategies in Brazil are the responsibility of 
the executive power, that is, the final endorsement of such decisions are incumbent on 
the presidency of the republic. As one of the directive institutions that make up the 
executive branch and give the necessary legitimacy to political decisions, the MME has 
the function of supporting the presidency in the planning and directives of the energy 
sector (Brazil 1960). Created on July 22, 1960, the MME became an autonomous entity 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, which until then had been responsible for decisions 
involving natural resources in a wide way: waters, mining, and agribusiness mainly. The 
power of the agricultural sector in the country’s politics and economy must be reckoned, 
looking at its influence since the beginning of the colonial times.  
The same law that implemented the MME also had incorporated some of the most 
relevant strategic institutions dealing with sovereign matters65, such as the National 
Department of Mineral Production (DNPM) and the now extinct institutions, National 
Council of Waters and Electric Energy, the National Council of Mining and Metallurgy, 
the National Petroleum Council, and the Committee on the Exportation of Strategic 
Materials. Beyond that, the companies related to the sale of energy inputs, such as 
Petrobras (the oil company), Chesf (generation and transmission of electricity company, 
which further became part of the holding Eletrobras), Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) (the 
mining company, privatized in 1998 during Fernando Henrique Cardozo’s 
administration) (Jr 2013) were legally under the institutional umbrella of the MME. 
 
Energy Planning and Military Dictatorship in Brazil  
The decades following the creation of the MME were marked by the military coup 
which installed a military dictatorial regime in Brazil, against the unstable international 
political background of the cold war. The military dictatorial regime instituted in the 
country (as also in other South American states during the cold war [Huneeus 2007; 
Cooney 2007]), was supported and sponsored by the United States (Campos 2012), and 
influenced by its international economic set up. The years of dictatorship in Brazil 
continued from 1964 to 1985. In that period, the developmental agenda (in the 
aforementioned international background) rested on economic growth through the 
                                                        
65 Brazil 1960, articles 7-8. 
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exploitation of natural resources – primary commodities, especially energy inputs and 
large infrastructure contracts (Skidmore 1988). 
In 1988, the Democratic Constitution of the Republic was enacted, enabling the 
first democratic presidential elections in 1989. Fernando Collor de Mello, Brazil’s first 
democratically elected president, however, renounced his post in December 1992, after 
an impeachment procedure accusing him of corruption scandals during the elections. 
Although Collor did not complete his mandate, his administration was marked by the 
introduction of Brazil as a neoliberal country in the international economic scenario, 
friendly with the US political agenda of ‘democratization’, opening of markets, and 
legitimization of international finance regulators (Hirst and Pinheiro 1995). Despite the 
fact that the neoliberal agenda appeared contrary to the nationalist economic development 
discourse of the militaries, economic and political importance given to the industrial and 
infrastructure elites after the democratization remained the same as it was under military 
rule (Campos 2012). The new democratic period was an excuse for the sale of public 
companies, applying the discourse that was being spread by international economic 
institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF (Anderson 1995), to ‘bring development 
to the Third World’. 
 
Development and Neoliberalism 
In 1990, during Collor’s administration, the MME was extinct. The law n. 8.028, 
changed the nature of MME, transferring its attributions and competencies to the newly 
created Ministry of Infrastructure, which encompassed the former MME, the Ministry of 
Communications, and the Ministry of Transports. In a clear attempt to reduce the 
influence of the state and to show international investors that the political agenda was in 
alignment  with  the idea that the private sector was more efficient and beneficial to the 
economic development of the country, the 1990s inaugurated a wave of privatizations 
and demonstrative steps in neoliberal economics (Alves 2002). In 1992, the Ministry of 
Infrastructure was dissolved and the MME was re-established, but the public companies 
under the MME’s institutional umbrella were weakened to boost the discourse about the 
inefficiency of the state to manage strategic sectors for the country's growth, together with 
the need for the same state to make intensive investments in infrastructure (Pêgo Filho, 




Neoliberal Decade: PSDB and the Right-wing Democracy 
The Brazilian neoliberal decade (Alves 2002), from 1990 to 2000, impacted 
energy planning negatively. The election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994, a 
dependency theorist (Cardoso and Faletto 1979), who became the great name of 
neoliberal politics in Brazil, gave a strong impetus to privatizing state-owned companies 
(Rodrigues 2013; Ribeiro Jr 2013). During Cardozo’s administration, the new currency 
and monetary plans were implemented in the country. The Brazilian Real (Filgueiras 
2000) brought economic stability and made the Brazilian currency equivalent to the US 
dollar in value. 
The 1990’s privatization movements applied strategies that could also be observed 
in the privatization of other public companies around South America, something strongly 
encouraged by international institutions (World Bank 1998) and liberal economists (Pêgo 
Filho, Cândido Júnior, and Pereira 1999). Such strategy was to gather scientific studies 
to underpin and legitimize the discourse about the inefficiency of the state, then to reduce 
public investments, scrapping public companies until their commercial value reduces to 
the point that selling them would appear to be a better deal for the public coffers 
(Benjamin 2001). This way, the population would be convinced that state-ownership of 
strategic companies was ‘holding back the development observed in the UK and in the 
US’ (Mattos and Coutinho 2005; Pêgo Filho, Cândido Júnior, and Pereira 1999). This 
was the case of companies in the energy sector. 
 
The Anti-Corruption Squad 
In December 1996 was created the Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency – 
Aneel (Brazil 1996) to inspect and regulate the production, transmission, distribution, and 
commercialization of electricity. With the legal nature of an autarchy, Aneel became the 
appropriate institution to celebrate concession contracts related to electricity. The 
‘outsider character’ of Aneel would almost represent a non-governmental body, totally 
‘unbiased’ and ‘unpolluted’ from the ‘corrupt Third World politics’ in order to give 
transparency and compliance with international standards to the commercialization of 
electricity in Brazil, as suggested by international regulatory agencies for the promotion 
of inward investments in ‘developing countries’ (UN 2003) during the 1990s. 
The international anti-corruption movement started in 1990 so regulatory agencies 
would promote international standards of mechanisms against corruption and 
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international crimes, strongly supported and encouraged by the US. It is important to 
bring to light that the ‘hollowness of the anti-corruption discourse’ (Bukovansky 2006) 
hides the intention to hierarchize levels of corruption in Third World countries, creating 
the international obligation to enact laws in the domestic environment to apply the 
international guidelines in order to reduce the risk for foreign investments.  
The United Nations Guide Practical Measures against Corruption was originally requested by the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1990 and first published in 1992 by 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), with the assistance of the United 
States Department of Justice. During the 1990s, issues relating to corruption were repeatedly 
raised within the United Nations and in other contexts and in 1995, ECOSOC requested that the 
Guide be reviewed and expanded, with contributions from other relevant international 
organizations, to take account of new developments.  
(…) 
In order to respond to this request UNODC has developed three publications for anti corruption 
practitioners: (i) the Anti Corruption Tool Kit and (ii) a Handbook for Prosecutors and 
Investigators and (iii) International legal Instruments on Corruption. In order to help senior policy 
makers, UNODC has compiled this United Nations Guide on Anti Corruption Policies. 
(…) 
There is now increasing recognition throughout the public and private sector that corruption is a 
serious obstacle to effective government, economic growth and stability, and that anti-corruption 
policies and legislation are urgently required at the national and international level. 
(…) 
As a result of efforts on the part of the Council of Europe, OECD and OAS in recent years, the 
international community has embarked on the search for standards that are comprehensive 
in scope and global in application. These efforts will soon result into the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption, which is presently being negotiated in Vienna by an ad hoc 
committee, supported by my Office (emphasis added in bold) (Pêgo Filho, Cândido Júnior, and 
Pereira 1999). 
 
Exploring the concepts of compliance, corruption and international crime is 
crucial for the understanding of the history of energy planning in the Third World, 
because it explains the core of the neoliberal discourse in guaranteeing that foreign 
investors’ property will not be expropriated. In addition to the necessity of privatizing 
strategic sectors of the economy, it was necessary to please and reassure the capital 
exporting countries and the wealthy investors that the Third World was underdeveloped, 
but ‘honest’ or intensive observation by foreign investors will suffice to exercise adequate 
control (Bukovansky 2006). Despite the fact that there is no space in this study to discuss 
the length of Aneel’s institutional arm, it is interesting to perceive that such an agency 
was created to scrutinize the electricity sector and to celebrate concession contracts during 







Cardoso and the Country on Sale 
During Cardoso’s second mandate, a series of regulatory measures were created 
to enable the progressive privatization of strategic sectors of the economy. In 1997, with 
the enactment of the law n. 9.478, the principles and objectives of the National Energy 
Policies were determined, as well as the national regulation for the rational use of energy 
sources66. That law also created the Brazilian CNPE, the institution of reference for 
energy planning in Brazil. The most important aspect of this law, however, is the 
definition of monopoly regarding oil and natural gas and the creation of the ANP, an 
autarchy created with the goal of  attracting new investments in the search for new 
reserves in the Brazilian sedimentary basins (Lucchesi 1998). Although the ‘Oil Law’, as 
it became known, claimed energy independence and sufficiency of supply within the 
country, it strongly encouraged the private sector to take advantage of the energy 
potentials in Brazil, something that would benefit mainly the infrastructure business and 
internationalized capital. 
The privatization of the mining company CVRD in 1997 and the state-owned 
telecommunications holding Telebras in 1998 were justified as the salvation of public 
finances, but the reforms were intended to go far beyond: 
In the period from 1991 to 1998, the sectors with the largest participation in the general results of 
privatization were: 37% in telecommunications; 33% in electricity; 10% in steel; and 8% in mining 
[…]. In the case of telecommunications, the percentage refers to the sale of the TELEBRÁS 
system and the concession of the B band of cellular telephony. Regarding electricity, the highlights 
were the privatizations of the state distribution companies, in which there were very high 
premiums, such as in the CEEE and CPFL sales; there were several large projects in the steel 
sector; in the mining sector, the participation was due to the sale of CVRD. (Pêgo Filho, Cândido 
Júnior, and Pereira 1999, 41). 
 
The privatization project was centrally committed to transfer to private capital the 
entire infrastructure sector, which encompassed telecommunications, energy, and 
transport (Pêgo Filho, Cândido Júnior, and Pereira 1999). Discussions about the 1990s 
privatizations divided intellectuals in Brazil; it is possible to find literature arguing how 
efficient the mining company CVRD became after its privatization (Pêgo Filho, Cândido 
Júnior, and Pereira 1999; Oliveira, Lustosa, and Sales 2007; Leme 2005) and, at the other 
extreme, some consider the sale of CVRD one of the biggest strategic mistakes of the 
country's economic history (Ribeiro Jr 2013; Zorzal and others 2004; Biondi 2014; 
Affonso 2000).  
                                                        
66 To the extent that the unconstrained and incontrollable aims of expansion of industry would allow. 
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The political dedication to privatize the energy sector through the weakening and 
scrapping of state-owned companies has made the planning function of the MME less 
important than the impact of the rate of return of the sale of each of its enterprises in the 
stock market. Such a conjecture culminated in the worst electricity crisis in Brazilian 
history, still during Cardozo’s administration – the ‘blackouts’ or apagões. 
The deficiency of electricity supply materialized in the year 2000 with the 
occurrence of blackouts (‘apagões’), was the consequence of the discrepancy between the 
rise in the number of consumers and the lack of expansion of installed capacity for 
generation and transmission of energy (Tolmasquim 2000). The first decade of the twenty 
first century was marked by campaigns for domestic energy rationing, in an attempt to 
transfer to the population – residential consumers – the responsibility and onus for the 
crisis, creating the false impression that the main consumer of electricity in the country 
was residential, whereas it was more than clear that industry was and still is the main 
consumer (Fearnside 2016; MME and EPE 2015). 
 
Development and the Partido dos Trabalhadores Left-wing Governments 
When Lula was elected in 2002, Brazil was going through the peak of the 
electricity crisis. Although the left-wing administration reached the highest institutional 
level for the first time in the country’s history, the political alignments proposed at 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) were definitely 
neoliberal in character. The aims were to economically strengthen the region in order to 
start ‘the rise of Latin American countries as industrial potencies’, in accordance with 
international economic institutions, reinforcing the discourse of economic growth as 
development and maintaining strong alliances with local elites – especially regarding 
infrastructure.  
The Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), (the Brazilian Workers’ Party) governments 
(Lula 2003 – 2006; 2007 – 2010; Dilma Roussef 2011 – 2014; 2015 – 2016), although 
concerned with social programs, public investments in education and in the National 
Health System – Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS), made irreparable mistakes in continuing 
the neoliberal politics in the infrastructure and energy sectors. Numerous concessions and 
subsidies were given to the private sector (“Orçamento de subsídios da União — 
Ministério da Economia Fazenda,” Relatório 2º Orçamento de Subsídios da União 2003 
- 2017), and many concession contracts were entered into for the exploitation of energy 
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resources. Gigantic infrastructure enterprises were initiated during the PT governments, 
which led to the investigation of corruption scandals involving construction companies 
and investors in the infrastructure business. 
At this point, there is room for further research about the relationship between the 
infrastructure elites and political campaigns in democratic governments in Brazil. 
 
The Energy Research Company as the Gateway 
In order to deliberate on and frame policies for exits from the structural energy 
crisis, in 2004 the EPE was created (Brasil 2004). EPE is a state-owned company, with 
the purpose of providing services in the area of studies and research aimed at subsidizing 
the planning for the energy sector, such as electricity, oil, natural gas and its derivatives, 
coal, renewable energy sources and energy efficiency, among others (Brazil 2004, art. 1). 
The legal nature of EPE is of a consulting company entrusted with the following duties, 
among others: 
To obtain the prior environmental license and the declaration of water availability required for the 
biddings involving hydroelectric generation and electric power transmission projects selected by 
EPE; 
To monitor the execution of projects and feasibility studies carried out by interested and duly 
authorized agents; 
To support and participate in the articulations for energy integration with other countries (Brasil 
2004, art. 4, VI-XI-XIV.). 
 
EPE allows payments from public and private entities or individuals and Brazilian 
nationals or international institutions; it also allows payments in the form of investments 
and donations. EPE’s personnel, i.e., the technical staff to produce the most important 
documents for the authorization of energy exploitation in Brazil (especially hydropower), 
can be appointed by public concourse and by direct hire. All this information is useful to 
understand the double nature of the main entity within the MME in charge of 
environmental licensing, producing scientific documents, guidelines, and technical 
reports that underpin political decisions for energy planning and execution.  
As an example, EPE produces the Environmental Impact Assessments (Estudo de 
Impacto Ambiental) (EIA) and issues the Environmental Impact Report ((Relatório de 
Impacto ao Meio Ambiente) (RIMA) for the feasibility studies of hydroelectric projects. 
These two reports are presented as a joint document known as the EIA/RIMA, which is 
essential and conditional for the authorization of the viability of new enterprises.  The 
EIA/RIMA is produced by EPE in partnership with third-party consultancies, according 
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to the Law n. 10.847 (Brazil 2004, article 15). This entails that the EPE is allowed to 
contract by waiver due to unenforceability of the tendering procedure and hire the 
contracted consultancies as technical staff to develop activities indispensable for its 
functioning. Article 6 of the same law authorizes any institution of the public 
administration to contract EPE without the tendering procedure, on condition that the 
contract is for the pursuit of their institutional purpose. That is, indirectly, institutions of 
the public administration are able to contract third-party consultancies without going 
through the scrutiny and procedural period of the tendering process. 
There are many problems in this. The ‘third-party consultancies’ might be part of 
the holdings that operate in the energy sector, as in the case of Engevix Engenharia S.A 
or the CNEC – WorleyParson, part of the Camargo Corrêa Group. The two environmental 
licensing consultancies are also holdings and international players in the construction 
sector, linked to energy concessionaries in the country, as the Belo Monte Hydropower 
Complex concessionaire, Norte Energia (Norte Energia n.d.). As active players in the 
industry, international holdings are also prospecting for new long-term concrete-
heavy/capital-intensive projects, which removes the discretionary nature of the 
environmental licensing process. EPE’s partners represent the clear influence of the 
interests of private capital. The consequence undermines the idea that regulation and 
transparency in processes are decisive factors in boosting economic growth, given the 
maintenance of seats of power by the capital markets operating elites at national and 
international levels (Paiva 2015). 
 
The National Energy Plan – PNE 2030 
In 2006, EPE released the first PNE 2030, a joint document that proposed a 
combined analysis of the main components of the energy sector: electricity, oil, natural 
gas, and biofuels. By then, the MME did not have a unified plan for long-term energy 
planning, which  previously had been done exclusively for the electricity scenario (Santos 
and Souza 2011). The document considers macroeconomic premises by sector in order to 
quantify the demand, that is, it operates by applying international currency and market 
parameters to determine the amount of investment to be made in each sector of the 
economy – mainly about capital-intensive-infrastructure projects. Although the document 
contemplated a national scope and predictions on energy security in the long term, it does 
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not mention any social or environmental concern which would, in any way, interfere with 
their macroeconomic perspective.  
In the year following  the creation of the PNE 2030, the MME, applying the 
directives instructed by the CNPE, in partnership with EPE (and all the private consultants 
that composed the Energy Research Company), released the first DEEP 2007 – 2016 
(MME and EPE, 2007). The DEEPs became the reference for planning the energy sectors, 
with transparency and scientific legitimacy endowed by the scope and legal nature of the 
EPE and the CNPE. The assumptions made, however, were useful to demonstrate energy 
security overshadowing any crisis, in order to attract investments and foster economic 
growth. The report advised massive public investments in infrastructure to meet the 
market requirements of economic growth. 
This Plan, in a pioneering way, extends the planning scope to the 10-year horizon, incorporating 
an integrated vision of the expansion of demand and supply of various energy sources, as well as 
electric energy. 
The objective of the 10-year planning of the expansion of the national energy system is to 
provide a reference scenario for the implementation of new facilities in the energy supply 
infrastructure necessary to meet the growth of market requirements, according to supply, in 
an environmentally sustainable manner, and minimizing the total expected costs of investment, 
including socio-environmental, and operational costs (emphasis added) (MME and EPE 2007). 
 
Between 2007 and 2018, the MME and the EPE released ten DEEPs: 2016, 2017, 
2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2026, and 2027, all with reference to the PNE 2030 
and offering very similar methodological parameters. As mentioned previously, this work 
is focused on the DEEP 2015–2024 – referred to as DEEP. 
 
The Brazilian Decennial Energy Expansion Plan 2015–2024 – The 
DEEP  
The DEEP is produced by EPE, adopting economic assumptions on the 
macroeconomic and sectorial scenarios. This is the turning point of the thesis. 
Considering that: 
a) coloniality of power (and its deployments in being and knowledge) is the 
ideology that permeates the public administration in Brazil;  
b) for this ideology to take place, it requires the implementation of the 
epistemological parameters that impose an agenda of power, annihilating 
epistemic diversity, i.e., imposing violent epistemologies;  
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c) the ethical system we have been living in for the last five centuries does not 
aim at the production and reproduction of all lives, instead requiring the 
existence of victims for the preservation of certain lives, hierarchically 
determining who benefits from the ethical system;  
we get to the point of analysing the DEEP as a document forged in the coloniality 
of power that annihilates epistemic diversity for the promotion of the economic agenda, 
made effective in an ethical system consistent with the hierarchization of bodies, living 
beings, territories, and knowledges and which needs victims for the preservation of such 
hierarchizations.  
The most entrenched epistemological problems in the DEEPs consist in the 
establishment of the basic premises of energy planning. Narrowing the premises to 
economic variables defines the scope of energy planning and, hence, the goals to be 
achieved with the plan. The scope’s definition prevents the inclusion of 
socioenvironmental (to use the DEEP’s terminology) premises in energy planning. This 
way, whatever means are necessary to expand energy production in Brazil are justified if 
the economic agenda is achieved. Downsides such as environmental damage and the non-
involvement of the population (consultation, long-term socioeconomic benefits, and so 
on) with the installation of an energy enterprise are mere consequences that are less 
important when compared with the main goal established for the plan.  
The DEEP’s premises epistemically determine the goals for energy planning, 
limiting the analysed items and the methodology for the analysis. The major goal which 
permeates all Brazilian strategic planning is the country’s economic growth, and, for that, 
the expansion of industry, which demands energy expansion, sets the tone of the middle-
term planning. Before expatiating the concept and problematic of economic growth, the 
DEEPs premises are clarified in the light of the ethics of exhaustion, considering 
coloniality of power and epistemic violence. 
 
The DEEPs’ Premises  
The DEEPs premises are considered with reference to the macroeconomic 
scenario for a period of 10 years: from 2015 to 2024. The economic indicators used for 
the 10-year projection are: the national and global GDPs, as well as the amount of 
investment considered for the national GDP; the growth of the global trade; the national 
surplus based on commodities’ export; the evolution of the oil prices; and the trade 
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balance of import versus export. The external variables considered for the 10-year 
projection are the country’s savings and the total productivity index. The other premises 
are demographic, considering population growth and distribution in the territory 
throughout the period (MME and EPE 2015, 18–24). 
The macroeconomic scenario considers the international financial markets that 
determine energy planning since energy inputs are commodities and their prices will vary 
according to market oscillations. The sectorial scenario suffers the impacts of the 
macroeconomic expectations but are considered under domestic regulation. Economic 
variables such as economic growth impact directly the projection for energy consumption 
since the main variable to evaluate it is the growth and stability of industry (Bermann 
2004). The social challenge is related to the lack of infrastructure that imposes limits to 
the expansion of industry (MME and EPE 2015, 19), which limits the economic potential 
of the country.  
The general premises involve dependence on the Global North’s economic 
stability, as rich countries are the greatest exporters of capital. Capital flows warm up the 
economy and, from the macroeconomic perspective, the rise of the global GDP is said to 
be beneficial to a country’s economy. The premises also point out the necessity of raising 
the industrial productivity in the domestic environment, justifying the need for 
investments in skilled labour, research, and development. 
The international perspective and expectation for the energy business, as the guide 
for the Brazilian energy planning in the short, middle, and long terms is explained in the 
2019 World Energy Issues Monitor, a report produced by a private organization named 
World Energy Council. The 2019 report for the ‘Brazilian case’ is a mix of a bad internet 
meme and a show off of economist clichés. As shown in Figure 3, environmental or social 
dilemmas are not issues of ‘impact’ in the business, neither of any relevance to be even 
mentioned in the chart. Crazily enough, “hydrogen economy”, “Russia”, “terrorism”, “US 
policy” and “coal” are somehow issues – although less urgent – of concern for energy 
planning in Brazil.  
As mentioned above, the DEEPs are not environment-friendly reports. They are 
economic reports that consider the concept of sustainability for the socioenvironmental 
studies within the overall economically-focused reports. As a unified document for the 
various sectors of energy planning, the DEEP contains a chapter entitled 
Socioenvironmental Analysis. The DEEPs are national documents for the mitigation of 
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and adaption to climate change in the energy sector67. The methodology applied for such 
analysis in the DEEP is the same as of the previous reports (2022 and 2023) (MME and 
EPE 2015, 386). Despite being presented in a vague and generic way, the 
socioenvironmental analysis makes clear the lack of intention in setting the environmental 
problems or the empowerment of communities as long-term priorities68. None of the 
premises consider any socioenvironmental demand.  
 
 
The DEEP declares that ‘the concept of sustainability guided the premises and the 
criteria used in the analysis’ but neither describes or references the concept in the 
premises nor refers to the territories, communities, population, or living beings. Instead, 
it lists the following general considerations at the end of the document after all the 
‘relevant subjects’ (as if these elements form a separate isolated group that does not 
interfere with the central elements of energy planning):  
                                                        
67 The National Policies on Climate Change (PNMC) appoints the DEEPs as the plans for mitigation and 
adaptation to climate change in the energy sector (Brasil 2009). 
68 It would be fair to say that having a chapter called ‘Socioenvironmental Analysis’ in the PDE means to 
Brazil the equivalent of what the BP’s CSR website means to the population of Bento Rodrigues, the village 
destroyed by the collapse of the Mariana iron ore waste dam at the end of 2015 (Segura et al. 2016). 
Figure 3 - World Energy Issues Monitor 2019 – Brazil (World Energy Council 2019) 
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• Reduction of the local and global impacts in the use of energy sources, especially in the 
hydropower generation; 
• The use of renewable sources; 
• The minimization of environmental impacts; 
• The discussions regarding climate change (MME and EPE 2015, 385). 
 
For epistemological clarifications, the word sustainable means ‘that which can be 
maintained over time’ (Heinberg and Lerch 2010). The concept came to be globally used 
after 1987, when the United Nations World Commission on Environment and 
Development defined sustainable development, as a type of development that ‘“meets the 
needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs’ (WCED 1987). In the modern–colonial world-system’s ethics, 
sustainability is about thinking about a better future, by maintaining the practices for the 
achievement of the benefits of Modern standards. The current ethical system creates 
victims but suggests mitigating the consequences of the harm already caused.  
In this way, the DEEP’s concept of sustainability is about mitigating the necessary 
harm caused by energy expansion with practices that do not change the nature of the harm 
caused, but attend to international parameters and specifications of ‘best environmental 
practices’. Being sustainable is being ethically conscientious of the harms caused by 
energy enterprises. In the ethics of exhaustion, being ethically conscientious means that 
the ends will justify the means – that socioenvironmental harm must exist for the 
achievement of the wonders that energy expansion brings. The plan’s ‘social’ part of the 
‘socioenvironmental’ long-term perspective receives far less attention and less visibility 
in the analysis, whereas the ‘environmental’ is a very superficial aspect covered as an 
issue of ‘risk’. The problems created by the expansion of the economy are dealt with as 
the necessary sacrifice for development, whereas human and environmental obstacles to 
economic growth are treated as challenges. There is no reference in the DEEP to the local 
population as the main stakeholders of the energy business. 
It is clear that the DEEP’s socioenvironmental premises are used to encourage 
hydroelectricity since it is considered a renewable source in the official energy plans. 
Since hydropower is the main source of electricity in the country, the socioenvironmental 
analysis is focused on how green the Brazilian Energy Matrix is due to the country’s huge 
hydroelectric potential. According to the EPE, 43% of the country’s energy matrix are 
from renewable sources. That is an interesting point to make: despite the irreversible 
impacts caused by large hydropower dams (Fearnside 2015), hydroelectricity is 
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considered a green source. It is assumed in the DEEP that hydroelectricity does not 
produce greenhouse gases (Fearnside 2009). The energy sector celebrates the fact that the 
international agreements on climate change are being met, which roughly could be 
considered a good thing. However, the point is not about ‘being the politest predator’, but 
the ‘rudest fake environmentalist’69. 
The results show that the scenario of expansion of energy supply and consumption in the 10-year 
horizon is in line with the target expressed in terms of the absolute value of emissions in 2020 
(range 634-680 MtCO2eq). Even in 2024, emissions do not reach the lower limit of the PNMC 
target set for 2020 (MME and EPE 2015, 392). 
 
The first considerations of sustainable development and environmental impacts in 
energy planning are materialized on a very broad and generic way in the DEEP. Decisions 
to make the Environmental Strategic Assessment (ESA)70 point out ‘technological 
characteristics and social, economic and environmental impacts of energy production, 
transformation and use highlight the strategic importance of the energy sector’ (Santos 
and Souza 2011).  
As mentioned in Chapter 5: The Problematic of Energy, energy is 
epistemologically dealt with as a commodity. Energy sources are not considered the 
environment. Socioenvironmental harm is treated as a consequence of energy production, 
whereas it is part of the process of obtainment of energy inputs for economic purposes. 
Socioenvironmental harms are necessary for the production of commercial energy. 
Therefore, in the DEEP, harm is a condition to, not a consequence of energy production 
that can be mitigated. The DEEP does not clearly include the necessary 
socioenvironmental harm among its premises – all the premises are exclusively 
economic. For these reasons, the DEEP’s definitions attend to an agenda of power: the 
transnational monopoly finance agenda. This reveals the DEEP’s epistemic violence as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Violent epistemologies are direct coercive ways of imposing 
meanings on social institutions to legitimize agendas that ensure positions of power. From 
                                                        
69 ‘Regarding emissions from hydroelectric reservoirs, although there are several studies in this area, there 
is no academic consensus on a reliable estimation method that can be applied to a set of reservoirs. In this 
context, the strategic R & D project called BALCAR - Carbon Balance in Hydropower Reservoirs, 
coordinated by CEPEL, is in progress and has the participation of several research institutions, in addition 
to the support of ANEEL and MME. The already published data of this project indicate emissions 
significantly low (with exceptions) and quite variable, depending on the different conditions in which the 
reservoirs are. It is also worth noting that several of the existing studies are based on gross emissions from 
reservoirs, but recent studies point to the need to account not only for gross emissions, but for net emissions, 
i.e., it is necessary to discount emissions existing before the construction of the reservoir and to evaluate 
the influence of external factors, such as the use of the soil of the contributing basin to the reservoir. 
Considering this scenario, such emissions are not accounted for’. (MME and EPE 2015, 387).  
70 Avaliação Ambiental Estratégica – AAE. (Simone Santos and Souza 2011, 371). 
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epistemic violence, it is possible to grasp colonialities in the DEEP. Coloniality of power 
is identified in the imposition of the economic agenda to the detriment of any other 
subject, as the Brazilian colonial history exemplifies. Coloniality of being is identified in 
the exclusion of the existence of life in determining what is energy, in determining the 
premises for energy planning and the long-term plan underpinned by these definitions – 
the majority of the population are not considered at any moment throughout the 
document. Coloniality of knowledge is identified in the fact that the people’s knowledge 
is not allowed to change energy planning in Brazil. The narrow macroeconomic aspects 
prevent any non-economic discussion. The peoples that are mostly affected by energy 
enterprises do not have the economic arguments, their demands are about maintaining 
their culture, their relationship with the land, and their capacity to influence the need and 
object of the energy enterprise.  
All the ‘sustainability aspects’ mentioned in the DEEP are considered with 
reference to the country’s expansion of industry for economic growth. This way, it is 
relevant to discuss this concept to understand who benefits from energy expansion, as 
well as what kind of economic growth comes from it. 
 
The Epistemic Problem of Energy Expansion for Economic Growth  
The epistemic decolonial turn on energy planning begins with challenging the 
DEEP’s priorities and premises. Grounded in the ethics of exhaustion, the DEEP’s main 
goal is to delineate strategies for the country’s ‘economic development’, what would be 
achieved via economic growth. Such strategies are researched by the EPE. According to 
the DEEP, the ultimate goal for energy planning in Brazil is to promote economic growth.  
It is inadmissible that the middle and long-term directives on energy management 
in Brazil are guided by the pursuit of economic growth. Scholars in various areas of 
sciences have been challenging the idea of economic growth as something good for some 
time now (Martínez-Alier 2009). Such a concept brings together white male liberal 
economists at the MIT and indigenous feminist movements in Popayán: challenging the 
alleged advantage of this growth, exposing its disadvantages. 
To discuss the institutional pursuit of economic growth in Brazil, it is necessary 
to contextualize the debates surrounding the concept of development, the epistemic 
creation of its necessity after WW2, as well as its influence in the post-independence 
movements on the second half of the twentieth century.  
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Development as a concept informed the “backwardness” character assumed by 
countries from the Global South (Pahuja 2011, 56). In this sense, underdevelopment 
represented a consequence of colonization and then imperialism.  The Global South 
should aim for development as means to claim their sovereignty in the international post-
war configuration. In the post-independence context, the status of nation-state would 
guarantee that former colonial countries could claim permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources (PSNR)71, since colonialism was partly about controlling natural resources, 
raising the economic gap between developed and underdeveloped nations. The aim of a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO) raised at the UNCTAD in 1964 (“officially” 
recognised by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3201, of 1974) was to 
expose the fiasco of the post-war world order in enabling the former colonial states to 
have their own approach to development. 
The viability of a potential NIEO for the “underdeveloped world” would be the 
cooperation between countries from the Global South to achieve such economic 
development and to overcome the North-South structural unequal exchange based on the 
attributes of sovereignty. Having as a historical milestone the Asian-African Bandung 
conference in 1955, and reinforced at the UNCTAD in 1964, South-South Cooperation 
(SSC) was launched as a movement to lessen the dependency on the developed 
economies. 
In the 1960’s and 1970’s, SSC was established as a political movement for 
economic development asserting control over the assets through international law 
mechanisms and Third World solidarity. If the unity gained strength during the oil crisis, 
it was rapidly dissolved with the instability of commodity prices, splitting the oil 
producers and the non-oil producers, since the formation of cartels of non-oil 
commodities were proved difficult to form (Pahuja 2011, 104). Political debates and 
actions around SSC re-gained strength from the early 2000’s, gaining centre stage of 
world politics and economics, due partially due to the rise of China, as well as the wave 
of left governments gaining political space in Latin America, and the declared global 
movement towards “development” as identified in the United Nations Development 
Programme.  
The concept of development has been intrinsically embedded in the necessity of 
economic growth to enable “development as freedom” (Sen 2001). In this sense, the 
                                                        
71 Permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources was a deployment of the right to self-
determination, as defined in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803, of 1962. 
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nationalist character of SSC demanded a level of economic complicity to achieve the 
discursive aspects of justice and equality for the “rise of the rest” (Amsden 2001). The 
problematic of the developmental or economic-growth centred approach is the trap of the 
achievement development goals (UNDP 2017) via the operationalization of the economic 
dynamics of massive industrialization, commodity-exportation and the strengthening of 
local elites. None of this is new in the modern-colonial world-system. Development is 
deployed from the ability to operate the transnational monopoly financial system, which 
does not differ in any sense from the exploitative dynamics of global capitalism. The rise 
of global potencies like China, and trade alliances like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa) ends up configuring what Ruy Mauro Marini called 
subimperialism (Marini 1992; Valencia 2019). This happens because development entails 
the use of colonial epistemes for the maintenance of capitalist hegemony grounded on the 
geopolitical and socioenvironmental hierarchizations (from regional to global), built on 
exhaustivist relationship between people and the environment.  
Eduardo Gudynas (2016) informed that SSC takes place around the disputes 
regarding two types of development: type I, considered positive, involves controversies 
or instrumental arrangements about the use of technologies or locations for industrial 
projects, different options for value-chains in agro-foods, concerning mainly technology 
assistance or policy transfers. Type II regards controversies about varieties of 
development, whether neo-Keynesian or neoliberal (or a mismatch of both, such as the 
Brazilian Energy Planning – neo-Keynesian methodology, neoliberal premises); or 
whether sustainable development is different from economic development. It informs 
development “based on different political and ideological perspectives, such as classical 
Anglo-Saxon capitalism, the Latin American neo-developmentalist 21st century 
socialism, or state-controlled Chinese capitalism” (Gudynas 2016, 726).  
In this sense, SSC towards development of the Global South can be depicted from 
the presence of the BRICS in the African continent, specially Brazil and China, which 
“remains primarily a recipient of limited and natural-resource-concentrated foreign direct 
investments, an aid recipient and an exporter of primary commodities” (Carmody 2013, 
137). The subimperialist character of the BRICS contains the projection of political power 
across borders, differing from each country (the private sector engagement of India, the 
neodevelopmental Brazilian state or the state-driven capitalism of China), expanding “the 
portfolio of extraversion possibilities that enable regime maintenance”. As Carmody 
explains, this takes place in the formula “revived economic growth and tax revenues + 
 
 167 
aid + ‘no questions asked’ = (in general) regime maintenance” (Carmody 2013, 136), in 
which the regime is fundamentally grounded on market-oriented economic growth.  
Some may see the geopolitics of development as positive, as the defense of the 
Chinese presence in African countries being different from that of the West, suggesting 
the possibility of a cultural “third space” (Jackson 2012, 188). This understanding of the 
concept of development from solidarity, cooperation and friendship, sounds like an 
attempt to fit Bhabha’s concept of resistance and re-construction of cultural spaces into 
the capitalist vortex of the epistemologies of development.  
Development and economic growth are twins (Pahuja 2011, 45), separated by a 
very tenuous line via discourse. The advocates of the contradictory discourse of an anti-
imperial socialist rise of the South via industrialization and commoditization, condone 
the operation within the transnational monopoly finance for the rescue of culture values. 
These advocates have been proved wrong in the Latin American left experiences of the 
twenty first century. This can be easily observed in Brazil during the PT governments of 
Lula and Dilma Rousseff (responsible for the creation of the DEEPs), or in Ecuador 
during Rafael Correa’s governments72.  
This is the reason why the “good” twin, development, is not the central analysis 
for the critique of the Brazilian developmental state that leads to the colonial 
epistemologies of energy planning. Such energy plans were made in the realm of Brazil 
representing “the rise of the Global South” as a potency in energy exploitation and 
commodity export country. Development is just another catch-word for the expansion of 
the capitalist agenda, regardless of the perpetuation of the ethics of exhaustion. The bad 
twin, economic growth, is more powerful and more entrenched in the epistemologies of 
energy planning. Reason why we proceed to discuss some of the aspects and schools on 
economic growth. 
There is no room in this thesis to evidence all classic, Keynesian, neoclassic, 
liberal, neoliberal, and critical scholarship on economic growth. For the coherence of the 
argument proposed in this part, that economic growth cannot be the main goal for energy 
planning in Brazil, we point out the grounds of the economic growth advocacy, a few 
examples of the classic limits to growth, and open the discussion of the (non) benefits of 
capital accumulation. Such a discussion comes from the Marxian critique of political 
economy and leads to the contemporary critical scholarship on de-growth and the 
                                                        
72 More about the left developmentalism in Ecuador is discussed in CH7. 
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communal practices of Buen Vivir. Finally, we show that the priority of energy planning 
in Brazil must be against the colonial ideology of the accumulation of capital, in this case, 
through the exploitation of energy inputs. Such a practice only benefits the great 
capitalists to the detriment of the people and the environment, and it compromises the 
future. Because it compromises the future, it cannot be the strategy for the future – the 
plan – as the DEEP maintains. Trying to plan the future reinforcing well-known failures 
is condemning to catastrophe. The bad strategy has been killing the indigenous and the 
poor to make the rich richer at the cost of spilt blood and the destruction of nature. If we 
are to plan the future, we better apply a good strategy, starting from not making the same 
mistakes of the colonial times. It is mandatory to stop the violence of energy planning, 
a.k.a, it is mandatory to decolonize energy planning.  
 
Grow the Pie, Feed the Greedy 
The advocates of the endless pursuit of economic growth follow a Keynesian 
strand (illustrated by the Harrod-Domar growth model) (Keynes 2003, 114–16), based on 
the idea that there is a direct relationship between the level of investments (in physical 
capital or gross formation of fixed capital) and savings of a country and the pace of GDP 
growth. By establishing that Brazil’s economic growth depends on the expansion of 
energy production, the DEEP relies on the level of (transnational capital) investments in 
the energy sector for the growth of industrial/agricultural production, which, in terms of 
the earlier mentioned growth model, will increase the country’s savings and improve the 
country’s GDP, as mentioned above in the section The DEEP’s Premises. This model 
assumes that investors are the main decision makers of countries’ growth rate, 
safeguarded by states’ capital controls and regulated currencies. Such a model, in wealthy 
countries, would lead to rapid and relatively balanced economic growth and would also 
free governments to institute the social-democratic programs. Investors decide their level 
of investment according to their expectations (Keynes' animal spirits) (Keynes 2003, 103) 
and these expectations will dictate long-term investment levels (Keynes 2003, 55–60). 
There is no balance in this model (Shell and Stiglitz 1967, 600–602), which presents a 
strong undemocratic character since, in the words of Chomsky,  
free flow of capital creates a “virtual senate” of lenders and investors who carry out a “moment-
by-moment referendum” on government policies if they find them irrational – that is, designed to 
help people, not profits – they vote against them by capital flight, attacks on currency, and other 
means. Democratic governments therefore have a “dual constituency”: the population, and the 




The Keynesian model increases the volatility of energy prices, increasing the risk 
of business and demanding that the state guarantee the supply via economic rescue of 
investors. In the Global North, this model made investors shift from energy-intensive 
industry to financial services and other intensive activities (Helm 2007, 14–15). In 
electricity markets, operating the grid needs constant price update in the pools. According 
to Helm, '[i]n liberalized energy markets, investors, operators and consumers should, in 
theory, face the full costs of their decisions. This applies to access to resources and capital, 
and the social and environmental impacts of energy consumption. However, current 
practice falls short of this ideal’ (Helm 2007, 295). The electricity grid itself is a social 
form of accumulation of value (Bellamy and Diamanti 2018, XXVI). This means that, in 
this model, it does not matter whether the energy source is ‘clean’ or fossil since markets 
operate the commodity according to the business risks. Their capacity for altering prices 
makes energy markets undemocratic. Every single person indirectly involved in the 
energy business – from affected communities to final consumers – is vulnerable to the 
economic dictatorship. 
As mentioned before, the current model of economic growth presented in the 
DEEP  (MME and EPE 2015, 18–22) is a mix of neoliberal and Keynesian approachs; 
i.e., it operates in a methodology almost free from interventions in regulatory measures, 
in which the figure of the state is a mere guarantor to the original investor that enables 
the investors to reduce their risk. For example, in the DEEP, the articulation of a 
‘difficulty’ in obtaining public investments is made through the shrinking salience of the 
‘public debt’ and the encouragement of strong players (infrastructure sector – 
construction companies, concrete-heavy capital-intensive projects and so on) in the 
national economy (with transnational capital) to improve the economy. In asserting that 
public debt discourages investments by increasing the country’s risk, evaluated by rating 
agencies, the DEEP announces its neoliberal facet. 
In the last year [2014], the country did not reach the surplus target, with a primary deficit of 0.6% 
of GDP. Thus, many efforts should be made to return the country to a declining trend for the public 
sector net debt, thereby removing the risk of loss of investment grade rating agencies. In 
addition to the issues cited above, economic performance has been limited by structural factors 
such as infrastructure bottlenecks that limit industry competitiveness and productivity gains 
in the economy. To solve these bottlenecks is of extreme importance in order to observe a 
more significant growth of the Brazilian economy. In general, the future performance of the 
Brazilian economy depends on the evolution of these conjunctural issues and on how the structural 




The DEEP’s ‘reference scenario’ for the establishment of the projections of the 
Brazilian economy is a moderate global economic growth. ‘[T]he premise is that 
developed countries will recover from the crisis, and there is no rupture in the European 
Union. In addition, despite expecting a soft slowdown in China, developing countries, 
especially Asian ones, will continue to contribute heavily to world GDP growth’ 
(emphasis added in italics) (MME and EPE 2015, 20). Overall, the perspective described 
in the DEEP for the ‘recovery of Brazilian economic growth’ is to increase the volume 
of investments and economic productivity, expecting that in the ten-year projection, 
‘Brazil will grow at an average rate of 3.2% per year, while the world grows at 3.8% per 
year’ (MME and EPE 2015, 20). 
Why is energy planning in Brazil based on the premise that the rich are recovering 
from the crisis? Which crisis? Chomsky explains that ‘[f]or the West the phrase ‘the 
crisis’ has a clear enough meaning: the financial crisis that hit the rich countries with great 
impact, and therefore of supreme importance” (emphasis in original) (Chomsky 2011, 1). 
The financial crisis of the hegemonic economies shares a common source with the food 
crisis (Shiva 2011, 169) in the global South: the shift towards neoliberalism from the 
1970s onwards (D’Souza 2013). How is the production of energy in Brazil benefited by 
the enrichment of the rich? What does it have to do with the majority of Brazilians? Will 
the transnational monopoly finance be able to share the pie? History has shown it will 
not.  
As evidenced in chapters 2 and 3, scientific research is also a strategy to underpin 
and legitimize power – coloniality of knowledge. The “scientific” character of the 
projections – elaborated by the research company EPE – analyzes energy exclusively as 
a matter of economic sciences. This way, in order ‘to increase the productivity of the 
Brazilian economy, making it contribute more strongly to economic growth, investments 
in R & D and training of the workforce will need to increase considerably’ (MME and 
EPE 2015, 20). There is no intention here to deny the importance of research for better 
energy planning in Brazil. However, the DEEP does not mean ‘all relevant research’, 
which would include sociological research or decolonial research but exclusively 
research to increase the productivity of the Brazilian economy – the one and only relevant 
issue. 
To sustain strong economic growth in the long term, investments must be increased. In the short 
term, however, the low level of investor confidence in the Brazilian economy will limit the 
resumption of investments, which should only gain more momentum in the second five-year 
period. The outstanding sectors in the period will be infrastructure, aiming to overcome the 
bottlenecks and increase the productivity of the Brazilian economy; the housing sector, in order to 
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reduce its high deficit; and those related to the exploration and production of petroleum, 
aiming to supply the recent discoveries in the pre-salt layers and to guarantee the positive 
impacts that this sector provides for the other sectors of the economy (emphasis added in bold) 
(MME and EPE 2015, 21). 
[On the second quinquennium if the period] a more favourable international scenario and the 
expectation of increased exports from the oil sector are factors that should boost a recovery of the 
trade balance. 
With regard to the current trade balance, the expectation is that the deficit will intensify, especially 
in the first five years, due to the lower balance of trade and the growing deficit of services and 
income. In the meantime, there is no difficulty in financing this deficit. Especially because, in 
the period, capital inflows are expected to increase through foreign direct investment 
(emphasis added in bold and italics) (MME and EPE 2015, 22).  
 
The Plan recognizes the debt and declares that there is no problem because the 
country can attract FDI for the exploitation of fossil fuels, which is seen as a good thing, 
although it does not solve the problem and increases the carbon footprint. The DEEP 
gives directives for energy planning in Brazil for a 10-year period. Such directives aim at 
the country’s economic growth through the encouragement of the infrastructure sector73, 
oil export, and increasing foreign direct investment. Such priorities are the recipe for 
social and environmental harm.  
On this projection for the country’s economy grounded in the diminution of the 
public debt by attracting foreign investment (financial and direct), the historical primary 
commodities (raw materials and agriculture) gain central importance in regulating 
economic stability. The volatility of commodity prices, however, leads to market 
uncertainties in the chicken–egg question of whether inflation determines commodity 
prices or commodity prices lead to inflation. It is well accepted among mainstream 
economists that rising commodity prices leads to increasing inflation, which increases 
instability and risk (Schaeffer 2008, 33) at the international markets level, as well as 
unemployment and social crisis at the national level (Schaeffer 2008, 53–54; 62). It is 
clear that the macroeconomic orientation for economic growth entails the abuse of 
monetary policies, generating cycles of policies controlled by financial speculation. On 
this approach, the economy may (or may not) grow at the cost of endless repeated cyclic 
social crises. Commodity producers, however, may benefit from the external markets, but 
this cannot be the way to democratically manage the country’s economy since it benefits 
the capitalists to the detriment of the majority of people. 
                                                        
73 Referring mainly to heavy construction – a sector extremely influential in financing political campaigns, 
directly related to corruption scandals, denounced for abuse of environmental and labour rights, with big 
companies as shareholders of EPE. 
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The economic scenario presented in the DEEP is divided into three sectors of 
energy interest: agricultural (which includes livestock), industrial, and services. While 
lamenting the economic crisis and fall in industrial production, the DEEP’s sectoral 
premises celebrate the fact that the export extractive industry is expanding: 
As a reflection of the most unfavourable external and domestic economic scenarios, the value 
added of industrial production fell by 1.2% in 2014. One exception was the extractive industry, 
which, despite the significant fall in the price of commodities, inaugurated important expansion 
projects in the areas of oil and mining. The negative industrial performance was mainly due 
to the downturn in the construction industry and in the manufacturing industry sectors 
linked to the automotive and machinery and equipment production (emphasis added in bold) 
(MME and EPE 2015, 25). 
 
The advocacy for the strengthening of infrastructure and automobile 
manufacturing industries (leading to infrastructure for logistics, roads, ports, airports, as 
well as production and consumption of fossil fuels and many other consequences that are 
very unfavourable to environmental sustainability) is blatant.  
The analysis is based on the long-term plan of energy planning adopted by the EPE, from which 
some assumptions impact the outcome of the sectoral projection for the decade, such as: high 
investments in the petroleum chain and in the housing sector; increasing investments in 
infrastructure, facilitated by PPPs, and the consequent reduction of logistics bottlenecks; 
economic development with gain of participation of the services sectors; a shift in the profile of 
international trade, with reduced growth in China and other developing countries and recovery 
of developed economies. 
It should be emphasized that such assumptions will have a more limited impact in the first five 
years in view of the need for macroeconomic adjustments to recapture economic stability and 
confidence indicators of consumption and investment (emphasis added in bold and italics) 
(MME and EPE 2015, 25). 
 
In the introductory section of the DEEP document, there is a vague mention of 
‘reduction of local and global impacts on the environment in the expansion of energy 
supply’. This, however, contradicts the basic assumptions, which definitely run counter 
to recovery and protection of the environment. The loose references to technological 
advances for ‘greener’ expansion of energy are negated in the same document by the 
insistent mention all over the plan, of the need to support the infrastructure business.  
The agricultural sector, a very problematic part of Brazilian history, politics, and 
economy, gains as special attention as the mining and infrastructure sectors in the context 
of energy planning. The grantees control a good part of the country’s territory, 
management of energy inputs, water courses, and so on. Since the beginning of the 
colonial times, and especially after the alliance with the English traders during the 




This can be considered the first historical moment for the understanding of the 
energy sector: when land and nature are alienated from people and communities to 
become ‘resources’ and thereafter commoditized. The colonial origins of the alienation 
of energy resources continues to guide the nature of energy planning in the present – 
detached from the existence of life. Energy inputs, like every other commodity produced 
by the alienation of land and nature, become private property to be traded in transnational 
markets.  
The independence from the metropolis resulted in a centralized state. With control 
and influence over the political and economic decision-making processes, commodity 
producers relied on the centralized state for the monopoly over commercialization of 
resources. The present Brazilian energy planning does not interrupt its colonial legacy, 
reinforcing and relying on wealthy business owners for the country’s economic growth. 
It is not a secret that the enrichment of the grantees does not bring social 
improvement, does not reduce hunger or poverty (Shiva 2011). The ‘agribusiness kings’74 
are some of the wealthiest businessmen in the country, having their tentacles in every 
sector of the economy and even a bench in the national congress (a result of the historical 
configuration of public administration in Brazil as mentioned earlier). In the DEEP, the 
agricultural sector is treated as ‘well positioned in the global market’, capable of 
‘improving competitiveness with the maturation of the considered investments in 
infrastructure’. The energy plan for the agricultural sector is then directly related to the 
expansion of exports and (again) the growth of infrastructure business. The energy used 
in industrial scale agribusiness not only alienates land from people but transfers the 
benefits of energy to consumers in the Global North through export – in every export 
from Brazil there is an energy export that is implicit. Obviously, the agricultural sector in 
question is not the small producer, but the big players in the transnational markets. This 
way, when energy is planned to assist the agricultural sector, it must be understood to 
refer to the big agribusiness sector in alliance with the infrastructure barons.  
The services sector is considered in the sectoral part just for the sake of ensuring 
it is not omitted since there is no explanation or definition of what would be included in 
this sector. The DEEP only affirms that the increase of consumerism in Brazilian families 
is excellent for the services’ sector,  which does not say much about how energy should 
be planned in relation to it (MME and EPE 2015, 27). If consumerism is growing, there 
                                                        
74 Reference to the poem and song by Chico César “Reis do Agronegócio” album Estado de Poesia 2015. 
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is need for more industry, fossil fuels, electricity. But this is not for the benefit of the 
people, but for the financial/industrial class and surely to the detriment of the 
environment.  
For the industrial sector, the plan insists on advocating for investments in 
infrastructure, as if the EPE, the company that produces the plan, worked for a massive 
infrastructure holding75. Among the sectors that compose industrial activity in the 
country, special attention in the plan is given to the growth of the extractive industry 
(mining and oil), followed by the industries of ‘electricity, water and gas, processing, and 
civil construction’ (MME and EPE 2015, 27). It is particularly interesting that water 
management is dealt as part of the industrial sector. 
The industry average growth projection is of 2.8% over the next 10 years. This growth will occur 
below the variation of GDP, due to the economic premises on which the Ten-Year Plan is based. 
In general terms, the partial solution of infrastructure bottlenecks in Brazil is admitted, as a 
result of the increase in the investment rate in logistics, as well as the increase in investments 
in the oil and civil construction sector. The external sector will continue favourable to the growth 
of the most competitive export sectors, as it will assume a soft deceleration profile of Chinese 
growth, offset by the gradual recovery of developed economies. The exchange rate, in turn, will 
be more favourable to the domestic producer than what is observed in recent history. 
 
The epistemology of energy planning, that is, the definition of the premises of 
energy planning in Brazil, supports a mainstream approach to growth. But mainstream 
economists have also demonstrated concern with unlimited growth, following the 
Malthusian alarmist fear of population growth. Let us briefly cite three very distinct 
positions in three different moments of the modern capitalist history. The first in 1848, 
when the idea of unlimited growth of wealth was questioned by John Stuart Mill, in his 
Principles of Political Economy76.  
The second example takes place in 1968, when a group of businessmen, 
company’s representatives, industrialists, economists, and civil servants from a number 
of countries – mainly from the Global North, assembled a work group named the Club of 
Rome. ‘They met at the instigation of Dr. Aurelio Peccei, an Italian industrial manager 
and economist’ who, as the wealthy white man’s entitlement and self-esteem allows, 
intended ‘to discuss a subject of staggering scope – the present and future predicament 
of men’77 (Meadows et al. 1972, 9). As the outcome, the Club of Rome published in 1972 
                                                        
75 See section EPE as the Gateway. 
76 “If the Earth must lose that great proportion of its pleasantness which it owes to things that the unlimited 
increase of wealth and population would extirpate from it… I sincerely hope, for the sake of posterity, that 
they will be content to be stationary, long before necessity compels them to it” (Mill 2004, 692). 
77 Emphasis added in italics to highlight the arrogance of a half-dozen millionaires in “informing the future 
of humanity”, like in a super-hero movie.  
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The Limits to Growth, a semi-Malthusian report covering a vast range of issues related to 
the unviability of maintaining the industrial pace and population growth rates. Despite 
very universalistic, deterministic, and technocratic (blaming the exponential growth of 
industry on population pressure78) the report announced limits of infinite growth of the 
economy.  
Finally, the third example takes place in 2008, when the World Bank released the 
report about the ‘limitations to growth’ called Living Beyond Our Means: Natural Assets 
and Human Well-being (World Bank 2008). Typical of WB’s reports, nature is treated as 
an asset at the service of human well-being. They recommend for better use of natural 
resources and imposing of limits on industrial growth. This would be viable through 
things such as market-regulated mechanisms to control pollution; influence individual 
behaviour; environment-friendly technology; and, of course, better managerial skills, as 
well as (international standardized) market policies for better business practices (World 
Bank 2008, 18). In other words, the solution for unending growth is that markets – which 
expect more capital flows to operate – would be advising the operators in the transnational 
capital to encourage less pollution through individual awareness. This is clearly 
ideological. 
 Challenging economic growth without challenging the basic principles of 
capitalism becomes a useless effort. Capital accumulation is diametrically opposite to 
limitations to growth. Despite the gymnastics of numbers, manufactured consents through 
economic studies, and empty predictions, accumulation and limit cannot coexist.  
 
Money is Pregnant79 with Rosemary’s Baby 
A large number of critical scholars have antagonized the advocacy for economic 
growth. Starting from the basic principle that capital accumulation – money generating 
money – happens at the cost of the life of the labourer and all living things80, the 
exhaustion of everything and the need of de-growth must be discussed. 
The fetishized performance of ever-growing capital is incompatible with 
distributive wealth, since growing capital demands having capital. For the labourer (the 
                                                        
78 See chapter 5 for the concept of population pressure. 
79 In the Chapter 24 of the Capital Volume III, Marx explains the fetishized character of capital referring to 
Goethe’s Faust tragedy, Part I, Scene 5, in which Mephistopheles proves he has supernatural powers and 
overwhelming control over people and objects. Marx says “money is now pregnant”, evidencing the 
“magic” character of fetishized capital (Marx 2010, 267; Goethe 1808). 
80 In the ethics of exhaustion, as explained in CH4. 
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person who does not own capital), whose only commodity is the availability of her 
body/time to exchange for wages, there is no time (life) to accumulate capital. The 
production of capital does not return to the labourer: the reproduction of capital is the 
‘pregnancy’ of wealth in the hands of the capitalist, ovum fertilized by donation of the 
worker’s body and time. Even if there is an increase in the labourer’s wages, there is no 
distributive wealth.  This is extensively discussed in Chapter 25 of the Volume I of the 
Capital, The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation (Marx 2015a, 434–38)81: 
The rise of wages therefore is confined within limits that not only leave intact the foundations 
of the capitalistic system, but also secure its reproduction on a progressive scale (emphasis 
added in bold) (Marx 2005a, 438). 
 
 Capital accumulation is a condemnation to growth. The ever-increasing 
economy’s populist justifications are grounded in a fictional demand of the ever-
increasing population. But the problem is not the isolated (ever-increasing) number of 
persons, but the way wealth ‘consumes’, especially about the compulsions of wealth in 
forcing consumerism for its expansion (Latouche 2009, 26–28). As Latouche exemplifies, 
Over-consumption of meat on the part of the rich, which is the source of many health and 
ecological problems, means that 35% of the planet's arable land (in addition to the 30% of Natural 
grazing land above water level [Paquot 2007a: 13]) has to be given over to the production of 
animal fodder. A relative cut in stock breeding and improved treatment of livestock would allow 
us both to feed a larger population better and to cut carbon dioxide emissions (Latouche 2009, 28). 
 
 There is a salient scholarship on the search for fair futures (Sachs and Santarius 
2007), alternatives to the exhaustive character of the global economy. Miriam Lang 
explains the motive to search for alternatives (Lang 2012) which, if we can apply to this 
work, is  grounded in the fact that the ethics of exhaustion can no longer be the ethics of 
                                                        
81 “The law of capitalistic accumulation, metamorphosed by economists into pretended law of Nature, in 
reality merely states that the very nature of accumulation excludes every diminution in the degree of 
exploitation of labour, and every rise in the price of labour, which could seriously imperil the continual 
reproduction, on an ever-enlarging scale, of the capitalistic relation. It cannot be otherwise in a mode of 
production in which the labourer exists to satisfy the needs of self-expansion of existing values, instead of, 
on the contrary, material wealth existing to satisfy the needs of development on the part of the labourer. 
As, in religion, man is governed by the products of his own brain, so in capitalistic production, he is 
governed by the products of his own hand.” (Marx 2015a, 438). In Chapter 24 of the Volume III, 
Externalization of the Relations of Capital in the Form of Interest-Bearing Capital, Marx clarifies: “In 
interest-bearing capital, therefore, this automatic fetish, self-expanding value, money generating money, 
are brought out in their pure state and in this form it no longer bears the birth-marks of its origin. The social 
relation is consummated in the relation of a thing, of money, to itself. Instead of the actual transformation 
of money into capital, we see here only form without content. As in the case of labour-power, the use-value 
of money here is its capacity of creating value – a value greater than it contains. Money as money is 
potentially self-expanding value and is loaned out as such – which is the form of sale for this singular 
commodity. (…) For vulgar political economy, which seeks to represent capital as an independent source 
of value, of value creation, this form is naturally a veritable find, a form in which the source of profit is no 
longer discernible, and in which the result of the capitalist process of production – divorced from the process 
– acquires an independent existence.” (Marx 2010, 272). 
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the future. Eduardo Gudynas presents pathways for the transition towards a non-
extractive model (Gudynas 2011). The Spanish economist Joan Martínez-Alier works on 
the concepts of ecologic economy (Martínez-Alier, Roca and Sánchez 1998), 
environmental justice, and environmentalism of the poor (Martínez-Alier 2014), and 
proposes a ‘socially sustainable’ economic de-growth (Martínez-Alier 2009). Demaria et 
al. explain what is intended by such a transition from the greed economy to a de-growth 
economy: 
Unlike sustainable development, which is a concept based on false consensus, degrowth does not 
aspire to be adopted as a common goal by the United Nations, the OECD or the European 
Commission. The idea of ‘socially sustainable degrowth’, or simply degrowth, was born as a 
proposal for radical change. The contemporary context of neo-liberal capitalism appears as a post-
political condition, meaning a political formation that forecloses the political and prevents the 
politicisation of particular demands. Within this context, degrowth is an attempt to re-politicise 
the debate on the much-needed socio-ecological transformation, affirming dissidence with the 
current world representations and searching for alternative ones. Along these lines, degrowth is a 
critique of the current development hegemony (Demaria et al. 2013, 192). 
 
 Degrowth or décroissance is a discussion introduced in the global North by 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen in the 1980s (Georgescu-Roegen 1992), which has been 
gaining strength among ecological economists in the last ten years. Martínez-Alier 
explains what is meant by degrowth:  
It is easy for the financial system to increase debt (private or public), and to mistake this expansion 
of credit for the creation of real wealth. However, in the industrial system, growth of production 
and growth of consumption imply an increase in the extraction, and eventual destruction, of fossil 
fuels. Energy is dissipated and cannot be recycled. Real wealth would instead be the current flow 
of energy from the sun. Economic accounting is false because it mistakes the depletion of 
resources and the increase of entropy for wealth creation. The obligation to pay debts at compound 
interest could be fulfilled by squeezing the debtors for a while. Other means of paying the debt are 
either inflation (debasement of the value of money), or economic growth, which is falsely 
measured because it is based on undervalued exhaustible resources and unvalued pollution. 
Economic accounting does not properly count environmental damages and the exhaustibility of 
resources (Martínez-Alier 2009, 1100). 
  
 Precisely, policies to rescue the economy via economic growth, especially in the 
Global South, are exhaustive and unstable, aiming at short-term solutions of long-term 
harms. One question that comes up is: how to deal with debt, if the continuous financial 
crises arise alongside the claims of the creation of wealth, especially in the colonized 
world? Notwithstanding those claims, the decolonial argumentation follows this question 
with sharper ones: where did the wealth of the Global North come from? How was it 
historically formed? The transnational financial system, financial capitalism, is the third 
continuous phase of capitalism. Mercantile capitalism and industrial capitalism incubated 
the beast. Capital growth is not abiogenic, it comes from the unpaid original 
accumulation. The stolen resources, the unpaid profit to the labourer, and the mass taking 
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of land from the peoples are the places where financial capital originated from. It came 
from colonization and developed as management. Even so, it would be naïve to claim the 
restitution of such capital to its original owners, since the violence of the ethics of capital 
accumulation cannot be the methodology of rebalancing the global economic system. 
Nevertheless, the mere consideration that applying the same methodology that led the 
wealthy nations to their financial stability to be used against them would be at all possible 
will create a global financial collapse. Let us imagine that if the African nations or the 
indigenous nations would apply the financial methodology of interest to each transaction, 
to each enslaved labourer, to each milligram of gold and silver that underpinned the 
organization of the financial system as it is today, the debt and inequality would not be 
exclusivities of the Global South. But reinforcing the ethics of exhaustion is catastrophic. 
The vindictive reasoning of repealing the evil with the same evil helps nobody. It is, 
though, an argument to discuss the present debt of the poor and the need to cancel this 
ethical reasoning.  
 Reality is very different. Instead of redefining the strategies of global economics 
from below, countries that underwent the experience of colonization operate in the 
ideology of coloniality of power. Repeating colonialities are means to access power. The 
poor were taught that the pie must grow in order to be shared – the economy must grow 
in order to be able to invest in social programmes. It does make sense at first glance, in 
the short term, it is possible that increasing revenue and attracting FDI can increase 
employment and hence some dignity to the poor people. But this only happens until the 
next capitalist crisis since the financial system cannot avoid periodic crises, which 
generates inflation and unemployment (Chomsky 2011). Of course, this will always lead 
to environmental and social catastrophes.  
 Market fluctuations and instability, the vehement social disparities, and 
environmental harm do not suffice as arguments for adopting comprehensive mechanisms 
of sustainable degrowth in rich countries, nor do they present an opportunity for the 
Global South. The effects of such measures in the Brazilian case, under Lula’s 
administration and of his successor, Dilma Rousseff, culminated in the DEEP’s violent 
energy epistemologies. As Martínez-Alier exemplifies, 
Will the economic crisis bring an end to the boom in exports of energy and materials, thus 
diminishing pressures at the commodity frontiers? Grandiose plans for more and more exports 
from Latin America were pushed particularly by President Lula of Brazil. More roads, pipelines, 
harbours and hidrovias, more exports from Latin America of oil, gas, coal, copper, iron ore, 
soybeans, cellulose, biodiesel and ethanol, this was the credo of President Lula. In October 2008, 
and in total opposition to the views of Via Campesina and the MST in Brazil, Lula was still 
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pushing for an opening of world markets to agricultural exports. He went to India to press for the 
liberalization of agricultural imports and exports in the Doha round. True, the export boom gave 
Lula money for social purposes and increased his popularity. Petrobras was no less dangerous to 
the environment and to indigenous peoples of Latin America than Repsol or Oxy. But Lula’s 
obsession with primary exports made him do nothing about deforestation of Amazonia and drove 
environment minister Marina Silva to resign in 2008. What will the strategy of President Lula and 
the Latin American left be after the crash of 2008–09? (Martínez-Alier 2009). 
  
 Indeed, during Lula’s administration there were unprecedented investments in 
social programmes. Fighting the neoliberal agenda, however, was not on Lula’s plan. If 
he could not fight against them, he joined them. At the international level, becoming a 
competitive player threatened creditors, competitors (especially in the United States), and 
business monopolies, mainly in the electricity, oil, and mining businesses (Watts 2013). 
However, to do so, under Lula’s government, Brazil was a strong advocate of free market 
globalization, and for a seat in the WTO (Gray and Gills 2016, 560). On the opposite 
direction of the social movements claiming for land and environmental justice, Brazil 
asked for the continuation of the negotiations at the Doha round, arguing that for more 
liberalization, and that “a world without the WTO or other multilateral institutions would 
only reinforce the North’s capacity to extract concessions from the weaker states in the 
South” (Gray and Gills 2016, 560). By reinforcing the commodity-export 
competitiveness of the Brazilian “strong players”, Brazil disrupted intentions of solidarity 
in the South-South Cooperation in the name of “national interest” (Gudynas 2019, 4). 
Therefore, the creation of Brazilian National Bank for Development (BNDES) to sponsor 
capital-intensive projects and de-linking the dependency from the World Bank 
institutions were bold movements in the global economic geography for a resource 
export-oriented growth. At the same time, alongside with the other BRICS countries, 
Brazil was seeking for shares in the IMF, having become among the 10 largest 
shareholders in the Fund in 201082.  
Backing social policies through the neodevelopmentalist (neoliberal in character) 
approach was a strategy that led to the weakening of the social programs in a short period 
of time. The Brazilian neodevelopmentalism was based on exports, investment and 
consumerism, taking advantage of the commodity price boom after the 2008 crisis, with 
notable increases in both volume and value, enabled by the expansion of the extraction 
of natural resources. As Gudynas explains,  
This has resulted in progressivist extractivism, which has repeated social and environmental 
impacts (particularly on indigenous and peasant communities), but also in a number of spill-over 
                                                        




effects beyond the extractive sectors. These include, among others, the weakening of social and 
environmental regulations in order to attract investment, drastic territorial reshaping as a result of 
oil and mining concessions and expansion of agricultural lands, the curtailment of human and 
environmental rights as extractivism has displayed increased violence, and the narrowing of social 
justice to distributive economic programmes, and particularly economic compensation.  Most 
countries deepened their traditional roles as raw material suppliers and are competing in their 
flexibility to attract foreign investment, resulting in more subordination to global markets and a 
reduction of national industries  (Gudynas 2016, 723). 
 
The governments of Lula and Dilma Rousseff, as well as their contemporary left 
governments in South America and in other emerging economies of the Global South 
(even when inspired by different versions of socialism and Marxism) defended growth, 
development and some very limited forms of valuation (Gudynas 2019, 5). The 
establishment of South-South trade agreements such as the Mercosur, the ALBA 
(Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples) (Muhr 2013) or even the BRICS are questionable 
as to  whether they would differ in any sense (politically, practically or epistemologically) 
from the neoliberal norms of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee and as 
providing assistance as an alternative to the dominant aid paradigm.  
The subimperialist character of the Brazilian “social miracle”83 (Marini 1992) 
reiterate structural problems and opens political vulnerabilities as consequences of the 
“economic dictatorship”. Having the colonial epistemologies for energy planning in 
Brazil as the guidelines for the extractivist economic security, aiming at economic 
growth, do not change the global relationships of dependency (Valencia 2019).  
 How to move towards a degrowth economy? How to start the socioecological 
transition? In the Global South, problems such as unemployment and the need of public 
attention to social policies sound contradictory to the idea of degrowth.  
According to Arturo Escobar, such ‘transition discourses’ as degrowth are 
prominent in the fields of culture, ecology, religion, and spirituality, alternative science 
(e.g., complexity), food and energy, and digital technologies (Escobar 2015, 452). The 
author informs that the sharpest reactions to the exhaustive economy come from ground 
movements in the Global South, and must be radical: 
World-wide, the economic globalized civilization has taken on a tremendous force, seemingly 
relegating critical debates over growth and ‘development’ to the back burner; internationally, these 
debates are domesticated within the discourses of the millennium development goals (MDGs) and 
the post-2015 ‘sustainable development goals’. (…) At least for many social movements and for 
transition advocates, whatever form ‘development’ or alternatives to development take will have 
to involve more radical questionings of growth, extractivism, and even modernity than ever before 
(Escobar 2015, 460–61). 
  
                                                        
83 Brazil was historically considered out of the hunger map in 2014 by FAO (FAO 2014). 
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Energy planning in Brazil must be radically transformed. It is not only a matter of 
transition discourses; it is about the praxis of another ethics. Economic growth cannot be 
the priority of energy planning, nor its euphemisms ‘economic development’ and 
‘sustainable development’. The radical transformations come from places radically 
excluded from interference in mechanisms of power, such as energy planning. The next 
chapter explains some of these radical places and positions. 
 
Conclusion 
By taking up one country it is possible to better highlight the epistemological 
problems in energy planning. Energy planning in Brazil is historically dealt with 
exclusively as an economic matter that disregards the most relevant aspects when dealing 
with energy: persons, the living beings, and ecosystems. The official document that sets 
epistemologies and methodology for energy planning in the country, DEEP, is a 
collection of economist clichés, narrowing the energy issue to market expectations, 
without considering the complexity of the intervention in the territory and in people’s 
bodies for the exploitation of energy inputs.  
This chapter evidenced how Brazil’s geopolitical position influences the 
perspective of energy planning in Brazil. Located at the periphery of the modern–colonial 
world-system, Brazil remains a commodity-export country since colonial times, with 
severe problems of land, resources, and wealth distribution. The peripheral position was 
historically established. The colonial invasion imposed political, economic, legal, and 
educational institutions, annihilating epistemic diversity. The historical relationship 
between Brazil as a nation-state and the management of natural resources is about 
economic advantage and operates through violence. It was evidenced that the formation 
of administrative bodies in Brazil is related to relationships of patronage, economic 
power, exploitation of natural resources for export, the domination over the land, military 
protection, and political control. Energy planning has its primary origins in that moment 
of Brazilian colonial history: the alienation of land from the peoples and the imposition 
of colonial ideologies. The historical and geopolitical analysis are fundamental to the 
understanding of the configuration of the Brazilian energy management in the present 
times. 
The history of energy planning as an autonomous issue is relatively recent. 
Beginning with the creation of the MME in the early 1960s, energy becomes a ‘national 
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concern’ in the context of the military dictatorial regime at the national level and the Cold 
War in the international level. The historical analysis evidences that the international 
economic panorama influencing national politics is a determinant for the understanding 
of energy planning. The energy business is a transnational financial issue. This way, 
international policies and guidelines influence the national planning. The liberalization of 
the economy, the establishment of anti-corruption laws and institutions, the need for 
attracting foreign investment, and the international trade balance are elements that 
compose the epistemology of energy in Brazil as expressed in the DEEP.  
The epistemology of energy planning is defined from the country’s economic 
perspective as a player in the international energy business and in attracting inward 
investments. These elements are the premises for planning energy futures in Brazil. Such 
premises set the goal for energy planning, which is the country’s economic growth. In 
this part, we argue that the current epistemology for energy planning in Brazil imposes 
an agenda of power by preventing epistemic diversity in dealing with the energy issue. 
Preventing epistemic diversity excludes possibilities of energy futures outside of the 
modern–colonial world-system’s framework of power, exhaustivist by principle. The 
ethics of energy planning in Brazil substantiates the use of violent epistemologies, in 
which energy is planned for economic growth regardless and to the detriment of the 
existence of life.  
Energy planning in contemporary Brazil is the outcome of the ethical relationship 
between people and nature in the modern–colonial world-system – the ethics of 
exhaustion. The Brazilian DEEP is a product of long-term violent assumptions and 
practices wrongfully perceived as necessary for the improvement of the country’s 
economy. In a broader perspective, energy planning is part of the 
modern/colonial/patriarchal/capitalist task of dividing and conquering the world, 
smoothened by the idea of progress, civilization, evolution, development, and more 
recently, democracy. The modern–colonial world-system’s ‘necessary evil’ is so 
entrenched in the ways institutions are conceived that it naturalizes violence and 
perpetuates colonialities. This is the reason why challenging epistemologies is so 
necessary, to keep questioning: why do we think that killing the river will create life? It 
is an ethical matter. The ethics of exhaustion must be then challenged.  
The following chapter deals with epistemological possibilities that do not reduce 
energy planning to economic growth. Decolonial epistemologies search for, above all, 
epistemic diversity. The first step towards decolonial epistemologies is overcoming 
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coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being, that is, including perspectives from 
subalternized bodies, territories, communities, and cultures that have been historically 
prevented to interfere in the modern–colonial world-system relationships of power. 
Energy planning is central to solutions to the contemporary ethics of exhaustion, given 
that energy is a fundamental part of the capitalist system. By dealing with energy planning 
from decolonial approaches and methodologies, we apply a complex philosophical and 
epistemological framework to something extremally practical, presenting possibilities 

















Chapter 7: The Decolonial Plan 
 
Decolonial Argumentation for Decolonial Reality  
It is rare to find someone who would disagree that the ideology of colonialism – 
coloniality – permeates the present relationships of power, subjectivities, and institutional 
knowledge. The elaborations of the Decolonial Community of Argumentation 
demonstrate that, arising from the colonial wound, there is a coherent historical linkage 
with the hierarchization of places, living beings, and institutions and with the creation of 
victims. Notwithstanding the formal decolonisation steps that have taken place, the 
colonial world continues to perpetuate colonialities in practice. Intersubjective 
recognitions, subjective conscientiousness, political praxis, institutional arrangements, 
and economic dynamics carry on the ideology of colonialism.  
 It is hence mandatory to decolonize. Evidencing the ideology and the ethics that 
substantiates it are the first steps towards transformation in the real world. The decolonial 
argumentation cannot exist only in academia; it must reframe the social realities as a 
decolonial praxis. Such praxis is the challenge of the Decolonial Community of 
Argumentation at present.  
 Introducing peripheral and subalternized voices to address entrenched 
institutionalized problems like the colonial Brazilian energy planning is not only a 
political problem, it is also an academic task. Setting theoretical grounds enables 
directions and methods towards decolonization. For energy planning, the decolonial 
theoretical framework challenges the ethics of exhaustion in favour of epistemic 
diversity. Doing so is to constantly have in mind the question: what do we want for energy 
futures? How should we be thinking of energy? How can we plan energy futures without 
feeding the capitalist Lernaean Hydra? 
Decolonial praxis must dismantle the powerful pillars of this system of 
oppressions, not only in a metaphorical way. Energy is one of the pillars of the modern–
colonial world-system. This is the reason why, when discussing the possibilities of energy 
futures, we must have a decolonial plan. Energy planning is a very practical thing. 
Moving towards better energy production and use demands a whole new perception of 
what we want for the future. Energy planning must be a strategy to decolonize the 
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systemic creation of victims that is entrenched in the current ways of energy production 
and use.  
Spivak asked if the subaltern can speak. The modern–colonial world-system’s 
ethics of exhaustion prevents the victims from challenging violent epistemologies. In 
order to get the subaltern peoples to speak, they must challenge the violence of the voice 
that speaks on their behalf to their detriment, a voice that silences theirs. Piercing 
institutional epistemologies is the first and probably the major difficulty. The next section 
discusses the challenges of decolonial epistemologies in penetrating institutional spaces 
and then identifies possibilities of planning energy from a decolonial loci of annunciation. 
 
Defeating the Lernaean Hydra 
I felt ashamed to think that I had not known enough to value the wisdom of the people. Because, 
look: I who had not attended university, nor the school had even been able to go, I who was neither 
a teacher, nor a master, nor a lawyer, nor a professor... What had I done in the Tribune? What I 
had spoken was only what I had heard of my people from the cradle, I could say, through my 
parents, my colleagues, the leaders, and I saw that the experience of the people was the best school. 
What I learned from village life was the best teaching. And I cried when thinking: How big is my 
town! (Viezzer 2014, 397)84. 
 
Calling out the lies contained in the economist’s language of energy planning is 
dangerous territory. Those who challenge the manufactured consent face a variety of 
challenges: their arguments are technically/scientifically disqualified, threatened with the 
disappearance of employment possibilities, politically persecuted, and they receive death 
threats. In the intellectual disqualification, coloniality of knowledge, the flagrant evidence 
of poverty, environmental degradation, lack of representation, and wide social disparity 
become invisible and are glazed over by the complex theories of economic flows that 
result in wealth for the rich and employment for the poor (to work for the rich).  
Coloniality of knowledge operates through epistemic violence. Challenging the 
priorities of the macroeconomic energy planning is to challenge such violence. The 
priority of energy planning must be the enabling and guaranteeing of the production and 
reproduction of life. There is no “why?” or “how?” or “whose?” to follow such 
                                                        
84 This fragment is part of the text Si me permiten hablar: testimonio de Domitila, una mujer de las minas 
de Bolivia (If you allow me to speak: testimony of Domitila, a woman from the mines of Bolivia) (Viezzer 
2014) published in the book Tejiendo de otro modo: Feminismo, epistemología y apuestas descoloniales 
en Abya Yala (Weaving differently: Feminism, epistemology and decolonial bets in Abya Yala) (Miñoso, 
Correal, and Muñoz 2014). The text is part of the publication of Moema Viezzer of her conversations with 
Domitila Barrios, entitled: ‘If you allow me to speak...’ Testimony of Domitila. A woman from the Mines of 
Bolivia. This was published for the first time in 1977, and the version reproduced in the book is the 2005 
digital edition of the print edition Siglo XXI Editores S.A.  
 
 186 
affirmation. There is no moral relativism. All life. Defending the big profit is the opposite 
of protecting and generating life. This is a radical priority. It is necessary to stop 
pretending to be resolving mega economic problems with false dichotomies and 
tautological explanations. As Vandana Shiva comments, 
[G]lobalization didn’t take over in a kind of natural organic growth. It’s presented that way you 
know, “we lived in world villages, then we lived in states, and now we live in a beautiful global 
world – it’s all a village”. It’s not (Shiva 2010, 83–84). 
 
The most prominent radical critiques of economic growth (and economic 
perspectives) as strategies for better futures are from feminist indigenous movements. In 
Latin America, indigenous philosophies and ways of perceiving the world are gaining 
communal, political, and academic force, like the discourse of buen vivir in actually 
entering certain political spaces and practices. In October 2009, the Global mobilization 
in Defence of Mother Earth and Peoples took place in Peru, having made the Declaration 
of Mama Quta Titikaka. The declaration was elaborated by “indigenous peoples from the 
Abya Yala, sister nations of Africa, the United States, Canada, the Polar Circle and other 
parts of the world, and observers of various social movements”. The first and second 
resolutions of the Declaration are as follows: 
Proclaim that we are witnessing a profound crisis of the capitalist Western civilization where the 
environmental, energy, cultural, social exclusion, hunger, and other crises are superimposed, as 
an expression of the failure of Eurocentrism and of colonialist modernity born from ethnocide, 
and that now leads to the whole humanity to sacrifice. 
 
Offer an alternative life to the civilization of death, picking up our roots to project us to the future, 
with our principles and practices of balance between men, women, Mother Earth, spiritualities, 
cultures and peoples, which we call Buen Vivir/ Vivir Bien. A diversity of thousands of 
civilizations with more than forty thousand years of history that were invaded and colonized by 
those who, scarcely five centuries later, are leading us to planetary suicide. Defend food 
sovereignty, prioritizing native crops, domestic consumption and community economies. Mandate 
for our organizations to deepen our Good Living strategies and exercise them from our community 
governments (emphasis in the original) (Miñoso, Correal, and Muñoz 2014, 407). 
 
Buen vivir (good living) is the translation into Spanish of the Kichua expression 
sumak kawsay, similar to the Aymara expression suma qamaña (bien vivir – living well) 
and to the Guarani Tekó Porã. The Kichua good-living (buen vivir – bien vivir) “refer to 
a way of life in harmony with nature and other human beings, inspired by the ancestral 
culture of Andean-Amazonian indigenous peoples, which is based on the principles of 
social equity and environmental sustainability. This way of life aims to become an 
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alternative to the development notion of Western civilization” (Cubillo-Guevara and 
Hidalgo-Capitán 2015, 302)85.  
The buen vivier discourse was introduced in the Ecuadorian constitution (the 
Constituición de Montecristi) in 2008 (Vega 2016). The introduction was the result of the 
transference of the concept of buen vivir from the indigenous political realm in 2006 to 
the political articulations of the Alianza País (Pais Alliance or Country Alliance) led by 
Rafael Correa, to launch his presidential candidacy. According to Cubillo-Guevara, the 
Alianza País “agglutinated almost all the critical Ecuadorian social movements with the 
neoliberalism” (Cubillo-Guevara 2016, 128). Correa, who was the president of Ecuador 
                                                        
85 Cubillo-Guevara and Hidalgo-Capitán explain the genuine sumak kawsay as grounded in the works of 
Carlos Viteri Gualinga, the indigenous, kichwa, man from Sayaraku (Ecuador), anthropologist and 
executive secretary of the Amazonian Regional Ecodevelopment Institute (ECORAE, 2009-). “The sumak 
kawsay must occur in a specific territory that constitutes a vital cosmos in which material and spiritual 
elements interact. This territory has three spheres: the orchard (chacra) from which the basic sustenance is 
obtained (yuka and other foods, among them the asua or chicha de yuka); the jungle (sacha) from which 
game meat is obtained as a complement to the diet and other materials; and terrestrial water (yaku) from 
which domestic water and fish are obtained as a complement to the diet (Viteri 2003, 41-52). In order to 
obtain the necessary resources for sumak kawsay from the territory, good management of the soil, the forest 
and the waters is required and this is related to a series of material and spiritual elements that, in the case 
of the Sarayakuruna, are based on the myths of Nunguli or spirit of the garden, of the Kushillu Supai Runa 
or spirits of the jungle and of the Tsumi or spirits of the waters (Viteri 2003, 74-77). In addition, in order to 
obtain the necessary resources for sumak kawsay from the territory, the runa (person-spirit) needs to have 
inner strength (sámai), balanced behavior (sasi), wisdom (yachai), comprehension capacity (ricsima), 
vision of the future (muskui), perseverance (ushai) and compassion (llakina). And all these elements are 
acquired by the runa throughout their lives through a process of community teaching / learning, based on 
myths and experience, and called yachachina (Viteri 2003, 53-65). If the runa possesses all these qualities 
(strength, balance, wisdom, understanding, vision, perseverance and compassion), it will be able to interact 
with the orchard, the jungle and the waters to obtain the essential material resources, and nothing more than 
the essentials, to the sumak kawsay. But the sumak kawsay also has an ethical dimension, which is related 
to a series of values without which the former could not be maintained. These values are: domestic 
harmony, which is concretized in "eating, drinking and making love" (mikuna, upina and huarmita yukuna); 
solidarity or compassion (llakina); the help (yanapana); generosity (kuna); the obligation to receive 
(japina); reciprocity (kunakuna); the council (kamachi); and the listening (uyana) (Viteri 2003, 66-71). 
Thus, sumak kawsay requires that there be a harmony within each household (mikuna, upina and huarmita 
yukuna), because if there is not a good living in each house, there cannot be a good living in the community. 
It also requires solidarity (llakina), which translates into mingas, helping those who do not have, inviting, 
sharing the hunt and dealing in a special way with the elderly and widows; this way, sumak kawsay extends 
to those members of the community who are in need. This solidarity has other related values, such as: aid 
(yanapana), which is materialized in the minga (mandatory community work that benefit the entire 
community); generosity (kuna), which is materialized in the sharing of material objects and gives prestige 
to those who practice it; the obligation to receive (japina), which is the counterpart of generosity, since to 
refuse generosity generates conflicts; and reciprocity (kunakuna), which, unlike generosity, consists in 
giving in the hope of receiving in the indefinite future something in return that links donor and recipient in 
a relationship of exchange that can be deferred over time. Together with these values are advice and 
listening. The councils (kamachi), which are given by respected members of the community, usually the 
elders, have the mission of guiding and correcting the behavior of the other members of the same to reach 
and maintain sumak kawsay. Its counterpart is the listening or following of the councils (uyana), which 
guarantees not only the acquisition of wisdom, but also respect for the social norms that lead to sumak 
kawsay. Taking all this into account, the sumak kawsay is configured as the philosophy of life of the 
indigenous based on the search and maintenance of harmony with the community and with other beings of 
nature and that has both a plan of vital aspiration and another of vital daily life.” (Cubillo-Guevara and 
Hidalgo-Capitán 2015, 318–19). 
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from 2007 to 2017, was of left-wing orientation. As it happened in the left-wing 
governments in Brazil, development and economic growth epistemologically took over 
as the exclusive ways to access social stability.  
According to Cubillo-Guevara, the inclusion of buen vivir in the Ecuadorian 
constitution was pragmatically usurped as an “omnibus concept of post-neoliberal 
development” (Cubillo-Guevara 2016, 130), and emptied of its genuine philosophy. 
Embedded in the developmental agenda of the economic growth of the poor, buen vivir 
was appropriated by false discourses, away from the indigenous understanding of the 
relationship with the territory and the community. Cubillo-Guevara also criticizes the 
academic ecologist movements that, in search of paradigmatic pathways for another 
economic model, detach the genuine intentions of the indigenous understanding of buen 
vivir as the strategy of a post-extractivist model (Cubillo-Guevara 2016, 141). The 
genuine intentions of indigenous ways of living are related to the holistic comprehension 
of life and the balance between production and necessity. Instead of a general “macro” 
model of relationship between peoples, land, knowledge, and communities, we need to 
observe ways of production and resources locally. Academic attempts to impose the 
indigenous modus vivendi over colonialities insist on a Manichean dualistic perception 
that there must be a new paradigm that will overcome the old paradigm, which fails to 
appreciate sufficiently the localized phenomena. 
Decolonizing the structure of colonial institutions like academic and political ones 
is such a difficult demand. Colonialities are means to access power, and, for the 
powerless, accessing power is at least a strategy of survival. This way, when indigenous 
movements, social movements, decolonial academic movements, and political 
organizations outside the hegemonic power have to deal with the entrenched colonialities 
of the system, the trap is formed so that the structures of power remain.  
As it happens with those who dare to challenge the violent epistemologies that 
underpin the oppressive system, piercing institutions with decolonial philosophies and 
ways of living is also a delicate and very dangerous task. Fighting the solid mechanisms 
of power demands sagacity and resistance at all times. Sometimes it demands resilience 
and the capacity for democratic dialogue, which is even more difficult for those being 
collaterally violated. The patriarchal, racist, and classist characters of the institutions of 
power have mechanisms of protection and return to the status quo every time they are 
challenged. Such characters “mainstreamize” or trivialize the agendas and claims of 
popular struggle, and, before one notices, the agendas of the struggle are working in favor 
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of the structures of power all over again. The system pretends to be inclusive of new   
leaderships and agendas, but in fact, they realign relations of power, with the already 
established relations of power, with catastrophic results. Instead of changing the 
oppressive mechanisms, the agendas of popular struggle end up being swallowed by the 
neoliberal agenda effectively co-opting the challenge. 
The trivialization mechanism operates in a manner that prevents the complaint 
that the powerful are silencing popular voices. The implementation of policies of popular 
origin within the neoliberal agenda makes social movements and activists’ claims sound 
like “nothing is ever good or enough for these people”. It works in a pattern. First, popular 
struggle makes every attempt to penetrate the institutional arena to transform ideologies 
and practices. Then, there is the political/legal/institutional fight to make it an institutional 
reality – to be written as a paper, to have institutional commitment and compromise. After 
that, when it sounds legitimate, that is, because the agendas come from social movements 
through their representatives, they operate like a silencing weapon – “there can no longer 
be any complaints” since the movements were “heard”. The operationalization of the 
agendas falls into the old well-known colonial reasoning, making the genuine attempt 
shallow, empty, and meaningless. Instead of promoting actual change, it fortifies the 
oppressive system. Like the Greek myth of the Lernaean Hydra, trying to kill the beast 
without cutting off its “immortal head” with the correct tool will not only not kill it, but 
make it stronger86. “Nor could he effect anything by smashing its heads with his club, for 
as fast as one head was smashed there grew up two” (Apollodorus 2015). 
 Such usurpation and absorption of popular claims happens at local and 
international levels. The idea of “human rights” as a resource that can be used when there 
are violations at the national level unaddressed by the prevalent judicial system is also 
dangerous. As Radha D’Souza points out,  
‘Human’ rights went from standing in opposition to the International Economic Organizations-
supported development model to becoming the vehicle for neoliberal restructuring. These 
developments did not occur in an economic and political vacuum; rather they occurred in the 
context of the economic crises in capitalist countries, the debt crises, the development crises, 
anxieties about the state of the environment in the G7 states and the establishment of the National 
Endowment for Democracy. (D’Souza 2018, 160) 
                                                        
86 Hercules’ second labor was to kill the Lernaean Hydra. “Now the hydra had a huge body, with nine 
heads, eight mortal, but the middle one immortal. So mounting a chariot driven by Iolaus, he came to Lerna, 
and having halted his horses, he discovered the hydra on a hill beside the springs of the Amymone, where 
was its den. By pelting it with fiery shafts he forced it to come out, and in the act of doing so he seized and 
held it fast. But the hydra wound itself about one of his feet and clung to him. Nor could he effect anything 





 Instead of disbelief and despair, the popular struggle must persist. Concomitant to 
the institutional penetration for change, local possibilities of thinking decolonial futures 
must take place through shared experiences in families and communities. The oppression 
and situation of the victims of the modern–colonial world system is a given. The 
possibilities for change exist only through the struggle that must be guided by an ethics 
that aims at abundance, not by the ethics of exhaustion. Radha D’Souza, in the conclusion 
of What’s Wrong With Rights – Social Movements, Law and Liberal Imaginations, 
teaches an important lesson: 
I inherited the Indian constitution and the UN Charter. They were written before I was born. We 
have no choice except to live under the institutional conditions we inherit at birth. Because we are 
forced to live under the institutions we inherit does not mean we must claim them or defend them. 
Quite the opposite. Because there is widespread racism in the academia, I do not stop working for 
a university. I cannot, if I wish to survive. No one sees any inconsistency in my employment in a 
university where there is racism and my claim that non-discrimination laws cannot address the 
problems of institutional racism. I am born into a patriarchal society and must necessarily live 
with family, friends and neighbours. I do not therefore defend patriarchy nor do I advocate 
aborting male children because they might turn into future patriarchs; or claim that patriarchy is a 
thing of the past because my own father raised his daughters to be independent women in thoughts, 
actions and spirit. The conflation of individual life with social institutions is a hallmark of liberal 
thinking. We have inherited rights-based institutions. Do we need to, for that reason, demand 
rights, struggle for them and place our futures in its power of promise, knowing the promises are 
empty for most people most of the time? What did the socialists and the freedom fighters in anti-
colonial movements do? They demanded the real thing – food not right to food – national 
independence not right to independence, peace not right to peace, debt-repudiation not 
forgiveness. (D’Souza 2018, 210) 
 
 It is necessary to occupy the institutions. The popular struggle must take the 
institutional wheel without repeating colonialities. Energy discussions are fundamental to 
the consummation of viable futures. Brazil must overcome institutional colonialities 
through an ethical shift. This can only be done through fair representativeness, with 
indigenous persons, Quilombolas, coloured women, small farmers, favelados87, i.e., the 
majority and most vulnerable population assuming the direction of the institutions. But it 
is not enough to have representatives. It must be decolonial, anti-exhaustivist. The 
institutional plan must be made by the people, for popular benefit. The Decolonial Energy 
Plan must be made within the ethics of abundance. Decolonial epistemologies for energy 
planning in Brazil are useless if narrowed to academic reflections. Challenging colonial 
epistemologies is to challenge the ethics of exhaustion, and that demands an actual 
intentional search for the silenced voices; otherwise, the plan will not change. 
 
                                                        
87 Inhabitants of the favelas and urban peripheries. 
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Towards an Ethics of Abundance 
Prior to the inclusion of decolonial epistemologies for energy planning, there must 
be an ethical change from the global ethical system that exhausts people, ecosystems, and 
the possibilities of knowledge, to an ethics that aims at abundance. This idea comes from 
the search for possibilities to counter the ethics of exhaustion, inspired by indigenous 
ways of living to provide ethical possibilities from outside of the modern–colonial world-
system.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the ethics of exhaustion is founded on the critical-
negative aspect of the Universal Material Principle of Ethics. The material principle of 
ethics is a key part of the content of ethics, focusing on the production and reproduction 
of life. The negative aspect of the material ethics is that the global ethical system we live 
in negates the existence of victims, to whom is denied the possibility to live a full life. 
The life in question is all kinds of life, meaning that enabling the production and 
reproduction of human life demands the preservation and balance of the life of non-
human living beings and the ecosystems. Aiming at abundance demands de-
hierarchization of lives as all lives matter. To move towards an ethical system that aims 
at the production and reproduction of all lives, intra-human relationships also need to be 
de-hierarchized.  
The ethics of exhaustion is the modern–colonial world-system’s ethics. It takes 
place in three macro spheres of human intervention in the planet: exhausting persons, the 
ecosystems, and the possibilities of understanding the world. This ethics is substantive to 
the colonial ideology of power, materialized epistemically in the modern–colonial world-
system’s institutions. Energy planning is one of those institutions.  
To shift from the ethics of exhaustion to an ethics of abundance that will infuse 
substance into decolonial epistemologies for energy planning, there must be a primary 
intention to produce and reproduce life. In this sense, the primary goal for energy planning 
in Brazil cannot be economic growth, but practices that enable the possibility of living a 
full life. The premises of energy planning cannot be macroeconomic scenarios but the 
combat of colonialities and consequent hierarchizations that prevent peoples from living 
full lives. The existence of hierarchies of bodies, territories, and knowledges makes it 
impossible for the majority of people to participate in the mechanisms of energy planning.  
The premise to decolonize – to de-hierarchize – makes the activity of energy 
planning to be concerned with the existence of victims. Therefore, from the standpoint of 
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decolonization, the most victimized must be the priority in planning energy futures. This 
action allows an institutional mechanism to share the victims’ burden of liberation, 
enabling the community of victims to survive while moving towards liberation, instead 
of being exhausted before actual liberation takes place. Changing the premises and goals 
for energy planning – the ethics of it –alters the epistemology of energy planning to 
include decolonial perspectives.  
Actions towards such a change back the community of victims since it involves 
collective action towards liberation. While the theorization of an ethical system that aims 
at abundance takes place in academia, references and practices of abundance take place 
in communal spheres, exemplified by ways of living such as the Guarani Tekó Porã and 
the Kichwa súmak kawsay, to name a few. There are numerous decolonial ways of living 
based on the principle of abundance, of a relationship with the land, the living beings, the 
spirit, and between ancestry, existence, and the future.  Those practices are not part of the 
institutional frameworks because of imposed colonialities. This is the reason why ethics 
is a propaedeutic matter in proposing decolonial epistemologies for energy planning. 
Moving towards an ethics of abundance enables a decolonial energy plan elaborated from 
decolonial epistemologies. 
 
The Decolonial Plan 
The premises of a Decolonial Energy Plan aim at decoloniality of power, 
decoloniality of being (decoloniality of gender and race), and decoloniality of knowledge. 
It is assumed that people and nature should not be exhausted, and that knowledge cannot 
be exhaustive – there must be epistemic diversity. The Decolonial Energy Plan is 
grounded in the critical-negative aspects of material ethics for the recognition of the 
victims. This way, instead of carrying the burden of liberation, the victims are empowered 
with the facilities of instrumentalization, institutionalization, and politicization of 
liberation. This happens in the three concomitant and overlapping spheres of people’s 
power, the power that arises from the discontinuation of colonialities. While 
discontinuing colonialities, there must be endogenous and exogenous institutional forces 
for the replacement of the oppressive ideology through actual participation of the victims 
in the mechanics of institutional power and in energy planning.  
 The central ideology of energy planning in Brazil is coloniality of power, that 
mimicry of colonial power is the means to access power. Buttressed by the ethics of 
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exhaustion, energy planning does not aim at the production and reproduction of all lives. 
The most flagrant feature of such ethics and consequent ideology is the main goal of 
economic growth, operating in macroeconomic reference scenarios that extol the virtues 
of transnational capital and imprisonment of the future of people and nature within the 
volatile walls of financial capital. The Decolonial Energy Plan does not operate on this 
dynamic, since it is founded on ethical parameters that aim at abundance. Therefore, 
having life as a priority and abundance as a goal, mechanisms must be developed to resist 
the violence of the modern–colonial world-system. Decolonial epistemologies allow 
epistemic diversity – that is, the inclusion of meanings that are outside the ostensibly 
legitimate agendas that ensure positions of power. An energy plan founded on the ethics 
of abundance through decolonial epistemologies is legitimized via the material moment 
of ethics: the production and reproduction of life; the formal moment of ethics: the 
intersubjective and institutional recognition of communal practices of abundance; and its 
ethical feasibility: institutional meanings, values, and practices that enable abundance. 
Therefore, decolonial epistemologies will change the premises, methodology, and goals 
of energy planning.  
 Instead of a macroeconomic analysis of investment flows, the methodology for 
energy planning must be geographical from the local to the federal levels. In the local 
spheres, private interests must have less relevance than communal interests, in the sense 
that the communities’ representatives must be more influential than the agribusiness’ 
owners and industrial lobbyists. The public apparatus, that is, the executive political 
organizations at municipal levels, the judiciary, the police, the revenue, the legislative 
have the obligation to enable people’s forums and create cogent mechanisms to ensure 
that their decisions prevail. The concerns related to the viability of generation of energy, 
should prioritize attending to the community, and in case of any surplus of energy, it 
should be exchanged for investments in culture and the reinforcement of local traditions 
and ways of living.  
 In the case of products considered of national importance, such as petroleum and 
minerals, the policies must aim at restitution of historical looting against popular 
sovereignty. In this case, such businesses cannot be in the hands of transnational capital, 
so as to guarantee that international legal mechanisms of protection of investors and 
investments are not prioritized to the detriment of historical restitutions. Every polluting 
activity must be part of a specific case analysis to evaluate the necessity, communal gain, 
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and collective benefit. In the balance of advantages, the community will decide on the 
existence/continuation or not of such activity.  
The question of land must be addressed using the same methodology. The social 
function of property must prevail and the expropriation of land must happen under the 
existent constitutional parameters in Brazil. On top of effecting constitutional measures, 
there must be a mechanism of justice of land, restorative justice for the historical exercise 
of unlimited control over land and resources in the hands of grantees. The expropriation 
of land (which includes productive land, since the Brazilian constitution allows the 
expropriation of land for public necessity and national interest) will happen under the 
existing compensation regimes currently applied only to the land of poor people. The 
compensation mechanism for rich landowners must be less burdensome on the public 
budgetary resources. 
The energy plan cannot be made by a company. Every single person involved in 
the activity of energy planning must be directly involved in the management of the energy 
enterprises. The various levels of the decision-making process must include popular 
consultation and such consultation should override any private interest in the exploitation 
of the land. The communities affected by energy activities must be prioritized in the 
distribution of energy; the entities executing the activities of energy production and 
distribution should not operate in the stocks markets and prioritize the claims of 
shareholders for dividends over the rights of communities. There should be no profits at 
all, communities should produce for their own use – first and foremost for consumption 
and then for sale (exchange) of surplus products to geographically close regions and/or 
supply to regions going through severe necessity.  
The activities of energy planning are continual, demanding local establishments 
to meet, discuss, and understand supply and demand, new prospects, and green 
technologies. All the technical personnel involved in the viability studies, construction of 
energy enterprises, commissioning, and energy production and distribution should have 
managerial positions and report to the communities’ consultation boards. There must be 
a large number of people from the communities among the technical personnel. Such 
personnel cannot be temporary or constantly changing, as usually happens in the 
construction of energy enterprises. As the activities are never ending, there cannot be a 
conclusion to the activity of planning.  
 The studies, researches, technological developments, and all knowledge produced 
around energy must have the final goal of promoting local life, culture, small agriculture, 
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health systems, and education. The priority in the studies must be communal abundance. 
According to each area of study, each community will have a support center for the 
development of viable local green technologies. Studies must be focused on local 
sustainability and never on the commercialization of energy. Everything that is taken 
from the land must be applied to the land. Studies on logistics must guarantee a carbon-
free goal, gradual reduction of fossil-fuel-driven vehicles, and the prioritization of clean 
energies. The study groups must periodically meet with each other to discuss challenges 
to and opportunities for a gradual movement towards the best relationship between 
persons, communities, ecosystems, and natural phenomena.  
 Changing energy planning entails changing the practices that involve energy 
viability studies, construction of energy enterprises, energy generation, transmission, and 
distribution. Moving towards ethical parameters that aim at abundance of energy 
demands epistemological decolonization.  
There must be an academic intention to understand and discuss decolonial 
epistemologies. Decolonizing ways of knowing requires actions to diversify the places of 
annunciation of knowledge. This can only happen through critical thought. This thesis 
brings theoretical frameworks to critique of Eurocentric – modern–colonial – established 
ways of relating theory and socioenvironmental dilemmas. The critique demands action, 
theory demands practical objects. The epistemological critique herein proposed links the 
ethics of exhaustion and the modern–colonial world-system’s ideology of power to the 
activity of energy planning in Brazil. Without challenging the epistemologies that 
legitimate agendas of power, there cannot be institutional diversity; therefore, there 
cannot be institutional change. For energy futures that aim at the production and 






This thesis comprises epistemological critiques from the colonial difference 
approach that propose pathways towards decolonial energy planning in Brazil through 
the unlocking of decolonial epistemologies on the subject. In this way, this thesis is a 
theoretical work to answer the questions: why are the epistemologies for energy planning 
in Brazil colonial? Why is ethics central for the discussion of decolonial epistemologies? 
How is energy planning in Brazil related to an ethical change in the society-nature 
dualism?  
Although energy is one of the pillars of contemporary capitalism, the theme is not 
limited to economic and political discussions; it involves social and environmental 
problematics that must be considered for planning energy futures. Energy planning is an 
activity that takes place in the present to analyze the possibilities of energy studies, 
generation, and distribution in the future. This way, the standpoint of energy planning 
must be social and environmental analysis. However, these issues are intentionally 
detached from the economic and political analysis of energy, dealt with in separate 
branches of knowledge with the social/environmental becoming non-priority in thinking 
about energy futures. This detachment is part of the colonial project supported by the 
ethics of exhaustion that has been perpetuating colonialities since the late fifteenth 
century on a global scale. Energy planning in Brazil is permeated with the intentionality 
of exploiting natural resources regardless and to the detriment of the existence of life, 
evidencing the parameters of ethical exhaustion and the colonial ideology that are realized 
in the epistemologies consistent with the Brazilian Energy Expansion Plans. This work 
establishes a critique of colonial epistemologies by evidencing colonialities: the ethical 
model that confirms and normalizes violent energy planning. The work also identifies the 
core epistemological problems in energy planning in Brazil and elaborates on the 
epistemological possibilities of the colonial difference approach.  
Energy production and distribution fundamentally cause environmental and social 
harm. In the Brazilian energy planning, such harms are not explicitly considered as 
necessary for obtaining energy inputs, but as consequences of obtaining energy inputs. 
Dealing with social and environmental harm as consequences of energy production and 
distribution transfers a structural feature to a further analysis, de-linking the downsides 
of energy activities from its necessary harm. This is a perception of ethics, in which the 
production and reproduction of life is considered to be achieved at the cost of the lives of 
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the victims: the life aimed is that of the fetishized ethical subject. Dealt as consequences 
to be mitigated or solved, social and environmental problems caused by energy 
exploitation are not part of the fundamentals of energy planning. Energy is not defined 
with reference to the environment or the society in energy planning. Energy planning is 
cynical and confined exclusively to economic and political analysis. Therefore, by 
making invisible the victims of energy exploitation, energy planning prevents thinking 
about producing energy without creating victims. By not considering the existence of 
victims as premises for energy planning, the activity accepts victimization, intentionally 
creating more victims. Intentionally narrowing energy planning to economic and political 
matters necessarily creates victims. 
Including social and environmental problematics to the economic and political 
analysis of energy planning is an epistemic challenge, since epistemology is part of the 
formalization of ethics. The epistemic analysis of energy planning must be framed in time 
and space. Historical, social, and geopolitical contexts have to be considered for the 
accurate understanding of the decisions of a given state in projecting energy futures. In 
this thesis, we discussed energy planning in Brazil. The epistemology for energy planning 
in Brazil is formed in the context of the modern–colonial world-system’s ideology of 
power, the coloniality of power. This ideology is implemented through the ethics of 
exhaustion, the global ethical system that accepts the hierarchization of peoples, 
territories, and knowledges for the production and reproduction of the lives of a privileged 
minority at the cost of the lives of the majority of peoples and the ecosystems.  
We evidenced, by verticalizing the theoretical analysis in the 2015–2024 Brazilian 
DEEP, that the epistemologies for energy planning in Brazil are colonial and, therefore, 
violent. For this reason, there must be an epistemic decolonial turn on the subject. The 
decolonial epistemologies for energy planning in Brazil are considered from the 
possibilities of ethical systems that work for the production and reproduction of all lives 
and, instead of aiming at exhaustion, aim at abundance. Enabling the inclusion of 
epistemologies consistent with the idea of ethical systems of abundance, decolonial 
epistemologies must be proposed from the standpoint of the victims of the ethical system, 
whose capacity for living a full life is denied by the constraints of exhausting ways of 
living. Such epistemologies are inspired by indigenous modus vivendi such as the 
Guarani Teko Porã and the Kichwa Súmak Kawsay, grounded in the balanced 
interconnected relationship between persons, communities, the land, and the spirit, that 
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respects ancestral fundamentals that enables life in the present with guarantee of the 
future.  
In Brazilian energy planning, the inclusion of decolonial epistemologies start from 
a shift of priorities for energy exploitation. In the DEEP, the premises are macroeconomic 
parameters, and the goal for energy planning is the country’s economic growth. We 
evidenced the violence of such epistemic determinations and hence the need for 
completely rethinking the epistemologies of energy planning in order to transform energy 
exploitation. The premises of energy planning must be the acknowledgement of the 
creation of victims. The goals for energy planning must be the production and 
reproduction of all life.  
Throughout seven chapters, the thesis explained the theoretical grounds of the 
decolonial critique, the reasons why there must be an epistemic turn, the ethical system 
in which energy planning is currently developed, and the specificities of the Brazilian 
case in the analysis. The first chapter introduced the subject and set the main concepts 
used in the thesis. The second chapter defined coloniality of power and the relevance of 
the terminology as the framework for understanding the current situation of energy 
planning in Brazil. The third chapter discussed epistemology in the context of the 
modern–colonial world-system and the need to bring other ways of knowing from the 
colonial difference perspective. The fourth chapter explained why discussing ethics is 
central to the proposition of decolonial epistemologies since the modern–colonial world-
system’s ethics accepts the creation of victims as necessary for the production and 
reproduction of certain lives, to the detriment of the lives of the majority of people and 
ecosystems – the ethics of exhaustion. The fifth chapter dealt with the academic 
understanding and discussions about energy, establishing a critique of the Eurocentric 
perspectives and the possibilities of exploring natural resources. The sixth chapter 
localized the discussion in the Brazilian case, bringing the country’s geopolitical and 
historical contexts for energy exploitation, as well as the national relationship between 
public administration and natural resources. Building on the understanding of the 
Brazilian case, the DEEP was scrutinized from a decolonial perspective, in which the 
theoretical elaborations were applied to the reality of the Brazilian energy planning, 
linking coloniality, epistemology, and the ethics of exhaustion. Those links were used to 
explain the urgent need to decolonize energy planning in Brazil, by making the ethical 
shift that enables the elaboration of an energy plan applying decolonial epistemologies. 
Finally, the seventh chapter discussed the challenges of including the decolonial critique 
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in the praxis, bringing decolonial epistemologies from the academic realm to ground 
movements in order to replace the institutional structure for the ethical transformation. 
Bringing decolonial epistemologies to the reality of institutions such as energy planning 
remains a daunting challenge but is fundamental to a complete change in one of the solid 
pillars of contemporary capitalism: energy exploitation.  
This thesis presents the links between theoretical aspects – the discussions of 
decolonial epistemologies (the formal moment of ethics) – and the practicality of energy 
planning, as a material institutional framework that gives the directives of energy futures 
in Brazil. These linkages inform the contribution of the theoretical framework in the 
production of novel research about alternative ethics in the discussion of energy planning 
outside the conventional framework of development, exploring other epistemologies, 
departing from the repudiation of economic growth as the aim of energy planning, 
considering the central ethical discussion of the society-nature dualism. The thesis also 
brings novel approach to the analysis of energy planning in Brazil applying a decolonial 
methodology. The use of a decolonial methodology shifts the economic-centered analysis 
of energy planning, focusing the study on the socioenvironmental perspective, de-
hierarchizing the macroeconomic parameters as traditionally observed in energy planning 
studies.  
The limitation of the epistemological critique of energy planning is to pierce 
Brazilian institutions with a discussion of ethics. In this sense, decolonial epistemologies 
for energy planning are academic discussions that must go beyond the theoretical 
framework and take place as decolonial praxis. Hence, this thesis is limited to the 
academic critique of the ethical system that epistemically condones (formalizes) 
colonialities in thinking energy futures. The next steps for the research concern deepening 
the critique of the ethics of exhaustion towards a theory of value in the society-nature 
dualism. Such work comprises the comprehensive inclusion of indigenous ways of living 
and relating to nature such as the Tekó Porã (the Guarani way of living) for the 
overcoming of the epistemologies concerning development, in order to substantiate 
energy planning outside of the paradigm of economic growth, towards an ethics of 
abundance.  
Moving forward to better energy futures comprise the understanding of how 
energy is perceived in the present. In doing so, we realise that the complexity of issues 
that must be discussed demand an ethical change to actually aim at the production and 
reproduction of all lives. The decolonial epistemic turn involves the inclusion of voices 
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and practices that have been historically set aside when deciding energy futures. This is 
an academic work that sets theoretical – philosophical and epistemic grounds – to 
evidence the role of academia in social transformation. The novelty of this work in 
discussing ethics, epistemology, and energy opens up ways to challenge, in practice, the 
pillars of the system of oppressions. Energy is one of these pillars. The only possible way 
of thinking about energy futures is acknowledging that energy is about life, and life is 
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